JUDGMENT S.P. Srivastava, J.
1. The petitioner No. 1 claiming to represent the registered Trade Unions of Beedi Workers at Allahabad, Mirzapur, Sultanpur, Farrukhabad and other places in U.P. and Petitioner No. 2 which is a Trade Union of Workmen employed in Beedi Industry at Allahabad seek quashing of the order dated August 2, 1994 passed by the respondent No. 3 whereunder exercising the jurisdiction envisaged under Section 6-B (3) of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, the said authority had refused to register the settlement dated April 11, 1994 claimed to have been arrived at between the employers of the Beedi Industry and the Beedi Workers Union and Others.
2. In this writ petition, the petitioners have impleaded besides the State of U.P., Labour Commissioner and Deputy Labour Commissioner, and four Biri Employers of the Beedi Industry who have been arrayed as respondents Nos. 4 to 7.
3. The aforesaid four Beedi employers along with a registered society of Beedi Employers in U.P. arrayed as petitioner No. 5 have filed another writ petitioner No. 27305 of 1994 in which, besides the Deputy Labour Commissioner, the Assistant Labour Commissioner, the Labour Enforcement Officer, the petitioners of Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 27305 of 1994 have been impleaded as respondent Nos. 5 and 6 apart from various other Beedi Workers Unions.
4. The employer-petitioners in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 27478 of 1994 have also sought for the quashing of the order dated August 2, 1984 challenged in the writ petition No. 27305 of 1994. The petitioners in both the cases have further prayed for a direction requiring the respondent-authorities to register the settlement dated April 11, 1994. However, in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 27305 of 1994 it has also been prayed that the respondent-authorities be directed to enforce the settlement dated April 11, 1994 till the final decision of the High Court and a further direction requiring the respondent-authorities to restrain the respondent Nos. 4 to 7 from shifting their Beedi Industries from Allahabad to other places in U.P. or to other States.
5. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case both the writ petitions were heard together and are being disposed of by a common order.
6. It appears from the record that through a notification dated January 3, 1994 by the State Government in exercise of the jurisdiction envisaged under Section 3 to the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 whereunder a wage structure was provided for the payment of wages to various categories of workmen employed in the Biri Industry. This wage structure was to remain in force for a period of two years unless cancelled or altered otherwise. The aforesaid wage structure provided for payment of wages which were higher than those which were being paid during the period anterior to the issuance of the notification.
7. In writ petition No. 27305 of 1994 it has been asserted that prior to January 3, 1994 the Beedi Mazdoors in U.P. were getting Rs. 20 per thousand from their employers whereas the said wage was enhanced to 35 rupees per thousand with the publication of the notification dated January 3, 1994. It is also asserted that the wage structure in force in the State of M.P. provided the rate of Rs. 22.50 p., per thousand whereas in the State of Bihar the rate was Rs. 19/- per thousand. It is further asserted that on account of this enhancement the Beedi Manufacturers intended to shift to the adjoining States of Uttar Pradesh and this threatened a mass unemployment of several lacs of Biri Mazdoors in Allahabad and throughout U.P. The petitioners claimed that this matter was agitated before the labour authorities with the request to stop the shifting of Beedi Industries from U.P. otherwise the Beedi workers will suffer irreparable loss and will be compelled to start movement resulting in labour unrest which will disturb the economy of the nation. It is also asserted that in the compelling circumstances the Beedi manufacturers and the representatives of the Mazdoor unions arrived at a settlement dated April 11, 1994 which was to continue till the matter relating to the validity of the notification dated January 3, 1994 was finally adjudicated upon by the High Court at Allahabad or the State Government. It is further asserted that about 30 lacs of Beedi Mazdoors in the State of U.P. were affected by the threatened exodus of the Beedi manufacturers and their threat to close down their establishments in U.P. from August 25, 1994. In the circumstances there could be no justification for refusing the registration of the settlement reached between the workmen and the employers which was aimed at to secure industrial peace and harmony.
8. In Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 27478 of 1994 filed by the employer, it has been asserted that the wages of the workers under the impugned notification had been enhanced by about 75% from Rs. 20/- per 1000 Beedi rolled to Rs. 35/- per 1000 Beedi rolled whereas the rates of wages fixed in the State of M.P. was only Rs. 22.50 per 1000 beedi rolled. It was asserted that this wage fixation was patently illegal and unjust and had the effect of virtually driving the Beedi manufactures of U.P., out of business or compelling them to migrate to the neighbouring State of M.P. where the cost of production was much less. It was asserted that this notification was against the interest of beedi workers who were to loose employment or get reduced employment on account of migration of Beedi manufacturers to the neighbouring State or the manufacturers of U.P. getting their Beedi manufactured in the State of M.P. and marketing them in U.P. These employer-petitioners further averred that they had challenged the notification dated January 3, 1994 issued by State Government by means of various writ petitions details of which were given in paragraph 5 of the writ petition but no interim relief had been granted in the aforesaid writ petitions which were awaiting preliminary hearing for admission. The petitioners assert that the employers and the workmen had arrived at a settlement which secured interest of both and ought to have been registered to maintain industrial peace and harmony. It was only in view of the settlement dated April 11, 1994 that the petitioners had reconciled to retain their manufacturing units in U.P. and not to shift it to the neighbouring State of M.P. itself protecting and maintaining employment,
9. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioners as well as the learned Chief Standing Counsel and perused the record.
