JUDGMENT G.P. Mathur, J.
1. This writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution has been filed praying that the proceedings before the Dealers Selection Board, Lucknow-II, initiated on the basis of review petition dated 4.2.2002, filed by respondent No. 4, and the notice dated 5.2.2002, issued to the petitioner may be quashed.
2. The Indian Oil Corporation issued an advertisement on 28.6.2000 inviting applications for appointment as dealers for retail outlet for petrol and diesel in various places including Srinagar, District Mahoba. The Dealers Selection Board held interview of the aspirants who had responded to the advertisement and, thereafter, prepared a merit list of the selected candidates. In the said list, Brijesh Kumar Misra, respondent No. 4, was placed at Sl. No. 1 and the petitioner, Vijai Bahadur Singh, was placed at Sl. No. 2. The petitioner challenged the selection of respondent No. 4 by filing a representation on the ground that he was not a domicile or permanent resident of district Mahoba but was a permanent resident of district Teekamgarh (Madhya Pradesh) and, therefore, was not eligible for being appointed as a dealer in district Mahoba. He also filed Writ Petition No. 6351 (M/B) of 2001 in this Court. which was disposed of on 2.1.2002 with a direction to the petitioner to make a fresh representation to the Dealers Selection Board, Lucknow-II, and the same shall be decided by the selection board after hearing the petitioner and respondent No, 4. The petitioner then made a fresh representation to the Dealers Selection Board to which a reply was given by respondent No. 4. After considering the matter, the Chairman of the Board passed an order on 28.1.2002. holding that respondent No. 4 is not a resident of district Mahoba, but is a resident of district Teekamgarh (M.P.) and, as such, he was not eligible and his selection was liable to be cancelled. Thereafter, respondent No. 4, preferred a detailed review petition before the Board on 4.2.2002, praying that the order passed on 28.1.2002 be reviewed and the merit list declared on 6.1.2001 be restored. The Dealers Selection Board issued a notice to the petitioner on 5.2.2002, on the review petition asking him to submit his reply along with necessary documents and affidavits, etc. by 5.3.2002. The writ petition has been filed for quashing of the proceedings initiated on the basis of the review petition filed by respondent No. 4 and also the notice issued to the petitioner.
3. The first question which requires consideration is whether this Court should entertain a writ petition against a notice as the petitioner can file a reply to the same and satisfy the Dealers Selection Board that the order passed by it on 28.1.2002 is correct and there is no ground to review the same. Article 226 of the Constitution confers power upon the High Court to issue writs, directions or orders for enforcement of the fundamental rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution and also for any other purpose. The remedy provided under Article 226 of the Constitution is a discretionary one and the High Court is not always bound to grant relief even though a legal right may have been infringed. The existence of an alternative remedy is an important consideration which the High Court takes into consideration while deciding the question whether discretion should be exercised or not. The jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is couched in wide terms and the exercise thereof is not subject to any restrictions but the exercise of jurisdiction is discretionary. The very amplitude of the jurisdiction demands that it will ordinarily be exercised subject to certain self-imposed limitations. Resort to this jurisdiction is not intended as an alternative remedy for relief which may be obtained in a suit or other mode prescribed by Statute. Thus, the Court will refuse to exercise its discretion in favour, of a litigant who has an alternative remedy for redress of his grievances.
4. In Union of India and another v. Brij Fertilisers Put. Ltd. and Ors., (1993) 3 SCC 564, it was held that the High Court should normally not interfere at the stage of show cause notice. In Chief of the Army Staff and Ors. v. Major Dharam Pal Kukrety, AIR 1985 SC 703, it was held as follows in paragraph 5 of the reports :
".......... Where the threat of a prejudicial action is wholly without jurisdiction, a person cannot be asked to wait for the injury to be caused to him before seeking the Court's protection. If, on the other hand, the Chief of the Army Staff had the power in law to issue the said notice, it would not be open to the respondent to approach the Court under Article 226 of the Constitution at the stage of notice only and in such an event his writ petition could be said to be premature...."
5. In Kabir Chawla v. State of U. P., 1994 SCC (Cr) 577, the validity of the notice under Section 3 of the U. P. Control of Goondas Act was assailed but the Court declined to go into the correctness or validity of the notice on the ground that the petitioner could satisfy the District Magistrate, who was seized of the matter.
6. There are some exceptions to the rule that the High Court would decline to entertain a writ petition against a notice only. If the notice has been issued by an authority who has no jurisdiction to do so or if there is a statutory bar against issuing of a notice, like reopening of an assessment order after expiry of limitation fixed for the purpose in the statute or if the action is mala fide, the Court may entertain a writ petition only against a notice.
7. Sri K.S. Rastogi, learned counsel for the petitioner, has submitted that the Dealers Selection Board, has no authority or jurisdiction to review its order and, therefore, the proceedings initiated and the notice issued by it are wholly without Jurisdiction and, consequently, this Court should entertain the writ petition. Learned counsel has submitted that the power of review can be exercised by the Dealers Selection Board only if the same has been specifically conferred upon it and in absence of such a power, the proceedings initiated by it on the basis of the review petition filed by respondent No. 4 are wholly without jurisdiction. In support of this submission, reliance has been placed on several decisions which we will notice in the later part of the judgment. Sri Anil Kumar. learned counsel for respondent No. 1, has, on the other hand, submitted that the Dealers Selection Board does not exercise any judicial or quasi-judicial power while making selection of a person as a dealer of retail outlet of an oil company and, on the contrary, it performs a purely administrative function and, therefore, there is no prohibition or embargo on its power to review its decision.
