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Virendra Yadav vs State Of U.P. Thru Prin. Secy. Home ...

High Court Of Judicature at Allahabad|22 January, 2016

JUDGMENT / ORDER

This writ petition is directed against the order dated 19.5.2008 passed by disciplinary authority removing the petitioner from service as well as the order passed by the appellate authority on 8.9.2008 by which the order passed by the disciplinary authority stands upheld. The impugned orders are contained in Annexure-1 and 1-A to the writ petition respectively.
Brief facts relevant for the purpose of present writ petition are that the petitioner was appointed as a Constable in Provincial Armed Constabulary (PAC) on 7.7.94 and subsequently he was promoted as Head Constable and was posted at Balrampur at the relevant point of time. It is gathered from averments made in the writ petition that the petitioner was married to one Smt. Kesa Devi in the year 1984 according to rituals of Hindu religion and after five years of his marriage, Gauna took place and Smt. Kesa Devi came to live in the house of her in-laws alongwith the petitioner.
The pleadings reveal that marital relationship between the petitioner and Smt. Kesa Devi was cordial but out of their wedlock they did not have any issue and for this reason, not only family members of the petitioner but Smt. Kesa Devi being the legally wedded wife of the petitioner, were deeply concerned. The petitioner, it is alleged, on account of compelling circumstances generated by the family members as well as motivation exercised by his wife, entered into a relationship with one Smt. Sangita and out of this relationship, two children were born. The relationship with Smt. Sangita, as per the material available on record, is almost like the second marriage for the reason that the petitioner and Smt. Sangita alongwith his first wife have lived together sometime since the year 1999. Smt. Kesa, who is legally wedded first wife of the petitioner, did not oppose or protest nor lodged any proceedings against the petitioner for a considerable period of time but later on, it appears that a complaint came to be made by Smt. Kesa Devi against the petitioner, wherein the fact of second marriage was disclosed coupled with the allegation that the petitioner was not taking good care of her and being a government servant he is duty bound to maintain her failing which it would be violative of Rule 29 (1) of the U.P. Government Servants Conduct Rules, 1956. Essentially the protest was for seeking maintenance so that complainant-wife could also lead her life with the husband.
The departmental authorities taking note of the complaint filed by Smt. Kesa Devi, initiated disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner under Rule 14 (1) of the U.P. Police Subordinate Officers (Punishment & Appeal) Rules, 1991. A charge sheet was issued to the petitioner on 8.9.09 alleging specific violation of Rule 29 (1) of the Conduct Rules of 1956 not for failure to seek permission but for having contracted a second marriage. The petitioner submitted reply to the charge sheet, wherein it was admitted that he had contracted a second marriage but the reason for second marriage was stated to be the insistence on the part of the family members coupled with consent of the first wife in the pursuit of having a male successor who would offer oblations at the time of death and shall secure spiritual salvation. The enquiry officer held the enquiry elaborately by fixing date, time and place and ample opportunity was given to the petitioner which is clearly reflected from the enquiry report. There does not seem to be any denial of reasonable opportunity so far as the enquiry proceedings are concerned. The only noticeable fact in the enquiry proceedings surprisingly is withdrawal of the complaint by Smt. Kesa Devi, the first wife, but the enquiry proceedings on that basis did not stop and were continued. A detailed enquiry report was forwarded to the disciplinary authority with a clear finding as follows:
