Antony Dominic, J.
These are appeals filed by the United India Insurance Company Limited and the Oriental Insurance Company Limited against the awards passed by the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation, Thrissur in W.C.C.Nos.361/2000 and 374/2003.
2. The claimants in the workmen's compensation claims were sales representatives employed by their respective employers. As part of their conditions of service, their employers had provided them two wheelers. While riding the vehicles in their course of their employment, they met with accidents, resulting in bodily injuries. This led the injured to file claims under the Workmen's Compensation Act, claiming the benefit of coverage of the insurance policy. This was in view of proviso (i) to Section 147 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as 'the M.V.Act' for short).
3. The Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation overruled the objection raised by the Insurance Companies that they are not liable under the proviso (i) to Section 147 of the M.V.Act and awarded compensation against the Insurance Companies. It is aggrieved by these awards that the aforesaid insurance companies have filed these appeals.
4. When MFA No.191/05 came up for consideration before a Division Bench of this Court on 23rd of September, 2010, on behalf of the claimant, reliance was placed on the judgment of this Court in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nimmy & Ors. (2002 (1) KLJ 811). However, the Division Bench, prima facie, found that the coverage under the proviso to Section 147 of the M.V.Act is available only to those persons who are employed as drivers and are engaged in driving and not to other employees who were engaged in driving at the time of the accident. On that basis, doubting the correctness of the view taken by the Division Bench in Nimmy's case (supra), the appeal was referred for consideration by a Full Bench.
5. Subsequently, since the issue raised in MFA No.7/09 was similar, by order dated 8/11/11, this appeal was also referred to a Full Bench to be heard along with MFA No.191/05. It is accordingly that these cases are listed for hearing before us.
6. We heard the learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant in MFA No.7/09, learned counsel appearing for the appellant in MFA No.191/05, the learned counsel appearing for the respective claimants and the employers, who are respondents in these appeals.
7. In these appeals, we are called upon to examine the scope and purport of Clause (a) to the first proviso to Section 147 of the M.V.Act, 1988. The first proviso and Clause (a) thereof, being relevant, are extracted below for reference;
“Provided that a policy shall not be required-
(i) to cover liability in respect of the death, arising out of and in the course of his employment, of the employee of a person insured by the policy or in respect of bodily injury sustained by such an employee arising out of and in the course of his employment other than a liability arising under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 (8 of 1923) in respect of the death of, or bodily injury to, any such employee--
(a) engaged in driving the vehicle.”
8. A reading of the former part of proviso shows that a policy as provided in Section 147 (1) shall not be required to cover liability in respect of death, arising out of and in the course of his employment, of the employee of a person insured by the policy or in respect of bodily injury sustained by such an employee arising out of and in the course of employment. Latter part of this proviso makes an exception to the aforesaid exclusion clause by providing that a policy shall be required to cover a liability arising out of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 in respect of the death of, or bodily injury to, any such employee. Thereafter, by Clauses (a), (b) and (c), the categories of employees who are eligible for the benefit of coverage are enumerated. Among the three categories, clause (a) provides that, an employee 'engaged in driving the vehicle' is entitled to coverage of the insurance policy.
9. The learned counsel for the Insurance Companies reiterated their contention that in order to get the coverage of Clause (a) to the proviso to Section 147, an employee should be employed as a driver and should be engaged in driving. It is the settled position of law that when the language of a statute is unambiguous, the Courts are bound to literally interpret the statute and give full effect to the provisions. In so far as Clause (a) to the proviso to Section 147 is concerned, Section only uses the expression 'engaged in driving the vehicle' without specifying either the class of the vehicle which is covered by this provision or the nature of the employment of the person engaged in driving the vehicle, unlike clauses (b) and (c) to the proviso, which specifies the nature of the employment to claim coverage of the said provision. This, therefore, means that to claim coverage of Clause (a) to the proviso to Section 147 of the Act, the employee need only be engaged in driving the vehicle, irrespective of whether he was employed as driver or not. Needless to say that such coverage would be available only if the accident arose out of and in the course of his employment and only if the other requirements of the Workmen's Compensation Act are also satisfied.
10. On the other hand, if we are to accept the contention canvassed on behalf of the Insurance Companies that the claimant should be employed as driver and that he should be engaged in driving, that would mean that this Court would be adding words to the statute, which is impermissible for a Court interpreting statutory provisions. Therefore, we do not see any justification to adopt the interpretation canvassed by the counsel for the Insurance Companies.
