* THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE U. DURGA PRASAD RAO
+ M.A.C.M.A No.3149 of 2009
%28.04.2014
Between:
United India Insurance Co. Ltd. .... Appellant AND Y. Padmaja Vani and others. …. Respondents ! Counsel for Appellant : Sri V. Sambasiva Rao ^ Counsel for Respondent No.3 : Sri Posani Venkateswarlu < Gist:
> Head Note:
? Cases referred:
1) 2001 (1) ALT 495
2) 2014(1) ALD 111 (SC)
3) 2011 (6) ALT 321 = LAWS (APH) 2010-7-52
4) LAWS (SC) 2013-8-57
5) (2002) 7 Supreme Court Cases 456
6) AIR 2012 SC 86 THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE U. DURGA PRASAD RAO
M.A.C.M.A. No.3149 of 2009
JUDGMENT:
Challenging the award dated 08.02.2005 in O.P.No.83 of 2000 passed by the Chairman, M.A.C.T-cum-District Judge, Ongole (for short “the Tribunal), the appellant/United India Insurance Company Limited preferred the instant appeal.
2) The appellant herein is the R.2 before the Tribunal; R.1 herein is the R.1 before the Tribunal; R.2 herein is the R.3 before the Tribunal and the R.3 herein/claimant is the petitioner before the Tribunal. The parties are referred to as arrayed before the Tribunal.
3) The factual matrix of the case is thus:
a) The claimant—Koduri Harish Babu is a minor boy of six years old, who was studying U.K.G, English Medium at Nagarjuna Residential School at Maddipadu. The claimant’s case is that on 29.08.1999 at about 5:30pm, when the claimant along with his parents after attending a marriage at Mukthinuthalapadu village was returning to Maddipadu village in a bus and when they got down and crossing the road, one lorry bearing No.AP 16 V 4236 which was proceeding from Ongole being driven by 3rd respondent at high speed and in a rash and negligent manner and dashed the claimant. In the resultant accident, the claimant sustained simple and grievous injuries over the head, left eye, left upper part of thigh below the buttock region and left ankle joint. The claimant was shifted to Venkata Rama Hospital, Ongole and from there he was shifted to Peoples Trauma and Emergency Hospital, Guntur and was treated as inpatient from 30.08.1999 to 01.10.1999 and the doctors found that there was some hemorrhage in the occipital region and thereby brain of body was effected, which resulted in permanent disability to the claimant. It is pleaded that the claimant became mentally retarded and his prospects of life are jeopardized due to loss of memory. It is averred that the accident was occurred due to the rash and negligent driving by the driver of the offending lorry. On these pleas, the claimant filed O.P.No.83 of 2000 against respondents 1 to 3, who are the owner, insurer and driver of the offending lorry and claimed Rs.10,77,000/- as compensation under different heads mentioned in the O.P.
b) Respondent No.1 remained ex parte.
c) Respondent No.2/Insurance Company filed counter and opposed the material averments in the petition and urged to put the claimants in strict proof of the same. R.2 denied the method and manner of occurrence of the accident and pleaded that the accident was occurred due to the gross negligence on the part of petitioner and his parents. R.2 denied the nature of injuries sustained by the claimant and the alleged mental disablement. R.2 contended that the crime vehicle was not insured with it and the policy was not in force as on the date of accident. R.2 contended that the driver of the offending lorry was not having valid license to drive the vehicle. R.2 further contended that the claim is highly excessive and exorbitant and thus, prayed for dismissal of the O.P.
d) During trial P.Ws.1 to 4 were examined and Exs.A.1 to A.8 were marked on behalf of claimants. Policy copy filed by 2nd respondent was marked as Ex.B.1.
e) A perusal of the award would show that the Tribunal having regard to the oral evidence of PW.1—father of the claimant coupled with Ex.A.1—F.I.R and Ex.A.6—charge sheet held that the accident was occurred due to rash and negligent driving by the driver of the offending lorry.
f) Regarding issue No.2 which relates to quantum of compensation, the Tribunal awarded compensation of Rs.5,32,000/- with proportionate costs and simple interest at 9% p.a from the date of O.P till the date of realization under different heads as follows:
Loss of earnings Rs.4,50,000-00 Medical expenses and other incidental charges Rs. 41,000-00 Attendant charges Rs. 3,000-00 Travelling charges Rs. 1,000-00 Extra nourishment Rs. 2,000-00 Pain and suffering and Loss of amenities in life Rs. 15,000-00 Future medical expenses Rs. 20,000-
00 Total Rs. 5,32,000-00 Hence, the appeal by Insurance Company.
4) Heard arguments of Sri V. Sambasiva Rao, learned counsel for appellant/Insurance Company and Sri Posani Venkateswarlu, learned counsel for respondent No.3/claimant. Even though notice sent to R.1 was served, there is no representation on his behalf. However, since R.1 suffered decree before the Tribunal, his absence in the appeal will not have any difference as per the decision reported in Meka Chakra Rao vs. Yelubandi Babu Rao @ Reddemma and
[1]
others . R.2 is not necessary party in this appeal vide Memo USR No.889/2009.
