JUDGMENT S.P. Srivastava, A.C.J.
1. I have had the opportunity to go through the judgment in draft prepared by my learned brother, Ashok Bhushan, J. I agree that this writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India deserves to be dismissed. However, I would like to add a few words.
2. The legislative policy underlying the various provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act clearly indicates that the right to appeal contemplated under Section 173 of the said Act, so far as the insurer is concerned, is not an absolute right but has been made subject to certain conditions. The statute does not recognise or provide for any remedy to an insurer against an award, if the requisite conditions are not satisfied. In its decision in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd., Chandigarh v. Nicolletta Rohtagi and Ors. JT 2002 (7) SC 251, the Apex Court had clearly indicated that in the absence of the grant of permission envisaged under Section 170 of the Motor Vehicles Act, it is not open to an insurer to challenge the quantum of compensation awarded raising a defence other than the statutory defences permissible under the Act, which may be available to an Insured or owner. The legislative intent cannot be set at naught by permitting recourse to a remedy which is not contemplated for the insurer. It is, therefore, obvious that in the absence of any permission as contemplated under Section 170 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the plea raising defence other than the statutory defences cannot be permitted to be raised by an insurer in any proceeding whether it be a revision under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code or a writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Doing so will tantamount to violation of legislative intent/policy underlying the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act as amended.
3. It may be noticed that the question as to whether the Insurance Company can challenge the quantum of compensation under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code or under Article 227 of the Constitution of India had come up for consideration before a Full Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in its decision in the case of New India Assurance Company Ltd. v. Smt. Rafeeka Sultan and Ors., 2001 (1) JLJ 1. After taking into consideration a large number of decisions of various Courts including the Apex Court, the Full Bench had come to the conclusion that the remedy of revision under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code or a writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India was not available to an insurer. In that case, the insurer had assailed the award of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal through a Civil Revision under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code, challenging the quantum of compensation. Before the Full Bench, it had been urged that the Insurance Company could not challenge the quantum of compensation and as it had to remain confined to the limited defences available to the Insurance Company.
4. No justifiable ground has been made out for taking a departure from the view expressed by the Full Bench in the case of New India Assurance Company Ltd. (supra).
Ashok Bhushan, J.
5. We have heard Sri Satish Chaturvedi, the learned counsel for the petitioner.
6. By this writ petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has prayed for quashing the judgment/award dated 1.8.2002 passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal/Additional District Judge, Gautam Budh Nagar in M.A.C. Case No. 12 of 2000, Badal Tyagi v. Babloo and Ors.
7. Facts giving rise to this writ petition briefly stated are :
Respondent No. 2 while going on a Motor Cycle on 9.12.1999 was hit by a Maruti van bearing registration No. DL-4C/B-1195 causing injuries to the respondent No. 2. The respondent No. 2 filed a claim petition under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred as 'the Act') impleading the driver, owner of the Maruti van and the petitioner-Insurance Company as defendants. The petitioner-Insurance Company also filed written statement. The Motor Accident Claims Tribunal after hearing the parties and considering the evidence on record gave the award dated 1.8.2002 allowing the claim petition for an amount of Rs. 1,92,812.00 along with 9% per annum interest from the date of claim. The petitioner-Insurance Company was held liable to pay the aforesaid amount. It has been stated in paragraph 8 of the writ petition that though a First Appeal From Order lies against the judgment/award of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal under Section 173 of the said Act but since the grounds available to the insured are not available to the petitioner-Insurance Company for want of permission under Section 170 of the said Act, the petitioner has filed this writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
8. The learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that the judgment of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal is Illegal, since it accepted that the claimant had Income of Rs. 17,000 per month without there being any credible evidence. The counsel contended that since the decision of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal is patently erroneous, the same can be corrected by this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The counsel for the petitioner submitted that the First Appeal From Order is not being filed against the award of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal since in the said First Appeal From Order, the petitioner could not have challenged the illegality of the award in accepting the income of Rs. 17,000 per month.
9. We have considered the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the record. It ts not disputed by the counsel for the petitioner that against the impugned award, the petitioner had right to file a First Appeal From Order under Section 173 of the said Act. However, the grounds for attacking the award which have been raised in the present writ petition, are not available to the petitioner in the aforesaid First Appeal From Order for want of permission under Section 170 of the Act.
10. The Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 contains detailed provision regarding liability of the insurer and the grounds on which the insurer can challenge the liability. Section 149(2) of the said Act provides for grounds on which insurer can defend the action. Section 170 of the Act provides for impleadment of insurer in such cases. Section 170 further provides that the Tribunal may, for the reasons to be recorded in writing, direct that the insurer shall be impleaded as party and shall thereupon without prejudice to provisions contained in Sub-section (2) of Section 149 of the said Act, have right to contest the claim on the grounds which are available to the person against whom the claim has been made. Section 173 of the Act provides for the appeal. The object of the aforesaid provision and the underlined scheme has been considered by the Apex Court in Chinnama George and Ors. v. N. K.
