JUDGMENT Dilip Gupta, J.
1. This writ petition has been filed for quashing the order dated 17.1.1997 passed by the Deputy General Manager, Syndicate Bank by which the petitioner was dismissed from the service of the Bank with immediate effect and the order dated 21.6.1997 passed by the Appellate Authority rejecting the Appeal filed by the petitioner against the aforesaid dismissal order.
2. The petitioner was working as a Clerk in the Bank. A charge sheet was served upon the petitioner mentioning therein that he was instrumental in getting a Saving Bank Account No. 40930 opened at Meerut Main Branch of the Bank in the name of Rajiv Bhardwaj with an initial deposit of Rs. 10/- by signing as Rajiv Bhardwaj. He then got prepared a Demand Draft for S. 3.85 lacs making use of a Demand Draft leaf bearing No. 162052 of II. series, pilfered by him from the Meerut Main Branch. The said Draft was shown to have been issued by Baraut Branch in favour of Rajiv Bhardwaj. It was then presented at Meerut Main Branch for crediting the proceeds to SB Account No. 40930 in the name of Rajiv Bhardwaj on 9.10.1991. Subsequently he destroyed the paid Demand Draft for Rs. 3.85 lacs and tore off the account opening form of SB Account No. 40930 so that the portion showing the name of the introducer and his account number was removed. The chequebook was, however, not delivered by the Branch when it came to the knowledge that the relevant SB Account opening form Had been torn. Consequently the amount could not be withdrawn by the petitioner.
3. The petitioner submitted a detailed reply to the charge-sheet and participated in the enquiry before the Enquiry Officer. The Enquiry Officer submitted a detailed report holding the petitioner guilty of the charges levelled against him. A notice was thereafter issued to the petitioner to show-cause why the proposed punishment of dismissal from service from the Bank should not be imposed upon him and a copy of the Enquiry Report was also enclosed. The Disciplinary Authority gave a personal hearing to the petitioner also and then passed the dismissal order clearly mentioning that the petitioner had been given a fair and reasonable opportunity to defend himself in the enquiry and that the Enquiry Officer after properly analysing the evidence had held the petitioner guilty of the charges. The petitioner then filed an Appeal against the aforesaid order, which was also dismissed. The Appellate Authority has also recorded a finding that the Enquiry Officer gave proper opportunity to the petitioner to defend his case and has also elaborately discussed the evidence and given cogent persons for arriving at the conclusions. The Appellate Authority has also recorded a finding that the punishment awarded to the petitioner was not disproportionate to the misconduct committed by him.
4. I have heard the learned Counsel for the petitioner and Sri P.K. Singhal, learned Counsel appearing for the respondent-Bank and have perused the materials available on record.
5. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the enquiry had been conducted in utter breach of the principles of natural justice. He further challenged the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer and also submitted that in fact no loss had been caused to the Bank and that the punishment of dismissal from service awarded to the petitioner was highly disproportionate.
6. Learned Counsel for the Bank, Sri P.K. Singhal, however, submitted that a detailed enquiry was held in the matter after giving adequate opportunity to the petitioner to place his defence; that the report of the Enquiry Officer elaborately deals with every aspect of the matter; that the findings have been recorded on the basis of both oral and documentary evidence; that the petitioner cannot avoid the punishment merely because no loss was actually caused to the Bank and that the punishment awarded to the petitioner cannot be said to be disproportionate to the offence.
7. I have carefully considered the submissions advanced by the learned Counsel for the parties.
8. A bare perusal of the enquiry report clearly shows that the petitioner was given ample opportunity to defend his case. A detailed charge sheet dated 17.6.1993 was served upon the petitioner to which he submitted a reply dated 5.7.1993. The Management Representatives submitted the list of documents and the list of the witnesses. The documents and the list were made available to the petitioner. The management relied, upon 26 documents and three witnesses to establish the charge while the petitioner examined himself. The petitioner also cross-examined the witnesses. After the completion of the enquiry both the parties were advised to submit their written briefs and in fact they submitted their briefs also. In such circumstances the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that principles of natural justice had been violated in the conduct of the enquiry, cannot be accepted.