5 a) Criticizing the compensation awarded by the Tribunal as highly excessive and exorbitant, learned counsel for appellant firstly argued that the Tribunal while computing the future loss of earnings, grossly erred in fixing the notional monthly income of the minor boy as Rs.2,500/-. He submitted that the boy was admittedly six years old by the time of accident and studying U.K.G and as such he was a non-earning person. Hence, the Tribunal by following the Second Schedule of the M.V. Act ought to have accepted his annual income as Rs.15,000/-. Due to this error, he argued, the compensation was highly escalated and hence needs to be revised.
b ) Secondly, impugning the genuinity of Ex.A.5—medical bills, learned counsel argued that they would show that some of the bills were procured from Peoples Medical Stores, Guntur and very curiously they contain serial numbers like 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175 and so on of different dates. He argued, even if the medicines are purchased from the said shop, it is impossible to get serial numbers for different dates and that creates doubt on the genuinity of the bills that too in the absence of medical prescriptions. He therefore, argued that the medical expenditure may be discarded.
He thus prayed to revise the quantum of compensation by allowing the appeal.
6 a) Per contra, learned counsel for respondent No.1/claimant firstly argued that the appeal challenging the quantum of compensation itself is not maintainable in view of the fact that the appellant/insurance company has not obtained any permission from the Tribunal under Section 170 of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short “the Act”) to contest the matter on all grounds apart from the grounds mentioned under Section 149 (2) of the Act. In the absence of such permission from the Tribunal, the Insurance Company is debarred from filing the appeal on the ground of exorbitance of compensation which ground is not one of those mentioned in Section 149(2) of the Act to raise without any prior permission. In this regard, he relied upon the following decisions:
1) Josphine James vs. United India Insurance Co.
[2]
Limited and another .
2) National Insurance Company Limited vs. Yarrasani
[3]
Aparanji .
Thus he prayed to dismiss the appeal on this main objection.
b) Apart from above, regarding quantum of compensation, learned counsel argued that the Tribunal rightly awarded compensation under different heads and there is no need to revise the same. He submitted that the Tribunal has not faltered in taking the notional income of the injured at Rs.2,500/- p.m. He submitted that in fact in the following decision, the Hon’ble Apex Court for the death of a 10 years old boy fixed his notional income at Rs.30,000/- and therefore, the Tribunal cannot be found fault.
[4]
1) Kishan Gopal vs. Lala
c) Nextly, regarding the genuinity of the Ex.A.5—medical bills, his submission is that though the parents of the minor boy purchased medicines from Peoples Medical Stores, Guntur on different dates, they failed to obtain the receipts immediately after purchase of the medicines due to serious health condition of their son and during the time of discharge, on realizing that the bills were needed to be filed before the Claims Tribunal during trial, they obtained the bills from the said medical shop on the same day with respective date-wise. Hence the bills contain serial numbers. He submitted that there is no malpractice in obtaining those medical bills. He further argued that having regard to the grave injuries suffered by the minor boy and treatment underwent in a Corporate Hospital, the medical expenditure of Rs.40,000/- and odd cannot be said to be high side.
He thus prayed to dismiss the appeal.
7) In the light of above rival arguments, the points for determination in this appeal are:
1) Whether the Insurance Company without securing permission from the Tribunal under Section 170 of the Act can file the appeal challenging the quantum of compensation?
2) If Point No.1 is held in affirmative, whether the compensation awarded by the Tribunal is just and reasonable or excessive?
8) POINT No.1: It may be noted that while filing the claim petition, the claimant himself has voluntarily added the Insurance Company as a party-respondent but the Insurance Company has not got impleaded itself. This fact has a bearing on the right of Insurance Company to prefer the appeal in the light of precedential law which will be presently discussed a little while later. As stated supra, after it was added as party by the claimants, the Insurance Company contested the matter.