11. It was interpreting the provision in Clause (a) to the proviso to Section 147, Nimmy's case (supra) was decided by a Division Bench of this Court. That was a case where the deceased was employed by the 5th respondent therein. While he was riding a scooter provided by his employer, an accident occurred out of and in the course of his employment. Following the accident, the claim was filed under the Workmen's Compensation Act. The Insurance Company contended that to get coverage of Clause (a) to the first proviso to Section 147, the employee mentioned in Clause (a) should be employed as a permanent driver of the owner of the vehicle. Repelling this contention, the Division Bench held thus;
“It is not stated in the section that to get protection under this section one should be permanently employed as driver or the sole duty entrusted on him is driving. We are of the opinion that when an employee in driving the vehicle as part of his duty, he will come within the first proviso to Section 147(1) of the M.V.Act. Here, the victim was an employee of the owner of the vehicle which was insured by the appellant. He was driving the vehicle as part of his duty. Hence first proviso to section 147(1) is attracted. Words used in clause (a) is 'engaged in driving the vehicle' and not engaged as a permanent driver as contended by the insurance company. Therefore, insurance company is liable to pay compensation.”
12. Subsequently, a learned single Judge of this Court had occasion to deal with an identical issue in Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Davis (2006 (4) KLT 1013). That also was a claim which arose out of the Workmen's Compensation Act and the question considered was whether in order to claim compensation under the W.C.Act, for injuries sustained while driving the motor vehicle, it was necessary that the employee should be employed as a driver. This contention was negatived by the learned single Judge making reference to the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act and Section 147 of the M.V.Act thus;
9. In terms of S.3(1) thereof, the liability of an employer to pay compensation in accordance with the provisions of Chapter II of the W.C.Act, is for the personal injury caused to a workman by the accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. The thrust is on the course of employment. While drafting the first proviso to S.147 of the M.V.Act, the legislature has used the terms “employment”, “employed” and “engaged”. The liability that is required to be covered in terms of the first proviso is the compensation due on account of injury arising out of and in the course of his “employment”, suffered by the employee, while Clause (a) under proviso (i) uses the word “engaged”. The legislature by the use of the words “employment”, “employed” and “engaged” in the M.V.Act, 1988, with reference to W.C.Act, 1923, a legislation that was already in existence, the clear distinction between the concept of “employment” and “engagement” is maintained. Hence, the words “engaged” in Clause (a) of Proviso (i) is not to be read as “employment”. Therefore, the legislative intention is clear that any injury sustained by an employee during the course of his employment has to be compensated if bodily injury or death has occasioned during his engagement in driving the vehicle. So much so, the word “engaged” in Clause (a) of proviso (i) indicates the duty or activity carried on by the workman at the time of suffering the accident, resulting in his death or in injuries to him. Hence, it would be an impermissible and an extremely restricted approach to hold that a person, who was employed as a driver, would alone fall under Clause (a) of Proviso (i). Therefore, the only manner in which Proviso (i) (a) of S.147(1) can be interpreted is by holding that it is not necessary for a person to be employed exclusively as a driver under an employer to sustain a claim referable to the said provision and one who is engaged in driving the vehicle, thereby meaning, driving the vehicle at the time of the accident, is entitled to compensation and insurance covered under the said proviso, provided he was in the employment of the employer and therefore a workman and still further, that he was driving the vehicle at the time of the accident under due authorisation of the employer.”
13. This issue came up for consideration before a Division Bench of this Court again in the context of an appeal filed against an award under the Workmen's Compensation Act in the case of Benz Automobiles Ltd. v. Thomas (2008 (3) KLT 1015). That was a case where, the employee, working as a Field Officer, was provided with a motor cycle owned by the appellant, the employer. The accident arose out of and in the course of his employment and the injured claimed compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act. The Commissioner allowed the claim and directed the Insurance Company, which insured the motor cycle, to pay the amount. In an appeal filed by the Insurance Company, the matter was remanded. When the claim was again considered by the Commissioner, the contention of the Insurance Company that it was not liable was accepted and the employer was ordered to pay the compensation. It was against that award, the employer filed the appeal.
14. Upholding the contention of the employer regarding the liability of the Insurance Company, the Division Bench of this Court held thus;
“S.147(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act and S.3(1) of the Workmen's Compensation Act read with S.11 (3) of the conditions of policy makes it clear that the liability of the Insurance Company to indemnify the workmen compensation liability of the injured towards its employee-driver who sustained injuries in an accident during the course of employment.”
