JUDGMENT M.L. Bhat, J.
1. The petitioner challenges the award dated November 27, 1982 passed by the respondent No. 2, notified on December 11, 1982.
2. It appears that the respondent No. 3, who was appointed as Chaukidar in the petitioner Bank on probation for a period of one year, had raised an industrial dispute that his services were terminated as probationer on September 22, 1979. The reference was made by the U.P. Government to the Labour Court as to whether the order terminating the service of the respondent No. 3 was valid and if not, to what relief he was entitled to. The Labour Court heard the matter and by its award set aside the order of termination of the services of the respondent No. 3. It was submitted by the petitioner in this writ petition that the respondent No. 2 was the Presiding Officer of the Labour Court. He was not qualified to be appointed as the Presiding Officer of the Labour Court as he has not worked for a period of three years as a District Judge or an Addl. District Judge or he has not held the office of the Chairman or any other member of the Labour Court, Appellate Tribunal constituted under the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunals) Act, 1950 or of any Tribunal for a period not less than two years or he has not been a Presiding Officer of a Labour Court constituted under any Provincial State Act for a period of not less than five years or he has not held any judicial office in India for not less than seven years. The respondent No. 2, therefore, had no jurisdiction to decide the dispute. On merits it was submitted that the respondent No. 3 was a purely temporary employee. His services were terminated during the period of probation, which could be done in pursuance of the contract of appointment. The termination of the services of the respondent No. 3 was, therefore, valid and the Labour Court has committed an error by setting aside the same. It is contended that the conduct of respondent No. 3 was found unsatisfactory and on that basis his services were terminated, which could not cast any stigma on the respondent No. 3
3. In the counter-affidavit filed by the respondent No. 3 it is submitted that the respondent No. 2 was qualified to be appointed as the Presiding Officer or the Labour Court. Anything said to the contrary in the writ petition was denied. It is contended that the petitioner had no right to terminate the services of the respondent No. 3 without following the procedure established by law. The procedure under the Industrial Disputes Act was not followed before terminating the services of the respondent No. 3. Therefore, the Labour Court could pass the award, which is valid. The termination of the services of the respondent No. 3 would amount to retrenchment which could be passed only after complying with the procedure laid down in the Industrial Disputes Act.
4. Rejoinder-affidavit also has been filed by the petitioner. The assertions of respondent No. 3 made by him in the counter- affidavit are refuted and it is stated that the termination of service of respondent No. 3 does not suffer from any illegality, therefore, the Labour Court had no jurisdiction to set aside the order.
5. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties. The learned counsel for the petitioner raised only two points. He submitted that the respondent No. 2 was not qualified to be appointed as the Presiding Officer of the Labour Court, therefore, he could not pass the award. The award as such was without jurisdiction. In the second place he submitted that the respondent No. 3 was only a probationer and termination of his services was termination simpliciter, which did not cast any stigma on him. Therefore, it was not necessary to follow the procedure under the Industrial Disputes Act. The termination of the services of the respondent No. 3 was in accordance with the contract of service, therefore, no award could be passed in his favour nor' could a dispute under the Industrial Disputes Act be raised by him.
6. The learned counsel for the workman, respondent No. 3, has drawn my attention to an authority of this Court, reported in Jain Shudh Vanaspati Ltd, v. The Labour Court and Ors. 1983(46) FLR 324 in which the High Court has held that the respondent No. 2 belongs to State level service. His appointment as the Presiding Officer, along with some other persons mentioned in the judgment, is valid in law. Therefore, the question of the respondent No. 2 being disqualified to be appointed as the Presiding Officer of the Labour Court cannot be agitated in this writ petition. The matter has already been concluded by the aforesaid decision of this Court. Nothing has been shown by the learned counsel for the petitioner to rebut this authority. The argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner about the disqualification of the respondent No. 2 to be the Presiding Officer of the Labour Court is, therefore, rejected.
7. The provisions of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act apply to the probationers also. In the case of a probationer also retrenchment compensation is to be paid and a notice or salary in lieu of notice is to paid before the termination order is passed. That has not been done in this case. Therefore, the termination of services of the chawkidar in Zila Sahakari Bank could be challenged under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act.
8. There is no force in this writ petition and the award passed by the Labour Court does not suffer from any infirmity or illegality. The same cannot be set aside on any ground much less on the grounds urged by the petitioner.
9. The result is that the writ petition fails and is hereby dismissed with costs.