JUDGMENT Umeshwar Pandey, J.
1. This Second Appeal arises out of the judgment and decree dated 8.8.1977 passed by the District Judge, Ghazipur.
2. The brief facts giving rise to this appeal are that the appellant-plaintiffs suit was for permanent injunction to restrain the respondent-defendant from recovering the certain sums of money under an award duly decided and confirmed by the Arbitrator under Section 71 of U.P. Co-Operative Societies Act, 1965 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act'). According to the plaint case, the entire amount due against him in the award was paid by him to the Co-operative Amin. As such, he had no liability of any such further payment. The defendant Co-operative Society contested the suit and filed the written statement. It was pleaded that the suit was barred under Sections 102 and 111 of the Act. The learned trial Court framed an issue on this point and gave its finding in affirmative holding that the suit was barred under Sections 102 and 111 of the Act. On appeal the Lower Appellate Court concurred with the findings recorded in regard to the bar of the suit and finding no merit in the appeal dismissed it by the impugned judgment dated 8.8.1977.
3. Aggrieved with the aforesaid judgment of the 1st Appellate Court, the plaintiff-appellant has approached this Court in the present Second Appeal.
4. I have heard Sri Sankatha Rai, learned Counsel for the appellant and Sri S.K. Verma, learned Counsel for the respondents. The substantial question of law arising in this appeal is as below :
"Whether the suit is barred under Sections 102/111 of the UP. Co-operative Societies Act, 1965 and also under Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure."
5. It is contended by the learned Counsel for the appellant that in his suit for the grant of permanent injunction under the Specific Relief Act, the bar of Sections 102 and 111 of the Act will not operate because the nature of the dispute neither requires a reference to be made to the Registrar under Section 70 of the Act nor does it amount to a dispute relating to the award given and duly satisfied by making full payment by the plaintiff to the recovery Amin.
6. In reply to the aforesaid submission made on behalf of the appellant learned Counsel for the respondent Co-operative Society states that the bar envisaged under Sections 102 and 111 of the Act will definitely operate in the present case, as the dispute raised for decision in the present suit would be covered by clause (d) of Section 111 of the Act. He has also submitted that the remedy for all the grievances, as demonstrated by the plaintiff-appellant in his pleadings, is available within the framework of the provisions of the Act and as such, the relief from the Civil Court as has been claimed would also be impliedly barred. The learned Counsel has cited the case law of The Premier Automobiles Ltd. v. Kamlekar Shantaram Wadke of Bombay and others, (1976) 1 SCC 496 and Rajasthcm State Road Transport Corporation and Anr. v. Krisna Kant and others, (1995) 5 SCC 75.
7. In the present case, it is admitted that undisputedly there was a 'dispute' within the meaning of clause (a) of sub-section (2) of Section 70 of the Act, which was referred for arbitration under Section 71 and an award was made for recover)' of an amount under the said provision. The said award is not disputed. The appellant-plaintiff claims that the award, which is executable within the provisions of Section 92 of the Act was satisfied before it was put in execution and the award money was paid and a payment receipt was obtained from the Amin. Any fresh proceeding to further realize the same amount already recovered is being resisted by means of the aforesaid civil suit and it cannot be legally reacted as barred under the provisions of Sections 102 and 111 of the Act or Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short C.P.C.). The learned Counsel for the appellant has stressed that this suit is not by way of a challenge against the award itself and therefore, the bar of the suits as envisaged under Sections 102 and 111 of the Act or implied bar under Section 9, CPC, could not operate against such suit.
8. With the aforesaid facts situation, the matter which stands crystallized is actually the question of execution of a valid award, Section 92 of the Act provides the mode of execution of an award which is as below "Execution of certain orders and awards.-Every award made under Section 71, and capable of execution in the manner provided below and every order so capable of execution made by the Registrar under Section 67 or sub-section (2) of Section 68 or under Section 91, or bv the liquidator under Section 74 or by an Appellate Authority on appeal under Sections 97 or 98 or on review under Section 99 or as an interlocutory order under Section 100 (or a certificate for recovery issued under Section 95-A) shall, if not carried out, be executed.
(a) in the manner provided by law for the time being in force for the recovery of arrears of land revenue :
Provided that an application for the recovery of any such sum is made to the Collector and accompanied by a certificate signed by the Registrar or any person authorised by him in this behalf:
Provided further that such application is made within 12 years from the date fixed for payment in the order or award and if no such date is fixed, from the date of the order or award, as the case may be; or
(b) by the Registrar or any other person subordinate to him and empowered by him in this behalf, by attachment and sale or sale without attachment of any property of the person or the co-operative society against whom the order or award has been made; or
(c) by the Civil Court having jurisdiction over the matter as if the order or award were the decree of that Court."
