ORDER Ganga Nath, J.
1. Civil Revn. No. 62 of 1936 has been heard and disposed of with this Civil Revn. (No. 61 of 1936) as the same point arises in both the revisions. Both are defendant's applications in revision against the decrees of the learned Judge Small Cause Court, Dehra Dun, decreeing the plaintiff's opposite party's suits against him for recovery of the price of the necessaries supplied to him (defendant) by the plaintiff. The applicant's estate was under the superintendence of the Court of Wards at the time the necessaries were supplied. It has since been released. The defendant applicant's contention was that the suits were barred by Section 37, U.P. Court of Wards Act, and he was not liable for the price of the necessaries supplied to him. The learned Judge has held that Section 37, Court of Wards Act, does not exclude Section 68, Contract Act, and therefore the plaintiff were entitled to the price of the necessaries supplied by him under Section 68 Contract Act. The point for consideration is whether Section 37, U.P. Court of Wards Act, is a bar to the suit. It is admitted that the plaintiff's suits were for the recovery of the necessaries supplied to the defendant. Section 37, Clause (A) of the Court of Wards Act lays down:
A ward shall not be competent to transfer or create any charge on, or interest in, any part of his property which is under the superintendence of the Court of Wards, or to enter into any contract which may involve him in pecuniary liability.
This section has to be read with Sections 11 and 68, Contract Act. Section 11, Contract Act, lays down:
Every person is competent to contract who is of the age of majority according to the law to which he is subject, and who is of sound mind and is not disqualified from contracting by any law to which he is subject.
2. So long as the estate of the applicant remained under the superintendence of the Court of Wards he was a person disqualified from contracting under the provisions of Section 37, Court of Wards Act, and was not competent to contract. Section 68, of the Contract Act, lays down:
If a person, incapable of entering into a contract, or any one whom he is legally bound to support, is supplied by another person with necessaries suited to his condition in life, the person who has furnished such supplies is entitled to be reimbursed from the property of such incapable person.
3. The relief which is contemplated under Section 68, Contract Act, is not dependent on any contract but is quite independent of it. The section does not create any personal liability, but on the other hand creates a statutory claim against the property of the person who is incapable of entering into a contract and has been supplied with necessaries suited to his condition in life. Two things are necessary under Section 68, Contract Act, namely (1) that the person against whom the suit is brought is incapable of entering into a contract, and (2) another person (the plaintiff) has supplied him or any one whom he (the person incapable or entering into a contract) is legally bound to support with necessaries suited to his condition in life. The only effect of Section 37, U.P. Court of Wards Act, is to make a ward incapable of entering into a contract and he is therefore a person who comes under the words "disqualified from contracting by any law to which he is subject," in Section 11, Contract Act. If the two aforesaid conditions which are necessary for the application of Section 68, Contract Act are fulfilled a ward's property would be liable to reimburse the person who has furnished the necessaries to him or to any person whom he is legally bound to support. Section 37, U.P. Court of Wards Act, is therefore no bar to a claim under Section 68, Contract Act. In Umrao Singh v. Firm Banarsi Das-Dip Chand 1927 Lah 414 the same view was taken. It was held there that:
Section 68 is not excluded by the terms of the Court of Wards Act and therefore a suit based on a contract can be maintained in the alternative as a suit for necessaries supplied within the terms of Section 68.
4. I therefore agree with the finding of the learned Judge. There is no force in the application. It is therefore ordered that both the civil revision applications be dismissed with costs.