K.A. Mohamed Shafi, J. 1. This original petition is filed by the petitioner to quash exhibit P-9 and for declaration that the petitioner is entitled to benefits of immunity under the amnesty scheme declared under exhibits P-10 to P-19 in respect of the assessment year 1986-87 and to declare that the prosecution launched by the second respondent against the petitioner in CC No. 66 of 1988 on the file of the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate (Economic Offences), Ernakulam, is unwarranted, unjustified and incompetent.
2. The petitioner filed a return of income on December 31, 1986, declaring a net income of Rs. 8,790 after claiming deduction of more than Rs. 1 crore for depreciation, investment allowance, etc. Subsequently, the petitioner sent exhibit P-1 letter dated February 3, 1987, stating that they are filing a revised return of income for the assessment year 1986-87 for claiming the correct amount of depreciation on the basis of the exact date of installation of machinery. They filed a revised return of income on March 11, 1987.
3. The respondents have contended that the petitioner had filed a bogus return on December 31, 1986, claiming huge amounts by way of deduction for the machinery installed not in the accounting year but in the subsequent year by fabricating the documents and therefore a survey was con-
ducted by the respondents and found that the machinery were not installed as on March 31, 1986. Therefore, according to the respondents, the petitioner filed a subsequent return dated March 11, 1987, at the point of time when they were caught for filing a false return. It is also contended that the Revenue had knowledge of falsification of accounts and the petitioner had mens rea at the time of filing the earlier return and, therefore, the second return filed is not a valid one. Therefore, the same was rejected.
4. The petitioner contended that the earlier return filed by the petitioner on December 31, 1986, is not a legal and valid return as contemplated under Section 140(c) of the Income-tax Act since it was not signed by the managing director or any director of the petitioner-company and was signed only by an executive director. Section 140(c) of the Income-tax Act stipulates that the return under Section 139 shall be signed and verified in the case of a company by the managing director thereof or where for any unavoidable reason such managing director is not able to sign and verify the return, or where there is no managing director, by any director thereof. Therefore, counsel for the petitioner, vehemently submitted that the earlier return dated December 31, 1986, signed and verified by the executive director in respect of the petitioner-company is illegal. Therefore, according to him, the subsequent return dated March 11, 1987, filed by the petitioner signed and verified by the managing director is only proper, correct and legal return under Section 140(c) of the Income-tax Act. Therefore, he submitted that any enquiry or survey conducted by the Revenue in pursuance of the return filed on December 31, 1986, which is non est in the eye of law is illegal and cannot be sustained. This contention raised by the petitioner is not sustainable in view of the decision of the Division Bench of this court reported in CIT v. Masoneilan (India) Ltd. [2000] 242 ITR 569, wherein the Division Bench of this court has observed as follows (page 574) :
"Section 292B provides that no return of income shall be invalid or shall be deemed to be invalid merely by reason of any mistake, defect or omission in such return of income if it is in substance and effect in conformity with, or according to the intent and purpose of the Act. Section 139 also throws some light on the question. If there is any defect, the Assessing Officer is required to give an opportunity to the assessee to rectify the defect within a stipulated time."
5. Therefore, merely because of the fact that the return filed by the petitioner on December 31, 1986, is signed by the executive director and not by the managing director or director of the company as stipulated under Section 140(c) of the Act it is non est, is not sustainable since the petitioner has no case that the return filed is not in substance and effect in conformity with or according to the intent and purpose of the Act. Hence, this contention raised by the petitioner is not sustainable.
6. The respondents have contended that after the return filed by the petitioner on December 31, 1986, the Revenue had conducted the enquiry and had knowledge about falsification of documents and claiming deduction of very huge amounts to which the petitioner was not entitled in that accounting year and therefore the mens rea of the petitioner at the time of filing of the original return was patent. According to them, if there is any honest or bona fide mistake in the earlier return submitted by the asses-see, a revised return can be filed under Section 139 of the Income-tax Act. Therefore, on that ground also, the rejection of the subsequent return filed by the petitioner seeking benefit under the amnesty scheme is perfectly justified. In the decision reported in CIT v. K. Mahim [1984] 149 ITR 737, a Division Bench of this court has observed as follows (page 744) ;
"An assessee who made a bona fide discovery about having made a previous incorrect return was entitled to make a revised return invoking the enabling provision of Section 22(3) of the 1922 Act. Such a course, however, is not open when a previous return was dishonestly made. The Full Bench had no hesitation to reject outright a contention, though 'seriously argued', that an assessee is enabled to put in a return correcting a former inaccurate one notwithstanding the fact that the previous return was a deliberately dishonest one. Such an exercise could not absolve him from liability to penalty. A different conclusion, according to the court, was 'to put a premium on dishonesty'."
7. Therefore, if in fact the original return filed by the petitioner was with the dishonest intention to claim deduction of an exorbitant amount, they cannot escape the liability arising out of it by filing a subsequent return correcting the original claim made. In this case the respondents have contended that it is only after the Revenue collected ample evidence regarding the false claim made by the petitioner in the original return dated December 31, 1986, that they have filed a subsequent return to escape from the clutches of law. Therefore, according to the respondents, the subsequent return filed by the petitioner is not a voluntary return and, therefore, the respondents are perfectly justified in denying the claim for amnesty made by the petitioner.
8. After hearing counsel for the petitioner and considering the facts and circumstances of the case, I find that after filing the incorrect return claiming deduction of very huge amounts, they filed the subsequent return dated March 11, 1987, claiming benefit under the amnesty scheme in this case. Therefore, it is clear that the subsequent return filed by the petitioner is not voluntary after finding out the bona fide mistake committed by them. Therefore, the petitioner is not entitled to any amnesty in view of the filing of the subsequent return dated March 11, 1987. Hence, I find absolutely no ground to set aside exhibit P-9 order and to extend the benefit of amnesty to the petitioner in this case. Hence, this original petition is dismissed.