JUDGMENT Anjani Kumar, J.
1. The petitioner-tenant, who is aggrieved by the order dated 21st August, 2002, passed by the Judge Small Cause Court, Kanpur Nagar in Suit No. 220 of 1992 and the order dated 25th February, 2003, passed by the revisional court in S.C.C. Revision No. 70 of 2002, approached this Court by means of this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
2. The brief facts, as stated in the writ petition, are as under :
That the premises in question was let out to petitioner's father, Sri Girdhari Lal Chopra, in the year 1950. Sri Girdhari Lal Chopra, father of the petitioner, died in the month of October, 1986, leaving behind the petitioner -- Virendra Kumar Chopra, Vijay Chopra and Rajeev Chopra, All the three sons of late Girdhari Lal Chopra, according to the petitioner, succeeded the tenancy of late Girdhari Lal Chopra. The respondent-landlord served a notice dated 29th January, 1991 to the petitioner for payment of arrears of rent as the tenant is in default of rent for more than four months and for ejectment after termination of tenancy. The notice was served on the tenant. A suit was filed on 28th March, 1992. being Suit No. 220 of 1992 for ejectment of the petitioner and recovery of arrears of rent and damages. The trial court by its judgment and order dated 16th July, 1996, decreed the Suit No. 220 of 1992. Aggrieved thereby the petitioner preferred a revision before the revisional court being Revision No. 92 of 1996. Another revision was filed by the landlord being Revision No. 100 of 1996. The revisional court by its order dated 14th February, 1997, allowed both the revisions and remanded back the matter to the trial court for decision in accordance with the observations made in the order of the revisional court. During the pendency of the case after remand an application for amendment of written statement was filed before the trial court by the petitioner-tenant which has been rejected by the trial court by order dated 28th April, 1997. The petitioner preferred a revision against the order dated 28th April, 1997, before the revisional court which was dismissed on 22nd August, 1998. Thereafter a Writ Petition No. 28377 of 1998 was filed by the petitioner before this Court against the remand order dated 14th February, 1997, passed by revisional court and this Court dismissed the said writ petition by judgment dated 27th July, 2000.
3. After remand the trial court by its judgment and order dated 21st August, 2002, decreed the Suit No. 220 of 1992 after complying with the direction of the remand order of the revisional court. The petitioner-tenant preferred a revision being S.C.C. Revision No. 70 of 2002 challenging the order dated 21st August, 2002, whereby the trial court decreed the suit. During the pendency of revision before the revisional court the petitioner-tenant approached this Court by way of Writ Petition No. 42705 of 2001 against order dated 4th September, 2001, which was dismissed by this Court by order dated 18th December, 2001, with the observations that proceedings in S.C.C. Suit may be decided expeditiously, preferably within six months from the date of filing the certified copy of the judgment dated 18th December, 2001.
4. During the pendency of Rent Revision No. 70 of 2002, which was filed challenging the judgment and order dated 21st August, 2002, passed by the trial court after remand in S.C.C. Suit No. 220 of 1992, some grounds were sought to be amended and incorporated which was allowed by the revisional court after imposing cost. Ultimately the revision was dismissed by the impugned order dated 25th February, 2003. Thus, this writ petition.
5. The trial court formulated the following three points for decision out of pleadings of the parties :
(1) Whether the tenancy is in the name of sole defendant or his brothers are also tenants along with the defendant and whether the rent of the accommodation in dispute is Rs. 160 per month or enhanced to Rs. 320 per month, if so, when it was enhanced?
(2) Whether notice served on the defendant by the plaintiff is a valid notice as the notice has not been served on all the tenants?
(3) Whether the tenant has materially altered the accommodation in dispute?
6. The trial court by its judgment and order dated 16th July, 1996, has found that no material alteration has been done by the tenant. It has found that the notice served on the defendant is sufficient notice along with finding that the defendant is in arrears of rent and therefore decreed the suit for ejectment and arrears of rent and damages. Against the judgment and order dated 16th July, 1996, the matter went in revision when the revisional court remanded back the matter by order dated 14th February, 1997, with the direction to the trial court to give a fresh finding as held in the judgment and order of the revisional court in accordance with law. The point on which the matter was remanded back by the revisional court was as to whether the tenant was defaulter in payment of rent, if so, its effect?
