(1) By way of this petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner interalia challenges the legality of the judgment and award dated 22.4.2003 passed by the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Ahmedabad in Reference (LCA) No.2391 of 1995.
(2) The facts that can be carved out from the record of the petition are that the petitioner is an establishment having its factory premises at Ahmedabad. The respondent workman was working as Turner with the petitioner. It is a matter of record that the petitioner found that the respondent workman has resorted to go slow tactics and was disobeying the lawful orders of the superiors. Because of such a conduct on the part of the respondent workman, a show cause notice was issued on 19.7.1993 and after holding a fullfledged departmental inquiry, the respondent workman came to be dismissed from service by an order dated 29.8.1995.
(3) Being aggrieved by the order of dismissal, the respondent workman raised a dispute which came to be referred to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Ahmedabad as Reference (LCA) No.2391 of 1995. The Labour Court by the impugned judgment and award dated 22.4.2003 directed the petitioner to reinstate the respondent workman.
(4) It transpires from the record, which requires to be noted at this stage, that the respondent workman filed a purshis (Exh.12) on 11.9.2001 before the Labour Court, whereby the respondent admitted the legality and validity of the inquiry held against him, however, challenged the findings given by the Inquiry Officer. It is a matter of record that thereafter, the reference was heard before the Labour Court and during pendency of the reference, by a purshis dated 4.2.2003 (Exh.96), the respondent workman gave up his challenge to the findings of the Inquiry Officer and admitted and accepted the findings. After considering the evidence on record and submissions, the Presiding Officer of the Labour Court by the impugned judgment and award dated 22.4.2003 has quashed and set aside the order of dismissal dated 29.8.1995 and directed the petitioner to reinstate the respondent workman with full back wages and continuity of service.
(5) Being aggrieved by the impugned judgment and award, the present petition is filed by the petitioner.
(6) This Court (Coram : Akil Kureshi, J.) by an order dated 28.6.2004 has passed the following order: “Rule. Adinterim relief granted earlier is confirmed and shall continue.”
(7) It is not in dispute that during pendency of the present petition, the respondent workman has been accorded benefit of Section 17B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act” for the sake of brevity).
(8) Heard Mr. A.K. Clerk, learned advocate for the petitioner and Mr. Mukesh H. Rathod, learned advocate for the respondent workman.
(9) Mr. A.K. Clerk has taken this Court through the impugned judgment and award as well as the relevant documents which are part of the record of this petition. Mr. Clerk has drawn attention of this Court to the purshis Exh.12, whereby the respondent workman declared before the Labour Court that he admits the legality and validity of the inquiry held against him, but challenges the findings. Mr. Clerk also drawn attention of this Court to the purshis Exh.96, whereby the respondent workman gave up his challenge to the findings of the Inquiry Officer and admitted and accepted the findings. Mr. Clerk submitted that in view of purshis Exh.12 and purshis Exh.96, when the validity of the inquiry is not challenged and when the findings arrived at by the Inquiry Officer are admitted, the charge against the respondent workman stands proved and the Labour Court had, therefore, no jurisdiction to interfere in its jurisdiction under Section 11A of the Act. It is submitted that in fact the respondent workman has even otherwise reached the age of superannuation on 31.12.2003. Mr. Clerk relying upon the earlier contention submitted that the Labour Court has no compassionate jurisdiction under Section 11A of the Act and therefore, the findings arrived at by the Labour Court are perverse and without jurisdiction. It is submitted that in view of the purshis Exh.12 and Exh.96, having recorded the fact that the respondent workman gave up his challenge to the inquiry as well as the findings arrived at in the inquiry, the Labour Court had no jurisdiction to examine the matter on merits. It is submitted that in such a situation, when the charges stand proved, the allegation against the respondent workman namely to the effect that the respondent workman was engaged in go slow tactics is a grave misconduct and therefore, the Labour Court ought not to have even otherwise interfered with the order of dismissal. It is further submitted that it is on record of the reference itself and as pointed out by the petitioner herein which is not denied by the respondent workman that earlier also, the respondent workman had resorted to go slow tactics for which he was dismissed. However, as per the award of the Labour Court, the petitioner reinstated him as the Labour Court in that case found that the penalty was disproportionate, even though the Labour Court came to the conclusion that the charges are proved. It is, therefore, reiterated that the Labour Court could not have gone into the merits of the matter. Mr. Clerk, in order to buttress his contentions, has relied upon the following judgments:
(i) U.P. State Road Transport Corporation Vs. Vinod Kumar, reported in (2008) 1 SCC 115.
