IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 368 of 2005
With
CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 1067 of 2005
For Approval and Signature:
HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE D.H.WAGHELA Sd/
HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE N.V. ANJARIA Sd/
========================================================= 1 Whether Reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment ?
2 To be referred to the Reporter or not ?
3 Whether their Lordships wish to see the fair copy of the judgment ?
4 Whether this case involves a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the constitution of India, 1950 or any order made thereunder ?
5 Whether it is to be circulated to the civil judge ? 1 & 2 YES; 3 to 5 NO =========================================================
VARIYAMSINGH KARTARSINGH BHATIA & 2 - Appellants
Versus
THE STATE OF GUJARAT - Opponents
=========================================================
Appearance :
MR BR GUPTA with Mr VB GUPTA for Appellants : 1 - 3.
MR JM PANCHAL SPECIAL PUBLIC PROSECUTOR with MR KJ PANCHAL for Opponent : 1, MS KRUTI J VORA for Opponent : 1, =========================================================
CORAM : HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE D.H.WAGHELA
and
HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE N.V. ANJARIA
Date : 31/01/2012
CAV JUDGMENT (Per : MR.JUSTICE D.H.WAGHELA)
1. These appeals are preferred from the judgment and order dated 23.2.2005 in Sessions Case No.74 of 2003 wherein the three appellants in Criminal Appeal No.368 of 2005 have been convicted and sentenced for the offences punishable under sections 147, 148 and 149 read with section 188 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and the offence punishable under section 135 of the Bombay Police Act. The State has preferred Criminal Appeal No.1067 of 2005 for conviction of the respondents for the charge of murder under section 302 read with the aforesaid sections of IPC.
2. On 28.02.2002, when a general strike was called by Vishwa Hindu Parishad and riots had broken out in Ahmedabad pursuant to the incident of burning of a coach with passengers at Godhra, at around 02.00 p.m., the complainant, Nishar Ali Shaikh, had to flee from his colony and rush to a safe place with his four young children. His wife, Nasimbanu, aged 38, being pregnant, could not run with the rest of his family and fell victim to a mob wielding deadly weapons near a Punjabi hotel, according to the complainant. Upon his complaint being lodged on 01.03.2002 and after recording statements of several witnesses and collection of other evidence, chargesheet was filed and charge was framed against the three accused persons. During the course of trial, the complainant and 13 other witnesses were examined and, after appreciation and discussion of oral and documentary evidence on record, the trial Court found that presence of the accused persons in the mob at the time of the offence was proved; but the prosecution had failed to prove to the hilt the offence of murder and hence benefit of doubt had to be given to the accused persons. Thus, each accused-respondent was convicted accordingly and punished with imprisonment for three years and fine of Rs.10,000/-, of which Rs.20,000/- was ordered to be paid to the complainant by way of compensation under section 357 of Cr.P.C.
3. It was vehemently argued by learned Special Public Prosecutor Shri J.M.Panchal appearing with learned counsel Mr.K.J.Panchal, that, while convicting the accused respondents for the offences punishable under sections 147, 148 and 149 read with section 188 of IPC, they could not have been exonerated from the charge of murder in view of uncontroverted homicide and ghastly murder of the complainant's pregnant wife. As against that, learned counsel Mr.B.R.Gupta, appearing with Shri V.B.Gupta for the accused respondents, submitted that they were implicated in the offence without any reliable or corroborative evidence against them, even as they were at the relevant time not present at the scene of offence at all, as stated in their statements recorded under section 313 of Cr.P.C. Material parts of the oral and documentary evidence have been subjected to critical examination at the instance of learned counsel appearing on both sides.
4. Perusing the relevant evidence on record, it was seen that Nishar Ali, complainant, husband of the victim, (PW.1, Exh.16), deposed that, on 28.02.2002 he was going with his family for a safe shelter under Asarwa Bridge, but his wife was left behind and a mob of 25 to 30 persons had injured and killed his wife. He came to know about the killing from one Naimbhai and Hasadbhai after having reached below the bridge. He deposed that after reaching the hospital where his wife was taken, his complaint was taken; and in that complaint (Exh.17), police had recorded something according to his dictation and something according to their own wish. He denied that the police had come to the place of incident immediately after the incident. He clarified that half of the mob had chased them till he reached below Asarwa Bridge and the remaining half had remained behind. He could not see the incident and had become unconscious upon reaching the end of the bridge. He categorically admitted that he had not mentioned in his complaint names of the accused persons and he specifically denied that the accused persons had killed his wife, even as he knew them before the incident.
