JUDGMENT Janardan Sahai, J.
1. An award was made against the petitioner by the Arbitral Tribunal under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') on 17.11.1997. The petitioner filed an application to set aside the award under Section 34 of the Act. The application was dismissed by the District Judge, Kanpur Nagar, by order dated 16.1.2003. The appeal against the order filed was dismissed on 7.3.2003. An application for special leave to appeal to the Apex Court filed by the petitioner has been allowed and the civil appeal is now pending before the Apex Court.
2. Under Section 36 of the Act an arbitral award is executable as a decree. But it can be enforced only after the time for filing an application under Section 34 has expired and no application is made or such application having been made has been rejected. An application for executing the award has been filed by the respondent before the District Judge. The petitioner objected to the execution on the ground that as the appeal of the petitioner before the Supreme Court against the orders rejecting his application under Section 34 is pending, the refusal of the application under Section 34 has not become final and the appeal being a continuation of the proceeding the award cannot be executed till the appeal is decided, The District Judge by his impugned order dated 29.10.2003 has rejected the application.
3. I have heard Sri Ashutosh Srivastava, learned counsel for the petitioner and Shri Shashi Kant Gupta, learned counsel for the respondent.
4. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that no appeal is provided against the award. It is only when an application to set aside the award has been finally refused would the award be open to execution. In support of his submission reliance was placed upon the provisions of Sections 34, 35, 36 and 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. For the purposes of determining the point in issue it is necessary to quote the provisions of Section 36 of the Act, which are as under :
"36. Enforcement.--Where the time for making an application to set aside the arbitral award under Section 34 has expired, or such application having been made. It has been refused, the award shall be enforced under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908) In the same manner as if it were a decree of the Court."
5. The language of the section clearly indicates that the award can be executed In two situations : one when the time for filing an application for setting aside the award has expired and no application has been filed or where the application has been filed and it has been refused. It is not in dispute that an award can be executed as a decree in view of the provisions of Section 36 of the Act. The only question for consideration in this case is whether the word 'refused' used in Section 36 of the Act means a final refusal after all the proceedings of appeal etc. upto the Supreme Court are over or a refusal by the District Judge is sufficient to make the award executable. If the Legislature intended that it is only after the application under Section 34 has been rejected at the appellate stage would the award be enforceable, it could have used such words as 'finally refused' in the section. As stated above, the first situation referred to in the section when an award becomes executable is where the limitation for filing an application under Section 34 has run out and no application has been filed. The application for setting aside the award in the context necessarily means the application filed before the District Judge as it is the running out of the limitation for such an application which would make the award executable. It is clear that the opening part of the section does not refer to the running out of the period of limitation of filing an appeal. Now the second situation when the award becomes executable is when 'such application having been made' has been refused. The words "such application having been made" are significant. The words 'such application' refer to the application contemplated in the first situation which is clear from the use of the expression 'such' which in the context is used to describe something which has been referred to earlier. On the plain language, the refusal contemplated in the section is the refusal by the Court where the application is filed and not by the appellate court. Section 37(1)(b) of the Act provides for appeal against an order 'setting aside or refusing to set aside an arbitral award under Section 34'. The reference in the expression 'refusing to set aside an arbitral award' is obviously to the order of refusal of the application under Section 34 by the Court of first instance because Section 34 refers to an application made before the Court of first Instance. From the scheme of Sections 34, 36 and 37, it is clear that the refusal of the application referred to in Section 36 for setting aside the award is the application filed under Section 34. An interpretation that Section 36 refers to the refusal of the application at the stage of the appeal is not possible without straining the language of Section 36 and adding the word 'finally' as qualifying 'refused'. Such an interpretation also does not promote any purpose, which the Legislature may have had in mind. The purpose of arbitration is to provide a speedy remedy. If the award cannot be executed until It has successfully borne all challenges even up to the Apex Court, it cannot be conceived of as a speedy remedy. While the Legislature has used the word 'final' in respect of an award in Section 35, the finality being subject to an appeal under Section 37, no such expression of finality to the decision of an application under Section 34 has been used in Section 36. Counsel for the petitioner relied upon M.A. and Sons v. Madras Oil and Seeds Exchange Ltd., AIR 1965 Mad 392. In that case interpreting the words 'the award shall be final and binding on the parties' in condition No. 7 of the First Schedule to the Arbitration Act, 1940, it was held that these words have to be read subject to any right of appeal. The Court relied upon AIR 1957 SC 540, in which it was held that the legal pursuit of successive remedies will make them all proceedings 'connected by an intrinsic unity' and 'to be regarded as one legal proceeding'. It was held that it is the award by the appellate Tribunal, which becomes the final award that governs the parties. The proposition laid down cannot be doubted. If the award is modified or set aside in appeal, it will be the order of the appellate authority, which would prevail. The case is not an authority for the proposition that the award cannot be enforced if an appeal against an order refusing to set aside the award is pending. For what has been discussed above I do not find any force in the contention of the petitioner's counsel that the scheme of Sections 34, 35, 36 and 37 of the Act is to enforce an award only after all the remedies for setting it aside are exhausted.