9) The grounds on which an Insurance Company can contest the claim are envisaged under Section 149 (2) of the Act as below:
149. Duty of insurers to satisfy judgments and awards against persons insured in respect of third party risks:
1) xxxx
2) No sum shall be payable by an insurer under sub-section(1) in respect of any judgment or award unless, before the commencement of the proceedings in which the judgment of award is given the insurer had notice through the Court, or as the case may be, the Claims Tribunal of the bringing of the proceedings, or in respect of such judgment or award so long as execution is stayed thereon pending an appeal; and an insurer to whom notice of the bringing of any such proceedings is so given shall be entitled to be made a party thereto and to defend the action on any of the following grounds, namely:
(a) that there has been a breach of a specified condition of the policy, being one of the following conditions, namely:
(i) a condition excluding the use of the vehicle:
(a) for hire or reward, where the vehicle is on the date of the contract of insurance a vehicle not covered by a permit to ply for hire or reward, or
(b) for organized racing and speed testing, or
(c) for a purpose not allowed by the permit under which the vehicle is used, where the vehicle is a transport vehicle, or
(d) without side-car being attached where the vehicle is a motor cycle; or
(ii) a condition excluding driving by a named person or persons or by any person who is not duly licensed, or by any person who has been disqualified for holding or obtaining a driving licence during the period of disqualification; or
(iii) a condition excluding liability for injury caused or contributed to by conditions of war, civil war, riot or civil commotion; or
(b) that the policy is void on the ground that it was obtained by the non-disclosure of a material fact or by a representation of fact which was false in some material particular.
10) It may be noted that apart from the above grounds, an Insurance Company can also contest on other grounds such as no fault of the concerned driver, contributory negligence, quantum of compensation etc., in the circumstances envisaged under Section 170 of the Act, which reads thus:
170. Impleading insurer in certain cases—Where in the course of any inquiry, the Claims Tribunal is satisfied that—
(a) there is collusion between the person making the claim and the person against whom the claim is made; or
(b) the person against whom the claim is made has failed to contest the claim, It may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, direct that the insurer who may be liable in respect of such claim, shall be impleaded as a party to the proceeding and the insurer so impleaded shall thereupon have, without prejudice to the provisions contained in sub-section (2) of Section 149, the right to contest the claim on all or any of the grounds that are available to the person against whom the claim has been made.
1 1 ) Now in the context of Section 170 of the Act, the argument of learned counsel for respondent No.1/claimant is that since the appellant/Insurance Company has failed to obtain permission from the Tribunal under Section 170 of the Act to permit it to contest on all the grounds available to the insured, apart from the grounds available to it under Section 149(2) of the Act, it cannot challenge the quantum of compensation awarded by the Tribunal in the appeal. Hence in this context, the point is whether Insurance Company is required to obtain permission from the Tribunal under Section 170 of the Act to contest on all the grounds apart from the grounds under Section 149 (2) of the Act. We have cleavage of opinion in this regard. Before discussing those decisions, on factual side it must be mentioned that the Insurance Company except mentioning in Para 14 of its written statement to the effect that it seeks protection under Sections 147, 149 and 170 of the Act, does not appear to have filed any separate application seeking permission under Section 170 of the Act and no such permission seems to have been accorded by the Tribunal.
1 2 ) In the case of National Insurance Company Ltd., Chandigarh v. Nicolletta Rohtagi and others[5] Hon’ble Apex Court was answering following question that has arisen in a group of appeals:
“Where an insured has not preferred an appeal under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 against an award given by the Tribunal, is it open to the insurer to prefer an appeal against the award passed by the Tribunal questioning the quantum of compensation, as well as finding as regards the negligence of the offending vehicle?”
a) To answer the above point, the Apex Court in its judgment discussed the right of Insurance Company under Sections 149, 170 and 173 of the Act and held thus:
“26. For the aforesaid reasons, an insurer if aggrieved against an award, may file an appeal only on those grounds and no other. However, by virtue of Section 170 of the 1988 Act, where in course of an enquiry the Claims Tribunal is satisfied that (a) there is a collusion between the person making a claim and the person against whom the claim has been made, or (b) the person against whom the claim has been made has failed to contest the claim, the Tribunal may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, implead the insurer and in that case it is permissible for the insurer to contest the claim also on the grounds which are available to the insured or to the person against whom the claim has been made. Thus, unless an order is passed by the Tribunal permitting the insurer to avail the grounds available to an insured or any other person against whom a claim has been made on being satisfied of the two conditions specified in Section 170 of the Act, it is not permissible to the insurer to contest the claim on the grounds which are available to the insured or to a person against whom a claim has been made.(emphasis supplied) Thus where conditions precedent embodied in Section 170 are satisfied and award is adverse to the interest of the insurer, the insurer has a right to file an appeal challenging the quantum of compensation or negligence or contributory negligence of the offending vehicle even if the insured has not filed any appeal against the quantum of compensation. Sections 149, 170 and 173 are part of one scheme and if we give any different interpretation to Section 173 of the 1988 Act, the same would go contrary to the scheme and object of the Act.”