4.1 Prosecution witnesses, PW.2 (Exh.18), PW.3 (Exh.21), PW.4 (Exh.22) and PW.5 (Exh.26) turned hostile and denied that any of the accused persons had produced any of the weapons. Dr.Saumil P.Merchant, who carried out post- mortem of the victim on 01.03.2002 at 09.00 a.m., inter alia, stated that there were four ante-mortem injuries and the cause of death was shock as a result of stab wounds on vital parts of the body.
4.2 Abdul Naim Shaikh (PW.7 Exh.28) initially deposed that he was living near Jugaldasni Chawl (colony) and on 28.02.2002 at around 01.30 p.m., he had run away with his neighbours under a bridge and thereafter nobody was seen on the road. After being declared to be hostile, he stated in his cross-examination by learned A.P.P. that he had not closed his business of kerosene due to strike, but he had remained present and after closing his house, he had taken his family to an area where Muslim people were in majority and he and one Abdul Samad Khan Pathan and other Muslims had arranged for passage of Muslim people from the area where Hindus were in majority. At that time, Nishar Ali was also moving with his family to a safe place and, at around 02.00 p.m., a mob of 25 to 30 persons with deadly weapons had come near a Punjabi hotel. Then the victim was caught by the mob and killed by the wounds inflicted by deadly weapons. Names of the accused respondents had come to him later on, but he had seen them with weapons. He strongly doubted that the victim was killed by the accused and had informed her husband accordingly. He also categorically admitted that the police had arrived at the scene and he did not know the persons in the mob. The last few most important sentences of his cross- examination are not capable of exact translation and do not make clear sense. He was not cross-examined by learned advocate for the accused and even his statement and opinion about the strong doubt entertained by him about killing of the victim by the accused had remained on record.
4.3 Jaydipsinh B. Chauhan (PW.9 Exh.30), who was on duty at nearby Madhavpura Police Station, deposed that, at around 02.00 p.m. on 28.02.2002, a mob had gathered near Idgah Circle and they were damaging shops and throwing stones, lighted torches/burning rags and bulbs at the houses. He had resorted to lathi charge and hand-grenades for dispersing the crowd and also fired five rounds of ammunition; and at that time, a Muslim woman was injured and killed. He admitted that he did not know any of the persons in the mob. He further admitted in his cross-examination that he did not know where and how the victim was killed. Jayendrasinh D. Chauhan (PW.10 Exh.31), who was patrolling in the area, deposed that at 02.11 p.m., he had reached the place of offence near Jugaldasni Chawl and the violent mob having not dispersed despite warning, he resorted to lathi charge and firing. After the mob was dispersed, a women fallen on the ground was found at the spot. Gafalbhai M.Malek (PW.11, Exh.32) was also on patrolling and deposed to have fired near Jugaldasni Chawl.
4.4 Girishchandra Ravat (PW.12, Exh.33), Senior Police Inspector of Madhavpura Police Station, deposed that, on 28.02.2002 mobs were reported to be pelting stones and indulging in arson near Idgah Circle at noon. Therefore, he had reached the spot and resorted to firing gas-shells from gas gun and hand-grenades for dispersing the mob. Even then, as the mob was not dispersing, firing was resorted to and patrolling was continued even after the mob had dispersed. Thereafter, upon complaint of the complainant, he had investigated the offence and recorded statements of about 20 witnesses. He had arrested one of the accused respondents on 06.03.2002 and two of them on 30.04.2002. The weapons and empty shells of bullets were also recovered.
4.5 Ashadkhan R.Pathan (PW.13, Exh.40), specially called as a witness at the instance of learned A.P.P., deposed that he had fled away with his family on 28.02.2002 after being attacked by a mob of Hindus and had taken shelter under Asarwa Bridge. He stated that he was in his house at the time of the incident, he had not seen the incident and had learned about the killing as also the assailants afterwards. He was declared to be hostile and he denied in his cross-examination all the suggestions made by learned A.P.P. During the course of his cross-examination on behalf of the accused, he deposed that a dead-body was brought from near his house and he did not know the names of her killers. He specifically denied to have told to the complainant that he had seen the offence, even as he claimed to be his neighbour.