9. Learned Counsel for the petitioner then contended that the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer were vitiated. In effect he wanted the Court to reappraise the evidence.
10. Regarding re-appreciation of evidence by the High Court, the Supreme Court in the case of High Court of Judicature at Bombay through its Registrar v. Shri Uday singh s/o Ganpatrao Naik Nimbalkar and Ors. JT 1997 (5) SC 298 clearly held as follows:-
...In judicial review, it is settled law that the Court or the Tribunal has no power to trench on the jurisdiction to appreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own conclusion. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. It is meant to ensure that the delinquent receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the view of the Court or Tribunal. When the conclusion reached by the authority is based on evidence, Tribunal is devoid of power to reappreciate the evidence and would (sic) come to its own conclusion on the proof of the charge. The only consideration the Court/Tribunal has in its judicial review is to consider whether the conclusion is based on evidence on record and supports the finding or whether the conclusion is based on no evidence. This is the consistent view of this Court vide B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India , State of Tamil Nadu v. T.V. Venugopalan : , Union of India v. Upendra Singh , Government of Tamil Nadu v. A. Rajapandian and B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India (at pp. 759-60)
11. The Supreme Court in Rae Bareli Kshetriya Gramin Bank v. Bhola Nath Singh and Ors. held as follows:-
...Under these circumstances, the question arises whether the High Court would be correct in law to appreciate the evidence and the manner in which the evidence was examined and to record a finding in that behalf Judicial review is not akin to adjudication of the case on merits as an appellate authority. The High Court, in the proceedings under Article 226 does not act as an appellate authority but exercises within the limits of judicial review to correct errors of law or procedural errors leading to manifest injustice or violation of principles of natural justice. In this case, no such errors were pointed out nor any finding in that behalf was recorded by the High Court. On the, other hand, the High Court examined the evidence as if it is a court of first appeal and reversed the finding of fact recorded by the enquiry officer and accepted by disciplinary authority. Under these circumstances, the question of examining the evidence, as was done by the High Court, as a first appellate court, is wholly illegal and cannot be sustained.
12. In R.S. Saini v. State of Punjab , the Supreme Court observed as follows:-
Before adverting to the first contention of the appellant regarding want of material to establish the charge, and of non-application of mind, we will have to bear in mind the rule that the court while exercising writ jurisdiction will not reverse a finding of the inquiring authority on the ground that the evidence adduced before it is Insufficient. If there is some evidence to reasonably support the conclusion of the inquiring authority, It is not the junction of the court to review the evidence and to arrive at its own independent finding. The inquiring authority is the sole judge of the fact so long as there is some legal evidence to substantiate the finding and the adequacy or reliability of the evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the court in writ proceedings.
A narration of the charges and the reasons of the inquiring authority, for accepting the charges, as seen from the records, shows that the inquiring authority has based its conclusions on materials available on record after considering the defence put forth by the appellant and these decisions, in our opinion, have been taken in a reasonable manner and objectively. The conclusion arrived at by the inquiring authority cannot be termed as either being perverse or not based on any material nor is it a case where there has been any non-application of mind on the part of the inquiring authority. Likewise, the High Court has looked into the material based on which the enquiry officer has come to the conclusion, within the limited scope available to it under Article 226 of the Constitution and we do not find any fault with the findings of the High Court in this regard.
13. In the case of Lalit Popli v. Canara Bank and Ors. the Supreme Court observed as follows:-
While exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution the High Court does not act as an appellate authority. Its jurisdiction is circumscribed by limits of judicial review to correct errors of law or procedural errors leading to manifest injustice or violation of principles of natural justice. Judicial review is not akin to adjudication of the case on merits as an appellate authority.
