HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE P. NAVEEN RAO WRIT PETITION No. 8275 of 2013 Date: 10.9. 2014 Between :
Uttamchand Jain S/o Mangilal Jain R/o H No. 6-1-268, Khairtabad, Hyderabad and others … Petitioners and Govt of A P Rep by its Principal Secretary- Revenue Land Acquisition Department, Secretariat Hyderabad and another … Respondents The Court made the following:
HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE P. NAVEEN RAO WRIT PETITION No. 8275 of 2013 ORDER:
Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short the Act) was set in motion on 16.9.2011 to acquire land to an extent of Ac.11.03 guntas in Survey No. 22, katedan village, Rajendranagar mandal, Ranga Reddy district for the purpose of extension of Sardar Vallabhai Patel National Police Academy. Gazettee publication was issued on 3.11.2011 and local village tom-tom was made on 22.11.2011. This acquisition includes land to an extent of Ac. 10.36 ½ guntas concerning the petitioners. Draft declaration under Section 6 of the Act was published on 30.10.2012. The said draft declaration was challenged in W.P. No. 34676 of 2012 and initially interim stay was granted on 7.11.2012 and ultimately the writ petition was allowed by orders dated 31.12.2012 setting aside the draft declaration dated 30.10.2012. Pursuant to the said orders, fresh draft declaration under Section 6 of the Act was issued on 15.3.2013, which is impugned in this writ petition.
2. Learned counsel for petitioners contends that the draft declaration issued on 15.3.2013 is illegal and unsustainable as the said declaration was not made within one year from the date of Section 4 (1) notification. Even the date of tom-tom in the locality is taken, the respondents were required to issue the draft notification before 15.1.2013 even after excluding the period of stay operating in W.P. No. 34676 of 2012, whereas, the draft declaration was notified on 15.3.2013, therefore it is not valid in law and liable to be set aside. In support of his contentions, learned counsel placed reliance on the decisions of the Supreme Court in OXFORD ENGLISH SCHOOL Vs.
[1]
GOVERNMENT OF TAMILNADE AND OTHERS and PADMASUNDARA RAO (DEAD) AND OTHERS Vs STATE OF TAMIL
[2]
NADU AND OTHERS .
3. Learned Assistant Government Pleader submits that though the judgment was rendered on 31.12.2012, copy of the judgment was received by the respondent authorities on 5.3.2013, therefore the period up to the date of receipt of the judgment from the date of stay granted should be excluded and if that period is excluded, draft declaration notified on 15.3.2013 is valid.
4. The point for consideration is whether draft declaration issued on 15.3.2013 is within the time prescribed under Section 6 (1) of the Act?
5. According to explanation (1) appended to Section 6 (1) of the Act, if any litigation is instituted against Section 4 (1) notification or a draft declaration, the period of stay operating in the Court shall be excluded for the purposes of computing the period of one year prescribed in the second proviso appended to Section 6 (1) of the Act. The stand of the respondents is since the copy of the order was received by the defendants only on 5.3.2013 and unless the copy is received no steps could have been taken, period from date of stay till the copy is received i.e., 7.11.2012 to 5.3.2013 should also be excluded in terms of explanation (1) to Section 6 (1) of the Act.
6. This issue is no more res-integra. In two decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for petitioners, the very same issue has fallen for consideration.
7. In OXFORD ENGLISH SCHOOL draft declaration was notified on 19.12.1983. Challenging the same, writ petition was instituted in High Court of Madras. The Division Bench of Madras High Court has set aside entire acquisition proceedings after the stage of Section 4 (1) notification and allowed the writ petition in part. The Division Bench directed that there should be a fresh enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act in accordance with law and on completion of enquiry within six months draft declaration under Section 6 (1) of the Act should be issued and award should be passed within four months thereafter. The directions issued by the Division Bench of Madras High Court fixing time schedule for conducting fresh enquiry under Section 5-A, issuance of draft declaration and passing of award, was challenged before the Supreme Court. It was contended that subsequent time schedule is in conflict with the mandate of Land Acquisition Act. Supreme Court held that fresh declaration under Section 6 of the Act can be made in respect of any land notified under Section 4 (1) of the Act for acquisition within the time prescribed in Section 6 of the Act. The relevant para reads as under:
“8. The respondents have relied upon Explanation 1 to the proviso which provides that in computing the period of three years the period during which any action or proceeding to be taken pursuant to the notification under Section 4(1) is stayed by an order of court shall be excluded. In the case of the appellant such a stay was obtained by them from the High Court of Madras on 20-4- 1987. This was long after the expiry of the period of three years provided under the proviso to Section 6. Even if one excludes the period during which the subsequent stay operated, the issuance of a fresh declaration under Section 6 would be clearly beyond the period of three years prescribed under the proviso to Section 6. Since the prohibition on issuance of a declaration under Section 6 after the expiry of three years from the date of the publication of the notification under Section 4(1) is absolute, the High Court could not have given any direction permitting issuance of the declaration under Section 6 within six months from the date of its judgment.”
8. The decision in OXFORD ENGLISH SCHOOL was also considered by the Supreme Court in PADMASUNDARA RAO. The matter was referred to the larger bench on account of two different judgments operating on the issue. Supreme Court held that Court cannot read anything into a statutory provision which is plain and unambiguous. A statute is an edict of the legislature. Supreme Court further held as under:
“14…………Language of Section 6 (1) is plain and unambiguous. There is no scope for reading something into it, as was done in NARASIMHAIAH’S case {1996(3) SCC 88}. In NARASIMHAIAH’S case, the period was further stretched to have the time period run from date of service of High Court’s order. Such a view cannot be reconciled with the language of Section 6 (1). If the view is accepted it would mean that a case can be covered by not only clauses (i) and / or (ii) of the proviso to Section 6 (1), but also by a non-prescribed period. Same can never be the legislative intent.”
9. It is further held “legislature specifically provided for periods covered by orders of stay or injunction clearly shows that no other period was intended to be excluded and that there is no scope for providing any other period of limitation”.
10. In the instant case, after excluding the period of interim stay granted by this Court in W.P. No. 34676 of 2012 the maximum time that was available to the respondents was up to 15.1.2013, whereas the draft declaration was notified on 15.3.2013 that is beyond one year time available to the respondents even after excluding the period of stay. The date of receipt of copy of the order is not relevant as the same is not envisaged by the Act and therefore cannot be excluded and the draft declaration which is under challenge is not sustainable and it is accordingly set aside. However, if the respondents are in need of the subject land for the purpose of extension o f Sardar Vallabhai Patel National Police Academy, it is open for them to initiate fresh land acquisition proceedings as mandated by law.
Accordingly, the writ petition is disposed of. No costs. Sequel to the same, miscellaneous petitions, if any stand closed.
P NAVEEN RAO,J DATE: 10.9.2014 TVK 218 HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE P. NAVEEN RAO WRIT PETITION No. 8275 of 2013 Date: 10.9. 2014
[1] (1995) 5 SCC 206
[2] 2002(2) Supreme 359