The unsuccessful plaintiff is the appellant herein. O.S.No.3544 of 1998 on the file of the Additional District and Sessions Judge (Fast Track Court-IV), Chennai was filed by the appellant herein for : 1) a declaration that the appellant/plaintiff was entitled to half share in the suit 'A' schedule property, 2) a decree for partition directing the division of suit 'A' schedule property into two shares and allotting one such share to the appellant/plaintiff and also for putting him in possess of the share to be allotted to him and 3) for cost of the suit.
2. The first respondent/first defendant (since deceased) is the sister of the appellant herein/ plaintiff. The second respondent/second defendant is the son of the first respondent/first defendant. The suit claim was made by the appellant based on his contention that suit 'A' schedule property was purchased under a document registered as document No.257/1965 in the Office of the Sub-Registrar, Triplicane, Chennai by Mrs.M.K.Mohanambal, the mother of the appellant and the first respondent; that the said Mohanambal was in possession and enjoyment of the suit 'A' schedule property till her death on 04.10.1989; that her husband W.S.Sivabushanam (father of the appellant and the first respondent) pre-deceased Mohanambal and that after the death of Mohanambal the appellant and the first respondent became entitled to equal moieties as her legal heirs. The appellant/plaintiff contended further that the appellant was occupying the first floor whereas the first defendant was occupying the ground floor; that a tiled structure on the rear side of the main building, a Bombay terraced second floor and a shop portion in the front portion of the main building in the ground floor had been let out to the tenants and that though the defendants had been collecting the rent from the tenants, they failed to give the share of the appellant/plaintiff in the rental income. It was also his contention made in the plaint that due to hardships and deprivation caused by the respondents/defendants and their family members which led to frequent family quarrels between the two families, he was constrained to file the suit for declaration, partition and other reliefs.
3. The deceased first respondent/first defendant did not file any separate written statement. On the other hand, she adopted the written statement of her son, namely the second respondent/second defendant. It was admitted in the written statement by the first and second respondents/defendants that the suit property was a self-acquired one of Mrs.M.K.Mohanambal (the mother of the plaintiff and the first defendant) and that she died intestate on 04.10.1989. But the plaint allegation that the husband of Mohanambal predeceased her was disputed and it was contended that the husband of Mohanambal died on 27.12.1990. However, it was admitted that the deceased first respondent and the appellant/plaintiff became entitled to equal moieties in the suit 'A' schedule property. It was contended by them that the half share of first respondent/first defendant was settled by way of a registered settlement deed dated 13.01.1997 in favour of the second respondent/second defendant. However, it was contended further in the written statement that the plaintiff, who was one of the directors of Lifeguard Medical Diagnostic Centre Private Ltd., wanted a Power of Attorney from the respondent 1 and 2/defendant 1 and 2 in respect of the properties inherited by them from W.S.Sivabushanam (the father of the appellant and the first respondent) in favour of K.L.Jayakumar, Chairman cum Managing Director of the said company so as to enable him to give the said properties as security for raising loan for the business of Lifeguard Medical Diagnostic Centre Private Ltd.; that the respondents gave such deeds of Power of Attorney in favour of one K.L.Jayakumar, son of K.Loganathan, who is the director of the company; that the respondent 1 and 2/defendant 1 and 2 did so in consideration of the appellant's relinquishment of his right to half share in the suit property and that after such relinquishment, the appellant/plaintiff became a permissive occupant of the first floor in the suit property. It was also contended by the defendants in the written statement that such a relinquishment was oral; that having relinquished the share, the appellant/plaintiff was estopped from making any claim in respect of the suit property and that hence the suit for declaration, partition and other reliefs should be dismissed.
4. It was also contended by the defendants in the written statement that the properties of W.S.Sivabushanam, the father of the plaintiff and the first respondent, would devolve upon all his legal heirs on his demise as per the settlement dated 15.02.1942 and that hence the sons and daughters of the appellant/plaintiff as well as the children of the first respondent/first defendant were entitled to a share in the properties of W.S.Sivabushanam as co-owners and that since they were not made parties to the suit, the suit should be dismissed for non-joinder of necessary parties. It was also contended therein that the properties of late W.S.Sivabushanam were not made the subject matter of the suit and hence the suit was liable to be dismissed on the ground that the prayer made therein was for partial partition.