b) Thus the Apex Court held that unless the Tribunal passes an order permitting the insurer to contest on the grounds available to an insured or any other person against whom a claim has been made, it is not permissible for the insurer to contest the claim on the grounds which are available to the insured or to the person against whom a claim has been made. When Section 170 of the Act is satisfied and permission is accorded, then only the Insurance Company will have a right to file an appeal challenging the quantum of compensation or negligence or contributory negligence of the offending vehicle even if the insured has not filed any appeal challenging the quantum of compensation.
13) The correctness of the above judgment was challenged and hence referred to a three Judges Bench and the said Bench rendered its judgment reported in United India
[6]
Insurance Company Ltd. vs. Shila Datta and others .
Before the said Bench, five points were raised by the Insurance Companies, which are as follows:
(i) There is a significant difference between insurer as a 'noticee' (a person to whom a notice is served as required by Section 149(2) of the Act) in a claim proceedings and an insurer as a party-respondent in a claim proceedings. Where an insurer is impleaded by the claimants as a party, it can contest the claim on all grounds, as there are no restrictions or limitations in regard to contest But where an insurer is not impleaded by the claimant as a party, but is only issued a statutory notice, under Section 149(2) of the Act by the Tribunal requiring it to meet the liability, it is entitled to be made a party to deny the liability on the grounds mentioned in section 149(2).
(ii) When the owner of the vehicle (insured) and the insurer are aggrieved by the award of the Tribunal and jointly file an appeal challenging the quantum, the mere presence of the insurer as a co-appellant will not render the appeal, as not maintainable. When insurer is the person to pay the compensation, any interpretation, to say that it is not a 'person aggrieved' by the quantum of compensation determined,' Would be absurd and anomalous.
(iii) When an insurer is aggrieved by the quantum of compensation, it is not seeking to avoid or exclude its liability, but merely wants determination of the extent of its liability. The restrictions imposed upon the insurers to defend the action by the claimant or file an appeal against the judgment and award of the Tribunal will apply, only if it wants to file an appeal to avoid liability and not when it admits its liability to pay the amount awarded, but only seeks proper determination of the quantum of compensation to be paid.
(iv) Appeal is a continuation of the original claim proceedings. Section 170 provides that if the person against whom the claim is made, fails to contest the claim, the insurer may be permitted to resist the claim on merits. If and when an award is made by the Tribunal which is excessive, arbitrary or erroneous, the owner of the vehicle has to challenge the same by filing an appeal before the High Court. If the insured (owner of the vehicle) fails to challenge an award even when it is erroneous or arbitrary or fanciful, it can be considered that the insured has failed to contest the same and consequently under Section 170, the High Court or the tribunal may permit the insurer to file an appeal and contest the award on merits.
(v) The Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 ('Act' for short) creates a liability upon the insurer to satisfy the judgments and awards against the insured. The Act expressly restricts the right of the insurer to avoid the liability as insurer, only to the grounds specified in Section 149(2) of the Act. Though it is impermissible to add to the grounds mentioned in the statute, the insurer has a right, if it has reserved such a right in the policy, to defend the action in the name of the insured. If it opts to step into the shoes of the insured, it can defend the action in the name of the insured and all defences open to the insured will be available to it and can be urged by it. Its position contesting a claim under Section 149(2) of the Act is distinct and different, when it is contesting the claim in the name of or on behalf of the insured owner of the vehicle, In cases, where it is authorized by the policy to defend any claim in the name of the insured, and the insurer does so, it can not be restricted to the grounds mentioned in Section 149(2)of the Act, as the defence is on behalf of the owner of the vehicle.
Briefly stating—
i) Point No.1 concerns with the right of Insurance Company to contest on all grounds apart from grounds mentioned under Section 149 (2) of the Act—as a mere noticee and as a party.
ii) Point No.2 concerns with the effect of insurer standing as a co-appellant along with insured in an appeal.
iii) Point Nos.3 to 5 concern with the right of Insurance Company to prefer an appeal independently when the insured fails to do so.