"bl izdkj izdj.k esa vfHk;kstu dk;Zokgh ds nkSjku miyC/k vfHkys[k o vfHk;kstu i{k ds lk{khx.kksa ds dFku ls bl ckr dh iqf''V gks jgh gS fd gs0dk0 ¼vkjksih½ }kjk viuh izFke iRuh ds thfor jgrs gq, rFkk djhc 10 o'kksZ rd nkEiR; thou O;rhr djus ds mijkUr dksbZ larku iSnk u gksus ds dkj.k viuh izFke iRuh ds ekSf[kd lgefr ij nwljh 'kknh dh x;h gS] ijUrq vkjksih gs0 dk0 }kjk m0 iz0 ljdkjh deZpkjh fu;ekoyh&1956 esa of.kZr /kkjk 29 ¼1½ esa mfYyf[kr fu;eksa dksbZ ljdkjh deZpkjh ftldh ,d iRuh thfor gS] bl ckr ds gksrs gq, Hkh fd rRle; ml ij ykxw fdlh O;SfDrd fof/k ds v/khu mls bl izdkj dh ckn dh nwljh 'kknh djus dks vuqefr izkIr gS] fcuk igys ljdkj dh vuqefr izkIr fd;s nwljk fookg ugh djsxkA mDr of.kZr izkfo/kkuksa dk mYya?ku vkjksih gs0dk0 }kjk fd;k tkuk ik;k tk jgk gSA fu'd'kZ%& mijksDr of.kZr leLr lk{; ,oa lkf{k;ksa ds vfHkdFkuksa o miyC/k djk;s x;s vfHkys[kksa ds lrZd v/;;u] oLrqfu'B fo'ys'k.k rFkk vR;ar lgkuqHkwfriwoZd fopkj ds mijkUr vkjksfir gsM dkUl0 36 l0iq0 ohjsUnz ;kno ds fo:} yxk;k x;k mDr vkjksi lEiw.kZr% izekf.kr gksrk gS fd vkjksih gs0 dka0 }kjk ,d iRuh ds thfor jgrs gq, fcuk vuqefr izkIr fd;s nwljk fookg fd;k gS] tks m0 iz0 ljdkjh deZpkjh dh vkpj.k fu;ekoyh&1956 ds vUrxZr /kkjk 29 ¼1½ esa of.kZr izkfo/kkuksa dk mYya?ku gS] tks cgw fookg dh Js.kh esa vkrk gSA jkT; ljdkj }kjk cgw fookg dks izfrfl} djrs gq, mDr vkpj.k fu;ekoyh esa fu;e iz[;kfIr djrs gq, Li'V mYys[k fd;k gS fd fdlh O;fDr ¼ljdkjh deZpkjh½ dks ftlds ,d ls vf/kd ifRu;k gks vius v/khu lsokvksa esa ;k inks ij fu;qfDr fd;s tkus ls oftZr dj fn;k gSA bl izdkj mijksDr vkjksi ds iw.kZ:i ls izekf.kr gksus dh n'kk esa eS ihBklhu vf/kdkjh vkjksfir gs0 dk0 ds mDr d`R; ds fy, lsok ls i`Fkd fd;s tkus dh laLrqfr djrk gwWA"
The enquiry officer having come to the conclusion that the petitioner had contracted a second marriage during the lifetime of first wife, for lack of permission being obtained, found the petitioner guilty of violation of Rule 29 (1) of the Conduct Rules of 1956. This finding of enquiry officer does not suffer from any fault or infirmity particularly when the petitioner had admitted the relationship with Smt. Sangita and the same had come out to be proved by way of second marriage without permission applied for. The enquiry officer while forwarding the enquiry report, also made a mention of strict instructions of the State Government for not retaining the persons having contracted second marriage in government service. A show cause notice alongwith enquiry report was issued to the petitioner. The petitioner submitted reply to the show cause notice on 10.4.2008 taking a stand that he had not actually married Smt. Sangita but had entered into a relationship with her with the consent of his first wife and the same not being impermissible under law, therefore, alleged misconduct under Rule 29 (1) was sought to be justified. There appears to be a challenge to the framing of charge under Rule 29 (1) as well but the fact remains that in enquiry the petitioner admitted relationship with Smt. Sangita as that of marriage and subsequently the same relationship has been justified as living together with the consent of first wife. During enquiry proceedings Smt. Kesa Devi, the first wife of the petitioner, had also withdrawn her complaint so as to reinforce the stand of the petitioner she having permitted the petitioner to do so. The disciplinary authority while considering the enquiry report and the reply submitted by the petitioner came to the conclusion that the relationship between the petitioner and Smt. Sangita could not be classified other than by way of marriage and this finding was recorded on the basis of the enquiry report submitted by the enquiry officer. The disciplinary authority feeling satisfied about the violation of Rule 29 (1), proceeded to pass the impugned order and the same has been upheld by the appellate authority.
Both the parties have cited case laws on the point to substantiate their stand.
Learned counsel for the petitioner has cited the following cases in support of his submissions:
(i) Triloki Nath Pathak v. The Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal (2) Lucknow and others 2014 (32) LCD 757
(ii) Chairman-cum-Managing Director, Coal India Limited and another v. Mukul Kumar Choudhuri and others (2009) 15 SCC 620
(iii) Sant Kumar Upadhyay v. State of U.P. and others (2003) 2 UPLBEC 1496
(iv) Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India and others (1987) 4 SCC 611
(v) Union of India and others v. Giriraj Sharma 1994 Supp. (3) SCC 755
(vi) Rajbala Sharma (Smt.) v. State of U.P. and others (2009) 3 UPLBEC 2295
(vii) Pancham Giri v. State of U.P. and others 2010 (2) ESC 1441 (All.)