5. Based on the above said pleadings, the trial court framed five issues which are as follows:-
1. Whether the plaintiff has released his half share in favour of the first defendant?
2. Whether this suit is bad for non-inclusion of the other properties of the parties?
3. Whether the suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties?
4. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for 1/2 share by way of partition in the suit property?
5. To what relief is the plaintiff entitled?
6. The appellant/plaintiff figured as the sole witness (P.W.1) on his side and produced Ex.A1 in order to substantiate his case. The second defendant figured as the sole witness (D.W.1) and Ex.B1 to Ex.B14 were marked on the side of the defendants. After both side evidence were closed, the learned trial judge heard the arguments advanced on either side, considered the evidence in the light of such arguments and upon such consideration, accepted the case of the defendants regarding oral relinquishment of the appellant's/plaintiff's half share in the suit property. The learned trial judge also held that the non-inclusion of properties of W.S.Sivabushanam (father of the appellant and the first respondent) was also fatal to the plaintiff's case. Accordingly, in tune with the said findings, the learned trial judge came to the conclusion that the appellant/plaintiff was not entitled to the relief sought for and dismissed the suit by the impugned judgment and decree dated 28.04.2005.
7. Aggrieved by and challenging the said judgment and decree of the trial court dated 28.04.2005, the appellant/plaintiff has brought-forth this appeal on various grounds set out in the Memorandum of Appeal.
8. During the pendency of the appeal, the first respondent/first defendant died and thereafter respondents 3 to 5 were impleaded in their capacity as LRs of the deceased first respondent besides the second respondent, who was already on record in yet another capacity.
9. The points that arise for consideration in this appeal are:-
i)Whether it is true that the appellant/plaintiff orally relinquished his half share in the suit property in favour of the first respondent/first defendant?
iii)Whether the suit is bad for partial partition?
v)Whether the suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties?
vii)Whether the appellant/plaintiff is entitled to a declaration that he is entitled to a common half share in the suit property?
ix)Whether the appellant/plaintiff is entitled to a decree for partition as prayed for in the plaint?
xi)Whether the appellant/plaintiff is entitled to mesne profit?
xiii)To what other relief the appellant/plaintiff is entitled?
10. This court heard the arguments advanced by Mr.A.Muthukumar, learned counsel for the appellant, by Mr.T.Viswanatha Rao, learned counsel for the second respondent, by Mr.M.Jayasankar, the third respondent who appeared as party in person, by Mr.K.Sukumaran, learned counsel for the fourth respondent and by Mr.M.Kumarasamy, learned counsel for the fifth respondent were heard. The materials available on record were also perused.
11. The learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff advanced arguments contending that the judgment of the trial court was a classic example of non-application of mind showing perversity in the finding; that the court below having framed five issues failed to decide all the issues assigning reasons for the decision; that the court below misdirected itself in accepting the interested testimony of D.W.1 (second defendant) regarding the alleged oral family arrangement in which the appellant/plaintiff relinquished his half share in the suit properties; that the court below failed to consider the fact that the person competent to speak about the alleged relinquishment, though alive, did not enter the witness box and that adverse inference should have been drawn based on the failure on the part of the first respondent/first defendant (since deceased) to depose in support of the defendants' claim of relinquishment. The learned counsel for the appellant contended further that the court below failed to properly appreciate the fact that the first defendant in whose favour the alleged relinquishment was made by the plaintiff, did not file a separate written statement and on the other hand, she had simply adopted the written statement filed by the second respondent/second defendant. The learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff also contended that the trial court committed an error in arriving at a conclusion that the suit is bad for partial partition, as the properties of W.S.Sivabushanam (father of the plaintiff and the first defendant) were not included in the plaint schedule when the cause of action for seeking partition of the said properties and the cause of action relating to the properties of the mother were different and disjunct and that the perversity of the finding was writ large as the learned trial judge had not chosen to give specific finding regarding the issues, especially issue No.3.
12. The third respondent, who appeared as a party-in-person and the learned counsel for the respondents 4 and 5 were fair enough to concede that the plea of oral relinquishment and partial partition could not be sustained and that hence the appellant/plaintiff would be entitled to a declaration and a preliminary decree for partition as prayed for in the plaint. However, the learned counsel for the second respondent would contend that though the plea of non-joinder of necessary parties have not been substantiated, the finding of the trial court sustaining the plea of oral relinquishment and the plea of partial partition are well founded and hence they do not deserve any interference.
