(Delivered by F.M.IBRAHIM KALIFULLA,J.) These appeals arise out of the common judgment and decree dated 15.7.2003 passed in O.S.Nos.15 of 1999 and 3 of 2001. A.S.No.970 of 2003 has been filed against the judgment and decree in O.S.No.15 of 1999 on the file of Family Court, Salem, which was filed for partition of residential house as against the appellant herein. A.S.No.971 of 2003 has been filed against the judgment and decree in O.S.No.3 of 2001 also on the file of the Family Court, Salem wherein the respondent herein claimed enhancement of maintenance from Rs.1,250/- to Rs.3,500/- per month.
2. The brief facts are that the appellant and the respondent are husband and wife. Their marriage was solemnized on 21.2.1975 and out of the wedlock they got a male child on 22.5.1984. The suit schedule property was purchased jointly in the name of the appellant and the respondent for a consideration of Rs.80,000/-. Subsequently, there was difference of opinion between the husband and wife and it is stated that they are living separately. Thereafter, the respondent is stated to have filed O.S.No.572 of 1992 for maintenance which ended in compromise decree dated 27.8.1992, by which the appellant agreed to pay a sum of Rs.1,250/- per month towards maintenance. It is also stated that subsequently the appellant married one Gnanambal on 28.10.1992 at Vada Chennaimalai in Attur Taluk. It is in the above sated background the respondent herein filed the suit for partition initially before the Sub Court, Salem in O.S.No.564 of 1993 which on transfer to the Family Court, Salem got renumbered as O.S.No.15 of 1999. The respondent later on filed O.S.No.312 of 1997 on the file of the District Munsif Court, Salem claiming enhanced maintenance which on transfer to the Family Court, Salem got renumbered as O.S.No.3 of 2001.
3. The respondent examined herself as P.W.1, while the appellant and his brother were examined as R.Ws.1 and 2. Exs.P1 to P6 were marked on the side of the respondent and Exs.R1 to R7 were marked on the side of the appellant. The trial Court framed as many as four issues for determination in O.S.No.15 of 1999, which read as follows:
"1) Whether the plaintiff and the defendant jointly paid in instalments a sum of Rs.75000/- and a sum of Rs.5000/- at the time of execution of the deed on 11.12.1984 to the vendor K.V.Subramaniam or not? And whether the plaintiff had given the amount out of her own earning or not?
2) Whether the plaintiff and defendant are living separately and maintenance case is filed by the plaintiff or not?
3) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to one share of the suit schedule mentioned property and for possession of the said property or not?
4) To what other reliefs the plaintiff is entitled for?"
and two issues in O.S.No.3 of 2001, which read as follows:
"1) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for enhancement of maintenance as prayed for by her or not?
2) To what relief the parties are entitled to?"
4. On having tried the above issues, in O.S.No.15 of 1999, the trial Court held that the suit schedule property was jointly purchased by the appellant along with his wife, the respondent herein, and that she has also contributed her share in the sale proceeds by way of funds received by her from the disposal of her jewels as well as the amounts given by her father. In O.S.No.3 of 2001, the trial Court held that though maintenance at the rate of Rs.1,250/- per month was fixed in the earlier suit in O.S.No.572 of 1992 by way of compromise, yet the respondent was entitled to seek for enhancement and ultimately, granted a sum of Rs.2,500/- by way of enhancement from earlier sum of Rs.1,250/- per month. Aggrieved against the above judgment and decree of the court below, the appellant has come forward with these appeals.
5. We heard Mr.T.Muruga Manickam, learned counsel for the appellant and Mr.A.Nagarathinam, learned counsel for the respondent. We perused the judgment of court below.
6. On hearing the respective counsel as well as on perusing the pleadings as well as the judgment and decree of the court below, we find that the following issues arise for consideration:
(i) Whether the suit schedule property, namely the residential house belongs to the appellant and the respondent on equal moiety and whether the respondent is entitled to seek partition of her share of the property in the suit schedule property? and
(ii) Whether the respondent is entitled to seek for enhancement of the maintenance and if so, to what amount?
7. The learned counsel for the appellant contended that though the name of the respondent does find a place in the sale deed dated 11.12.1984 (Ex.P1), no part of the consideration was borne by her, that her name was included in the sale deed by the appellant formally and therefore, even assuming the issue would fall within
Section 3(2)(a) of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988, the presumption under the said provision being a rebuttable one, and that the court below ought to have accepted the stand of the appellant and should have dismissed the suit filed by the respondent in O.S.No.15 of 1999. The learned counsel would contend that after leaving the matrimonial home the respondent never returned back, that the appellant continued to live in the suit schedule property as rightful owner and therefore, the Court below ought not to have decreed the suit as prayed for by the respondent.
