JUDGMENT Aloke Chakrabarti, J.
1. This is a revision arising out of the judgment and order dated 24.10.1985 passed by the VI 1th Additional District Judge, Meerut in J.S.C.C. Suit No. 8 of 1983.
2. Plaintiff-opposite party by lease-deed dated 18.1.1977 leased out the disputed house with effect from 14.1.1977 at the rate of Rs. 250 per month for a period of five years which expired on 13.1.1982. One of the conditions of the lease-deed was that the defendants would vacate and hand over the vacant possession of the disputed premises after the expiry of five years to the plaintiff landlord and if it fails to do so, it would be liable to pay Rs. 600 per month until the landlord ejects the tenants from the said property through the Court of law or enters into a fresh lease agreement amicably and gets it registered.
3. The plaintiff-opposite party sent a notice dated 11.12.1981 informing the defendants to hand over possession of the premises in dispute on 13.1.1982 and in default to pay Rs. 600 per month. The defendants did not vacate the premises on the date fixed and continued in possession. The defendants paid rent till 13.1.1982 and after that date the plaintiffs refused to accept rent at the rate of Rs. 250 per month. The plaintiff on 7.9.1982 sent another notice by registered post in which the plaintiff demanded the arrears of rent and terminated the tenancy of the defendants under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act and thereafter filed the instant suit.
4. Defendants in spite of service of notice did not pay the rent and did not vacate the premises and contested the suit. Ultimately the suit was decreed with costs by judgment and decree dated 24.10.1985 and challenging the same the present revision was filed.
5. When this revision was taken up, both the parties argued only one question relating to interpretation of clause 10 in view of the provision of Section 20 (4) of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting. Rent and Eviction) Act. 1972 (hereinafter referred to as 'Rent Act').
6. The relevant clause being paragraph No. 10 of the lease deed has been translated at the bar and the same is as follows :
10. That on the expiry of above said period of five years, this lease deed will come to an end and first party without any objection will hand over the vacant possession of above property in his possession and if does not deliver then he will be liable to pay rent of Rs. 600 per month till the time the second party gets first party ejected from the said property through a Court of law or does not enter into fresh contract of lease in writing amicably and gets it registered."
7. Learned counsel for both the parties agreed to the fact that the aforesaid paragraph No. 10 in English is the correct translation of paragraph No. 10 of the lease-deed. The relevant word 'rent' used in English translation represents the word 'Kiraya' in the original deed in Hindi.
8. Learned counsel for the revisionists contends that the relevant expression in Section 20 (4) of the Rent Act requires the tenant to deposit "at the same rate as rent". It is stated that in the present case admittedly, the rent was Rs. 250 per month 50 long lease-deed remained in force for the period of five years with effect from 14.1.1977. Learned counsel for the revisionists contends that after the expiry of the said period, the agreement was that if the tenant did not deliver possession, he will be liable to pay a sum of Rs. 600 per month till the time the second party gets the first party ejected and this amount of Rs. 600 per month is not rent but is the amount representing the rent as also the damages.
9. Learned counsel for the revisionists referred to several paragraphs of the plaint. Paragraph No. 4 of the plaint indicates that the plaintiff-opposite party categorically referred to said Rs. 600 per month as mesne profit and the same expression has been used showing the amount to be mesne profit and towards damages as appears from the statement made in paragraph Nos. 6 and 7 of the plaint. In paragraph No. 7 of the plaint the claim has been made that the tenant was holding over and in paragraph No. 11 of the plaint reference has been to arrear rent and for that learned counsel for the revisionists contends that the amount equivalent to rent payable under Section 20 (4) of the Rent Act is the amount of Rs. 250 and not the rate of Rs. 600 which represented the damages and the mesne profit.
10. Learned counsel for the revisionists contends that the expression 'Kiraya' in the original deed represents both rent and damages and there is no corresponding expression in Hindi which can represent damages.
