JUDGMENT I.P. Vasishth, J.
1. This Special appeal is directed against the orders/judgment dated 22.11.1994 and 18,10.1995 passed by Hon'ble Mr. Justice A.P. Singh in Writ Petition No. 2119 of 1982 on application No. 14858 (W) of 1994 and 13244 (W) of 1995 (recall application dated 9.10.1995) respectively.
2. The case has a chequered history succinctly put; the writ petitioner Yash Karan Singh was an employee of the Uttar Pradesh Dental Council but for quite some time was working on deputation with the U.P. Pharmacy Council, Lucknow, since August 1980. Towards the close of April 1982 his services were sought to be repatriated to parent department against which he reonstrated and finally came to the Court as a petitioner in Writ Petition No. 2119 of 1982. An interim order was passed in that case on 10.5.1982 staying his repatriation. On 26.11.1983 some modification was ordered and a direction issued to the Pharmacy Council for depositing his salary which he was drawing at the time of repatriation. Permission was also granted to him to withdraw that amount. The writ petition itself was finally disposed off by an Hon'ble Single Judge of this Court on 31.3.1993 holding inter aha that the repatriation was bad in law because prior thereto he had been permanently absorbed and confirmed on the post of Junior Assistant in the U.P. Pharmacy Council with all consequential benefits arising therefrom.
3. It appears that the petitioner was not satisfied with the response of the U.P. Pharmacy Council in regard to the compliance of the Judgment, particularly in the context of payment of back wages. He, therefore, moved a formal application for contempt under Article 215 of the Constitution which came to be registered here in this Court as Criminal Misc. Case No. 837 of 1994, but it was dismissed as not maintainable on 12.8.1994. However, it was observed therein that the petitioner could execute its judgment and order by filing an application as provided under the Rules of the Court. He thereupon moved a formal application and the learned Single Judge on 22.11.1994 passed one of the orders impugned in this special appeal directing the office to "prepare a final order and send the same as prayed by the petitioner for execution" to the District Judge, Lucknow.
4. During the execution proceedings before the District Judge certain objections were raised by the Pharmacy Council, one of which went to the roof of the matter in view of its challenge to the Court's jurisdiction. The objection was, however, over-ruled by the learned District Judge vide order dated 31.5.1995. Feeling aggrieved, the Pharmacy Council filed Civil Revision No. 81 of 1995 and also prayed for recall of the aforesaid order dated 22.11.1994 authorising the writ petitioner to seek execution of its orders through the agency of the District Judge. Both these matters were taken up together by the learned Single Judge in C.M.A. No. 13244 (W) of 1995 and dismissed under the judgment dated 18.10.1995 now under challenge before this Court by way of the instant special appeal.
5. When the matter came up for hearing at the time of admission, it transpired that the appeal against the order dated 22.11.1994 was time-barred and there was no application seeking condonation of delay. Faced with the situation, the learned Counsel for the appellants confined his appeal only against the judgment dated 18.10.1995. In a manner of speaking the appeal against order dated 22.11.1994 was withdrawn. He, however, propagated an explanation that the order dated 22.11.1994 had actually merged in the subsequent judgment dated 18.10.1995 vide which his recall application was dismissed.
6. We have carefully perused the entire material on record and heard the learned Counsels for the parties. In all fairness to him, the learned Counsel for the appellants conceded that his appeal in so far as it relates to the rejection of revision No. 81 of 1995 against the order of the District Judge is concerned, is not maintainable in view of the embargo placed by Rule 5, Chapter VIII of the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952 (1952 Court Rules for the short).
7. With reference to the cases of Shivdeo Singh v. Stare of Punjab, AIR 1963 SC 1909, J.G. Shinker v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1981 Bombay 184 and Divisional Forest Officer v. T.U. Chariyan, AIR 1982 Kerala 363, the learned Counsel submitted that the Court has inherent powers to review or recall its own orders in befitting situations with the obvious intention of doing substantial justice between the parties. Pressing his view point the learned Counsel cited the case of Jai Narain v. Chheda Lal, AIR 1960 Alld. 385, for the proposition that whenever on account of some oversight or inadvertance any such error is committed which has the propensities of causing miscarriage of justice, it is rather the duty of the Court to rectify the mistake by resort to the provisions of Article 215 of the Constitution, as after all it is a Court of records.
8. In the same sequence, the learned Counsel tried to assail the principal order dated 22.11.1994, whose recall was rejected by the learned Single Judge, as according to him it was beyond the purview of Rule 11 of Chapter XXII of the 1952 Court Rules because the original order dated 31.3.1993 vide which the Court was pleased to allow writ-petition No. 2119 of 1982 granting certain relief to the private respondent Yash Karan Singh, did not have a stipulation of the type which could permit the quantification of the costs for preparation of a decree envisaged under the aforesaid rule. According to the learned Counsel if at all the private respondent was aggrieved by the non-compliance of the Court judgment in writ-petition No. 2119 of 1982, he could, seek its enforcement under the contempt law as held in the cases of Mohd. Ikram Hussain v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1964 SC 1625 and Kamla Bai v. Ram Das, AIR 1981 Bombay 187 rather than bank upon execution through a subordinate Court.
9. Summing up his submissions, the learned Counsel contended that since the initial order dated 22.11.1994 itself was non-est and impermissible under the law, therefore, the execution of the writ judgment through the agency of the District Court was also ill-advised and deserved to be recalled.