4.6 As a letter written in the name of the complainant was received by the trial Court and learned A.P.P., the complainant was recalled as a witness and again examined as PW.14 (Exh.44). Even as the letter (Exh.41) urged to impose capital punishment upon the accused, the complainant deposed that one Hasanbhai had only taken his signature on the letter which was typed before-hand and he did not know anything about the contents of the letter. Vakhatsinh D.Vanar, Police Inspector (DCB), Crime Branch, who submitted the chargesheet, deposed as PW.15 (Exh.45) that, as per other witnesses, real name of the eye witness was Samad @ Abdul Samad and his statement was recorded.
5. A few striking facts emerging from reading of the prosecution evidence as a whole are that the accused persons were known to the complainant and it is categorically deposed by him that they have not killed his wife. Secondly, any of the police witnesses or the investigating officer who have been on duty at and around the place of offence have neither named nor recognized or identified the accused persons as those who were seen in the mob. Thirdly, none, other than the accused persons, are named or even vaguely described by any of the witnesses to at least reach the figure of five to form and prove an unlawful assembly committing the offence of rioting. Fourthly, the only witness claiming to be an eye witness to the incident i.e. Abdul Naim Shaikh (Exh.28), turned hostile and then supported in his cross-examination the case of the prosecution. But the fourth person named and seen with weapons by him is not chargesheeted. Even that witness did not describe any weapons alleged to have been wielded by any of the accused persons. Although he deposed to have informed the complainant about the incident, the complainant apparently refused to believe him. These facts and factors put the whole case of the prosecution under a cloud of doubt and prove the investigation to have been specifically focused against the accused persons only. Even as the prosecution case against the accused rested only on the deposition of Abdul Naim Shaikh (PW.7, Exh.28) and his deposition is found to be ambivalent and unreliable, a reasonable doubt has to be entertained about presence of the accused persons in the mob of miscreants and wielding of any weapons by them with a shared or common object of killing anyone. Even as two of the accused persons are shown and described in evidence as “Sardarjis” and owners of a hotel near the scene of offence, it is difficult to imagine, in absence of any evidence in that regard, that they could have harboured any common object shared by the mob of miscreants who arrived at the scene of offence from other area. When independent officers of the police force, who actually arrived at the scene of offence during or immediately before or after commission of the offence, refrained from naming or even vaguely describing any person like the accused persons as members of the unlawful assembly, it would be perverse to jump to the conclusion that they were members of the unlawful assembly using force or violence and in prosecution of the common object of that assembly, they committed the offence of murder without any motive, rhyme or reason, rather than saving their own skin and establishment from indiscriminate acts of arson and destruction by the furious mob. The inference of the accused respondents having been specifically chosen and targeted for prosecution and punishment is buttressed by the fact that someone in the position of obtaining signatures of the complainant was proved to have been active even during the trial insofar as letters advising the trial Court and learned A.P.P. were prepared and sent so as to influence the Court and secure conviction of the respondents- accused.
6. In above view of the matter, it would clearly appear that the investigating agency had failed in its duty of properly investigating the offence of ghastly murder of a helpless and innocent pregnant woman and even bringing to book the miscreants who operated in the mob, presumably with plan, preparation and deadly weapons. It is obvious from the facts that the police did not round up or arrest anyone from the mob. The complaint of the complainant, which was recorded on 01.01.2003, was registered as an FIR, I-C.R.No.55 of 2002 (Exh.17), at 05.15 p.m. on 01.3.2002, but it was forwarded to learned J.M.F.C. on 06.03.2003, after most of the statements of witnesses were recorded. The vague and incoherent statement made by the main witness (Exh.28) in his cross-examination also strengthens sinister doubts about sincerity and perseverance of the investigation and prosecution .