(ii) M.P. Electricity Board Vs. Jagdish Chandra Sharma, reported in (2005) 3 SCC 401.
(iii) M/s. Sasa Musa Sugar Works (P) Ltd. Vs. Shobrati Khan, reported in AIR 1959 SC 923.
(iv) Bharat Sugar Mills Ltd. Vs. Jai Singh, reported in 1961 (2) LLJ 644.
(v) Tarun Kumare De Biswas Vs. Presiding Officer, Central Government Industrial Tribunal & Others, reported in 1991 (2) LLJ 208.
(vi) Carona Sahu Company Ltd. Vs. Mansoor Ahmed Noormiya, reported in 1997 (2) LLJ 1233.
Mr. Clerk, therefore, submitted that the petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned judgment and award deserves to be quashed and set aside.
(10) Per contra, Mr. Rathod, learned advocate for the respondent workman submitted that the misconduct alleged against the respondent workman is not at all grave so as to attract punishment of dismissal. Mr. Rathod relying upon the ratio laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Anoop Sharma Vs. Executive Engineer, Public Health Division No.1, Panipat (Haryana), reported in (2010) 5 SCC 497 submitted that this Court cannot interfere with the award under its extraordinary jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India when the finding of fact is arrived at. Mr. Rathod also urged that the jurisdiction of the Labour Court under Section 11A of the Act is wider jurisdiction and even if the charges stand proved, the Labour Court had jurisdiction to examine whether the punishment of dismissal imposed against the respondent workman is disproportionate or not. Mr. Rathod raised a contention that the respondent workman had rendered 25 years of service and was a protected workman and was an active member of Mahagujarat Labour Union and therefore, it is a clear case of victimization. It is submitted that this vital fact is not at all considered by the petitioner while passing the order of dismissal.
(11) Mr. Rathod has also relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Scooter India Limited Vs. Labour Court, Lucknow, reported in AIR 1989 SC 149 and the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Jitendra Singh Rathor Vs. Shri Baidyanath Ayurved Bhawan Ltd., reported in AIR 1984 SC 976 and has contended that the jurisdiction of the Labour Court under Section 11A of the Act is very wide and the view taken by the Labour Court is just and proper. It is submitted that in fact the Labour Court has exercised its jurisdiction which is permissible even though the charges stand proved. Mr. Rathod further relying upon the judgment of Jitendra Singh Rathor (supra) submitted that this is not a fit case for interference by this Court in exercise of its powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution of India as the Labour Court has committed no error much less any error apparent on the face of the record. It is, therefore, submitted that the petition is devoid of any merit and the same deserves to be dismissed.
(12) Before considering the submissions made by both the learned advocates appearing for the parties, it would be appropriate to note the contents of the purshis Exh.12 and purshis Exh.96. By Exh.12, the respondent workman, as per the record, admitted the legality and validity of the inquiry held against him but challenged the findings. Whereas on perusal of the purshis Exh.96 dated 4.2.2003, the respondent workman has stated that in this case, the workman had given a purshis challenging the findings of the Inquiry Officer and in place of the said purshis, he admits the findings by way of this purshis because of the reason that in the said findings in last but second paragraph of the report of the Inquiry Officer, it is recorded that with regard to the charge of less production, it is clearly stated that the figures of supervisors are not reliable and if the same is because of victimization of the workman, the same cannot be considered to be true and in case of the workman (Virjibhai) i.e. in the present case, the same thing has happened. It is further stated that thus, the findings are in favour of the workman, we do not challenge the same.
