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V Additional District And Sessions vs Sri Jayesh @ Jayesh Kantha

High Court Of Karnataka|13 October, 2017
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JUDGMENT / ORDER

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU ON THE 13TH DAY OF OCTOBER, 2017 BEFORE THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAVI MALIMATH AND THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE JOHN MICHAEL CUNHA CRIMINAL REFERRED CASE NO.2 OF 2016 C/W CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1529 OF 2017 CRIMINAL REFERRED CASE NO.2 OF 2016 BETWEEN:
V ADDITIONAL DISTRICT AND SESSIONS JUDGE, DAKSHINA KANNADA, MANGALURU SITTING AT PUTTUR DAKSHINA KANNADA … PETITIONER (BY SRI VIJAYAKUMAR S. MAJAGE, ADDITIONAL SPECIAL PUBLIC PROSECUTOR) AND:
SRI JAYESH @ JAYESH KANTHA S @ SHAHIR @ SHAKEER, S/O SHASHIKANTH N.A. AGED ABOUT 28 YEARS, R/O PULLOTTE HOUSE, ADDAHOLE, SIRIBAGILU VILLAGE, PUTTUR TALUK – 574 201.
PRESENTLY RESIDING AT PAYETHIRUVITTILU VADAK MEDAMUKKU, KAYANGULAM, MAVERIKARA TALUK, ALAPURA DISTRICT, KERALA STATE – 690 101.
(NOW IN JUDICIAL CUSTODY). … RESPONDENT (BY SRI: DINESH KUMAR K. RAO, ADVOCATE) THIS CRIMINAL REFERRED CASE IS REGISTERED AS REQUIRED U/S 366(1) CR.PC FOR CONFIRMATION OF DEATH SENTENCE AWARDED TO ACCUSED SHRI JAYESH @ JAYESH KANTHA S @ SHAHIR @ SHAKEER BY JUDGMENT DATED 9/12.8.2016 PASSED IN S.C.NO.5011 OF 2015 ON THE FILE OF V ADDITIONAL DISTRICT AND SESSIONS JUDGE, DAKSHINA KANNADA, MANGALURU SITTING AT PUTTUR, DAKSHINA KANNADA FOR THE OFFENCE PUNISHABLE UNDER SECTION 450, 302 AND 392 INDIAN PENAL CODE .
****** CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1529 OF 2017 BETWEEN:
SRI JAYESH @ JAYESH KANTHA S @ SHAHIR @ SHAKEER, S/O SHASHIKANTH N.A. AGED ABOUT 28 YEARS, R/O PULLOTTE HOUSE, ADDAHOLE, SIRIBAGILU VILLAGE, PUTTUR TALUK – 574 201.
PRESENTLY RESIDING AT PAYETHIRUVITTILU VADAK MEDAMUKKU, KAYANGULAM, MAVERIKARA TALUK, ALAPURA DISTRICT, KERALA STATE – 690 101.
(NOW IN JUDICIAL CUSTODY). ..APPELLANT (BY SRI: DINESH KUMAR K RAO, ADVOCATE) AND:
THE STATE OF KARNATAKA BY CIRCLE INSPECTOR OF POLICE, PUTTUR RURAL CIRCLE, UPPINANGADY, DAKSHINA KANNADA – 574 241 (UPPINANGADY POLICE) ` (REPRESENTED BY STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, HIGH COURT BUILDINGS, BENGALURU-560001) … RESPONDENT (BY SHRI VIJAYAKUMAR S. MAJAGE, ADDITIONAL SPECIAL PUBLIC PROSECUTOR) THIS CRIMINAL APPEAL IS FILED UNDER SECTION 374(2) CR.PC BY THE ADVOCATE FOR THE APPELLANT PRAYING THAT THIS HON’BLE COURT MAY BE PLEASED TO SET ASIDE THE JUDGMENT AND ORDER OF CONVICTION DATED 9.8.2016 AND SENTENCE DATED 12.8.2016 PASSED BY THE V ADDITIONAL DISTRICT AND SESSIONS JUDGE, DAKSHINA KANNADA, IN S.C.NO.5011 OF 2015 – CONVICTING THE APPELLANT/ACCUSED FOR THE OFFENCE PUNISHABLE UNDER SECTIONS 450, 302 AND 392 OF INDIAN PENAL CODE . THE APPELLANT/ACCUSED IS HEREBY AWARDED THE CAPITAL PUNISHMENT OF DEATH PENALTY. THE APPELLANT/ACCUSED SHALL BE HANGED TILL HIS DEATH FOR THE OFFENCE PUNISHABLE UNDER SECTIONS 450,302 AND 392 OF INDIAN PENAL CODE.