(viii) Ministry of Finance and another v. S. B. Ramesh (1998) 3 SCC 227
(ix) Shravan Kumar Pandey v. State of U.P. and others 2010 (8) ADJ 243
(x) M. V. Bijlani v. Union of India and others 2006 SCC (L&S) 919
(xi) S. N. Pandey v. State of U.P. and others 1999 (17) LCD 33
(xii) Anil Kumar Singh v. State of U.P. and others 1993 (11) LCD 611
(xiii) Pravina Solanki v. State of U.P. and others (2001) 2 UPLBEC 1354
(xiv) Payal Sharma alias Kamla Sharma alias Payal Katara v. Superintendent, Nari Niketan, Kalindri Vihar, Agra and others.
AIR 2001 Allahabad 254
(xv) Asha Ram Verma and others v. State of U.P. and others 2003 (21) LCD 493 (xvi) Ram Pal Singh v. Director of Agriculture, U.P. and others 2012 (30) LCD 843 (xvii) Kranti Associates Private Limited and another v. Masood Ahmed Khan and others (2010) 9 SCC 496 (xviii) Union of India and others v. J. Ahmed AIR 1979 SC 1022 On the basis of the aforesaid decisions, relationship between the petitioner and Smt. Sangita has been sought to be defended being permissible albeit the said marriage is forbidden under law.
Smt. Sangeeta Chandra, learned Chief Standing Counsel while defending the impugned order very ably, defended the orders passed by the competent authority and cited the following case laws:
(i) Ramesh Chand v. Executive Engineer and others 2012 (1) ADJ 143
(ii) Khursheed Ahmad Khan v. State of U.P. and others 2015 III AD SC 91
(iii) Ramesh Pal Singh v. Union of India 2008 (1) UPLBEC 46
(iv) Pawan Kumar Misra v. State of U.P. and others 2014 (4) ADJ 612 (DB)
(v) Ram Pratap Singh v. State of U.P. and others 2015 (2) ADJ 758
(vi) Afroz Khan v. State of U.P. and others 2014 (5) AWC 4512
(vii) Union of India and another v. K.G. Soni (2006) 6 SCC 794
(viii) State of Orrisa and others v. Bidyabhushan Mohapatra AIR 1963 SC 779
(ix) M. M. Malhotra v. Union of India and others (2005) 8 SCC 351
(x) State Bank of India and others v. Ramarendra Kishore Endow and another 1994 SCC (L&S) 687
(xi) High Court of Judicature at Bombay through its Registrar V. Udaysingh and others (1997) 5 SCC 129
(xii) Om Kumar and others v. Union of India (2001) 2 SCC 386
(xiii) State Bank of India and others v. Narendra Kumar Pandey (2013) 2 SCC 740 In view of rival contentions and having regard to the decisions cited by both the parties, there is hardly any doubt to hold the petitioner not guilty of contracting second marriage or at least contracting a second relationship during lifetime of his first wife, who is not only dependent upon the petitioner but there being a sacramental relationship with the first wife, she stands protected under the provisions of Hindu Marriage Act to which the Conduct Rules are subservient. The scope of permission under Rule 29 (1) is also not available to the petitioner being a Hindu, therefore, the order passed by the disciplinary authority on the ground of jurisdiction does not suffer from any illegality. Testing the proportionality of punishment in a situation where misconduct is clearly made out, the power of judicial review of this Court stands narrowed down in as much as interstitial space for a law to be made by the Judge is very narrow rather absent.
The case laws cited by learned Chief Standing Counsel seek to enforce the provisions of Hindu Marriage Act and a strong vision of discipline on that premise, as is embodied under Rule 29 (1) of the Conduct Rules.
The Court being in agreement with the respectful view taken in the decisions mentioned above, is left with no option but to reiterate the position of law in the same terms except for the reason that law and justice do not remain distant neighbours. The prohibition to contract a second marriage is primarily aimed to safeguard the family relationship of first marriage coupled with other statutory rights arising as a result of marriage i.e. property and legitimacy of children etc. Situation would be different if upholding of law is visibly seen to serve the purpose as to what law is but on a close analysis it appears to be distant from object of justice to the person for whose welfare the law in such a form is upheld. A person for example in the case at hand having contracted a relationship with another women with the loss of job would further let the first wife languish and would evade from providing her shelter and other basic amenities of life for she being the cause of a calamity of losing the job though he may be equally responsible for the same.