13. Admittedly, the suit properties were the self-acquired properties of M.K.Mohanambal (mother of the appellant and the deceased first respondent). It is also not in dispute that the said Mohanambal died intestate leaving behind her the appellant/plaintiff and the first respondent/first defendant (since deceased) as her legal heirs. However, the plaint averment that the husband of Mohanambal predeceased her, has been disputed. According to the defendants, W.S.Sivabushanam, the husband of Mohanambal died subsequently on 27.12.1990, namely subsequent to the death of Mohanambal. The same was admitted by P.W.1 in his evidence. However, it is admitted that on the death of Mohanambal, the appellant/plaintiff, first respondent/first defendant and their father W.S.Sivabushanam became entitled to the suit properties and on the death of W.S.Sivabushanam, the appellant/plaintiff and the first respondent/first defendant alone became entitled to the suit properties, each one having half share in it. However, the suit for partition has been resisted on the ground that the appellant/plaintiff orally relinquished his right to share in the suit property. It is the further contention of the respondents that such relinquishment in respect of the suit properties was made by the appellant/plaintiff since the respondents 1 and 2/defendants 1 and 2 relinquished their shares in the properties of W.S.Sivabushanam (father of the appellant/plaintiff and first respondent/first defendant).
14. Before ever considering the question of alleged relinquishment, the plea of partial partition raised by the defendants in the suit should be considered. Admittedly, W.S.Sivabushanam (father of the plaintiff and the first defendant) subsequent to the death of his wife M.K.Mohanambal and hence the succession to the properties of Mohanambal opened prior to the death of Sivabushanam. It was not the case of the defendants in the suit that the suit properties and the properties left by W.S.Sivabushanam were the joint family properties and that the suit was filed for division of joint family properties. Admittedly, the property was the absolute property of Mohanambal and it devolved upon the plaintiff, the first defendant and their father on her death. Therefore, the cause of action for seeking division of the properties of M.K.Mohanambal on her death among her legal heirs is different from the cause of action for claiming of the division of properties left by W.S.Sivabushanam among his legal heirs. However, since it has been admitted by P.W.1 that W.S.Sivabushanam (father of the appellant/plaintiff and the first respondent/first defendant) died subsequent to the death of Mohanambal and prior to the filing of the suit and the suit has been filed by the plaintiff staking claim to 1/2 share, the suit can be construed as one for the division of not only the share of the plaintiff as a legal heir of his mother, but also his share in the 1/3 share of his father. But the mere fact that the subsequent changes in the share of the parties due to the death of one of the legal heirs of Mohanambal will not change the character of the suit as a suit for partition of the estate of Mohanambal. In addition to that, as per the averments found in the written statement, the properties that came into the hands of the appellant/plaintiff and the first respondent/first defendant after the death of Sivabushanam was not inherited by them by the rule of succession provided in the Hindu Succession Act. On the other hand, the property came to them by virtue of the deed of settlement made by the father of W.S.Sivabushanam, marked as Ex.B1. Under the said document, only a life interest was given to W.S.Sivabushanam and the vested remainder was given to the sons and daughters of W.S.Sivabushanam and the children of the deceased son or daughter of W.S.Sivabushanam. Therefore, it is abundandly clear that the cause of action for claiming partition in respect of thesuit property and the other properties cited by the defendants in their written statement are not one and the same, but are different. Therefore, the contention of the defendants in the suit that the suit should have been filed for the properties left by W.S.Sivabushanam also deserves to be rejected as untenable. Point No.ii is answered accordingly.