14. In the present case, the Enquiry Officer, on the basis of the evidence on record, has recorded a categorical finding that the petitioner opened SB Account No. 40930 in the name of Rajiv Bhardwaj at Meerut Main Branch in a fictitious and fraudulent manner and removed the Demand Draft leaf from the custody of Meerut Main Branch, got prepared the said stolen leaf for Rs. 3,85,000/- and got the proceeds of said Demand Draft credited to the SB Account No. 40930 and attempted to withdraw the proceeds. A further finding has been recorded that in order to conceal the said fraudulent and dishonest act, he resorted to destruction of the Demand Draft in question and tore the introducer's particulars in the form. These are findings of fact and the learned Counsel for the petitioner has not been able to point out any finding recorded by the enquiry officer which could be termed as perverse and nor could he point out any error of law leading to manifest injustice. The Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority have also considered the matter in detail and have also recorded categorical findings. In this view of the matter, the contention of the petitioner cannot be accepted.
15. Learned Counsel for the petitioner then contended that the order imposing punishment is disproportionate. This argument has been seriously opposed by the learned Counsel for the respondent-Bank and it has been submitted that in the present case dismissal from service was the only appropriate punishment. In order to examine this contention it may be useful to refer the cases decided by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in this regard.
16. In Disciplinary Authority-cum-Regional Manager and Ors. v. Nikunja Bihari Patnaik the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed :-
... The findings of the Inquiry Officer which have been accepted by the disciplinary authority, and which have not been disturbed by the High Court, clearly show that in a number of instances the respondent allowed overdrafts or passed cheques involving substantial amounts beyond his authority.... If each officer/employee is allowed to act beyond his authority, the discipline of the organisation/bank will disappear; the functioning of the bank would become chaotic and unmanageable. Each officer of the bank cannot be allowed to carve out his own little empire wherein he dispenses favours and largesse. No organisation, more particularly, a bank can function properly and effectively if its officers and employees do not observe the prescribed norms and discipline. Such indiscipline cannot be condoned on the specious ground that it was not actuated by ulterior motives or by extraneous considerations.... As mentioned herein before, the very discipline of an organisation and more particularly, a bank is dependent upon each of its employees and officers acting and operating within their allotted sphere.... No further proof of loss is really necessary though as a matter of fact, in this case there are findings that several advances and overdrawals allowed by the respondent beyond his authority have become sticky and irrecoverable.
(emphasis supplied)
17. In Tara Chand Vyas v. Chairman & Disciplinary Authority and Ors. the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed:-
Economic empowerment is a fundamental right of the weaker sections of the people, in particular the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, ensured under Article 46 as a part of social and economic justice envisaged in the Preamble of the Constitution; the State is enjoined to promote their welfare effectuated under Article 38. Distribution of material resources to elongate that purpose envisaged in Article 39(b) is the means for the development of the weaker sections. The banking business and services were nationalsed to achieve the above objects. The nationalised banks, therefore, are the prime sources and pillars for establishment of socio-economic justice for the weaker sections. The employees and officers working in the banks are not merely the trustees of the society, but also bear responsibility and owe duty to the society for effectuation of socio-economic empowerment. Their acts and conduct should be in discharge of that constitutional objective and if they derelict in the performance of their duty, it impinges upon the enforcement of the constitutional philosophy, objective and the goals under the rule of law. Corruption has taken deep roots among the sections of the society and the employees holding public office or responsibility equally became amenable to corrupt conduct in the discharge of their official duty for illegal gratification. The banking business and services are also vitally affected by catastrophic corruption. Disciplinary measures should, therefore, aim to eradicate the corrupt proclivity of conduct on the part of the employees/officers in the public offices including those in banks. It would, therefore, be necessary to consider, from this perspective, the need for disciplinary action to eradicate corruption to properly channelise the use of the public funds, the live wire for effectuation of socio-economic justice in order to achieve the constitutional goals set down in the Preamble and to see that the corrupt conduct of the officers does not degenerate the efficiency of service leading to denationalisation of the banking system. What is more, the nationalisation of the banking service was done in the public interest. Every employee/officer in the bank should strive to see that banking operations or services are rendered in the best interest of the system and the society so as to effectuate the object of nationalisation. Any conduct that damages, destroys, defeats or tends to defeat the said purposes resultantly defeats or tends to defeat the constitutional objectives which can be meted out with disciplinary action in accordance with rules lest rectitude in public service is lost and service becomes a means and source of unjust enrichment at the cost of the society.