(13) Considering the contents of the purshis at Exh.96, it transpires that the respondent workman gave up the challenge to the findings of the Inquiry Officer. On further examining the contents of Exh.96 as quoted hereinabove and on considering the findings of the Inquiry Officer which are on record, the same are not true and it is not correct interpretation of the Inquiry Officer's report. This Court finds that what is stated in the purshis at Exh.96 is based upon the deposition of one witness which is not believed by the Inquiry Officer and the ultimate finding is that the charge of go slow against the respondent workman is proved and the Inquiry Officer has recorded the finding that the respondent workman was reinstated as per the award of the Labour Court and was given an opportunity to improve himself. Still however, the respondent workman has continued the policy of go slow, which is proved by the employer on the basis of documentary evidence as well as the witnesses. It is also recorded that over and above this, the respondent workman was asked to work upon leth machine by his superior on 14.7.1993, to which the respondent workman has declined and has thus disobeyed the orders of his superior. Considering the findings given by the Presiding Officer of the Labour Court, it is found that in Para 4 thereof, the Presiding Officer of the Labour Court has recorded the fact of Exh.12 as well as Exh.96. Having recorded that fact after considering the arguments and contentions raised by the petitioner as well as the respondent workman, the Labour Court has travelled into findings of the Inquiry Officer which did not remain the subject matter of challenge in view of Exh.96, as observed hereinabove. Having recorded the fact that purshis Exh.96 is filed, the Presiding Officer was not called upon to deliberate on the findings of the Inquiry Officer. In fact this Court finds that the Labour Court has not only examined the inquiry report, but has threadbare dissected it and substituted the findings of the Inquiry Officer. As pointed out by the learned advocate for the petitioner and relying upon the deposition of one of the witness before the Inquiry Officer that the respondent workman suffers from Tuberculosis, this Court also finds that the Labour Court has taken a compassionate approach considering the age of the respondent workman.
(14) In the case of U.P. State Road Transport Corporation (supra), the Apex Court has held as under: “10. As stated in the preceding paragraphs, the respondent had confined his case only to the conclusions reached by the Enquiry Officer as well as the quantum of punishment. Therefore, since the respondent had not challenged the correctness, legality or validity of the inquiry conducted, it was not open to the Labour Court to go into the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer regarding the misconduct committed by the respondent. This Court in a number of judgments has held that the punishment of removal/dismissal is the appropriate punishment for an employee found guilty of misappropriation of funds; and the Courts should be reluctant to reduce the punishment on misplaced sympathy for a workman. That, there is nothing wrong in the employer losing confidence or faith in such an employee and awarding punishment of dismissal. That, in such cases, there is no place for generosity or misplaced sympathy on the part of the judicial forums and interfering with the quantum of punishment. Without burdening the judgment with all the judgments of this Court on this point, we may only refer to a recent judgment in Divisional Controller, N.E.K.R.T.C. Vs. H. Amaresh, 2006 (6) SCC 187, wherein this Court, after taking into account the earlier decisions, held in para 18 as under: (SCC p.193) "18. In the instant case, the misappropriation of the funds by the delinquent employee was only Rs.360.95. This Court has considered the punishment that may be awarded to the delinquent employees who misappropriated the funds of the Corporation and the factors to be considered. This Court in a catena of judgments held that the loss of confidence is the primary factor and not the amount of money misappropriated and that the sympathy or generosity cannot be a factor which is impermissible in law. When an employee is found guilty of pilferage or of misappropriating the Corporation’s funds, there is nothing wrong in the Corporation losing confidence or faith in such an employee and awarding punishment of dismissal. In such cases, there is no place for generosity or misplaced sympathy on the part of the judicial forums and interfering therefore with the quantum of punishment. The judgment in Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation v. B.S. Hullikatti (2001) 2 SCC 574 was also relied on in this judgment among others. Examination of the passengers of the vehicle from whom the said sum was collected was also not essential. In our view, possession of the said excess sum of money on the part of the respondent, a fact proved, is itself a misconduct and hence the Labour Court and the learned Judges of the High Court misdirected themselves in insisting on the evidence of the passengers which is wholly not essential. This apart, the respondent did not have any explanation for having carried the said excess amount. This omission was sufficient to hold him guilty. This act was so grossly negligent that the respondent was not fit to be retained as a conductor because such action or inaction of his was bound to result in financial loss to the appellant irrespective of the quantum."