15. The defendants in the suit had also contested the suit based on their plea that the suit was not maintainable, as necessary parties were not impleaded. According to them, the other sons and daughters of first respondent/first defendant, who have now been impleaded as respondents 3 to 5 in the appeal as the LRs of the deceased first respondent and the sons and daughters of the appellant/plaintiff should have been impleaded in the suit as necessary parties, as all of them had a right to claim a share in the properties left by W.S.Sivabushanam. It was their contention that the said properties originally belonged to W.S.Seshachala Gramani, paternal grandfather of the appellant and the first respondent, who executed a settlement deed marked as Ex.B1 under which a life interest alone was given to W.S.Sivabushanam (father of the appellant and the first respondent) and the vested remainder was directed to be devolved upon the then existing legal heirs of W.S.Sivabushanam. There is an admission in the written statement that W.S.Sivabushanam died on 27.12.1990 and he had only a son and daughter who were none other than the appellant and the first respondent. However, the defendants had also contended in the written statement that the sons and daughters of the appellant and the first defendant were entitled to a share even during the life time of the appellant and the first defendant and hence they had pleaded that the suit was bad for non-joinder of necessary parties, as the children of the appellant and the sons and daughters of the first respondent, namely respondents 3 to 5 in the appeal were not made parties to the suit. A reading of the contents of Ex.B1-Will make it clear that the said contention of the defendants in the suit could not be countenanced. The document clearly says that the Settlee therein, namely W.S.Sivabushanam would have a life interest and after his death his legal heirs shall absolutely take the property in stripes. The document has made it clear that all the sons and daughters of W.S.Sivabushanam would be entitled to equal share in the properties covered by Ex.B1. Provision has been made in the deed to the effect that in case any son or daughter would have predeceased W.S.Sivabushanam, the issues of such predeceased son or daughter would be entitled to the share of such predeceased son or daughter, as the case may be. The relevant portion is extracted hereunder.
" NOW THIS DEED OF SETTLEMENT WITNESSETH that the SETTLOR hereby gives and grants to and unto and settles upon the SETTLEE from after the life time of the SETTLOR a life interest in the immovable properties mentioned and described in the Schedule hereunder written, TO HAVE AND TO HOLD the same for and during the life time of the SETTLEE after the life time of the SETTLOR:
AND THIS DEED FURTHER WITNESSETH that after the life time of the SETTLEE the said properties mentioned and described in the Schedule hereunder written shall pass absolutely to all the issue of the SETTLEE, the expression 'ISSUE' including therein not only all the sons and daughters of the SETTLEE alive at the time of the death of the SETTLEE but also in the event of any of the sons or daughters of the SETTLEE having predeceased the SETTLEE leaving the issue surviving him or her, then including also such surviving issue of the deceased issue of the SETTLEE taking his or her place, that is to say in other words, the said immovable properties described in the Schedule hereunder written shall be taken and enjoyed by the said issue of the SETTLEE after his death equally so that a share will also be allotted to the issue of any predeceased issue of the SETTLEE, such issue of the predeceased issue taking as a class the share which such predeceased issue would have taken if alive at the time of the death of the SETTLOR:"
16. A reading of the same will make it clear that after the life time of W.S.Sivabushanam, the property had to vest absolutely with the issues of W.S.Sivabushanam and issues of the predeceased son or daughter of W.S.Sivabushanam absolutely. Admittedly, the appellant and the first respondent were the only issues (sons and daughters) of W.S.Sivabushanam. There was no other son or daughter either alive or predeceased. Therefore, on the death of Sivabushanam each one of them became absolutely entitled to half share in the properties settled under Ex.B1 as both of them were alive and the first respondent/first defendant was made a party in the suit. Therefore, even in respect of the properties of W.S.Sivabushanam, the plea of non-joinder of necessary parties must necessarily fail. Furthermore, it has been held supra that the suit is not bad for partial partition and the properties of deceased W.S.Sivabushanam need not have been included in the suit and since it is admitted that no other person than the appellant and respondents 1 and 2 did have a right in the suit properties, the plea of non-joinder of necessary parties deserves to be rejected as untenable. Point No.iii is answered accordingly.
17. So far as the suit properties are concerned, admittedly, the same was the absolute property of M.K.Mohanambal. According to the plaint allegations, W.S.Sivabushanam predeceased his wife Mohanambal. But according to the averments found in the written statement he died on 27.12.1990 that is subsequent to the death of Mohanambal. P.W.1 in his evidence admitted the error committed by him in the plaint wherein it was stated that his father predeceased his mother. He has candidly admitted in his evidence that his father Sivabushanam was alive on the date of death of his mother Mohanambal and he died only after the death of Mohanambal. According to the admitted case of the parties Mohanambal died on 04.10.1989 and her husband W.S.Sivabushanam died on 27.12.1990. On the death of Mohanambal, besides the plaintiff and the first defendant, their father Sivabushanam would have become a co-sharer along with them. However, it is also not in dispute that Sivabushanam also died intestate on 27.12.1990. Therefore, his share would have devolved upon his son and daughter, namely the plaintiff and the first defendant and thus the plaintiff and the first defendant have become entitled to half share each. It is an admitted fact that the plaintiff and the first defendant, after the death of their parents were equally entitled to the suit properties. The first respondent/first defendant seems to have executed a settlement deed settling her half share in the suit property in favour of her son, namely the second defendant on 13.01.1997. Ex.B8 is the said settlement deed.