The object of justice drives the attention of this Court to have a re-look at the provisions of Rule 29 of Conduct Rules, 1956 which for ready reference is reproduced below:
"29 (1): No Govt. Servant who has a wife living shall contract another marriage without first obtaining the permission of the Govt. notwithstanding that such subsequent marriage is permissible under the personal law for the time being applicable to him.
(2) No female Govt. Servant shall marry any person who has a wife living without first obtaining permission of the Govt.
The above rules were framed in the year 1956 and came into force w.e.f. 21.7.1956 and at the relevant point of time Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 had already come into force. The language used in Rule 29 of the Conduct Rules, 1956 is very guarded despite the fact that by virtue of Section 11 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, a marriage, while a party has a living spouse at the time of marriage, is recognised as nullity in the eye of law but on being declared so by a competent court of law on the motion of either party thereto. The object of this provision is again to strengthen the existing relationship of first marriage and safeguard the institution of marriage being a sacramental relationship in our beliefs of religious philosophy codified in law. Once the statutory provision envisages a clear de-recognition on the freedom of a citizen particularly in government service for contracting second marriage, why under the Conduct Rules, 1956, the same act is legitimized on the basis of permission as a general rule appears to be a conscious liberty granted in the spirit of Article 21 of the Constitution of India which has to be understood in the context of law of marriages.
The complainant in the instant case having protection of Section 11 as well as Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, has neither availed Section 11 for declaration of second marriage as void nor has she sought divorce on the grounds available to her under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. Besides, no case under Section 494 IPC in the light of Section 17 of Hindu Marriage Act, has been lodged against the conduct of her husband. Is it the existence of these hard facts embedded in our religious philosophy guided by strong customs of faith in the sacramental relationship that the complainant begs of to her husband's conduct to be viewed as an act not amounting to moral turpitude, therefore, treating the act to be one forbidden under law, prays for it being within the scope of Rule 29 calling for permission by the State to classify the act not to be a misconduct. In my considered opinion law makes a distinction between an act forbidden under law and misconduct and the present being a situation of act forbidden under law, may not be viewed to be a misconduct barring for the reason that permission was not sought for.
On being satisfied about the violation of law, the government has not acted in the spirit of reformative law against the petitioner but has rather punished the first wife who ought to have been protected under some punitive measures beneficial to her and deterrent against the culprit. Even the scope of lodging a complaint in respect of such offences is controlled and the government has done nothing except bringing a state of misfortune for the whole family.
In my realistic approach why the marriage would not be a contract but a sacramental relationship is largely due to the economic dependence of a female on her male partner, coupled with her obedient human nature vulnerable to the genetic capacity of reproduction. The male partner from older days has had better educational opportunities and incomparative advantages helpful for economic independence as compared to female. The feminine life has largely been passive left influenced by the local environment unlike the life of a male who is termed as breadwinner. The economic liberation of feminine has thrown more challenges to the institution of marriage rather creating stability, therefore, sound economic balance between a couple of unmatchable physical, social and economic potential would play a balancing role towards the success of this institution that would help the people grow under the influence of positive law rather than so called personal laws stretched at variance.
Failure of marriages is a hard reality and the ground realities are manifold which can be sufficiently traced from our religious dogmas and social practices since vedic period like child marriage, venereal diseases or mental disorder, disparity in education, age or cultural conflicts, calamities, enmity, reproductive disability, obedience to the will of parents, ambitions, partition, migration, displacement, acquisition of foreign nationality, terrorism, unfulfilled connubial and many more, apart from dowry, desertion and cruelty as is the general belief. It is perhaps former area to which the language of Rule 29 applies in the spirit of Article 21 of the Constitution within the broader objects of Hindu Marriage Act for the welfare of first spouse, whose maintenance is the primary duty of a disciplined citizen. The legislation 'Hindu Marriage Act', is a wrong title given to the positive scheme of laws which, with an insertion of exception attempted in this judgement and just exceptions, deserves to be titled as 'Indian Marriage Act' applicable to all the citizens. (suggestive) The instant case is a unique instance of observance of 'Patni Dharma' and looking to the attitude of complainant showing unbridled faith in sacramental relationship which this Court weighed through ocular estimation of the behaviour and oral version of first wife during court proceedings being personally present as per Court order.