8. As far as the enhancement of maintenance is concerned, the learned counsel for the appellant contended that the appellant though was originally employed as an Assistant Professor in an Engineering College, he is now retired and he is only in receipt of pension and therefore, the appellant will not be in a position to meet the enhanced maintenance ordered by the court below. According to the learned counsel, since earlier maintenance sum of Rs.1,250/- was fixed by way of compromise between the appellant and the respondent, the court below ought not to have entertained O.S.No.3 of 2001 for enhancement of compensation.
9. The learned counsel for the respondent would however contend that the court below, after having analysed the entire pleading as well as oral and documentary evidence, found that there was no truth in the stand of the appellant about the full ownership claimed to the suit schedule property and that in the absence of any perversity in the findings of the court below its conclusion does not call for any interference.
10. As far as the enhancement of maintenance is concerned, the learned counsel for the respondent argued that, having regard to the considerable increase in the cost of living which weighed with the court below to enhance the monthly maintenance, the same does not call for any interference.
11. Issue (i): Whether the suit schedule property, namely the residential house belongs to the appellant and the respondent on equal moiety and whether the respondent is entitled to seek partition of her share of the property in the suit schedule property?
12. Having heard the learned counsel for the respective parties, we find force in the submission of the learned counsel for the respondent. At the outset, it will have to be kept in mind that even though the appellant is stated to have got remarried after the respondent left the matrimonial home as early as on 28.10.1992, the relationship of the appellant and the respondent as husband and wife remains even as on date. In the year 1992, when the appellant and respondent parted company, the male child who was then eight years old was in the care and custody of the respondent and at the time when the respondent filed the suit, the child continued to remain with the respondent till it came to be decreed on 15.7.2003.
13. As far as the right of the respondent to claim her share in the suit schedule property is concerned, we find that the appellant had made prevaricating stand before the trial court. It would be helpful to make specific reference to the various stand taken by the appellant in the suit as well as in the course of trial. In the written statement, the appellant took a stand which reads as follows:
"Just because the plaintiff was his wife, the defendant got her name also included as one of the vendees."
14. Then, in the course of cross-examination of the respondent as P.W.1, a suggestion was made which was to the following effect:
VERNACULAR (TAMIL) PORTION DELETED [I deny the suggestion that since because the defendant added my name in the sale deed casually and since there is enmity at present as against him I have filed the suit]
15. Again a different suggestion was put to the respondent as P.W.1, which was also denied by her, which was to the following effect:
VERNACULAR (TAMIL) PORTION DELETED [I deny the suggestion that at the time when the sale was executed the defendant was in Government service and if the entire sale is shown in her name it would cause prejudice to the defendant in his service and therefore, the sale was obtained in joint names.]
16. One other factor which was also relevant was that in the course of cross-examination the appellant himself admitted that he obtained permission from the Government to purchase the suit schedule property in his name, though no document was marked in support of the said stand. In the course of chief examination, the appellant took a stand which was totally different than what was taken either in the written statement or which was made by way of suggestions in the course of cross-examination of respondent as P.W.1. The said stand of the defendant was to the following effect:
VERNACULAR (TAMIL) PORTION DELETED which means, [As the plaintiff was living with me and hoping that she would support me in the future years and thinking that it would act as a security in future I added her name also in Ex.R1 (which is equal to Ex.P1).]
17. Therefore, as rightly analyzed by the trial Court, as against the stand of the respondent/wife that the suit schedule property was purchased jointly by both of them by contributing their share of the sale consideration equally, the stand of the appellant varied, as could be seen from the stand taken in the written statement as well as in the course of cross-examination of P.W.1 and the chief examination of the appellant himself. Such varied stand of the appellant was conflicting with each stand taken by him. In other words, the different stands taken by the appellant were conflicting with each other and when the said position was compared with the admission of R.W.2, who is none other than the appellant's own brother, to the effect that the jewels of the respondent were in the custody of the appellant which were returned later by him to the respondent, only supported the claim of the respondent that her contribution for the purchase of the suit schedule property was by way of disposal of her jewels as well as some money which she got from her father who was employed as Sub Registrar.
18. Therefore, the stand of the appellant that the name of the respondent was included in the sale deed either for namesake or with a view that she would support him in the evening of his life are all figment of imagination and seem to have been taken in a desperate attempt to defeat the claim of the respondent for the suit schedule property. Apart from the plea of the appellant in the written statement that the name of the respondent was casually included in the sale deed, the suggestion in the course of cross-examination of P.W.1 was highly detrimental to his original stand. The suggestion that the filing of the suit itself was motivated cannot be true, since by the time the suit came to be filed the appellant was stated to have been married to another woman and yet the respondent has not chosen to either seek for divorce or cause any hindrance to the appellant to his living with another woman.