7. As already stated the trial court after remand by its judgment and order dated 21st August, 2002, held that in continuation the finding recorded in the judgment and order dated 16th July, 1996, it is held that the defendant has committed default in payment of rent and therefore the suit is decreed. Aggrieved thereby, as already stated, the petitioner-tenant preferred a revision. Before the revisional court it appears that the only point argued was that the finding recorded by the trial court on the question as to whether the defendant has committed default in payment of rent if so, its effect. The contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner before this Court as well as before the trial court and the revisional court is that the trial court as well as the revisional court has committed an error in calculating the arrears of rent by including such rent which has become time barred and since revisional court and the trial court has not considered this aspect of the matter which, according to the learned Counsel for the petitioner, is covered by the decision of this Court in Padamnath Jaikishan v. Mohan Lal Agrawal and Ors., 1989 (1) ARC 150 and the decision in Kripa Dutt Bhatt v. Additional District Judge. Bareilly, 1984 (2) ARC 259. Learned Counsel submitted that these decisions of this Court and the decision of the Apex Court in Ram Deo v. Umrao Singh, 198O ARC 153. wherein the Apex Court has ruled as submitted by learned Counsel for the petitioner that if there is default in payment of rent prior to period of agreement then such default cannot be treated as default for the purpose of eviction as contemplated under provisions of the Act (namely Section 20 of U.P. Act No.13 of 1972) (hereinafter referred to as the Act).
8. On the other hand learned Counsel for the respondent has relied upon the decision in Khadi Gram Udyog Trust v. Ram Chandraji Virajman Mandir, Sarsaiya Ghat, Kanpur, 1978 ARC 59, wherein it has been held by the Apex Court that the tenant in order to take benefit of Section 20 (4) of the Act has to deposit even time barred rent. On the question of notice only to the defendant the revisional court has relied upon this Court's decision in Sandeep v. Vth Additional District Judge, Bijnor and Ors., 2000 (2) ARC 474, wherein this Court has held that notice to one of the joint tenant is sufficient and even other joint tenants are not impleaded as defendant the suit cannot be dismissed on this ground alone. In this view of the matter the revision filed by the petitioner-tenant was rightly dismissed by the revisional court.
9. Before this Court learned Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon a decision of the Apex Court in Ram Deo v. Umrao Singh, 1980 ARC 153 and also a decision in Harcharan Singh v. Smt. Shivrani, 1981 ARC 381, for the proposition that time barred rent cannot be subject matter of eviction under Section 20 of the Act by way of filing a suit and the trial court as well as the revisional court committed an error. Reading of the aforesaid two decisions clearly demonstrate that these decisions do not help the petitioner in any way in the facts and circumstances of the present case.
10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has further relied upon the decision in Gokaran Singh v. 1st Additional District and Sessions Judge, Hardoi and Ors., 2000 (1) ARC 653. To me it appears that the facts of the case of Gokaran Singh (supra), are different from the facts of the present case, therefore are not applicable to the law laid down in the case of Gokaran Singh (supra).
11. Learned Counsel for the petitioner thereafter submitted that findings arrived at by the trial court and affirmed by the revisional court are perverse and if permitted he will demonstrate that the conclusion arrived at by the trial court and affirmed by the revisional court, though the same was not challenged before the revisional court, require interference by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In view of law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Ranjeet Singh v. Ravi Prakash, , this Court will not reappraise the evidence in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India unless the petitioner demonstrates that the findings arrived at by the trial court and affirmed by the revisional court are either perverse or suffer from manifest error of law. Nothing has been demonstrated by learned Counsel for the petitioner to bring his case within the ambit permissible by law laid down by the Apex Court that the findings arrived at by the trial court. and affirmed by the revisional court are either perverse or suffer from manifest error of law. So far as question of law raised by the petitioner before the trial court and the revisional court and the answer given by the trial court and affirmed by the revisional court are concerned, in my opinion, they do not warrant any interference in view of what has been discussed above.
12. This writ petition has, therefore, no force and is dismissed. Interim order, if any, stands vacated.