****** THIS CRIMINAL REFERRED CASE AND CRIMINAL APPEAL COMING ON FOR FINAL HEARING THIS DAY, JOHN MICHAEL CUNHA J., DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
JUDGEMENT This Criminal Referred case and the Criminal Appeal are arising out of the judgment and order of sentence passed by the V Additional District and Sessions Judge, Dakshina Kannada, Mangalore, sitting at Puttur dated 9.8.2016/12.8.2016 in Sessions Case No.5011/2015 convicting the appellant/accused under Section 302, 392 and 450 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.
2. The brief facts of the prosecution case are that on 2.8.2008 at about 4pm, the accused trespassed into the dwelling house bearing No.1-7/1 situated at Pullotte in Survey No.40/2 of Siribagilu village of Puttur Taluk with an intention of committing robbery and in that process, at about 5.15pm, he strangulated the neck of the deceased Smt. Sowmya with a towel, stabbed on her stomach, waist and back with a knife and stabbed the son of the deceased by name Jishnu, aged about 3 years and took away the gold mangalyasutra chain and ear studs from the person of the deceased Smt. Sowmya and thereby committed the offences punishable under Sections 450,302 and 392 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (Hereinafter referred to as the ‘IPC’ for brevity).
2(a) The incident was reported to PW.27, the PSI of the Uppinangadi Police Station. He rushed to the spot, received a written complaint from the husband of the deceased (PW.1) and registered a case in Crime No.120 of 2008 against the accused under Sections 450, 394 and 302 of IPC. PW.24, the Circle Inspector of Police, Puttur Rural Circle continued the investigation. He conducted the inquest and forwarded the dead bodies for post-mortem examination. He drew up the spot mahazar as per Exhibit P.2 and seized the blood-stained and unstained mud from the spot of occurrence. A purse belonging to the accused was also seized from the spot of occurrence under Exhibit P.2. From the medical opinion, it was ascertained that the death was due to hemorrhage and shock following injury to the vital organs. In the course of the investigation, PW.24 recorded the statements of the material witnesses. Further investigation was continued by PW.25 and PW.26.
2(b) The accused was apprehended on 8.10.2012 at Thrikunnapuya of Alapur District. PW.26 recorded the voluntary statement of the accused and recovered the mangalya chain belonging to the deceased from the receiver namely, PW.13. After completing the investigation, he laid the charge sheet against the accused.
2(c) The accused was provided with the assistance of a counsel to defend him. On hearing the learned counsel and on considering the material produced by the prosecution, the learned Sessions Judge framed charges against the accused under Sections 450,302 and 392 of the IPC. The accused denied the charges. The prosecution examined 27 witnesses as PW.1 to PW.27 and produced 22 documents as Exhibits P.1 to P.22 and material objects at MOs.1 to 15. The accused denied all the incriminating circumstances appearing in the prosecution evidence and took up the defence of total denial and did not choose to enter into witness box.
2(d) On hearing the learned Counsel for the accused and the learned Public Prosecutor, by the impugned judgment, the Sessions Judge found the accused guilty of the offences under Sections 302, 392 and 450 Indian Penal Code. For the offence under Section 302 Indian Penal Code, the learned Sessions Judge sentenced to him to death and referred the matter for confirmation to this court under Section 366 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
3. We have heard the learned Counsel for the appellant/accused and the learned Additional State Public Prosecutor.
4(a) Sri Dinesh, learned Counsel for the appellant would submit that the court below has committed a serious error in convicting the accused for the offence of murder. The case of the prosecution is rested solely on circumstantial evidence. In proof of the last seen circumstance, the prosecution has relied on the evidence of PW.1 the husband of the deceased; PW.3, the sister-in- law of the deceased and PW.4 a neighbour. But there is material variation in the testimony of these witnesses which has not been taken into account by the court below. Likewise, the circumstance of the recovery of the chain is fraught with suspicion. In the complaint, it was alleged that the “karimani sara” was missing from the person of the deceased, whereas the property recovered by the prosecution is a “mangalya sara”, which cannot be related to the article missing from the person of the deceased. The Trial Court has also committed an error in accepting the seizure of the purse as one of the circumstance connecting the accused. The weapon used for the commission of the offence has not been recovered. Therefore, the conviction under Section 302 IPC is wholly illegal and cannot be sustained.