(15) In the case of M.P. Electricity Board (supra), the Apex Court has observed as under: “6. It is clear from the findings recorded and the materials available before us, that the charge against the employee of hitting a superior officer with an implement and causing him injury stood proved, as also his absence from duty without intimation. In fact, the Labour Court has found nothing wrong with the domestic enquiry wherein the charges were found to have been proved. The Labour Court also proceeded on the basis that the charges were proved. The Industrial Court in appeal accepted the finding that the charges against the employee were proved. The High Court also held that the charges against the employee stood proved on the facts of this case. The High Court also took note of the fact that the employee did not even challenge this part of the finding of the Labour Court in the appeal, he filed before the Industrial Court. Thus, it is clear that there is no reason for this Court to interfere with the finding that the charges against the employee stood proved, even assuming that the employee, the appellant in Civil Appeal No. 1340 of 2003, is permitted to raise the question regarding the proving of the charges against him. We were taken through the relevant materials. The materials clearly disclose that the charges were proved. We have, therefore, only to ask ourselves whether in the face of the charges proved, it was proper for the Labour Court or for the High Court to interfere with the punishment imposed by the employer.
7. On a comparison, it is seen that Section 107A of the Act is almost a reproduction of Section 11A of the Industrial Disputes Act. Learned counsel also agreed that its scope was the same as that of Section 11A of the Industrial Disputes Act.
8. The question then is, whether the interference with the punishment by the Labour Court was justified? In other words, the question is whether the punishment imposed was so harsh or so disproportionate to the charge proved, that it warranted or justified interference by the Labour Court? Here, it had been clearly found that the employee during work, had hit his superior officer with a tension screw on his back and on his nose leaving him with a bleeding and broken nose. It has also been found that this incident was followed by the unauthorized absence of the employee. It is in the context of these charges found established that the punishment of termination was imposed on the employee. The jurisdiction under Section 107A of the Act to interfere with punishment when it is a discharge or dismissal can be exercised by the Labour Court only when it is satisfied that the discharge or dismissal is not justified. Similarly, the High Court gets jurisdiction to interfere with the punishment in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India only when it finds that the punishment imposed, is shockingly disproportionate to the charge proved. These aspects are well settled. In U.P. State Road Transport Corpn. Vs. Subhash Chandra Sharma and others (2000) 3 SCC 324, this Court, after referring to the scope of interference with punishment under Section 11A of the Industrial Disputes Act, held that the Labour Court was not justified in interfering with the order of removal from service when the charge against the employee stood proved. It was also held that the jurisdiction vested with the Labour Court to interfere with punishment was not to be exercised capriciously and arbitrarily. It was necessary, in a case where the Labour Court finds the charge proved, for a conclusion to be arrived that the punishment was shockingly disproportionate to the nature of the charge found proved, before it could interfere to reduce the punishment. In Krishnakali Tea Estate vs. Akhil Bharatiya Chah Mazdoor Sangh and another, (2004) 8 SCC 200, this Court after referring to the decision in State of Rajasthan vs. B.K. Meena ,(1996) 6 SCC 417, also pointed out the difference between the approaches to be made in a criminal proceeding and a disciplinary proceeding. This Court also pointed out that when charges proved were grave, vis‘vis the establishment, interference with punishment of dismissal could not be justified. In Bharat Forge Company Ltd. vs. Uttam Manohar Nakate, 2005(1) Scale 345, this Court again reiterated that the jurisdiction to interfere with the punishment should be exercised only when the punishment is shockingly disproportionate and that each case had to be decided on its facts. This Court also indicated that the Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal, as the case may be, in terms of the provisions of the Act, had to act within the four corners thereof. It could not sit in appeal over the decision of the employer unless there existed a statutory provision in that behalf. The Tribunal or the labour Court could not interfere with the quantum of punishment based on irrational or extraneous factors and certainly not on what it considers a compassionate ground. It is not necessary to multiply