10. Despite seeming attraction, the submissions raised by the learned Counsel fail to carry conviction. There may not be any dispute with the ratio of the various judicial pronouncements cited by him but, then, the Court cannot lose sight of the time honoured rule of prudence that each and every case requires adjudication in the light of its own peculiarities because quite often it is observed that despite evidently binding nature, the judicial precedents do not lay down any abstract rule of law, to be precise, usually there is some slight difference in the facts and situations of the two given cases which, if appraised, critically may call for an entirety different view point. This apart, the submission of the learned Counsel ate highly loaded and suggestive besides being self-defeating on some crucial aspects.
11. As would be apparent from the history of the case enumerated here-in-before, the private respondent petitioner writ Yash Karan Singh had successfully approached this Court to avoid the order of repatriation as his grievance was sustained vide judgment dated 31.3.1993 in writ petition 2119 of 1982, When he complained to this Court against the appellants non-compliance by way of an application under Article 215 of the Constitution, they questioned its maintainability. Their objection was accepted by the Court and it was only thereafter that the parties were relegated to the executing agency of the District Judge, Lucknow, but in that forum-they raised the objections even against the execution thus forcing the private respondent to knock the doors of this Court once again as if in a backtracking exercise. The plea now is that this Court too has no jurisdiction. In a manner of speaking, the appellants are taking contradictory pleadings by adopting the method of approbation and re-approbation.
12. Be that as it may, the objection against the initial order dated 22.11.1994 is misconceived because a bare reference to Rule 1 (viii), Chapter II of the 1952 Court Rules would suffice to show the competence of this Court to enforce its orders by way of execution through the agency of the District Judge. For the proper appreciation of the point in issue, the rule is reproduced below :-
"1. Functions, powers and duties of Registrar-In addition to other functions, powers and duties of the Registrar under these Rules or other law, the following shall be his functions, powers and duties in relation to judicial proceedings, namely-
(i).................
(ii)................
(iii)..............
(iv)..............
(v).............
(vi)............
(vii)...........
(viii) to send decrees and orders passed by the court in the exercise of its original, ordinary or extraordinary jurisdiction to other Courts for execution."
13. In all probability it was because of the unambiguous nature of the aforesaid Rule that the appellants, in their wisdom, did not agitate against the relevant order dated 24.11.1994 at any stage till the fine" morning they moved the recall application under Article 215 of the Constitution at a highly belated stage on 9.10.1995, and that too, after the rejection of their objections by the District Judge. It may be interesting to note that for the reasons better know to them, the appellants skirted the review provisions of Rule 12, Chapter V of the 1952 Court Rules, To put it in plain words, instead of seeking review, they preferred to seek the recall. The intention should hot be too far to seek because the review jurisdiction even under Article 226 read with Order XLVII, Rule 1 of the C.P.C. could be invoked only in limited situations which were not available to them in this case.
14. The Apex Court judgment in the matter of Sheodeo Singh (supra), relied upon by the learned Counsel after passing through various phase including Northern India Caterers Ltd. v. Lt. Governor of Delhi, AIR 1980 SC 674 and P.N. Eswara Iyar v. Registrar, Supreme Court, AIR 1980 SC 808, does not change the consistent view that the review power has to be exercised sparingly and only in the cases envisaged under Order XLVII, Rule 1 of the C.P.C. In the instant case, there was no error apparent on the face of the record, the Court did not lack the jurisdiction in passing the initial order dated 22.11.1994. It is also not shown as to what particular material which required the notice of the Court could not be placed before it despite due diligence or whether something important and new material was discovered at. a later stage which called for judicial appraisement. This apart, simply because there could possibly be a view other than the one drawn by the learned Single Judge at the time of passing the initial order on 22.11.1994, would not justify the exercise of review or recall. After all the review of recall jurisdiction is not like appellate forum where the entire lis is laid open for re-appraisal as a matter of right.
15. And the crowning glory is that the initial order dated 22.11.1994 which was sought to be challenged by way of special appeal is no longer in dispute, as mentioned hereinbefore the special appeal against the said order was withdrawn by the learned Counsel for the appellants himself because of the glaring difficulty of limitation and absence of any application for condonation.
16. The learned Counsel then complained of over-claim filed by the private respondent Yash Karan Singh in the execution proceedings as according to him all his legitimate monetary claims had already been fully satisfied and there remained nothing to be paid to him. This aspect has already been taken into consideration and properly disposed off by the learned Single Judge with the observations that the appellants can arise all such objections and seek adjudication thereon before the executing Court within the purview of Section 47 of the C.P.C.
17. In so far as reference to the case of Mohd. Ikram Hussain and Kamla Bai (supra), is concerned, suffice to say that they have no relevancy with the facts of our case because in the matter of Mohd. Ikram Hussain, the learned Judges were dealing with the issue of awarding punishment for disobedience of its orders issued in a habeas corpus writ whereas in the matter of Kamla Bai the learned Judge was seized of a decree passed in the matrimonial matter and in neither of those two cases the Court had the facility of the nature envisaged by Rule 1 (viii) of Chapter II of the 1952 Court Rules reproduced hereinbefore. Similarly reference to the Allahabad case of Jai Narain (supra) is also misplaced as the learned Judge was dealing with a situation arising from a clerical error.
18. Thus, looking from all conceivable angles, the Special Appeal lacks merit and is thoroughly misconceived. It is accordingly dismissed with costs.