18. The next contention of the second respondent is that though the appellant/ plaintiff did have half share in the suit property, he orally relinquished the same in favour of the deceased first respondent/first defendant and that the deceased first respondent/first defendant in consideration of such a relinquishment of the appellants share in respect of the suit property, relinquished her half share in the properties of her father. The said contention of the second respondent has been stoutly refuted by the appellant/plaintiff. In fact, as pointed out supra, the person in whose favour the alleged relinquishment was made, namely deceased W.S.Rani, the first respondent/first defendant, did not file any separate written statement. The written statement was filed by the second respondent/second defendant alone and the same was adopted by the first respondent/ first defendant. In addition to the failure on the part of the first respondent to file a separate written statement, she has also failed to enter the witness box and depose in support of the defence plea that the half share of the appellant/plaintiff was orally relinquished by him in favour of the first respondent/first defendant. It was the second respondent/second defendant who figured as D.W.1 to depose in support of the above said plea of oral relinquishment. However, D.W.1s evidence in this regard is far from being reliable. According to the testimony of D.W.1, the appellant/plaintiff and the deceased first respondent/first defendant were the co-owners of the suit properties before ever the first respondent/first defendant executed Ex.B8-Settlement deed in favour of the second respondent/second defendant. It has been candidly admitted by D.W.1 that till 13.01.1997, namely the date on which Ex.B8-Settlement deed was executed in his favour by the first respondent/first defendant, the appellant/plaintiff had not relinquished his share in the suit property. Then, at what point of time the alleged oral relinquishment was made by the appellant/plaintiff - there is no clear averment or evidence in this regard. The second defendant relied on a Will allegedly executed by the first respondent/first defendant, which was marked as Ex.B11. Ex.B11 was a document allegedly executed by the first respondent/first defendant, a couple of months prior to the filing of the suit. Such a document can be created at any point of time. Therefore, not much importance can be attached to the said document. Furthermore, even as per the recitals found in Ex.B11, the deceased first respondent/first defendant executed a Power of Attorney on 06.10.1997 in favour of K.L.Jayakumar, the Chairman and Managing Director of Lifeguard Medical Diagnostic Centre Private Ltd., in which the appellant was a director at the instance of the appellant/plaintiff. It has been stated therein that in consideration of the said Power of Attorney, the appellant/plaintiff gave up, relinquished and released all his rights, title and interest in the suit property in favour of the first respondent/first defendant and thus the first respondent/first defendant became owner of half share and the remaining half share as per Ex.B8-settlement belonged to the second respondent/second defendant.
19. Even though the document states that the relinquishment was made in consideration of the Power of Attorney executed in favour of K.L.Jayakumar to mortgage the properties left by the father of the appellant and the first respondent, there is nothing to show that the first respondent relinquished her share in respect of the properties of her late father. It should also be noticed that originally the suit was filed against the first respondent alone. Though Ex.B8-Settlement deed was executed in 1997 itself, the second respondent/second defendant did not choose to take steps to get impleaded in the suit till 2003. Only in 2003 he got impleaded as second defendant. There is an admission on the part of D.W.1 that he filed the application for getting impleaded as a party-defendant only on the advice and instructions of his mother. The tenor of evidence of D.W.1 suggests that the oral relinquishment was made simultaneously with the execution of Power of Attorney in favour of K.L.Jayakumar. But there is no acceptable explanation as to why the parties have not chosen to get a deed in writing executed. It is pertinent to note that Ex.B11-Will was attested by the appellant/plaintiff. If at all it was true that the appellant/plaintiff orally relinquished his share in the suit property in favour of the first respondent/first defendant, the first respondent/first defendant could have made him sign as a witness in the Will, which she has not done. The preponderance and probabilities will show that the alleged oral relinquishment of the appellants/plaintiffs share in the suit property in favour of the first respondent/first defendant is not probable.