4(b) It is the submission of the learned counsel that even if the recovery is held to be proved, it may at most render the accused guilty of an offence under Section 411 IPC, but does not make out an offence of murder under Section 302 of the IPC. On this score also, the impugned judgment is liable to be interfered with by this court.
4(c) On the question of sentence, the learned Counsel would submit that the Trial Court has been swayed by the fact that, during trial, the accused tried to run away from the court and issued threats to advocates. Further, the learned Sessions Judge has noticed that on account of the conversion of the accused to Muslim religion the entire incident has taken place, which indicates that the trial Judge was prejudiced against the accused. The death sentence could not have been awarded on these considerations. The approach of the Trial Court smacks of manifest error in treating the case as rarest of rare case. Hence, the learned Counsel has pleaded for setting aside the impugned judgment as well as the sentence of death awarded by the Court below.
5. The learned Additional State Public Prosecutor has argued in support of the impugned judgment. He would submit that the circumstances relied upon by the prosecution have been proved with cogent and convincing evidence. The findings recorded by the Court below are based on legal evidence. In the light of the positive material produced by the prosecution, no other view is possible other than the guilt of the accused for the offence of murder for gain. Moreover, the accused having committed ghastly murders of an innocent child and a helpless woman without there being any provocation by them and that the accused having already been convicted in a case of theft and remained absconded for nearly four years, the Sessions Court was well justified in treating the case as rarest of rare cases and awarding the extreme penalty provided under law. Hence, the learned Additional State Public Prosecutor has sought for dismissal of the appeal and for confirmation of the death sentence awarded on the accused.
6 We have considered the above submissions and have carefully examined the records of the lower court with reference to the statements made by the witnesses. We find from the records that the case of the prosecution is rested on five strong circumstances. First, the prosecution has relied on the fact that the accused was seen entering the house of the deceased immediately preceding the incident and leaving the house after committing the offence. In this regard, the prosecution has relied on the direct testimony of PW.3 and PW.4. PW.3 Smt.Radha is the sister-in-law of the deceased. Her evidence indicates that she was residing close to the house of the deceased. According to her, on 2.8.2008, at about 4p.m., she had gone to her farm land to graze cattle. At that time, deceased Sowmya had also come there to take the cow which was tethered in the farm. After speaking to her, the deceased went home. At that time, she saw the accused entering the house of the deceased. PW.3 has further stated that at about 5.30 p.m. she heard loud cries from the house of the deceased and immediately she rushed there and found the deceased and the child fallen in a pool of blood with bleeding injuries on her stomach, back and other parties of the body. She has further stated that she inquired PW.1 about the matter and at that time, PW.1, namely, the husband of the deceased told her that he saw the accused running away from the house while he was returning home at about 5.30p.m.
7. PW.4 Sughadan is a resident of Shiradi village.
According to this witness, he knows both the accused as well as the deceased. He has categorically stated that on the date of the incident, when he was near Pullolli village, he saw the accused entering the house of the deceased at about 4.00 p.m.
8. The Trial Court has believed the above evidence in proof of the fact that both these witnesses had seen the accused at about 4p.m. going to the house of the accused. Learned Counsel for the accused however has seriously disputed the veracity of the testimony of these witnesses contending that in the cross-examination of PW.3, it is brought out that there was a distance of about 300 metres from the place where she saw the accused. It is the submission of the learned Counsel that it is humanly impossible to identify a person from such a distance. Therefore, the testimony of PW.3 is doubtful and cannot be given any credence.