7. Against the above backdrop of factual scenario, learned Special Public Prosecutor Shri J.M.Panchal relied upon judgments of the Apex Court in Gangadhar Behera v. State of Orissa [(2002) 8 SCC 381], Sheo Prasad Bhor v. State of Assam [(2007) 3 SCC 120], Mahmood v. State of Uttar Pradesh [(2007) 14 SCC 16], and Daya Kishan v. State of Haryana [(2010) 5 SCC 81], to submit that appreciation of evidence in such a complex case is no doubt a difficult task; but criminal courts have to do their best in dealing with such cases and it is their duty to sift the evidence carefully and decide which part of it is true and which is not. If a large crowd of persons armed with weapons assaults the intended victims, it may not be necessary that all of them have to take part in the actual assault. When charge under section 149 IPC is there, it is not necessary that each one should be assigned independent part played in the offences. If it is found that one of them was a member of the unlawful assembly and that unlawful assembly assaulted the deceased which ultimately caused her death, then all who were members of the unlawful assembly can be held liable. That commission of overt act by each member of the unlawful assembly is not necessary. Once membership of an unlawful assembly is established, it is not incumbent on the prosecution to establish any specific overt act by any of the accused for fastening of liability with the aid of section 149 IPC. That once the essential ingredients of section 149 IPC were established, it would not be open to the Court to see as to who actually did the offensive act, nor would it be open to the Court to require the prosecution to prove which of the members did which of the offensive acts. That section 149 IPC provides for vicarious liability. If an offence is committed by any member of an unlawful assembly in prosecution of a common object thereof or if the members of that assembly knew that the offence were likely to be committed in prosecution of that object, every person who at the time of committing that offence was a member would be guilty of the offence committed. The common object may be commission of one offence while there may be likelihood of commission of yet another offence, the knowledge whereof is capable of being safely attributable to the members of the unlawful assembly. Whether a member of such unlawful assembly was aware as regards likelihood of commission of another offence or not would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. Background of the incident, the motive, the nature of the assembly, the nature of the arms carried by the members of the assembly, their common object and the behaviour of the members soon before, at or after the actual commission of the crime would be relevant factors for drawing an inference in that behalf. Learned Spl.P.P. also relied upon recent judgment of the Apex Court in Shaji v. State of Kerala [2011 Cri.L.J.2935], wherein the Constitution Bench decision in Mohan Singh v. State of Punjab [AIR 1963 SC 174] was relied, for the proposition that “in order to bring home charge under section 149, it is not necessary that five or more persons must necessarily be brought before the Court and convicted ”
8. Learned counsel for the accused relied upon Achhey Lal v. State of U.P. [(1978) 3 SCC 526] to submit that the charge under section 149 of IPC must fail because there could not be an unlawful assembly where the number of persons participating in the offence is less than five. He also relied upon judgment of the Apex Court in Gangadhar Behera v. State of Orissa [(2002) 8 SCC 381] to submit that:
“.22. ..... Under section 149, the emphasis is on common object. Mere presence in an unlawful assembly cannot render a person liable unless there was a common object and he was actuated by that common object and that object is one of those set out in Section 141 of IPC. The word 'object' means the purpose or design and, in order to make it 'common', it must be shared by all. The 'common object' of an assembly is to be ascertained from the acts and language of the members composing it, and from a consideration of all the surrounding circumstances. It may be gathered from the course of conduct adopted by the members of the assembly. What the common object of the unlawful assembly is at a particular stage of the incident is essentially a question of fact to be determined, keeping in view the nature of the assembly, the arms carried by the members, and the behaviour of the members at or near the scene of the incident. The expression 'in prosecution of common object' as appearing in Section 149 have to be strictly construed as equivalent to 'in order to attain the common object'. It must be immediately connected with the common object by virtue of the nature of the object. The knowledge, possessed by each member of what is likely to be committed in prosecution of their common object may vary not only according to the information at his command, but also according to the extent to which he shares the community of object, and as a consequence of this the effect of Section 149, IPC may be different on different members of the same assembly. .......... An object is entertained in the human mind, and it being merely a mental attitude, no direct evidence can be available and, like intention, has generally to be gathered from the act which the person commits and the result therefrom. Though no hard and fast rule can be laid down about the circumstances from which the common object can be culled out, it may reasonably be collected from the nature of the assembly, arms it carries and behaviour at or before or after the scene of incident ”
He also relied upon the following observations of the Apex Court in Deo Narain v.State of U.P. [[2010 AIR SCW 5915]:
“6. It is true, as contended by Mr.T.N.Singh, that the factum of causing an injury or not causing an injury would not always be relevant where the accused is sought to be roped in with the aid of section 149 of the IPC. At the same time, where the animosity between parties is admitted with a series of murders and attempted murders inter se and political rivalries going back for years together, a case of false implication is also a clear possibility. It is for this reason that the Courts sift the evidence to separate the grain from the chaff and to see that in a case of admitted animosity and a large number of accused some corroborating evidence to support the eye witness account must be looked for ”
8.1 8.1 Learned counsel Mr.Gupta, appearing for the accused, pointed out that, in Jagir Singh v. The State (Delhi) [(1975) 3 SCC 562], Hon'ble Justice P.N.Bhagwati observed:
“7. .....It is now well settled that when a witness, who has been called by the prosecution, is permitted to be cross- examined on behalf of the prosecution, the result of that course being adopted is to discredit that witness altogether and not merely to get rid of a part of his testimony; and, when evidence of witnesses were not worthy of credit, it could not be relied upon ”
Kathi Odhabhai Bhimabhai v. State of Gujarat [AIR 1993 SC 1193] was relied upon for the proposition that where a prosecution witness had turned hostile and did not speak anything about occurrence of the offence, his testimony could not be of any use.