20. There is nothing to show that the first respondent/first defendant relinquished her share in favour of the appellant/plaintiff in respect of the properties of their late father so as to say that the said relinquishment was the consideration for the relinquishment of the appellants/plaintiffs share in favour of the first respondent/first defendant in respect of the suit property. Moreover, no mutation has been caused subsequent to the alleged relinquishment of the share of the appellant/plaintiff in respect of the suit property in favour of the first respondent/first defendant. If at all it were true that the appellant/plaintiff relinquished his share in favour of the first respondent/first defendant, thereafter the appellant/plaintiff would not have been allowed to continue to be in possession of a portion of the suit property without paying any rent and thus acknowledging the title of the first respondent/first defendant. The explanation offered by the defendants that the appellant/plaintiff remained there in possession as a permissive occupant after the relinquishment, was nothing but an invention for the purpose of the case. At least an acknowledgement showing such permissive occupationuld have been obtained. Same has not been done. Therefore, this court comes to the conclusion that the defendants had not proved by sufficient evidence their plea that the appellant/plaintiff relinquished his share in the suit property in favour of the first respondent/first defendant. The court below, without properly appreciating the evidence adduced on either side, came to an erroneous conclusion that the plea of relinquishment was proved by the defendants. Moreover, the person in whose favour the relinquishment was allegedly made did not enter the witness box to depose in confirmation of such a plea. The same should have been taken as a point giving rise to an adverse inference against the defendants, which the court below has failed to do.
21. For all the reasons stated above, this court comes to the conclusion that the finding of the court below that the plea of relinquishment made by the defendants had been proved by them is infirm and defective and that the same deserves to be reversed by this court in exercise of its appellate power. Moreover, the respondents 3 to 5 have conceded in this appeal that they cannot substantiate the plea of oral relinquishment. Therefore, it is hereby held that the finding of the court below regarding the said issue deserves to be reversed. Point No.i is answered accordingly.
22. The learned counsel for the second respondent expressed an apprehension that he may be deprived of his right to claim a share in the properties of late W.S.Sivabushanam (father of the appellant and the first respondent) since the appellant/plaintiff has not chosen to openly admit the title of the first respondent to the half share in the properties of her late father, the said apprehension seems to be unfounded. The case of the defendants that the first respondent orally relinquished her share in respect of the properties of her father in lieu of the relinquishment of the appellants share in the suit properties (properties of her mother), has not been either admitted by the appellant/plaintiff or proved by the respondents 1 and 2/defendants 1 and 2. As such appellant/plaintiff shall be estopped from contending that there was oral relinquishment of the share of the first respondent/first defendant in respect of the properties left by his father. The apprehension expressed by the learned counsel for the respondents 3 to 5 seems to be misconceived.
23. For all the reasons stated above, this court comes to the conclusion that the judgment and decree of the trial court dismissing the suit of the appellant/plaintiff for declaration and partition cannot withstand the scrutiny of this court; that the same cannot be sustained in law; that the judgment of the trial court deserves to be reversed and the decree of the trial court dismissing the suit should be set aside and that the suit should be decreed for the reliefs of declaration and partition as prayed for and a declatory decree and a preliminary decree for dividing the suit property into two equal shares by meets and bounds and allotting one such share to the appellant/plaintiff should be granted. So far as the question of mesne profit is concerned, the same has got to be relegated to be decided either in the final decree proceedings or in a separate proceeding. Point Nos.iv to vii are answered accordingly.
24. In the result, this appeal is allowed. The judgment of the trial court is reversed and the decree of the trial court is set aside. The suit is decreed as prayed for. A decree declaring the appellant's/plaintiff's entitlement to 1/2 share in the suit property and a preliminary decree directing division of the suit property into two equal shares and allotment one such share to the appellant/plaintiff are granted. The consideration of question of mesne profits is relegated, the same shall be the decision can be deferred to be decided either in the final decree proceedings or by a separate proceedings on an application to be filed in this regard. The parties are directed to bear their respective costs upto this stage of proceedings.
16.11.2009 Index : Yes Internet : Yes asr To The Additional District and Sessions (Fast Track Court-IV), Chennai P.R.SHIVAKUMAR, J.