(emphasis supplied)
18. In Regional Manager, U.P. SRTC v. Hoti Lal the Supreme Court observed as under:-
If the charged employee holds a position of trust where honesty and integrity are inbuilt requirements of functioning, it would not be proper to deal with the matter leniently. Misconduct in such cases has to be dealt with iron hands. Where the person deals with public money or is engaged in financial transactions or acts in a fiduciary capacity, the highest degree of integrity and trustworthiness is a must and unexceptionable. Judged in that background, conclusions of the Division Bench of the High Court do not appear to be proper. We set aside the same and restore order of the learned Single Judge upholding the order of dismissal.
(emphasis supplied)
19. In Ganesh Santa Ram Sirur v. State Bank of India and Anr. the Supreme Court observed as under:-
... Mr. Salve submitted that the appellant, the Branch Manager of a Bank is required to exercise higher standards of honesty and integrity when he deals with the money of the depositors and the customers and, therefore, he is required to take all possible steps to protect the interest of the Bank and to discharge his duties with utmost integrity, honesty, devotion and diligence and to do nothing which is unbecoming of a bank officer. According to Mr. Salve, good conduct and discipline are inseparable for the functioning of every officer, manager or employee of the bank, who deals with public money and there is no defence available to say that no loss or profit resulted in the case, when the manager acted without authority and contrary to the Rules and the Scheme which is formulated to help the educated unemployed youth. Mr. Salve's above submission is well-merited acceptance and we see much force in the said submission.
The bank manager/officer and employees of any bank, nationalsed/or non-nationalised, are expected to act and discharge their functions in accordance with the rules and regulations of the bank. Acting beyond one's authority is by itself a breach of discipline and trust and misconduct. In the instant case Charge 5 framed against the appellant is very serious and grave in natured. We have already extracted the relevant Rule which prohibits the bank manager to sanction a loan to his wife or his relative or to any partner, While sanctioning the loan the appellant did not appear to have kept this aspect in mind and acted illegally and sanctioned the loan. He realised the mistake later and tried to salvage the same by not encashing the draft issued in the maiden name of his wife though the draft was issued but not encashed. The decision to sanction a loan is not an honest decision. Rule 34(3)(1) is a rule of integrity and, therefore, as rightly pointed out by Mr. Salve, the respondent Bank cannot afford to have the appellant as bank manager. The punishment of removal awarded by the appellate authority is just and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case.
(emphasis supplied)
20. In State Bank of India and Anr. v. Bela Bagchi and Ors. the Supreme Court observed as under:-
A bank officer is required to exercise higher standards of honesty and integrity. He deals with money of the depositors and the customers. Every officer/employee of the bank is required to take all possible steps to protect the interests of the bank and to discharge his duties with utmost integrity, honesty, devotion and diligence and to do nothing which is unbecoming of a bank officer. Good conduct and discipline are inseparable from the functioning of every officer/employee of the bank, As was observed by this Court in Disciplinary Authority-cum-Regional Manager v. Nikunja Bihari Patnaik , it is no defence available to say that there was no loss or profit which resulted in the case, when the officer/employee acted without authority. The very discipline of an organisation more particularly a bank is dependent upon each of its officers and officers acting and operating within their allotted sphere. Acting beyond one's authority is by itself a breach of discipline and is misconduct. The charges against the employee were not casual in nature and were serious. That being so, the plea about absence of loss is also sans substance.