Relying upon Bhaiyan v. State of Madhya Pradesh [(1978) 1 SCC 149], he submitted that where the evidence is such that no tribunal could legitimately arrive at the inference that the accused is guilty, the Court would not hesitate to set aside the conviction. Where the evidence is manifestly unsatisfactory and does not establish that the accused were members of unlawful assembly or that the deceased was murdered in prosecution of the common object, a conclusion of guilt would be wholly unjustified and unreasonable.
Relying upon State of Tamil Nadu v. N. Rajamanickan [(2008) 13 SCC 303], it was submitted that, when there was no explanation for delayed receipt of FIR and connected documents and the prosecution witnesses lacked credibility and cogency, the Supreme Court refused to interfere with the order of acquittal.
C.Magesh v. State of Karnataka [(2010) 5 SCC 645] was relied upon for the proposition that, “in a criminal trial, evidence of the witnesses requires a careful assessment and must be evaluated for its creditability. Since the fundamental aspect of criminal jurisprudence rests upon the stated principle that “no man is guilty until proven so”, utmost caution is required to be exercised in dealing with situations where there are multiple testimonies and equally large number of witnesses testifying before the court. There must be a string that should join the evidence of all the witnesses and thereby satisfying the test of consistency in evidence against all the witnesses.” “.....Needless to emphasize, consistency is the keyword for upholding conviction of an accused.”
Bhajan Singh v. State of Haryana [(2011) 7 SCC 421] was relied upon to point out the following observations:
“30. However, unexplained inordinate delay in sending the copy of FIR to the Magistrate may affect the prosecution case adversely. An adverse inference may be drawn against the prosecution when there are circumstances from which an inference can be drawn that there were chances of manipulation in the FIR by falsely roping in the accused persons after due deliberations. Delay provides legitimate basis for suspicion of the FIR, as it affords sufficient time to the prosecution to introduce improvements and embellishments. Thus, a delay in dispatch of the FIR by itself is not a circumstance which can throw out the prosecution's case in its entirety, particularly when the prosecution furnishes a cogent explanation for the delay in dispatch of the report or prosecution case itself is proved by leading unimpeachable evidence.”
9. As held by the Apex Court in Daya Kishan (supra), whenever a Court convicts any person for an offence with the aid of section 149, a clear finding recording the common object of the assembly must be given and the evidence discussed must show not only the nature of the common object but that in pursuance of such common object the offence was committed. There is no manner of doubt that before recording the conviction under section 149 IPC, the essential ingredients of section 149 IPC must be established. In the facts of the present case, proof beyond reasonable doubt for establishing presence of the accused in the unlawful assembly was required for recording a finding of their guilt for the offence punishable under section 147 or 148, 149, 188 and section 302 of IPC. Under section 143 of IPC, whoever being aware of facts which render any assembly an unlawful assembly, intentionally joins that assembly, or continues in it, is said to be a member of an unlawful assembly. And, an “unlawful assembly” under section 141 of IPC is an assembly of five or more persons, if the common object of the persons composing that assembly is to, inter alia, commit an offence or compel, by means or show of criminal force, any person to do what he is not legally bound to do or to omit to do what he is legally entitled to do. Whenever force or violence is used by such unlawful assembly or by any member thereof, in prosecution of the common object of such assembly, every member of such assembly is guilty of the offence of rioting. Where an offence is committed by any member of an unlawful assembly in prosecution of the common object of that assembly, or such as the members of that assembly knew to be likely to be committed in prosecution of that object, every person who, at the time of committing of that offence, is a member of the same assembly, is guilty of that offence under section 149 of IPC. Thus, an assembly of five or more persons and a common object to commit the same offence or to compel any person by criminal force are the essential ingredients for the offences of membership of an unlawful assembly and rioting. If these offences are proved by reliable evidence to have been committed, any member of the assembly can as well be held vicariously guilty of any other offence committed by any member of that assembly in prosecution of the common object.
