JUDGMENT J.C. Gupta, J.
1. This application for transfer of Rent Control Appeal No. 9 of 1997 has been moved under Section 24 of the Code of C ivil Procedure. The said Rent Control Appeal is pending before the District Judge. Almora. The appeal arises out of proceedings initiated by respondent Nos. 2 and 3 against the petitioner under Section 21 (1) (a) of U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972. The release application was allowed by the Prescribed Authority and against that judgment the petitioner has preferred an appeal under Section 22 of the Act.
2. The first question which requires consideration is whether the present transfer application is maintainable under Section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure? It is well-settled law that entire provisions of the C.P.C. have not been made applicable to the proceedings under the Act, either original or appeal or revision. Section 34 of the Act specifically provides that the District Magistrate, the Prescribed Authority or any (appellate or Revising Authority) shall for the purposes of holding any Inquiry or hearing (any appeal or revision) under this Act have the same powers as are vested in the civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure when trying a suit, in respect of the following matters namely.-
(a) summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath ;
(b) receiving evidence on affidavits ;
(c) inspecting a building or its locality, or issuing commission for the examination of witnesses or documents or local investigation :
(d) requiring the discovery and production of documents ;
(e) awarding, subject to any rules made in that behalf, costs or special costs to any parts or requiring security for costs from any party ;
(f) recording a lawful agreement, compromise or satisfaction and making an order in accordance therewith ;
(g) any other matter which may be prescribed.
3. Transfer of a case or of appeal is not Included in the aforesaid Clauses (a) to (g). Rule 22 which has been framed by virtue of the powers conferred under Section 34 (1) (g) of the Act further provides that the aforesaid authorities shall have the same powers as are vested in the civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, when trying a suit, in respect of the following matters, namely :
(a) the power to dismiss an application, appeal or revision for default and to restore it for sufficient cause.
(b) the power to proceed ex parts and to set aside, for sufficient cause, an order passed ex parte ;
(c) the power to award costs and special costs to any successful party against an unsuccessful party ;
(d) the power to allow amendment of an application, memorandum of appeal or revision ;
(e) the power to consolidate two or more cases of eviction by the same landlord against different tenants ;
(j) the power referred to in Sections 151 and 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 1908 to make any order for the ends of justice or to prevent the abuse of the process of the authority concerned.
4. In this rule also, the matter of transfer of a case or of appeal is not mentioned in clauses (a) to (f).
5. It is, thus, clear from the above provisions that Section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which deals with the transfer of cases, has not been made applicable to the proceedings before the Prescribed Authority or appellate or revisional authority under the Rent Control Act.
6. Learned counsel for the applicant placed reliance on the decision rendered by Hon'ble D. C. Srivastava, J.. In the case of Or. Ved Bhushan v. Dr. Jinendra Kumar Jain and others, 1996 (II) ARC 370, wherein the Hon'ble Judge took the view that Section 10 (1) of the Act is applicable only to the appeals filed against an order passed under Sections 8, 9 and 9A of the Act and not to an appeal filed under Section 22 of the Act. With greatest respect to the Hon'ble Judge. I may, however, state that the said view is not in consonance with the provisions of Section 22 of the Act, as it is provided therein that any person aggrieved by an order made under Section 21 or Section 24 may within 10 days from the date of the order, prefer an appeal before the District Judge, and in other respects, the provisions of Section 10 shall mutatis mutandis apply in relation to such appeal. A plain reading of Section 22. therefore, leaves no room of doubt that the provisions of Section 10 also apply to appeals filed under Section 22 of the Act against an order made by the Prescribed Authority under Section 21 of the Act, meaning thereby that the District Judge may either hear the appeal himself or transfer it to any other Additional District Judge and it is also invested with the power to recall the same from any such officer.
7. In the aforesaid decision of Dr. Ved Bhushan. (supra), the learned Judge further went on to observe that Section 24(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure inter alia provides that the High Court or the District Court may at any stage transfer any suit, appeal or other proceedings pending in any Court subordinate to it for trial or disposal to any other Court competent to try or dispose of the same . As already indicated above, the scheme of U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972 is such that the entire provisions of C.P.C. have not been made applicable to the proceedings under the Act and only specified provisions have been made applicable, which do not include Section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Thus, power under Section 24. C.P.C. cannot be exercised in relation to any proceeding of the Court of first instance or of appeal or revision under the Rent Control Act. Apart from this, the use of the word 'Court' in Section 24 refers only to a civil court which is subordinate to the High Court or the District Court, as the case may be. In the decisions of Smt. Surjit Kaur v. IVth Additional District Judge, Bulandshahr and others, 1983 ARC 202, as well as in Smt. Shakuntala Devi v. IVth Additional District Judge, Meerut and others, 1981 ARC 262. It has been held that the Prescribed Authority appointed under the Act is not a Court of civil jurisdiction but he acts only a persona designata. In my view, similarly the authority hearing appeals under Section 22 of the Act cannot be termed as a 'civil court' as defined under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure.
8. Section 141 of the Civil Procedure Code provides that the procedure contained in the Code in regard to suit shall be followed so far as it can be made applicable in all proceedings in any court of civil jurisdiction. Since the Prescribed Authority is also not a court of civil Jurisdiction, even by virtue of the provisions of Section 141, C.P.C. provisions of the Code cannot be made applicable in the proceedings pending before the Prescribed Authority. In the aforesaid decisions, a question arose whether a revision under Section 115, C.P.C. was maintainable against an order passed by the Prescribed Authority during the pendency of the proceedings before him and it was held that Section 115. C.P.C. could not be pressed into service as the same has not been made applicable to the proceedings under the Act either by Section 34(1) or by means of Rule 22.
9. The Apex Court in the case of Virendra Kumar Satyawadi v. State of Punjab, AIR 1956 SC 153, expressed the view that while a Court is invested with the entire judicial powers of the State, a tribunal is vested with only a part of them. A tribunal does not possess all the attributes of a Court. A tribunal is, thus, not a Court in the sense that entire inherent judicial powers and functions of the State are not vested in it.
10. Under the provisions of Section 22 of the Rent Control Act, the District Judge has been empowered to hear the appeals but at the same time, to such appeals also, entire provisions of C.P.C. have not been made applicable. Only those provisions of C.P.C. as have been specified either in Section 34(1) or in Rule 22, have been made applicable. The District Judge under the scheme of the Act only acts as an appellate-authority and not as a civil court or a court of civil jurisdiction within the meaning of the Code of Civil Procedure. The word 'appeal' used in Section 24. C.P.C. refers only to appeals pending in any Court of civil jurisdiction which is subordinate to the High Court or the District Court, as the case may be and, in my opinion, this word would not relate to an appeal filed under Section 22 of the Rent Control Act. With great respect. I may submit that perhaps the above provisions were not brought to the knowledge of Hon'ble Judge who decided the case of Or. Ved Bhushan. For the foregoing reasons. I hold that the present application for transfer of Rent Control Appeal filed under Section 22 of the Rent Control Act is not to be entertained as being legally non maintainable under Section 24 of the Civil Procedure Code. If so advised, the petitioner may invoke the writ Jurisdiction of this Court for the relief claimed in this application.