Raju and Anr., 2000 (2) AWC 1596 (SC) : 2000 (4) SCC 130. In the case before the Apex Court on a claim petition filed by the heirs of the deceased, the Tribunal allowed the claim. The appeal was filed under Section 173 of the Act both by the owner of the Bus and the Insurance Company. The Apex Court after considering Section 149 of the Act laid down in paragraph 6 as under :
"6. Admittedly, none of the grounds as given in Sub-section (2) of Section 149 exist for the insurer to defend the claim petition. This being so, no right existed in the insurer to file appeal against the award of the Claims Tribunal. However, by adding N. K. Raju, the owner as co-appellant, an appeal was filed in the High Court which led to the Impugned judgment. None of the grounds on which the insurer could defend the claim petition was the subject-matter of the appeal as far as the Insurer is concerned. We have already noticed above that we have not been able to figure out from the impugned judgment as to how the owner felt aggrieved by the award of the Claims Tribunal. The impugned judgment does not reflect any grievance of the owner or even that of the driver of the offending bus against the award of the Claims Tribunal. The insurer by associating the owner or the driver in the appeal when the owner or the driver is not an aggrieved person cannot be allowed to mock at the law which prohibits the Insurer from filing any appeal except on the limited grounds on which it could defend the claim petition. We cannot put our stamp of approval as to the validity of the appeal by the insurer merely by associating the insured. Provision of law cannot be undermined in this way. We have to give effect to the real purpose to the provision of law relating to the award of compensation in respect of the accident arising out of the use of the motor vehicle and cannot permit the insurer to give him the right to defend or appeal on grounds not permitted by law by a backdoor method. Any other interpretation will produce unjust results and open the gates for the insurer to challenge any award.
We have to adopt a purposive approach which would not defeat the broad purpose of the Act. The Court has to give effect to true object of the Act by adopting a purposive approach."
11. The Apex Court recently in National Insurance Co. Ltd., Chandigarh v. Nicolletta Rohtagi and Ors., (2002) 7 SCC 456, has again considered the provisions of Sections 149, 170 and 173 of the Act while considering the following issue as noted in paragraph 2 of the judgment which is quoted as below :
"Where an insured has not preferred an appeal under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred as "the 1988 Act") against an award given by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as "the Tribunal"), is it open to the Insurer to prefer an appeal against the award by the Tribunal questioning the quantum of the compensation, as well as finding as regards the negligence of the offending vehicle?"
The Apex Court in the aforesaid judgment has held that the insurer, if aggrieved, against the award, can file an appeal only on grounds mentioned in Section 149(2) of the Act and no other ground. The Apex Court in the aforesaid judgment has also held that where conditions precedent embodied in Section 170 of the Act are satisfied, the insurer has a right to file an appeal challenging the quantum of compensation, or the findings regarding negligence or contributory negligence of the offending vehicle even if the insured has not filed any appeal against the quantum of compensation. Following was laid down by the Apex Court in paragraph 26 :
"26. For the aforesaid reasons, an insurer if aggrieved against an award, may file an appeal only on those grounds and no other. However, by virtue of Section 170 of the 1988 Act, where in course of an enquiry the Claims Tribunal is satisfied that (a) there is a collusion between the person making a claim and the person against whom the claim has been made, or (b) the person against whom the claim has been made has failed to contest the claim, the Tribunal may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, implead the insurer and in that case it is permissible for the insurer to contest the claim also on the grounds which are available to the insured or to the person against whom the claim has been made. Thus, unless an order is passed by the Tribunal permitting the insurer to avail the grounds available to an insured or any other person against whom a claim has been made on being satisfied of the two conditions specified in Section 170 of the Act, it is not permissible to the insurer to contest the claim on the grounds which are available to the insured or to a person against whom a claim has been made. Thus where conditions precedent embodied in Section 170 are satisfied and award is adverse to the interest of the insurer, the insurer has a right to file an appeal challenging the quantum of compensation or negligence or contributory negligence of the offending vehicle even if the insured has not filed any appeal against the quantum of compensation. Sections 149, 170 and 173 are part of one scheme and if we give any different interpretation to Section 173 of the 1988 Act, the same would go contrary to the scheme and object of the Act."
Answering the question raised before the Apex Court, it was held in paragraph 32 :
"32. For the aforesaid reasons, our answer to the question is that even if no appeal is preferred under Section 173 of the 1988 Act by an insured against the award of a Tribunal, it is not permissible for an insurer to file an appeal questioning the quantum of compensation as well as findings as regards negligence or contributory negligence of the offending vehicle."