11. Learned counsel for the revisionists refers to the case of R. V. Bhupal Prasad v. State of A. P. and others. (1995) 5 SCC 698 ; Keshav Kumar Swaroop v. Ftowmore Private Limited, (1994) 2 SCC 10 ; Puzhakkal Kuttappu v. C. Bhargaui. (1977) 1 SCC 17 : Prouash Chandra Dalvi v. Bishwanath Banerjee. AIR 1989 SC 1834 and the case of Vayallakath Muhammedkutty v. Illikkal Moosakutty, (1996) 9 SCC 382 and contended that for the purpose of interpreting the intention of the parties entering into a contract, help is to be taken not only from the entire document but also from the surrounding circumstances and, therefore, the intention appears from the said terms of lease-deed itself as also from the stalements made in the plaint by the landlord and on that basis, it is stated that the requirement of the tenant was to deposit only Rs. 250 per month as rent and not at the rate of Rs. 600 per month also included the amount of damages.
12. Learned counsel for the opposite party contends that the arrear of rent as described in paragraph No, 11 of the plaint and the prayer portion of the plaint indicates clearly that the plaintiff was asking for payment of rent at the rate of Rs. 600 per month alter the expiry of the lease period of five years. Moreover, it is stated on behalf of the opposite party that Rs. 5,600 for the period between 14.1.1982 and 23.10.1982 clearly represents that Rs. 600 per month was being asked for by the plaintiff.
13. Learned counsel for the opposite party also contended that, the word 'Kiraya' represents only rent and it does not represent damages as in Hindi equivalent to the word 'damages' is 'Nuksan' or 'Kshatipuri'.
14. Learned counsel for the opposite party states that Section 20 (4) of the Rent Act requires deposit by the tenant unconditionally and the tenant is not entitled to dispute the claim of the plaintiff and to make deposit of any amount which the tenant feels fit.
15. After considering the contentions of the respective parties, it appears that there is no dispute that clause 10 of the lease-deed governs the issue. The said clause 10 clearly provided that on expiry of the period of five years, the lease-deed would come to an end and the first party being the present revisionists were required to hand over vacant possession of the property. A provision has been made in the said clause that if the lessee did not deliver possession, then he would be liable to pay rent at the rate of Rs. 600 per month till the time the plaintiff opposite party gets him ejected from the said property through a Court of law. In the present case, admittedly the lease-deed expired on 13.1.1982 and the plaintiff-opposite party issued notice for delivery of possession long before that date. Therefore, clause 10 becoming effective, the revisionists became liable to pay rent at the rate of Rs. 600 per month till their eviction. In the expression used in clause 10, there is no ambiguity that liability to pay rent at the rate of Rs. 600 per month arose when possession was not delivered by lessee in terms of said clause 10.
16. The expression in Hindi 'Kiraya' as used in the lease-deed means only rent. The contention of the revisionists that there is no suitable expression for damages. Is not acceptable as expression like 'Kshatipurti' is available in Hindi language which sufficiently represents damages. On the date. Section 20 (4) of the Rent Act became relevant, admittedly the revisionists were continuing possession and applying the provisions of clause 10 of the lease-deed, became liable to pay rent at the rate of Rs, 600 per month till ejection. In appropriate cases, interpretation of expression "at the same rate as rent" may require an interpretation from various circumstances apart from the agreement. But, in the present case, the agreement itself was very clear providing for liability to pay rent at the rate of Rs. 600 per month in the eventuality of not handing over of possession even after expiry of period of five years. Therefore, there is no question of interpreting the said provision further considering other attending circumstances. The provision of agreement itself makes the position clear here.
17. The law in this connection relied as decided in the case of R. V. Bhupal Prasad (supra) also shows clearly that the tenant by sufferance cannot be made by contract. In the present case, when the contract itself makes the position clear, there is no need of considering whether revisionists became a tenant by sufferance making it further open to decide as regards quantum of rent payable by the revisionists at that stage.
18. In view of the aforesaid findings. 1 am of the view that no interference is required with the impugned judgment and order dated 24.10.1985 passed by the Court below and the revision is thus dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.