10. A perusal of the settlement which was sought to be registered a true copy of which forms part of the record indicates that in view of the new wage structure with enhanced rates of wages the employers intended to close down their business in Uttar Pradesh and have decided to get entire manufacturing of beedis done in the neighbouring States and had also challenged the validity of the notification dated January 3, 1994 in the High Court at Allahabad. It is also indicated in the aforesaid settlement that on account of the threatened exodus of the employers to the neighbouring States or the shifting of their manufacturing units from U.P. to adjoining States the Beedi workers were likely to be rendered jobless and it was in this view of the matter that the employer and workmen had arrived at a settlement for the time being and as a temporary measure with a view to check the exodus of the employers. The salient feature of the aforesaid settlement was that the employer had agreed to enhance the wages from Rs. 20/- to Rs. 24/-, during the pendency of the writ petitions which had been filed challenging the notification dated January 3, 1994. The employers had also agreed that in case the wage structure in force in the State of M.P. was enhanced, in that event they will pay to the workmen the wage which will be one rupee higher than that enforced in the State of M.P.
11. The objects disclosed in the settlement deed itself as well as the terms and conditions contained therein clearly point out that this settlement was nothing else except a measure to get over the notification dated January 3, 1994 and a substitute for an interim relief which the employers had failed to get in the proceedings initiated by them in the High Court challenging the validity of the notification dated January 3, 1994 and seeking its quashing.
12. It is significant to note that the workmen-petitioners in their writ petition No. 27305 of 1994 have not sought for the quashing of the notification dated January 3, 1994 which as the recitals contained therein itself shows had been issued as an acute emergency had arisen on account of the threatened agitation by the work-men for fulfilment of their demands regarding enhancement of the wages and the revision of the wage structure upwards.
13. A perusal of the impugned order passed;
by the Deputy Labour Commissioner U.P.
shows that the registration of the settlement in question had been refused in view of the said settlement being contrary to the notification dated January 3, 1994.
14. Learned counsel for the petitioners in both the writ petitions have vehemently urged that the impugned order is clearly without jurisdiction. The contention is that the competent authority cannot refuse registration of a settlement except if it is inexpedient to do so on public grounds affecting social justice or if the settlement has been brought about as a result of collusion, fraud and mis-representation and in any other case an obligation stands cast upon it under the law to grant the registration. It is urged that the ground on which the registration has been refused in the present case does not fall within the ambit of the two exceptions provided for in Section 6-B (3) of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act.
15. Sri. S.M.A. Kazmi, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel who had accepted notice on behalf of respondent-authorities, has on the other hand contended that the ground of refusal disclosed in the impugned order clearly falls within the ambit of the first exception. The contention is that in face of the notification issued by the State Government in exercise of the jurisdiction envisaged under Section 3 of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, in public interest and to preserve the industrial peace and harmony, the grant of registration would have been in-expedient on public grounds affecting social justice. Learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel further contended that in any view of the matter no such settlement or agreement can be allowed to be enforced which per-se is against the public policy reflected under the scheme underlying the notification issued in exercise of the jurisdiction vested in the State Government as contemplated under Section 3 of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act which has to be presumed to have been issued for maintaining an industrial peace and harmony.
16. I have given my anxious consideration to the above rival contentions and have carefully gone through the record.
17. Settlement of labour disputes by direct negotiation or settlement through collective bargaining is always preferred as it is the best guarantee of industrial peace and harmony which is the aim of all legislation for the settlement of labour disputes. However, a settlement arrived at by agreement between the employer and workmen otherwise than in the course of conciliation proceedings is not binding on the parties to the agreement unless it is registered in accordance with the provisions contained in Section 6-A of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act. Section 6-B (3) of the aforesaid Act provides that on receipt of application for registration of a settlement the conciliation officer or the authority notified by the State Government in this behalf can either register the settlement in the prescribed manner or refuse registration if it considers it to be inexpedient to do so on public grounds affecting social justice or if the settlement has been brought about as a result of collusion, fraud or mis-represervation.
18. The provisions contained in Section 3 of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, apart from other things, provide that if in the opinion of the State Government it is necessary or expedient so to do for securing the public safety or convenience or the maintenance of public order or supplies and service essential to the life of the community, or for maintaining employment it may by general or special order make provision for requiring employers, the workmen or both to observe for such period as may be specified in the order such terms and conditions of employment as may be determined in accordance with the order.