To put on record it may suffice to say that the first wife innocently owned the responsibility and pleaded that she unknowingly became the cause of her husband's grief and attributed the misconduct to herself for making the unwarranted complaint being helpless due to the death of her parents that too under the guidance of some person well versed with the legal rights but not of her own volition. If that extra element of guidance had not intervened, perhaps everything would have settled right as the victim wife believed, an act forbidden under law would have yet established its existence within the exceptional area of Article 21 due to husband's conduct of treating and maintaining her well and in that eventuality, the language used in Rule 29 would stand to justify the permission and the real intent of rule making authority emerges to serve the purpose. The government servants who are within the ordinary reach of State are bound to be a model of happy and disciplined life, unlike unemployed/self-employed class. The former class can be easily subjected to financial accountability towards first marriage. In my humble opinion it is the creation of a financial obligation as a measure of reformation which violation of Rule-29 would attract so as to achieve the object of monogamy in line with Article 21 of the Constitution of India, rather a harsh punitive measure. Any measure which unsettles the family as a whole is counter productive. The scientific tenor of reformative law is bound to be understood and observed within the broad and inclusive scope of Article 21 of the Constitution.
Marriage as an association plays a vital role to discipline the conduct of a natural person in human society. Marriage elevates the standard of life, liberty and ensures peace, marriages are sacrament and regulate the legitimacy of reproduction. At no cost first marriage of a couple should be left surrounded by economic crisis, want of recognition in terms of respect and dignity. All these concepts are the vital means of social existence of mankind achieved through marriage, therefore, sovereign law has to act like a guardian to the first marriage for achieving the real object and allow genuine exceptions to settle equally in respect of all and permission on well defined economic sanctions and equitable treatment, being the exception to normal rule, be recognised to streamline marriage laws so as to achieve the object of common civil code on a vital subject like marriage. (suggestive) There is no other aim of above discussion except to discover the gray area within which rule 29 of the Conduct Rules would classify an act forbidden under law to be a source of compensatory remedy for the well being of real victim instead of leaving the culprit free and at liberty to enjoy the fruits of a social crime or disorder.
The scope of above rule mandates for screening a forbidden act objectively so that the institution of marriage is not only strengthened but is established to discourage live-in relationships which is surfacing against the objects of reformative law as is the alternative defence pleaded in the case. If live-in relationship is allowed to transcend lawlessly as a permissible way of life, in preference to marriages under permissible conditions, days are not far when organized and dignified life, discipline and peace would be concepts in our imaginations far from being a reality. Speaking for myself and with due respect to the concept of mystical faith, bordered development of Personal Laws during post independence, we owe and is vitally traced to the masqueraded wisdom of conceiving human relationship in a rigid form opposed to the classical customary practices constituting way of life which, of course, have a force of law and the philosophy of divine and natural law comes to the rescue of this argument. The institution of marriage links human behaviour with an undefined spirit i.e. a creation of divine, therefore, law made by the Parliament on such an issue has to stand the pure tests of Article 15 (1) of the Constitution of India, which embodies equality as a basic principle, as the faith in equality alone has led to the evolution of political welfare State.
Hinduism as a way of life is the most primitive civilized order to recognise the concept of mystical faith in the behaviour of human beings living in an organised society and various forms in which faith is universally practised lies on the broader plane of life cycle as conceived in holy 'Vedas' and 'Geeta' and there is no reason to discriminate on the ground of form or language in which faith is individually practised. The behavioural independence of a natural person in the context of Article 14 and 19 of the Constitution of India, is as vast as Article 21 which is inclusive of all laws and as narrow as it stands regulated by positive law but equality has to be achieved for the larger object of welfare reachable to all. It is a misnomer that customary law is the religious law whereas the fact is that the religion is above law. Customs and usages are liberated forms of behaviour in absence of an effective social order restricting human behaviour strictly as per positive law, may be, some of the customs and usages are a form of positive law once the same are believed to be permissible within the ambit of positive law. Therefore, the meaning of law provided in Article 13(2) of the Constitution when applied to define the reach of Article 21, in my considered opinion, is inclusively exhaustive and here I beg to differ with the eminent Judges, who have ruled otherwise.