authorities on this question, since the matter has been dealt with in detail in a recent decision of this Court in Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd. v. N.B. Narawade, 2005 (2) Scale 302. This Court summed up the position thus: (SCC P.141, para 20) "20. It is no doubt true that after introduction of Section 11A in the Industrial Disputes Act, certain amount of discretion is vested with the labour court/Industrial Tribunal in interfering with the quantum of punishment awarded by the Management where the concerned workman is found guilty of misconduct. The said area of discretion has been very well defined by the various judgments of this Court referred to herein above and it is certainly not unlimited as has been observed by the Division Bench of the High Court. The discretion which can be exercised under Section 11A is available only on the existence of certain factors like punishment being disproportionate to the gravity of misconduct so as to disturb the conscience of the court, or the existence of any mitigating circumstances which requires the reduction of the sentence, or the past conduct of the workman which may persuade the Labour Court to reduce the punishment."
It may also be noticed that in Orissa Cement Ltd. vs. V. Adikanda Sahu (1960 (1) LLJ518 SC) and in New Shorrock Mills vs. Maheshbhai T. Rao, (1996) 6 SCC 590, this Court held that use of abusive language against a superior, justified punishment of dismissal. This Court stated "punishment of dismissal for using abusive language cannot be held to be disproportionate". If that be the position regarding verbal assault, we think that the position regarding dismissal for physical assault, must be found all the more justifiable. Recently, in Employers, Management, Muriadih Colliery M/s BCCL Ltd.
v. Bihar Colliery Kamgar Union, Through Workmen (JT 2005 (2) SC 444) this Court after referring to and quoting the relevant passages from Management of Krishnakali Tea Estate v. Akhil Bharatiya Chah Mazdoor Sangh & Anr. [2004 (7) Scale 608] and The Management of Tournamulla Estate Vs. Workmen, [(1973) 2 SCC 502] held : (SCC p.336, para 17) "The courts below by condoning an act of physical violence have undermined the discipline in the organization, hence, in the above factual backdrop, it can never be said that the Industrial Tribunal could have exercised its authority under Section 11(A) of the Act to interfere with the punishment of dismissal."
(16) In the case of M/s. Sasa Musa Sugar Works (P) Ltd. (supra), the Apex Court has observed as under: “8. We are of opinion that on the findings of the Industrial Tribunal on the three points formulated by it which have not been upset by the Appellate Tribunal, the only order possible on the applications of the management under S. 33 was to permit it to dismiss the fortyeight workmen provided there was evidence against them. It was not open to the Industrial Tribunal when it was asked to give permission to dismiss to substitute some other kind of punishment and give permission for that. The Industrial Tribunal was satisfied that there was misconduct and that finding has been upheld by the Appellate Tribunal. As such if there was evidence that these fortyeight workmen were guilty of misconduct, the Industrial Tribunal was bound to accord permission asked for. We cannot agree with the Appellate Tribunal that the suspension in this case was substantive punishment and was not an interim order pending enquiry and proceedings before the Industrial Tribunal under S. 33. We have already pointed out that the Labour Officer told to management on January 31, 1952, that it was free to take disciplinary action with the permission of the Industrial Tribunal. It was thereafter that thirtythree workmen were suspended on January 31 and the notice clearly said that the suspension was pending further orders, thus intimating to the workmen that the order of suspension was an interim measure. This notice of January 31 was followed by an application on February 6 to the Industrial Tribunal for permission to dismiss the thirtythree workmen involved in it, and this also clearly shows that the suspension was pending enquiry (if any) by the management and proceedings before the Industrial Tribunal. Similarly, the suspension notices of February 5 and 6 relating to fifteen workmen said that they were suspended till further orders and were followed on February 11 by an application under S. 33 to the Industrial Tribunal for permission to dismiss them. In the circumstances it is quite clear that suspension in this case was not a punishment but was an interim measure pending enquiry and proceedings before the tribunal. We have already pointed out that this was the finding of the Industrial Tribunal on the basis of which the application under S. 33A was dismissed and this finding stood confirmed when the workmen withdrew their appeal with respect to their application under S. 33A. The Appellate Tribunal therefore was clearly in error in holding that the suspension was punishment.