9. As the aforesaid provision goes every award made in connection with a dispute for claim of money under Section 71 is executable in three modes i.e. :
(a) either it is to be executed in the manner provided by law for the recovery of arrears of land revenue; or
(b) by the Registrar of the Co-operative Society by attachment and sale of the property and the person against whom the award has been made; or
(c) by the Civil Court having jurisdiction over the matter treating the award as decree of that Court.
10. If an award is being executed in the manner referred to in clause (a) of Section 92, the objection of the person claiming the satisfaction of the award by making earlier payment has to be decided by the authority concerned under the provisions of U.P. Z.A. & L.R. Act/Rules and the law in that respect is complete in the said statute itself. If the recovery in pursuance to the award is being done under clause (b) by the Registrar of the Co-operative Society, the rules in that respect are also complete in itself in Chapter XXII of U.P. Co-operative Societies Rules, 1968. These Rules are 312 to 354. Rule 314 specifically says that in case the amount due under award is not paid before then only the attachment etc. of the property belonging to the judgment debtor shall be issued. It is quite obvious that if plaintiffs take such an objection about the satisfaction of the award made against him before the authorities concerned under the aforesaid Rules that will be decided by that authority only. The third mode for execution of award is obviously governed by the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure wherein specific provisions have been envisaged under Section 47 as well as under Order XXI, Rule 58 of the CPC and such objections can be validly decided by the Executing Court. Therefore, in such a position where the provisions for execution of award are so obvious that they provide full and complete opportunity to judgment-debtor for making his objections about the satisfaction of the award before the Competent Authority/Court, it is quite crystal that such objections could not be converted into a cause of action for a separate civil suit.
11. In the aforesaid case of the Premier Automobiles Ltd (supra), the Apex Court has dealt with such a situation only where there was a disputed question that whether a matter arising within the Industrial Dispute Act, can be taken cognizance of under Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure in an injunction suit by the Civil Court. The Supreme Court has propounded in very clear terms that for the purpose of enforcement of certain rights or liability created under a special statute/enactment, a civil suit will not lie if the provisions of such enforcement of rights or liability are envisaged under the provisions of that special enactment. In para 9 of the judgment, the Supreme Court held as below :
"So the Civil Court will have no jurisdiction to try and adjudicate upon an industrial dispute if it concerned enforcement of certain right or liability created only under the Act. In that event Civil Court will have no jurisdiction even to grant a decree of injunction to prevent the threatened injury on account of the alleged breach of contract if the contract is one which is recognised by and enforceable under the Act alone."
12. Thus, it becomes obvious that if the rights which are sought to be enforced in a civil suit are the rights created under a special statute then the remedy for its enforcement as envisaged under that Act/Rules will alone be available to the party seeking the enforcement of those rights. In the present case, the Co-operative Society-defendant was enforcing the award given in its favour against. its individual member (plaintiff-appellant), hence any objection in regard thereto taken by the judgment-debtor against the said recovery', can be raked up before the Authority/Court concerned only under the specific provisions of either U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act/Rules or Chapter XXII of the U.P. Co-operative Societies Rules, 1968 or Code of Civil Procedure as the case may be. The provisions of the aforesaid statutes are complete code in itself and a suit having its cause of action based on those objections seeking relief of permanent injunction has to be treated as impliedly barred under Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
13. Even if it is claimed that the bar as envisaged under Sections 102 and 111 of the Act, may not apply with full force to the present injunction suit of the appellant-plaintiff yet it will be impliedly barred as contemplated under Section 9 of CPC. In fact, the nature of cause of action for the suit is not in exact form of an objection against the award itself as the legality of award is admitted to the plaintiff but if the Registrar of the Co-operative Societies or any other person subordinate to him empowered by him in this behalf passes an order for execution of the award, the bar of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court as envisaged under Section 111 of the Act would also come into play. The findings thus, recorded in the aforesaid context by the trial Court as well as the 1st Appellate Court about the bar of the suit by one or the other provisions of the Act thus, also do not require to be disturbed in this Second Appeal, as in the obvious terms the appellant's suit for relief of permanent injunction is expressly barred under Section 111 of the Act and impliedly barred under Section 9 of the CPC.
14. In the aforesaid view of the matter, the present appeal of the plaintiff appears to be wholly without merits and is, therefore, dismissed with costs.