14) For the purpose of answering above points with reference to Section 149(2) and 170 of the Act, the Hon’ble Apex Court, it appears categorized the insurer into three classes:
i) Insurer as a party being voluntarily impleaded by the claimants.
ii) Insurer was initially a mere noticee under Section 149(2) of the Act and later impleaded as a party.
iii) Insurer was only a mere noticee and not impleaded as party.
a) Discussing the rights of the insurer to contest on all grounds, when he was voluntarily impleaded as party by the claimants, Apex Court in Para 8 has held thus:
“8. The Act does not require the claimants to implead the insurer as a party Respondent. But if the claimants choose to implead the insurer as a party, not being a noticee under Section 149(2), the insurer can urge all grounds and not necessarily the limited grounds mentioned in Section 149(2) of the Act. If the insurer is already a Respondent (having been impleaded as a party Respondent), it need not seek the permission' of the Tribunal under Section 170 of the Act to raise grounds other than those mentioned in Section 149(2) of the Act.”
b) Then discussing the rights of the insurer to contest on all grounds when he was shown as a mere noticee at the first instance and later impleaded as party by virtue of Section 170 of the Act, the Apex Court in Para 9 has held thus:
“9. Section 170 proceeds on the assumption that a claim petition is filed by the claimants, or is registered suo moto by the tribunal, with only the owner and driver of the vehicle as the Respondents. It also proceeds on the basis that in such a proceeding, a statutory notice would have been issued by the tribunal to the insurer so that the insurer may know about its future liability in the claim petition and also resist the claim, on any of the grounds mentioned in Section 149(2). Section 170 of the Act also assumes that the tribunal will hold an inquiry into the claim, where only the claimants and the owner and driver will be the parties. Section 170 provides that if during the course of such inquiry, the tribunal finds and satisfies itself that there is any collusion between the claimant and the owner/driver or where the owner/driver has failed to contest the claim, the tribunal may suo moto, for reasons to be recorded in writing, direct that the insurer who may be liable in respect of the claim, who was till then only a notice, shall be treated as a party to the proceedings. The insurer so impleaded, without prejudice to the provisions of Section 149(2), will have the right to contest the claim on all or any of the grounds that are available to the driver/owner.”(emphasis supplied)
c) Then summing up the rights of the insurer under classes 1 and 2, the Apex Court in Para 10 has held thus:
“10. Therefore, where the insurer is a party-respondent, either on account of being impleaded as a party by the tribunal under Section 170 or being impleaded as a party-respondent by the claimants in the claim petition voluntarily, it will be entitled to contest the matter by raising all grounds, without being restricted to the grounds available under Section 149(2) of the Act.”
Needless to emphasise that the observations of the Bench in Paras 8, 9 and 10 of its judgment are contrary to the view expressed in Nicolletta Rohtagi’s case (5 supra).
15) In respect of reference Point No.2, which concerns with the effect of insurer standing as a co-appellant along with insured in an appeal, the Apex Court answered that on account of the insurer standing as a co-appellant, it will not effect the maintainability of the appeal.
16) To answer Point Nos.3 to 5, the Apex Court treated the insurers under those points as mere noticees under Section 149(2) of the Act and not impleaded as parties to the claim proceedings. It observed that the basic premises in Nicolletta Rohtagi’s case (5 supra) was that the insurer can contest a Motor accident claim for compensation only on the ground mentioned under Section 149(2) of the Act. Though the Bench in Shila Datta’s case (6 supra) agreed with the contention of the insurers that when they do not deny their liability but only come to assist the Tribunal in arriving at the just compensation by contesting unjust or illegal or erroneous claims of the claimants and also seek right to file appeals, however in view of the decision in Nicolletta Rohtagi’s case (5 supra), the Bench has not answered Points 3 to 5 in favour of the insurers. Rather directed that Points 3 to 5 which are in conflict with Nicolletta Rohtagi’s case (5 supra) be referred to a Larger Bench. That is how referred Points 1 to 5 were answered by Apex Court.