9. The only question that remains is about the sixteen workmen about whom the Industrial Tribunal held that there was no evidence to connect them with the goslow. The Appellate Tribunal's view in this matter was that the contention of the management that the Industrial Tribunal was wrong in holding that there was no evidence against these sixteen workmen was correct. It has been shown to us that evidence against these sixteen workmen is of exactly the same witnesses and of the same kind as the evidence against the remaining thirtytwo. The finding, therefore, of the Industrial Tribunal that there was no evidence against the sixteen workmen is patently perverse, for there was the same evidence against them as against the remaining thirtytwo. It follows, therefore, that all the fortyeight workmen (two of whom are since said to have died) are exactly in the same position. As held by the Appellate Tribunal, goslow is serious misconduct which is insidious in its nature and cannot be countenanced. In these circumstances as these fortyeight workmen were taking part in the goslow and were thus guilty of serious misconduct, the management was entitled to get permission to dismiss them. But as the management held no enquiry after suspending the workmen and proceedings under S. 33 were practically converted into the inquiry which normally the management should have held before applying to the Industrial Tribunal, the management is bound to pay the wages of the workmen till a case for dismissal was made out in the proceedings under S. 33; (see the decision of this Court in the Management of Ranipur Colliery v. Bhuban Singh, ('59) C.
A. No. 768 of 1957, D/ 214l959: (AIR 1959 SC 833) ). As already pointed out, this is the view taken by the Industrial Tribunal while dealing with the application under S. 33A which stood confirmed by the dismissal of the appeal by the workmen in that behalf. The management will therefore have to pay the wages during the period of suspension till the award of the Industrial Tribunal.”
(17) Similarly in the case of Scooter India Ltd. (supra), the Apex Court while interpreting the jurisdiction of the Labour Court under Section 6 (2A) of the Act which is paramateria provision of Section 11A of the Act, in para 7 has stated thus: “7. The High Court has considered at length the nature of the powers conferred on the Labour Court by Section 6(2A) of the Act for setting aside an order of discharge or dismissal of a workman and substituting it with an order of lesser punishment and as such it cannot be said that the High Court has failed to consider the facts in their entirety. As regards the third contention, we may only state that the Labour Court was not unaware of the nature of the charges framed against the respondent or the findings rendered by the Inquiry Officer and the acceptance of those findings by the Disciplinary Authority. The Labour Court has observed as follows : "The workman has unfortunately to blame himself for much of the bad blood which has developed between him and the management and therefore his conduct, motivated by ideals which are not relevant has been far from satisfactory. In so far as it was rough, bordering on rudeness and with highly exaggerated sense of his duties. In these circumstances it will meet the ends of justice if back wages to the a extent of 75% are allowed to the workman. I would make my award accordingly but there L shall be no order as to costs."
It cannot therefore be said that the Labour ,Court had exercised its powers under Section 6(2A) of the Act in an arbitrary manner and not in a judicial manner The, Labour Court has taken the view that justice must be tempered with mercy and that the erring workman should be given an opportunity to reform himself and prove to be a loyal and disciplined employee of the petitioner Company. It cannot therefore be said that merely because the Labour Court had found the enquiry to be fair and lawful and the findings not to be vitiated in any manner, it ought not to have interfered with the order of termination of service passed against the respondent in exercise of its powers under Section 6(2A) of the Act.”