12. Applying the aforesaid pronouncement of the Apex Court in the facts of the present case, it is clear that the petitioner has no right to file an appeal against the impugned award of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal on any ground except the grounds enumerated under Section 149(2) of the Act. In the writ petition, the challenge has been made by the petitioner to the quantum of compensation, which according to the scheme of the Motor Vehicles Act, is not allowed to be challenged by the insurer without taking permission under Section 170 of the Act. The petitioner in this writ petition prays for quashing the award on the grounds on which he is debarred from filing an appeal.
13. Elaborating his submission, the counsel for the petitioner contended that this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution has every jurisdiction to quash the award of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal. For considering the submissions raised by the counsel for the petitioner, it is necessary to consider the scope and ambit of jurisdiction which can be exercised by this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution. Under Article 227 of the Constitution, the High Court has superintendence over all Courts and Tribunals. The scope and ambit of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution are well settled and well defined. The Apex Court in State of Gujarat etc. v. Vakhatsinghji Vajesinghji Vaghela and Ors., AIR 1968 SC 1481, has considered the scope of power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. Following was laid down in paragraph 14 :
"14. Mr. Bindra submitted that Section 12 of the Abolition Act makes the decision of the Tribunal final and conclusive and the High Court had no jurisdiction to interfere with this decision, particularly in respect of solatium of 15 percentum and non-irrigational bunds, tanks and wells. We are unable to accept this contention. Article 227 of the Constitution gives the High Court the power of superintendence over all Courts and Tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction. This jurisdiction cannot be limited or fettered by any Act of the State Legislature. The supervisory jurisdiction extends to keeping the subordinate Tribunals within the limits of their authority and to see that they obey the law."
14. In Bhutnath Chatterjee v. State of West Bengal and Ors., 1969 (3) SCC 675, the Apex Court held that the Jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution is not an appellate jurisdiction. It was laid down in paragraph 4 :
"4. Normally the High Court exercises jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution to ensure that a subordinate court or Tribunal does not transgress the limits of its jurisdiction. The jurisdiction with which the High Court is invested is not appellate ; it cannot seek to correct what it regards as merely an error of law or fact."
15. The Apex Court in State of Gujarat etc. v. Vakhatsinghji Vajesinghji Vaghela and Ors. (supra), has also, held that the jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution can be exercised by the High Court even though finality has been attached to an order. The Apex Court in Chandrasekhar Singh and Ors. v. Siya Ram Singh and Ors., AIR 1979 SC 1, has held that the power of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution cannot in any way be curtailed by the provisions of Section 146(1D) of the Criminal Procedure Code but the scope of interference by the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution is restricted. The following was laid down in paragraph 11 :
"11. The only other question that remains to be considered is whether an order under Section 146(1B) can be interfered with by the High Court in the exercise of its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution. It is admitted that the powers conferred on the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution. It is admitted that the powers conferred on the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution cannot in any way be curtailed by the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code. Therefore, the powers of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution can be invoked inspite of the restrictions placed under Section 146(1D) of the Criminal Procedure Code. But the scope of interference by the High Court under Article 227 is restricted. This Court has repeatedly held that "the power of superintendence conferred by Article 227 is to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate case in order to keep the subordinate Courts within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors vide Waryam Singh v. Amar Nath, 1954 SCR 565 : AIR 1954 SC 215. In a later decision in Nagendra Nath Bora v. Commissioner of Hills Division, 1958 SCR 1240 : AIR 1958 SC 398, the view was reiterated and it was held that the powers of judicial interference under Article 227 of the Constitution are not greater than the power under Article 226 of the Constitution, and that under Article 227 of the Constitution, the power of interference is limited to seeing that the Tribunal functions within the limits of its authority. In a recent decision in Babhutmal Raichand v. Laxmibai, AIR 1975 SC 1297, this Court reiterated the view stated in the earlier decisions referred to and held that the power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution cannot be invoked to correct an error of fact which only a superior court can do in exercise of its statutory power as the Court of appeal and that the High Court cannot in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227 convert itself into a Court of appeal."
16. In view of what has been laid down by the Apex Court in above mentioned cases, it is clear that although there is no fetter in the power of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India inspite of the fact that the finality has been attached to an order by the statute, the interference by this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution cannot be made in view of scheme of Motor Vehicles Act as noted above.
17. In the present case, the petitioner is asking this Court to exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution on the grounds on which an appeal cannot be filed by the petitioner. The petitioner when cannot challenge the award on the grounds which are sought to be raised in the writ petition in an appeal under Section 173 of the Act, there is no occasion to exercise discretion by this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution on the aforesaid grounds. When the scheme of Sections 149, 170 and 173 of the Act as noted above is not to permit the insurer to challenge the liability on any ground except the grounds enumerated under Section 149(2) of the Act, the High Court cannot exercise its discretion in proceedings under Article 227 of the Constitution on the grounds on which insurer cannot file an appeal.
18. In view of foregoing discussion no good grounds have been made out for quashing the impugned award dated 1.8.2002 in exercise of our jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. The writ petition lacks merit and is dismissed summarily.