9. We have carefully scrutinized the evidence of PW.3. We do not find anything in the cross-examination to suggest that this witness had seen the accused from a distance of 300 metres as sought to be contended. The evidence of PW.3 indicates that the accused as well as the deceased were both known to her. She is a relative of the deceased as well as the accused. In the cross-examination she has stated that at about 4.00 p.m., she had gone to the farm land to graze her cattle. What has been elicited in the cross-examination is the distance between the house of the deceased and the house of PW.3. The testimony of PW.3 is to the effect that she saw the accused entering the house of the deceased from her farm land. The accused has not elicited the distance from the farm land to the house of the deceased. There is not even remote suggestion to PW.3 that she could not either identify the accused or it was not possible for her to see the accused entering the house of the accused from her farm land. Therefore, merely on the basis of the plea advanced by the Counsel at the time of arguments, the evidence of PW.3 cannot be doubted. From her evidence, it stands established that she could not only identify the accused but also could see him entering the house of the deceased soon before the commission of the offence. The evidence of PW.3. is seen to have been suitably corroborated by the testimony of PW.4. We do not find anything in the cross-examination of PW.4 to doubt or disbelieve the testimony of PW.4 with regard to the fact that he had also seen the accused entering the house of the accused. Therefore, we have no hesitation whatsoever to accept the testimony of PW.3 and PW.4 in proof of the fact that they had seen the accused entering the house of the deceased immediately preceding the incident.
10. The fact that the accused was seen coming out of the house at about 5.30pm is established by the evidence of PW.1. PW.1 is the husband of the deceased. According to him, as usual, on the date of the incident, he was returning home at about 5.30pm. At that time, he saw the accused coming out of the house in a hurry and when he tried to talk to the accused, the accused went away without answering PW.1. Even this testimony of PW.1 has not been discredited in the cross-examination. On the other hand, the circumstances brought out in his evidence indicate that soon after the commission of the offence, on arrival of the police, PW.1 lodged a written complaint as per Exhibit P.1. This complaint was lodged within five hours from the commission of the offence. The said complaint reveals that the accused has been implicated in the murder of the deceased apparently on the ground that PW.1 and PW.3 had seen the accused entering the house and going away from the house of the deceased. The learned Counsel for the accused however has disputed the evidence of PW.1 contending that he has not mentioned the name of PW.3 and PW.4 in the complaint and he has not specifically stated that he saw the accused entering the house and therefore the testimony of PW.1 is rendered susceptible to doubt. This argument cannot be accepted. All such details are not required to be stated in the complaint. The very fact the accused is implicated in the murder of the deceased apparently on the basis of PW.1 having seen him coming out of the house itself lends credence to the testimony of PW.1.
11. We are conscious of the legal position that the evidence regarding the last seen theory could be accepted provided the time gap between the deceased and the accused are last seen together is so small that the possibility of any other person being the author of the crime becomes impossible. In the instant case, the circumstances brought out in the evidence of PWs.1, 3 and 4 indicate that the house of the deceased was visible to PW.3 from her farm land. The evidence of PW.3 goes to show that she had seen the accused entering the house. There is absolutely nothing on record to indicate that any other person had gained entry into the house of the deceased after the accused entered the house. If the evidence of PWs.1,3 and 4 is analysed, it only goes to show that the accused had entered the house at about 4.00 pm and came out of the house only at about 5.30pm thereby ruling out the possibility of any other person having ingress or egress to the said house when he was inside the house. Therefore, we have no hesitation whatsoever to hold that the prosecution has conclusively proved the circumstance of last seen theory connecting the accused to the murder of the deceased and other offences alleged against him.
12. The next circumstance relied on by the prosecution is the abscondance of the accused. The evidence indicates that soon after the commission of the offence, the accused remained absconding. The relatives and neighbours who have been examined by the prosecution have consistently stated that after the incident, the accused was not seen in the village. PW.2 has stated that after the incident, at about 5.45pm, he saw the accused at Addahole bus-stop. It is not in dispute that the case was registered against the accused on the date of the incident itself. The evidence of the Investigating Officer and the records indicate that efforts were made to trace him, but it is only after four years the accused was apprehended in Kerala State. There is absolutely no explanation whatsoever by the accused for his abscondance. This is also another circumstance which goes into the culpability of the accused for the offence charged against him.
13. Another circumstance proved by the prosecution is that after the arrest of the accused, on the basis of his voluntary statement, a mangalya chain belonging to the deceased was recovered from the receiver, namely, PW.13. PW.13 has deposed that he was running a jewellery shop by name R.K.Jewellery at Uppinangadi. In the first week of August 2008, PW.5 Rukiya Banu sold a mangalya chain weighing about 10 grams to him for Rs.5,000/-. On 11.10.2002, the said PW.5 had come to his shop along with the Police and at her instance, he returned the said chain to the Police and it was seized under mahazar Exhibit P.10. He has identified his signature on the mahazar and has also identified the chain MO.1.