6. In support of his submission that an appeal is a continuation of the original proceedings, reliance was placed by the petitioner's counsel upon certain decisions. In State of Gujarat v. Salimbhai Abdul Ghaffar Sheikh, it was held that an appeal is a proceeding taken to rectify an erroneous decision of a Court by submitting the question to a higher Court. In Rachakonda Narayana v. Ponthala Parvathamma and Anr., 2001 (4) AWC 2932 (SC) : (2001) 8 SCC 173, it was held that an appeal is a continuation of the suit and the whole matter is at large. In Mithtiesh Kumari v. Prem Behari Khare, (1989) 2 SCC 95, it was held in the context of the pendency of an appeal before the Apex Court that the matter becomes sub-judice again and the Apex Court has seisin of the whole case though for certain purposes, e.g., execution the decree was regarded as final and the courts below retained jurisdiction in that regard. Reliance was placed by the Apex Court upon Dayawati v. Indrajeet, AIR 1966 SC 1423, in which the word 'suit' was held to include an appeal and the only difference between a suit and an appeal it was pointed out was that an appeal reviews and corrects the proceeding in a cause already constituted but does not create the cause. In Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala, 2000 (4) AWC 2.37 (SC) (NOC) : (2000) 6 SCC 359, it was held that the mere pendency of an application seeking leave to appeal does not put in jeopardy the finality of the decree or order challenged and it is only if the application is allowed and leave granted that the finality of the decree or order under challenge is jeopardized. The proposition that an appeal is a continuation of the original proceedings in the sense that within the scope of the appellate power conferred by the statute which could be as wide as those of the trial court the appellate court can review the decision of the authority whose order is challenged does not imply that the order of the authority or court of first instance cannot be executed. It has been held in Kerala State Electricity Board v. M.R.F. Ltd., (1996) 1 SCC 597, that the pendency of appeal before the Supreme Court only ensured that the proceedings had not finally concluded. But in the absence of any interim order of the Supreme Court granting stay of operation of the judgment, the Judgment was binding between the parties. In Collector of Customs v. Krishna Sales P. Ltd., AIR 1994 SC 1239, it was held that the mere filing of appeal does not operate as a stay of the order challenged. In V.M. Shah v. State of Maharashtra, JT 1995 (6) SC 433, it was held that mere pendency of the appeal does not have the effect of suspending the operation of the decree of the trial court and the decree does not become inoperative. In India General Navigation and Railway Company Ltd. v. Their Workmen, AIR 1960 SC 219, it was held in the context of an award under the Industrial Disputes Act which was under challenge that a mere application for special leave does not have the effect of staying the operation of Sections 17 and 17A. That was a case where leave had not yet been granted but it was held that it is only by virtue of specific orders made by the Supreme Court staying the operation of the award or some such order that the appellant becomes for the time being immune from the operation of these provisions of the Act which impose penalties for infringement of the terms of the Award.
7. An appeal is a continuation of the proceedings. But it is not the same thing as the original application from which it arises. It is a creature of the statute and is available only where it is provided. It cannot be equated in all respects to the original proceedings. In Jupiter Chit Fund Pvt. Ltd. v. Dwarka Dhiesh Dayal and Ors., 1979 (5) ALR 341, it was held by a Full Bench of this Court in the context of Section 115, Civil Procedure Code :
"An appeal or a revision is for some purposes treated as a continuation of a suit. The appeal or a revision is the case, which arises out of the suit. But when the appeal or the revision is decided, such decision creates a different or a fresh case, which arises out of the appeal or the revision. It has an identity and existence different and apart from the case which arose out of the suit."
8. It has been held by the Apex Court in I.T.I. Ltd. v. Siemens Public Communication Networks Ltd., AIR 2002 SC 2308, that provisions of the Civil Procedure Code would be applicable to proceedings under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 26 of 1996. The effect of the application of the Civil Procedure Code would be that the appellate court would possess the power of grant of stay. The petitioner, therefore, is not remedyless. Stay can be granted in the appeal before the Supreme Court under Article 136 and no ground for applying the principle that the High Court has power to do substantial justice Ex Debito Justitiae is made out when leave has been granted and the case is pending before the Apex Court.
9. There is no merit in this petition. Dismissed.