19. The Notification dated January 3, 1994 had been issued by the State Government in exercise of the aforesaid jurisdiction secured in favour of the State Government under the provisions of Section 3 of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act. Such a notification has to depend upon the subjective satisfaction of the State Government upon which the powers to act under Section 3 of the Act have been conferred by the legislature. Further, the State Government can exercise powers secured in its favour under the aforesaid provision as a temporary measure when there is an acute emergency and where exercise of power to refer the matter for adjudication is inadequate to meet or face the situation as there may be occasions where fixation of wages or minimum wages through adjudication by Tribunal or under the Minimum Wages Act is unable to keep pace with galloping rise of price. Further, the revision of wage structure in exercise of the aforesaid jurisdiction can be done in the circumstances indicated hereinbefore to neutralise the erosion in real earning of the workman concerned. The exercise of the jurisdiction envisaged under Section 3 of the Act really aims at preventing exploitation of workmen and for maintaining industrial peace and harmony.
20. Beedi manufacture in India has been prevalent on a large scale in all parts of the Country. It is not a mechanised or sophisticated industry. In its very nature it does not require a regular or whole time labour nor a fixed premises. The Labour employed are not only unskilled but are mostly employed on contract. It is a prevalent practice in the trade to buy rolled Beedis from contractors and sell them under particular trade mark. The industry depends entirely upon human labour. The Beedi workers include 'home workers' as they are called, mostly women who manufacture Beedis in their own homes with the assistance of other members of their family. There are 'out workers' also. They roll Beedis out of the tobacco and Beedi leaves supplied by the proprietor himself without the agency of middle men. The large body of actual workers are illiterate women and infirm persons who can earn something by rolling Beedis. Such persons could with impunity be exploited by the proprietors and contractors. The dependence of these people particularly the women and infirm persons engaged in the Beedi industry shows that they have little bargaining power against powerful proprietors or contractors.
21. There is always an upper and lower limit for rates of wages and the actual rates between these limits are determined by the urgency of the employer's need for workers and the urgency of workers to accept employment so as to earn wages to provide for the necessaries of life. The rates fixed between these limits will, therefore, depend on the bargaining power of the two sides. In any particular bargaining situation the employers may be willing to pay higher wage by considering the prosperity of their undertakings, their competitive power and the risk of losing trade seriously if their labour cost rose too high. The lower limit can also be estimated by judging the strength of the resistance of the workers to lowering of their standards of living, the power of trade union and other factors.
22. In its decision in the case of Workmen represented by Secretary v. Repatakos Brett and Co. Ltd. and Anr. 1991 (63) FLR 928 (SC), the Apex Court has observed that each category of the wage structure had to be tested at the anvil of social justice which is the life-fibre of our society today. It was further pointed out that a living wage had been promised to the workers under the Constitution. A 'socialist' framework to enable the working people a decent standard of life has further been promised by the Second Amendment. The Apex Court observed further that the workers are hopefully looking forward to achieve the said ideal. The promises are piling up but the day of fulfilment is no where in sight.
23. Considering the facts and circumstances of this case, it seems to me that the provisions contained in Section 3 of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 cast a duty on the State Goveminent that in case the requisite conditions are satisfied it ought to issue a general or special order contemplated under Section 3(b) of the Act for securing convenience or the maintenance of public order and for maintaining employment. Further I am clearly of the view that where the Act imposes a duty it is implied that unless the contrary intention appears the duty is to be performed time to time as occasion requires.
24. The wage structure contemplated under the notification issued by the State Government in exercise of the jurisdiction envisaged under Section 3 of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act appears to have been issued to neutralise erosion in real earning of beedi employees and to provide a relief to a section of public in a situation of acute emergency and further to preserve industrial peace and harmony and prevent exploitation of beedi workers. Thus, there can be no manner of doubt that the aforesaid notification and the wage structure contemplated therein reflects a public policy affecting a large section of the public referred to hereinbefore engaged in the beedi manufacturing process which section of public falls in the category of a 'workman' and is a weaker section of the society.
25. The settlement in dispute contravenes the provisions contained in the notification issued by the State Government in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 3 of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act. Such an agreement/settlement has been nullified under the impugned order for avoiding disobedience to the public policy underlying the notification issued under Section 3 of the Act. It seems to me that the public policy underlying the notification is better served by refusal accorded by the respondent-authority than by registration of the settlement in dispute.
26. In the circumstance, therefore, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners appears to be without any merit and is not at all acceptable.
27. In Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 27305 of 1994 the learned counsel for the petitioners has also tried to urge that the impugned order had been passed without affording an opportunity of hearing to the petitioners and the parties to the agreement. Except taking a ground to this effect in the writ petition, the petitioners have not made any assertion of fact in the body of the writ petition which could support the aforesaid ground. In the circumstances the contention of the petitioner in this regard is not liable to be accepted.
28. If the matter is viewed from the view indicated hereinabove, that being the only view possible, I do not find any justifiable ground for interference by this Court while exercising the extraordinary jurisdiction envisaged under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
29. In view of my conclusion indicated hereinbefore, both these writ petitions being devoid of merits are hereby dismissed in limine.