19. When once the respondent was driven away from her matrimonial home and that too with an young child aged 8 years, it was quite natural that the respondent thought it fit to ensure that she is also provided with a roof to eke her livelihood with some meager maintenance. Such a perception of the respondent as a wife was quite natural and the same cannot be found fault with. As rightly held by the court below, the subsequent stand that since because the appellant was in Government service it would be risky to have the sale deed in his name as that would cause prejudice to his job itself was wholly not acceptable since the appellant himself admitted in his cross-examination that he has obtained permission from the Government for acquiring the property. Though there was no proof for the said statement, by accepting the said statement as true, it can be stated that when once the appellant had obtained permission there would be no scope at all for the employer, namely the Government to cause any prejudice to his job for the simple reason that he purchased the property in his name or jointly along with his wife.
20. The third stand that he included the name of his wife in the sale deed with the fond hope that she would support her in future years, even assuming to be true, does not in any way dilute the stand of the respondent that she also contributed to the sale consideration for the purchase of the suit schedule property, inasmuch as it was the clear and categoric admission of R.W.2, the brother of the appellant herein, who was examined at the instance of the appellant and whose version would fully bind the appellant, that the appellant returned to the respondent 55 sovereigns of gold ornaments which he had taken from the respondent and in proof of the same necessary receipts were filed before the trial Court. There was no explanation forthcoming from the appellant as to for what other purpose the jewels to the extent of 55 sovereigns belonging to the respondent were taken by the appellant or at which point of time and as to why the same are returned. In the absence of any such explanation, the claim of the respondent that her contribution to the purchase of the suit schedule property was by way of disposal of her jewels is quite appealing and acceptable and therefore, the reasoning of the court below in having accepted such a plea taken on the side of the respondent is quite convincing and we do not find any irregularity or illegality in accepting the said version of the respondent.
21. We, therefore, do not find any reason to interfere with the conclusion of the court below on this issue. The issue is, therefore, answered against the appellant and in favour of the respondent.
22. Issue (ii): Whether the respondent is entitled to seek for enhancement of the maintenance and if so, to what amount?
23. As far as the said issue is concerned, the first question to be considered is as to whether the respondent is entitled to seek for enhancement when the earlier maintenance granted at the rate of Rs.1,250/- per month was by way of a compromise between the parties. The said compromise was entered into between the appellant and respondent on 27.8.1992. The present suit came to be filed in the year 1997. The suit, on being transferred to the Family Court, Salem, got renumbered as O.S.No.3 of 2001 and came to be disposed of on 15.7.2003. When we examine the said issue, we find that the respondent, after she was driven out from the matrimonial home in the year 1992, continued to live on her own and the minor child who was then aged 8 years was brought up by her by providing food, clothing and shelter. Though the respondent is stated to be a graduate, it is not the case of the appellant that she was employed elsewhere and was eking her livelihood.
24. In the said circumstances, as between 1992 and 2003 when the prices of commodities have gone up by metes and bounds, it cannot be said that simply because the maintenance fixed on the earlier occasion was by way of compromise, the respondent should continue to maintain herself with the very same meager sum even at a subsequent point of time, i.e., at the stage were prices are on the higher side. While, at the same time, this Court can also take note of the fact that subsequent to the filing of the present suit for enhancement, the appellant, who was earlier employed as Assistant Professor in Government Engineering College, retired from his services and has now become a pensioner. Moreover, it is the admitted case that the appellant subsequently got remarried and is stated to be living with another woman from October, 1992. That means that the appellant has got his own different family with another member to be supported from his earnings. It is also stated that the male child, who is now stated to be more than 19 years, has also deserted his mother and is presently living with the appellant.
25. Taking note of the above factors, we are of the opinion that though enhancement of the maintenance is fully justified, such enhancement can be restricted to a sum of Rs.2,000/- per month as against a sum of Rs.2,500/- per month ordered by the court below. We are of the view that such a course would meet the ends of justice and accordingly, we modify the enhancement of maintenance and restrict it to a sum of Rs.2,000/- per month. It is stated that during the pendency of these appeals, the appellant had been paying a sum of Rs.1,850/- per month to the respondent as per the interim order of this court. It is stated that such enhanced amount of Rs.1,850/- was paid right from the date of claim of the respondent. Therefore, the appellant is only liable to pay the difference amount of Rs.150/- by way of arrears from the date of claim till this date and continue to pay at the rate of Rs.2000/- per month for the future years. This issue is answered on the above terms.
In the result, A.S.No.970 of 2003 is dismissed and A.S.No.971 of 2003 is partly allowed reducing the quantum of enhanced maintenance from Rs.2,500/- to Rs.2,000/- per month. No costs. Consequently, C.M.P.No.15052 of 2003 in A.S.No.970 of 2003 and C.M.P.No.15053 of 2003 in A.S.No.971 of 2003 are closed.
sasi To:
The Presiding Officer Family Court Salem