17) When the ratio of above decision is applied to the facts of the present appeal, it is needless to emphasise that the present appellant/Insurance Company was not a mere noticee under Section 149 (2) of the Act but it was a party respondent (R.2 in the O.P) right from the inception being voluntarily added by the claimant. As such, the appellant comes under that category of insurers in Point No.1 of Shila Datta’s case (6 supra). Applying the ruling in Point No.1, the appellant/insurer could contest the MVOP on all the grounds irrespective of no specific permission accorded by the Tribunal under Section 170 of the Act. Further as the appellant/insurer falls under Point No.1 but not under Points 3 to 5 of Shila Datta’s case (6 supra), in my view, the reference of the Points 3 to 5 to a Larger Bench will have no effect on the right of the present appellant/insurer to pursue the appeal independently in the absence of the insured. For this reason, the decisions in Josphine James’s case (2 supra) and Yarrasani Aparanji’s case (3 supra) cited by the respondent No.1 herein will not bind the appellant. This point is answered accordingly.
18) POINT No.2: As the Point No.1 is held in affirmative, it has
now to be seen whether compensation awarded is just and reasonable or excessive. The first argument of the appellant is that the Tribunal erred in taking the notional income of the claimant as Rs.2,500/- p.m, it contended that since the boy is only six years old and a non-earning member, his annual income ought to have been taken as Rs.15,000/-. On the other hand, respondent No.1/claimant contends that the notional income of Rs.2,500/- p.m is an appropriate one and in Kishan Gopal’s case (4 supra), the notional income of a 10 years old boy was taken as Rs.30,000/- p.a. In this context, perusal of the award would show that the Tribunal accepted the notional income of the claimant at Rs.2,500/- p.m (Rs.30,000/- p.a). Then, considering the evidence of PWs.2 and 3, the Tribunal appears to be convinced that the claimant suffered permanent disability and cannot do any work, fixed his functional disability at 100%. Thereby, it multiplied his annual income with a selected multiplier of ‘15’ and awarded Rs.4,50,000/- (Rs.30,000/- x 15).
a) Sofaras notional income is concerned, in the cited decision (4 supra), Hon’ble Apex Court fixed the notional income of 10 years old boy at Rs.30,000/-. Following it, the annual income fixed by the Tribunal can be accepted as appropriate one.
b) Disability is concerned, PW.2—Neuro Surgical Consultant of Peoples Trauma Emergency Hospital, Guntur deposed that the boy suffered defuse brain injury in the accident and he is still having defects like hampered cognitive functions and mental reprobation with inability to pursue his educational activities. He has right side facial policy (?) and ataxia of the limbs (inability to coordinate voluntary movements) resulting in inability to write properly and use the upper limbs with dexterity. PW.2 stated that he has to take physiotherapy for the above problems. Then PW.3—Dr.D.Phani Bushan, Psychiatrist in Guntur General Hospital deposed that the petitioner suffered permanent disability due to the accident and he needs treatment continuously for life long. He further deposed that the petitioner has age inappropriate sub average intelligence which will impair his functioning in society, academic, personal and biological. A careful analysis of the evidence of PWs.2 and 3 will no doubt show that the brain injury of the boy resulted in permanent disability and thereby, his cognitive faculties are retarded and the dexterity of his upper limbs also reduced. However, as opined by the Tribunal, it cannot be said that he is totally paralysed and unable to attend any works in future for earning his livelihood though his education is hampered. Therefore, his functional disability cannot be accepted as 100% but can be taken at 90%. In view of the same, the appropriate compensation for future loss of earnings is Rs.4,05,000/- (Rs.2,500/- X 12 X 15 X 90%).
1 9 ) The next argument is with regard to the genuinity of Ex.A.5—medical bills. Having regard to the explanation offered by the learned counsel for respondent No.1/claimant, Ex.A.5— medical bills can be believed. Accordingly, this point is answered.
20) In the result, in view of the findings in points 1 and 2, this appeal is partly allowed and ordered as follows:
a) The compensation awarded by the Tribunal is reduced by Rs.45,000/-.
b) The appellant/Insurance Company is directed to deposit the balance compensation amount within one month from the date of this judgment, failing which execution can be taken out against them.
c) No order as to costs in this appeal.
As a squeal, miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending in this appeal shall stand closed.
U. DURGA PRASAD RAO, J Date: 28.04.2014 Note: L.R. Copy to be marked: YES/ NO
scs
[1] 2001 (1) ALT 495
[2] 2014(1) ALD 111 (SC)
[3] 2011 (6) ALT 321 = LAWS (APH) 2010-7-52
[4] LAWS (SC) 2013-8-57
[5] (2002) 7 Supreme Court Cases 456
[6] AIR 2012 SC 86