(emphasis supplied)
21. In Canara Bank v. V.K. Awasthy 2005 AIR SCW 2005 the Supreme Court considered at length whether the punishment awarded was disproportionate in the matter relating to the Canara Bank where the employee had been dismissed from service as he had failed to discharge his duties with utmost integrity, honesty, devotion and diligence and his acts were prejudicial to the interest of the Bank. The learned Single Judge held that the quantum of punishment of dismissal from service was disproportionate to the misconduct proved but the plea about the violation of principles of natural justice was rejected. In the appeal filed before the Division Bench of the High Court it was held that the order of dismissal was passed in violation of the principles of natural justice. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal filed by the Bank and set aside the judgment of the Single Judge on the quantum of punishment and of the Division Bench on the violation of principles of natural justice. It was observed that the quantum of punishment cannot be interfered by the Court in a routine manner.
22. In V. Ramana v. A.P. SRTC and Ors. the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed :-
The common thread running through in all these decisions is that the court should not interfere with the administrator's decision unless it was illogical or suffers from procedural impropriety or was shocking to the conscience of the court, in the sense that it was in defiance of logic or moral standards. In view of what has been stated in Wednesbury case the court would not go into the correctness of the choice made by the administrator open to him and the court should not substitute its decision for that of the administrator. The scope of judicial review is limited to the deficiency in decision-making process and not the decision.
To put it differently unless the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the Appellate Authority shocks the conscience of the court/Tribunal, there is no scope for interference. Further to shorten litigations it may, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment by recording cogent reasons in support thereof. In a normal course if the punishment imposed is shockingly disproportionate it would be appropriate to direct the disciplinary authority or the Appellate Authority to reconsider the penalty imposed.
23. In B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India and Ors. , the Supreme Court after referring to a number of its earlier decisions Observed as under:-
A review of the above legal position would establish that the disciplinary authority, and on appeal the appellate authority, being fact-finding authorities have exclusive power to consider the evidence with ad view to maintain discipline. They are invested with the discretion to impose appropriate punishment keeping in view the magnitude or gravity of the misconduct. The High Court/Tribunal, while exercising the power of judicial review, cannot normally substitute its own conclusion on penalty and impose some other penalty. If the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority shocks the conscience of the High Court/Tribunal, it would appropriately mould the relief either directing the disciplinary/appellate authority to reconsider the penalty imposed, or to shorten the litigation, it may itself in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof.
24. It would, therefore, be seen that a bank can function properly and effectively only if its officers and employees strictly adhere to the prescribed norms and discipline. It must be ensured that any conduct that damages, destroys, defeats or tends to defeat the said purpose should be met with disciplinary action particularly when the charged employee holds a position of trust where honesty and integrity are in-built requirements of functioning. In such cases misconduct must be dealt with iron hands. Good conduct and discipline are inseparable for the functioning of every officer, manager or employee of the bank. The Courts can interfere with the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority when it shocks the conscience of the Court or when it is illogical. In effect, where the charge is serious relating to the integrity and honesty, the dismissal order should not be interfered with. In the present case the charges levelled against the petitioner are very serious in nature and it cannot be said that the punishment is so disproportionate that it would shock the conscience of the Court. The appellate authority has also recorded a finding that the punishment was not disproportionate to the gravity of the acts of misconduct committed by the petitioner.
25. In the end, the learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that no actual loss was caused to the bank inasmuch as the petitioner could not withdraw the amount and therefore, the punishment should not have been awarded to him. This submission cannot also be accepted in view of the decisions of the Supreme Court in Nikunja Bihari Patnaik (supra) and Bela Bagchi (supra).
26. There is, therefore, no merit in this petition. It is, accordingly, dismissed.