(18) In the case of Jitendra Singh Rathor (supra), the Apex Court has observed in para 4 as under: “4. Under S. 11A of the Act, advisedly wide discretion has been vested in the Tribunal in the matter of awarding relief according to the circumstances of the case. The High Court under Art. 227 of the Constitution does not enjoy such power though as a superior court, it is vested with the right of superintendence. The High Court is indisputably entitled to scrutinise the orders of the subordinate tribunals within the well accepted limitations and, therefore, it could in an appropriate case quash the award of the Tribunal and thereupon remit the matter to it for fresh disposal in accordance with law and directions, if any. The High Court is not entitled to exercise the powers of the Tribunal and substitute an award in place of the one made by the Tribunal as in the, case of an appeal where it lies to it. In this case, the Tribunal had directed reinstatement, the High Court vacated the direction of reinstatement and computed compensation of Rupees 15,000/ in lieu of restoration of service. We are not impressed by the reasoning of the High Court that reinstatement was not justified when, the tribunal in exercise of its wide discretion given under the law found that such relief would meet the ends of justice. The Tribunal had not recorded a finding that there was loss of confidence of the employer. The job of a librarian does not involve the necessity of enjoyment of any special confidence of the employer. At any rate, the High Court too did not record a finding to that effect. Again there is no indication in the judgment of the High Court as to how many years of service the appellant had put in and how many years of service were still left under the Standing Orders. The salary and other service benefits which the appellant was receiving also did not enter into the consideration of the High Court while computing the compensation. We are, therefore, of the view that the High Court had no justification to interfere with the direction regarding reinstatement to service and in proceeding to substitute the direction by quantifying compensation of Rupees 15,000/ it acted without any legitimate basis.”
(19) Considering the facts of the present case, it is an admitted position that the respondent workman was dismissed from service earlier on account of an inquiry initiated against the respondent workman for adopting go slow tactics and by an award of the Labour Court, the respondent workman came to be reinstated. It is also a matter of record that by reinstating the respondent workman as per the award of the Labour Court, the respondent workman was given opportunity to improve. However, it transpires from the record that again the respondent workman resorted to go slow tactics. Having considered the fact that the respondent workman gave up his challenge to the inquiry as well as to the findings of the inquiry report, the charges of go slow tactics against the respondent workman stands proved, therefore, the Labour Court had no jurisdiction to examine the same on merits. The jurisdiction under Section 11A of the Act though wider would not permit the Labour Court to consider the case of the respondent workman as the manner in which it has been considered by the Labour Court as the findings of the Inquiry Officer and the allegation of grave misconduct of go slow stood proved. Thus, the Labour Court has committed an error apparent on the face of the record and the findings arrived at by the Labour Court are perverse.
(20) Considering the ratio laid down in the case of Carona Sahu Company Ltd. (supra) and even in the case of M/s. Sasa Musa Sugar Works (P) Ltd. (supra), the Apex Court has observed and held that go slow tactic is a grave misconduct, which stands proved in the present case. The case of Scooter India Limited (supra) relied upon by Mr. Rathod does not apply to the facts of the present case. In the case before the Apex Court, the Labour Court had arrived at the findings that the inquiry was fair and lawful and yet the Labour Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 6(2A) of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 interfered with the same. However, considering the fact that the charges against the respondent workman for major misconduct of 'go slow' stands proved, an order of dismissal cannot be interfered under Section 11A of the Act especially when the respondent workman does not challenge the validity and findings of the inquiry. The argument that the respondent workmen being protected workman is subjected to victimization is not raised before the Labour Court by the workman and therefore, the same cannot be raised for the first time before this Court and the same deserves to be negatived.
(21) In view of the above, the impugned judgment and award passed by the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Ahmedabad dated 22.4.2003 in Reference (LCA) No.2391 of 1995 deserves to be quashed and set aside and is hereby quashed and set aside. The petition stands allowed. Accordingly, Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent.
[R.M.CHHAYA, J.] mrpandya