14. PW.5 is also examined by the prosecution.
She has stated that the accused is the friend of her son PW.6. In the year 2008, the accused had requested her to sell the gold chain (M.O.1)and to give him some money and hence she sold the said chain to PW.13 and gave Rs.5,000/- to the accused. During her evidence, she has identified the chain and has stood by her testimony that at the instance of the accused she had sold the said chain to PW.13. This testimony also has not been falsified in the cross-examination.
15. The learned Counsel for the accused however would submit that the recovery evidence produced by the prosecution is concocted to bolster up the charge against the accused. He contends that it cannot be believed that a jeweller who had purchased a chain paying Rs.5,000/- would retain the same with him for nearly four years. That apart, there is striking discrepancy in the evidence of PW.1 and the contents of Exhibit P.1 with regard to the description of the chain which would go to show that the recovery evidence is got up by the prosecution only after the arrest of the accused.
16. On scrutiny of the evidence of PW.5 and PW.13 we do not find any material in the entire cross-examination in support of his argument that the recovery evidence is concocted and got up by the prosecution. The fact that the accused was arrested after four years from the date of incident is not in dispute. It is also not in dispute that the voluntary statement of the accused was recorded after his arrest and the same is produced in evidence and the relevant portion thereof is marked as Exhibit P.21. The evidence brought on record indicates that the chain was not directly pledged or sold by the accused. Undisputedly the accused had remained absconded and had fled to a different State. The evidence of PW.5 indicates that she was requested by the accused to sell the ornaments, which fact is also not discredited. These circumstances therefore render credibility to the evidence of PW.6. that at the instance of the accused she sold M.O.1 to PW.13 and gave the proceeds to the accused. Moreover, PW.6 herself having shown the place where the gold jewellery was sold by her and having identified the jeweller as well as the gold chain, merely on the basis of the argument of the learned Counsel that there was no reason for the jeweller to retain the said ornaments for a period of four years cannot be a ground to doubt or disbelieve the uncontroverted testimony of PW.5. It was for the accused to elicit necessary explanation from the jeweller as to the reason for keeping the jewellery with him for four years. The court cannot assume or surmise the reasons based on the oral submissions of the learned Counsel. As the direct testimony of PW.5 and P.13 is found acceptable and no circumstances having been brought out in the evidence to doubt the transaction, we have no hesitation even to accept this evidence as one of the circumstance connecting the chain of circumstances pressed into service by the prosecution.
17. Lastly, the prosecution has relied on the seizure of the purse of the accused from the spot of occurrence. This evidence in our opinion, is beyond any pale of doubt or challenge. The fact that the purse was found at the spot of offence is established by evidence of PW.10 and the contents of the spot mahazar Exhibit P.2 which was prepared on 4.8.2008. The panch witness examined by the prosecution namely, PW.10 has unequivocally stated before the court that the said purse was found at the spot and it was seized under mahazar Exhibit P.2. He has identified the said purse and has also spoken about the contents found therein. He has categorically stated that the said purse contained a small diary with telephone numbers. The said diary is marked as MO.7. PW.10 has further stated that the name of the accused was written therein. Even though the learned Counsel for the accused has disputed this piece of evidence, on going through the evidence of PW.10, we do not find any circumstances elicited in his cross- examination to doubt or disbelieve his evidence with regard to the seizure of the said purse from the spot of occurrence. The fact that the said purse belonged to the accused also has been proved by the testimony of PW.1 who is none other than the maternal uncle of the accused. As already stated above, the specific case of the prosecution is that the accused was a relative of the deceased. Therefore, PW.1 was an equally competent witness to speak about the affairs of the accused. The evidence of PW.1 with regard to the identification of the purse MO.6 and the diary MO.7 has remained unchallenged in the cross-examination. As a result, there is no impediment whatsoever to place reliance on this evidence in proof of another circumstance connecting the accused to the offences charged against him.
18. With regard to the contention urged by the learned Counsel as to the weapon used for the commission of the offence, the case of the prosecution is that the deceased was strangulated to death and was also assaulted with knife. The medical opinion is to the effect that the deceased died due to haemorrhage and shock following injury to vital organs. The material used for strangulation has been found at the spot and the same is examined by PW.18, doctor who has given his opinion to the effect that the death can be caused by MO.8, bath towel. The opinion of PW.18 doctor does not go to show that the death was caused solely on account of the injuries sustained on the stomach and other parts of the body of the deceased. In the said circumstances, non-recovery of the knife is not fatal to the case of the prosecution.