9.1 Sifting the evidence in the present case for finding the proof of essential ingredients of the alleged offences by the accused respondents, it appeared that at the time and place of the incident, there was not only one mob, but several mobs who were intent on committing violence and that they did not disperse in spite of presence and warning of the police who had to resort to lathi charge, hand-grenades, gas shells and firing of several rounds of ammunition. Even at the end of such exercise and continued patrolling thereafter, the Senior Police Inspector (PW 12 Exh.33) did not witness the accused or the victim, nor the dead body on the bridge or the road, nor could he round up, recognize or identify any member of any assembly. That makes the time and place of murder near the Punjabi Hotel more doubtful. In absence of even a rough sketch or map of the area indicating the place of residence of the victim, i.e. Jugaldasni Chawl, location of the bridge, relevant distances and the area where the mobs were indulging in arson and violence, it becomes impossible to arrive at a definite finding about where the victim was actually assaulted and killed. Going by the version of Ashadkhan (PW 13 Exh.40), the dead-body of the victim was lying near their house. It is nowhere in evidence that the accused persons had joined the assembly at any point of time or place. Therefore, the solitary and unreliable oral evidence of Abdul Naim (PW.7 Exh.28) who had himself admittedly fled to a safe place but claimed to have recognized four persons, including the accused, could not be relied upon for conviction of the accused for all the alleged offences. It is highly improbable, if not impossible, that a victim or likely target of the furious mob would stand over or return to the spot of violence and a ghastly murder to recognize the assailants, receive their names immediately thereafter from an unnamed source and convey it to the complainant who had gone to the hospital and yet the complainant would not believe him. From overall view of the prosecution evidence as a whole, it appeared that the victim was killed near her house and not on the bridge as alleged; and names of the accused persons were introduced afterwards by the police and PW.7 with some ulterior motive and without any evidence or factual basis. Reasonable doubts about presence of the accused persons in the unlawful assembly are strengthened by complete lack of any evidence about their motive or reason to join such an assembly and apparent but inexplicable helplessness of the police in identifying, investigating, arresting or prosecuting any of the other persons without whom an assembly or mob could not have been formed and none of the offences could have been committed. In fact, in the charge framed by the trial Court against the accused persons, the mob was described as consisting of 200 to 250 persons.
10. Therefore, the evidence and material on record is found to be lacking in any reliable testimony or document to legally arrive at the conclusion of commission of any of the alleged offences by the accused respondents, particularly in view of the legal aspect discussed hereinabove. And hence, they have to be acquitted of the charges levelled against them for lack of sufficient and reliable evidence. Accordingly, Criminal Appeal No.368 of 2005 is allowed, Criminal Appeal No.1067 of 2005 is dismissed and the respondent accused persons are acquitted, setting aside the impugned judgment and order dated 23.02.2005 in Sessions Case No.74 of 2003 of learned Additional City Sessions Judge (Court No.10), Ahmedabad. In view of the order dated 28.02.2005 made herein by learned single Judge, the amount paid by way of compensation to the original complainant shall not be recovered and the remaining part of the amount paid by the accused persons shall be refunded to them. The bail bonds executed pursuant to release of the accused respondents on bail pending the appeals shall stand cancelled and they shall furnish fresh bail bonds in terms of provisions of section 437-A of Cr.P.C. in the sum of Rs.10,000/- (rupees ten thousand only) each with one surety in the like amount to appear before the higher court if and when such court issues notice.
(KMG Thilake) Sd/ ( D.H.Waghela, J.) Sd/ ( N.V.Anjaria, J.)