JUDGMENT Sushil Harkauli and Vikram Nath, JJ.
1. We have head Sri Umesh Narain Sharma Senior Advocate assisted by Sri Prabhakar Awasthi for the petitioner at length on the question of the territorial jurisdiction of this Court to entertain this writ petition.
2. In the prayer clause of this writ petition, there are two prayers.
3. The first prayer is that the respondents should be directed to forthwith entrust the management and control of the game of cricket in the State of Uttar Pradesh to the petitioner's association. The second prayer is for a mandamus directing the BCCI to forthwith recognise the petitioner's association as a controlling body of cricket in the State of Uttar Pradesh. Both the prayers are misconceived as no present right to such effect has been shown.
4. Accepting this situation, during the course of arguments, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner is pressing this writ petition for a third prayer given below which has not been made in writing. According to the petitioner it has applied to the BCCI for affiliation of the petitioner association to the BCCI and the BCCI is not deciding the said application. The prayer therefore is that this Court should issue a Mandamus to the BCCI to take a decision on the petitioner's application for affiliation.
5. For deciding territorial jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India either (1) the BCCI should be located within the territory of Uttar Pradesh; or (2) a part of the cause of action should have arisen within such territory.
6. The term 'cause of action' is the bundle of facts necessary for grant of the relief or the relevant, prayer. No other fact would be part of the cause of action. While considering whether a fact is or is not a part of the cause of action, a legally trained mind must learn to distinguish those facts which merely constitute history of the story and which are narrated for giving the complete picture, from the essential facts which form the basis of relief and in absence of which the concerned prayer cannot be granted. To demonstrate by example, the fact that the petitioner" was born is history or a background fact which cannot form part of cause of action for declaration of the examination result of the petitioner, even though if the petitioner had not been born he could not have appeared at the examination. The essential fact for cause of action for declaration of result in this example is only that the petitioner appeared at the examination. Thus no part of cause of action can be said t(sic) arise where the petitioner was born.
7. In our opinion, the facts constituting the cause of action/ in respect of the petitioner's prayer under consideration, are only as follows:--
(1) An application for affiliation was received by the BCCI located at Mumbai and registered in Tamilnadu.
(2) The BCCI located at Mumbai should have decided this application for affiliation at Mumbai, which was not done.
(3) The BCCI should decide the application for affiliation at Mumbai.
8. Thus for the prayer of the petitioner under consideration the entire cause of action arose at Mumbai and no part of the cause of action arose in Utter Pradesh, therefore the territorial jurisdiction would be that of the Mumbai High Court and not of the Allahabad High Court.
9. To meet another argument of the petitioner, it is our considered opinion, that the place from where the application for affiliation was sent will not give rise to territorial jurisdiction. For example, if petitioner had chosen to sent this application from Kolkatta, it would not give rise to a cause of action for filing the writ petition before the Kolkatta High Court.
10. It is well settled that the location or residence or place of business of the plaintiff does not constitute any part of the cause of action. Therefore, neither the location of the petitioner at Allahabad nor the fact that the application was sent from Allahabad will give any territorial jurisdiction to the Allahabad High Court.
11. Learned counsel for the petitioner has as a last desperate attempt argued that (a) because the BCCI is the apex body, and (b) because the BCCI is the controlling body of the cricket of India, therefore, this writ petition can be filed anywhere in India. This argument is wholly misconceived. Deciding affiliation application has nothing to do with control of cricket in India, and the concept of apex level society exists only in the co-operative societies and not in societies registered under the Societies Registration Act, and in any case it is not the law that the superior most parson or body or authority can be sued anywhere in the Country.
12. Learned counsel for the petitioner relies upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Navinchandra N. Majithia v. State of Maharashtra and Ors. . We have examined the decision carefully. In the said case, the entire transaction took place in Mumbai. However, the litigant with mala fide intention and to harass the other party chose to make a complaint with regard to said issue at Shilong and, therefore, the Supreme Court held that the Mumbai High Court had jurisdiction. The transaction was apparently treated as integral part of the cause of action in that case and, therefore, it was held by the Supreme Court that part of cause of action arose within the domain of the Mumbai High Court. In the present case, there is no such fact, therefore, we decline to entertain this writ petition due to lack of territorial jurisdiction.
13. This writ petition is, accordingly, dismissed.