8. There cannot be even the slightest dispute that the power exercised by the Dealers Selection Board while holding interview and selecting a candidate for appointment as a dealer of a retail outlet of an oil company is a purely administrative function. Such a power has not been conferred upon the Selection Board by any statutory provision. The Dealers Selection Board has been constituted by the Ministry of Oil and Natural Gas, Government of India, by an executive order. The selection of a candidate for being appointed as a dealer cannot be held to be a judicial or quasi-judicial function. It is not a case where there is a lis between two parties and a finding has to be recorded on the basis of the evidence adduced by them. By merely holding a selection, no civil right of any kind of any person are being affected. Nor he can be subjected to any kind of penalty or forfeiture etc. Therefore, the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner has to be examined on the premise that the Dealers Selection Board, while making a selection and preparing a merit list of the candidates who are aspirants for being appointed as dealer of an oil company performs an administrative function. Learned counsel for the petitioner has not been able to place any statutory provision which may prohibit the Dealers Selection Board from reviewing its order. Similarly, no executive orders have been placed on record which may lay down that once a merit list has been prepared, the same would become final and cannot be reviewed. Regarding the power of review of administrative orders, the law is well-settled that the authority or the Government can, in appropriate cases, review its decisions. In R.R. Verma and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors., (198O) 3 SCC 402, a similar contention was examined and it was held as follows :
"The last point raised by Shri Garg was that the Central Government had no power to review its earlier orders as the rules do not vest the Government with any such power. Shri Garg relied on certain decisions of this Court in support of his submission : Patel Narshi Thakershi v. Pradyumansinghji Arjunsinghji, AIR 1970 SC 1273 ; D.N. Roy v. State of Bihar, AIR 1971 SC 1045 and State of Assam v. J.N. Roy Biswas, AIR 1975 SC 2277. All the cases cited by Shri Garg are cases where the Government was exercising quasi-judicial power vested in them by statute. We do not think that the principle that the power to review must be conferred by statute either specifically or by necessary implication is applicable to decisions purely of an administrative nature. To extend the principle to pure administrative decisions would indeed lead to untoward and startling results. Surely, any Government must be free to alter its policy or its decision in administrative matters. If they are to carry on their daily administration they cannot be hidebound by the rules and restrictions of judicial procedure though of course they are bound to obey all statutory requirements and also observe the principles of natural justice where rights of parties may be affected. Here again, we emphasise that if administrative decisions are reviewed, the decisions taken after review are subject to judicial review on all grounds on which an administrative decision may be questioned in a Court. We see no force in this submission of the learned counsel. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed."
9. In Janardan Dubey v. State of Bihar and Ors., (1996) 8 SCC 461, it was observed that for good reasons, the Government has power to revise its orders. In M. Satyanandam v. Dy. Secretary to Government of A.P., General Administration (Accom. C) Department, Secretariat. Hyderabad and another. 1987 (3) SCC 574, the contention raised that the Government cannot review its order was repelled and the order passed by the Government which had earlier declined to release the premises but had subsequently changed the decision on the representation made by the landlord was upheld. In view of this settled legal position, we do not find any infirmity in the proceedings initiated by the Dealers Selection Board on the basis of the review petition filed by respondent No. 4.
10. Sri Rastogi, learned counsel for the petitioner, has placed strong reliance on Dr. Kashinath G. Jaimi and another v. Speaker and Ors., (1993) 2 SCC 703, and has urged on its basis that unless a power of review is conferred, the Dealers Selection Board cannot review its order. The authority cited by the learned counsel have no application here as controversy in the said case related to the power of the Speaker to disqualify a member of the house under the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution. This is not a case of exercise of an administrative power but a power which is exercised by the Speaker alone and has been conferred upon him by the Constitution. An exercise of constitutional power of the type conferred by the Tenth Schedule can by no stretch of imagination be held to be an administrative power. The other case cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner is State of Kerala and Ors. v. K.G. Madhavan Pillai and Ors., (1S38) 4 SCC 669, But the question involved here was the modification of the list made under Kerala Education Rules. 1959, by which selection of approved areas where new classes were to be opened had been made. The rules provided an elaborate procedure and due application of mind by several agencies before the final list of approved areas was published under Rule 2 (4) and the proviso to Rule 2 (5) granted only a limited power of modification to the Government. It was in these circumstances held that the Government could not scrap the list without giving the affected parties an opportunity to make representation against the proposed modification.
11. Learned counsel for the petitioner has next submitted that the Dealers Selection Board having once exercised the power on the representation made by the petitioner and taken a decision, it became functus officio and could not review the said decision. In support of this proposition, reliance has been placed on District Collector of Hyderabad and Ors. v. Ibrahim and Co., (1970) 1 SCC 386 and Lachmi Narain v. Union of India and Ors., AIR 1976 SC 714. Both these cases relate to exercise of power under a statute. In the latter case, on account of the peculiar language of Section 2 of the Union Territories (Laws) Act, 1950, it was held that the power given by the aforesaid provisions exhausts itself on extension of enactment and it cannot be exercised repeatedly or subsequently. As mentioned earlier, there is no such statutory provision here and. therefore, the authorities cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner can have no application to the facts of the case.
12. The High Court while deciding the earlier writ petition had directed the Dealers Selection Board to consider and decide in accordance with law the representation made by the petitioner. It obviously meant that the Board should decide the representation correctly. If the relevant material had not placed before the Selection Board or the material on which it placed reliance was factually incorrect or wrong, the Dealers Selection Board would be perfectly justified in re-hearing the matter. Therefore, we do not find any illegality in the proceedings which have been initiated by the Dealers Selection Board on the review petition filed by respondent No. 4.
13. For the reasons mentioned above, there is no merit in the writ petition which is hereby dismissed. The stay order is vacated.