15. Again, in the judgment in M.A.C.A. No.1271/07, an appeal filed against the award passed by the M.A.C.T., Ottappalam, this Court had occasion to consider the scope of Section 147(1) and it was held thus;
“So however, as per the proviso to Rule 147 of the Motor Vehicles Act, a policy shall not be required to cover the liability in respect of a death, arising out of and in the course of his employment, of the employee of a person insured by the policy or in respect of bodily injury sustained by such an employee arising out of and in the course of his employment other than a liability arising under the Workmen's Compensation Act, in respect of the death of, or bodily injury to, any such employee, engaged in driving the vehicle or; if it is a public service vehicle engaged as conductor of the vehicle or in examining tickets on the vehicle or; if it is a good carriage, being carried in the vehicle, or; to cover any contractual liability. It has been found that the liability arises under the Workmen's Compensation Act to compensate the deceased by the employer in terms of the provisions contained in the said Act, but as far as the policy is concerned, such a policy need be issued to cover an employee who is engaged in driving the vehicle. In so far as the term “engaged” in driving the vehicle is not restricted to a driver “employed”, the expression “engaged” need not and cannot confine to cases of a regular employment, and will extend to any person engaged by the owner to drive the vehicle. It is also not necessary that the vehicle involved should be a public carrier vehicle. Since the liability to pay compensation, if the death occurs in the course of employment, arises under the Workmen's Compensation Act, the only other condition to be satisfied so as to attract the provisions of Motor Vehicles Act is that such a person should have driven the vehicle, with authority.
23. When the owner himself has permitted the employee to travel in the motor bike for attending to the work connected with employment, the mere fact that he was self- driving the vehicle will not take his case out of the expression 'engaged in driving the vehicle' used in clause (a) of proviso (i) to Section 147 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Being a two wheeler and since the deceased was permitted to ride the motor bike for attending to the work connected with the establishment and thus he was engaged in driving the vehicle at the time of accident, Section 167 of the Motor Vehicles Act gives an option regarding the claims for compensation in certain cases. That is a non- obstante clause, which has an over-riding effect over the Workmen's Compensation Act. If the death or bodily injury arise out of an accident, a person has option to prefer the claim either under the Workmen's Compensation Act or under the Motor Vehicles Act, but not under both. Therefore, in this case, the accident occurred as a user of the motor cycle; that the deceased was riding the motor cycle and he was engaged to drive the vehicle; that he is found entitled to be compensated under the Workmen's Compensation Act, and, therefore, this a case where the claim for compensation arises under both the enactments. Hence, the the appellants had option to choose either of these two enactments. The appellants having chosen to file an application under Section 163 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the only other question to be considered is as to what is the compensation payable under the said provision.”
16. Thus, the above judgments rendered by this Court show that, consistently it was being held that, if an employee ,in discharge of his duties, is engaged in driving a vehicle as permitted by his employer, irrespective of whether he is employed as driver or not, the employee would be entitled to the coverage of the proviso to Section 147, provided the accident has occurred out of and in the course of his employment.
17. It is true that the learned counsel appearing for the Insurance Company made reference to Manager, National Insurance Company Ltd v. Saju P.Paul and another [(2013) 2 SCC 41], Sanjeev Kumar Samrat v. National Insurance Co. Ltd [(2013 (1) KLT 41(SC)], Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v.
Insurance Company Limited [(2007) 13 SCC 446], New India Assurance Company Limited v. Sadanand Mukhi and Others [(2009) 2 SCC 417], Alagadurai v. Immanuel (2009 (2) KLT 368) and United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Vijayarajan (2009 (3) KLT 269).
18. However, in none of these judgments, the Courts had occasion to interpret Clause (a) to the 1st proviso to Section 147 of the M.V. Act unlike the three judgments of this Court referred to in the earlier part of this judgment. Therefore, in our considered view, these judgments, relied on by the learned counsel for the Insurance Companies, would not in any manner indicate that the interpretation to Clause (a) to the 1st proviso to Section 147 of the M.V.Act, as given in the three judgments noticed above, is erroneous.
19. We, therefore, do not see any reason to reconsider the principles laid down in Nimmy's case (supra), which was followed in Davis's case (supra) and Benz Automobiles case (supra) and therefore confirm the principles laid down in these judgments.
20. Coming to the merits of the appeals, as we have already seen, the respective claimants were employed as Sales Representatives, who were provided with two wheelers. It has been found that the accident arose out of and during the course of their employment. They have also suffered injuries. It was in the above factual background that having been satisfied that the requirements of the Workmen's Compensation Act were all satisfied that the Commissioner has awarded compensation.
Since the only issue canvassed before us was the interpretation of Clause (a) to the proviso to Section 147 of the M.V.Act and as the same has been answered against the Insurance Companies, these appeals are only to be dismissed and we do so.
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ANTONY DOMINIC, JUDGE
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K.RAMAKRISHNAN, JUDGE
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ANIL K. NARENDRAN, JUDGE
Rp //True Copy// PA TO JUDGE