Article 25 (1) of the Constitution is an entity of spiritualism above positive and customary law. Every individual is free to embrace a particular sense of faith and belief out of his free will to attain spiritual heights but as soon as a natural person comes out of the environment of spiritual behaviour, the test whereof is 'harmless state', he is bound to be obedient to positive law at service. Time is right to safeguard the economic security of marriage in secular India, promote adoption and define the permissive exceptions wisely as per customary law so as to streamline the life of all in accordance with positive law, as the basic object of positive law is inclusive unity for a social change running on the wheels of realism and science. In other words, marriage filters a human being from the state of spiritualism into realism so as to be a subject of positive law and so is the position when an individual associates his spiritual, mental or physical presence in an activity having a bearing on social order. Any diversity in positive laws would challenge the aim of unified welfare which is the basic object of a welfare State, therefore, striking a balance in the present scenario of population growth, in my view, is emergent. The diversity of law on a subject like marriage is breeding hatred affecting the public order at large which is bound to have far reaching consequences and an exception in terms of Rule 29 applicable equally to all would streamline the system to achieve public order, peace and fraternity. The authority of permission in respect of government servants vests in the government whereas authority to grant permission in other organised institutions would be regulated by the employer. The rest of people for this purpose would be governed by the institutions, private or public, recognised by law. The need for carving out an exception is also necessary for the reason that a political welfare State comprises of a subjects of diverse legendary and faith led by majority rule and just exceptions so as to prove the rule have to be sustained. (suggestive) The provisions of statute being narrowly inconsistent and opposed to vastness of Article 21 of the Constitution of India governing a diverse society certainly leave scope for judge made law and each case is bound to be decided on its own facts.
The word 'permission' used in Rule 29 essentially is a charter of duty liable to be expressly imposed on noticing the violation of sacramental or contractual marital relationship by a government servant. It is acknowledged that citizens of this country of their own will and choice have embraced the rule of monogamy as an acceptable and healthy way of life but for the exceptions visible in all denominations, the emerging situations are bound to be dealt with effectively so as to control the distortions defeating the purpose and object of monogamy.
The positive law recognises polygamy and polyandry to be the outdated permissive exceptions in terms of Rule 29 reproduced above, which broadly may lie within the scope of Article 21 of the Constitution of India allowing a citizen to settle within the vastness of universal behaviour. The universal and sovereign considerations have to be balanced for the multifaceted growth of people in order to achieve peace and stability. Human conduct in marital relationship and in the situation of multifaceted diversities is not to be judged and decided under ideal conditions alone.
Time is not far when even a married couple for definite medical reasons would singly or mutually opt for healthy children through surrogacy or the spouse for the same very reasons may refuse to be the mother though obliged in a sacramental or contractual relationship, therefore, the marriage laws have not only to be liberal but time testing as well. Positive law in a welfare state has to play a progressive role in the matter of human relationship stimulated out of natural spirit. The Marriage Act, 1955 having regard to its reformative object is bound to be understood in the background of universal human behaviour which historically does not stand at variance.
Rule 29 of the Conduct Rules, 1956 has come to be framed after the enforcement of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.
Section 4 of Hindu Marriage Act states as under:
"4. Overriding effect of Act: Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act,
(a) any text rule or interpretation of Hindu law or any custom or usage as part of that law in force immediately before the commencement of this Act shall cease to have effect with respect to any matter for which provision is made in this Act;
(b) any other law in force immediately before the commencement of this Act shall cease to have effect in so far as it is inconsistent with any of the provisions contained in this Act."
Although the essence of Rule 29 understood within the broader scope of Article 21 read with Article 15, stands the test Article 44 contained in of Part IV of the Constitution of India but the same being subservient to the Statute, the same cannot be construed in a manner to recognise the rule by way of an exception.
In the light of the aforesaid discussion, this Court is of the considered opinion that the impugned punishment order requires reconsideration by the State Government for taking a lenient view, therefore, looking to the peculiar facts and circumstances of the present case, it is left open to the petitioner to make a fresh representation before the State Government within a period of one month from the date of this judgement and the same shall be considered by the Chief Secretary, Government of U.P. and decided accordingly in terms of the observations made hereinabove within a period of three months thereafter. In case a lenient view is taken by the State Government, the economic needs of petitioner's first wife shall be secured by incorporating suitable conditions in the order so passed.
The writ petition is accordingly allowed, subject to the outcome of the directions issued hereinabove.
Dated: Jan. 22, 2016 MFA Court No. - 8 Case :- SERVICE SINGLE No. - 4614 of 2008 Hon'ble Attau Rahman Masoodi,J.
The writ petition is allowed vide orders of date, on separate sheets.
Dated: Jan. 22, 2016 MFA
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Title

Virendra Yadav vs State Of U.P. Thru Prin. Secy. Home ...

Court

High Court Of Judicature at Allahabad

JudgmentDate
22 January, 2016
Judges
  • Attau Rahman Masoodi