19. Thus, on an overall consideration of the oral and documentary evidence produced by the prosecution, we are of the firm view that the prosecution has convincingly established the fact that soon before the commission of the offence, the accused was seen entering the house of the deceased and after the commission of the offence, he was seen coming out of the house. The time gap between the ingress and egress of the accused into the house of the deceased rules out the possibility of any other person being the author of the crime. Added to the said fact, the abscondance of the accused for inordinately a long period of four years points out the guilty mind of the accused. The recovery of the gold chain belonging the deceased, through PW.5, who has spoken to the fact that at the instance of the accused, she had sold the said chain to the jeweller would establish another circumstance connecting the accused to the murder as well as the robbery having taken place at the same time. The seizure of the purse belonging to the accused from the spot establishes the presence of the accused at the spot of occurrence. These circumstances in our considered opinion, form a complete chain which unerringly point out the guilt to the accused for the offence of trespass, murder as well as robbery of the gold ornaments belonging to the accused. Therefore, the Trial Court was well justified in convicting the accused for the above offences. Even on reappreciation of the entire material in the light of the contentions urged by the accused, we do not find any error or infirmity whatsoever either in the appreciation of the evidence or in the findings recorded by the Court below. The findings are based on legal evidence which do not call for any interference by this court. Hence, we confirm the conviction of the accused for the offences punishable under Sections 450, 302 and 392 of the IPC.
20. Coming to the sentence imposed by the Court, on hearing the learned Counsel and on going through the factors taken into consideration by the Court in awarding the death sentence, we find that the sentence awarded by the Court is not commensurate with the offences proved against the accused. No doubt two murders have been committed during the incident but there is no clear evidence as to the circumstance and the motive for which the child was murdered. According to the prosecution the motive was for gain. The prosecution has not established the motive for the murder of the child. The material on record does not indicate any perversity or brutality shocking the conscience of the court so as categorise the case as falling within the category of rarest of rare cases. There is no material to indicate that the accused is a menace to the society or that the victims were subjected to inhuman act of torture or cruelty. A reading of the order passed by the Trial Court indicates that the Trial Court was carried away by the fact that two murders were committed for gain and that the accused had bad antecedents in as much as he was convicted in a theft case and that his conduct in the open court warranted stringent action. In our opinion, the conduct of the accused during the trial may not be a relevant factor to award the death sentence. Likewise, the plurality of the murders also may not be a factor that should necessarily warrant death sentence.
21. The Honourable Supreme Court in a Constitution Bench judgment in Bachan Singh vs. State of Punjab,(1980)2 SCC 684 as well as in the subsequent judgment in the case of Machhi Singh vs. State of Punjab, (1983)3 SCC 470 has laid down the guidelines and parameters in treating the cases as rarest of rare cases. We do not find that any of the parameter laid down therein get attracted to the facts and circumstances of the present case.
22. Having regard to the overall circumstances of the case and the manner in which the incident has taken place, we are of the view that the ends of justice require that the death sentence imposed on the accused is reduced to life imprisonment. To this extent, the appeal deserves to be accepted. Hence, we pass the following:
ORDER Criminal Appeal filed by the accused in Criminal Appeal No.1529/2017 is partly allowed. The conviction of the accused for offences under Sections 450, 302 and 392 of IPC is confirmed. The death sentence awarded by the court below is set aside. The accused is sentenced to life imprisonment and a fine of Rs.25,000/- for the offence punishable under Section 302 of Indian Penal Code; in default to pay the fine amount, the accused shall undergo a further imprisonment for 3 years.
For the offence punishable under Section 450 of IPC, the accused is sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for 5 years and a fine of Rs.10,000/-; in default, to undergo further imprisonment for a period of 1 year. For the offence punishable under Section 392 IPC, the accused is sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 10 years and a fine of Rs.10,000/-; in default, to undergo imprisonment for 2 years. The substantive sentences are ordered to run concurrently. The appellant/accused is entitled for the benefit of set off as provided under Section 428 of Criminal Procedure Code.
In view of the above order, the Criminal Referred Case No.2 of 2016 stands rejected.
Sd/- Sd/-
JUDGE JUDGE NV.
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Title

V Additional District And Sessions vs Sri Jayesh @ Jayesh Kantha

Court

High Court Of Karnataka

JudgmentDate
13 October, 2017
Judges
  • Ravi Malimath
  • John Michael Cunha