Radhakrishnan, J. 1. The question that is posted for consideration before the Full Bench is as to whether Sections 4 and 4-A of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, as amended by Act 30 of 1995, enhancing the amount of compensation and rate of interest would be applicable to claims in respect of death or permanent disablement resulting from accident which occurred prior to September 15, 1995, the date on which the amendment provisions came into force.
2. A Division Bench of this Court in Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Majeed, 1996 (2) KLT 1022 held the benefits of Sections4 and 4-A as amended would be extended only in respect of claims arising out of the accident occurred on or after September 15, 1995. Same is the view taken by the same in Division Bench in Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Abdul Nazar, 1997 I ILR 496. A contrary view was taken by another Division Bench in Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., v. Asokan (1997-II-LLJ-429) (Ker). That Bench relied on a decision of the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal Nos. 16904 to 16909 of 1996 dated November 6, 1996, and held that the benefits of the amended provisions of Sections 4 and 4-A would be available when the claim is finally adjudicated, whether the death or permanent disablement resulting from the accident occurred prior to September 15, 1995 or not. It was also held that in view of the above mentioned decision of the Supreme Court, the earlier Division Bench decision in Majeed's case is impliedly overruled. We are therefore, called upon to resolve this apparent conflict between the above mentioned two Bench decisions.
3. The Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 was enacted to provide for payment by certain classes of employers to their workmen of compensation for injury caused to a workman by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. Act also provides separate and speedy forum to the workmen for claiming compensation and for this purpose wide powers have been bestowed on the Commission appointed under the Act. It is the duty of the employer or insurer, as the case may be, to pay compensation as soon as it falls due. The amount of compensation to be paid is enumerated in Section 4 of the Act.
4. We shall deal with the unamended provisions of Section 4(1) and Explanation II as also Section 4-A(3) first and then refer to the amendment effected to the above mentioned provisions by Act 30 of 1995. The unamended provisions of Section 4(1) and Explanation II as also Section 4-A(3) read as follows:
"4. Amount of compensation:(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, the amount of compensation shall be as follows, namely:
(a) Where death results from the injury An amount equal to forty percent of the monthly wages of the deceased workman multiplied by the relevant factor, or An amount of twenty thousand rupees, whichever is more;
(b) Where permanent total disablement results from the injury An amount equal to fifty percent of the monthly wages of the injured workman multiplied by the relevant factor, or An amount of twenty four thousand rupees, whichever is more;
Explanation II- Where the monthly wages of a workman exceed one thousand rupees, his monthly wages for the purpose of clause (a) and clause(b) shall be deemed to be one thousand rupees only......"
"4A. Compensation to be paid when due and penalty for default:
..................
(3) Where any employer is in default in paying the compensation due under this Act within one month from the date it fell due, the Commissioner may direct that, in addition to the amount of the arrears, simple interest at the rate of six per cent per annum on the amount due together with, if in the opinion of the Commissioner there is no justification for the delay, a further sum not exceeding fifty percent of such amount shall be recovered from the employer by way of penalty."
5. The Workmen's Compensation (Amendment) Act (Act 30 of 1995) has brought in drastic changes to different provisions of the parent Act. By amendment to Section 4 (1)(a) compensation amount equal to 40% of the monthly wages of the deceased workman was enhanced to 50% and Rs. 20,000/- was enhanced to Rs. 50,000/-, where death results from the injury. With regard to permanent total disablement resulting From the injury under Section 4(1)(b) of compensation amount equal to 50% as enchanced to 60% and the amount of Rs. 24,000/- was enhanced to Rs. 60,000. In Explanation II amount of Rs. 1000/- as originally provided was en-chanced to Rs. 2,000/-. The Amendment Act also inserted after Sub-section (1) of Section 4, Sub-section (1-A). It also added Sub-section (4) after Sub-section (3) which is extracted below:
"If the injury of the workman results in his death, the employer shall, in addition to the compensation under Sub-section (1) deposit with the Commissioner a sum of one thousand rupees for payment of the same to the eldest surviving dependent of the workman towards the expenditure of the funeral of such workman or where the workman did not have a dependent or was not living with his dependent at the time of his death to the person who actually incurred such expenditure."
In this connection it is also profitable to refer to Sub-section 4-A(3) as amended which reads as follows:
"Where any employer is in default in paying the compensation due under this Act within one month from the date it fell due, the Commissioner shall-
(a) direct that the employer shall, in addition to the amount of the arrears, pay simple interest thereon at the rate of twelve per cent per annum or at such higher rate not exceeding the maximum of the lending rates of any scheduled bank, as may be specified by the Central Government, by notification in the Official Gazette, on the amount due; and
(b) if, in his opinion, there is no justification for the delay, direct that the employer shall, in addition to the amount of the arrears and interest thereon, pay a further sum not exceeding fifty percent of such amount by way of penalty;
Provided that an order for the payment of penalty shall not be passed under Clause (b) without giving a reasonable opportunity to the employer to show cause why it should not be passed."
6. The Workmen's Compensation (Amendment) Act, 1995 (Act 30 of 1995) received the assent of the President on August 17, 1995. Section 1(2) of the Amendment Act says that the Act shall come into force on such dates as the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint and different dates may be appointed for different provisions of that Act. Sections 4 and 4-A as amended by Amendment Act, came into force with effect from September 15, 1995 vide Central Government Notification No. G1 Pt. II. Section 3 (ii) Ex. No. 528, New Delhi dated September 12, 1995.
7. In all these appeals before us the accident occurred prior to September 15, 1995. When the accident occurred and when the Commissioner finally decided the claims of the workmen, the Amendment Act was not in force. Claimants were satisfied with the award passed by the Commissioner under Workmen's Compensation Act. However, aggrieved by the quantum fixed by the Commissioner, Insurance Companies have preferred cross-objections. When the appeals came up for hearing in November, 1997 the claimants raised a contention that they are entitled to get benefits of Sections 4 and 4-A of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, as amended by Act 30 of 1995. They relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal Nos. 16904-16909 of 1996 and contended that in an identical situation the Supreme Court granted the benefit of Act 30 of 1995 to similarly placed persons. It was pointed out following the Supreme Court decision, a Division Bench of this Court in Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Asokan (supra) also granted the benefit of the Amendment Act to similarly placed persons even though the accident occurred prior to September 19, 1995.
8. Learned counsels appearing for the Insurance Companies however maintained the stand that the Division Bench of this Court has rightly decided the question in Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Majeed, (supra) on the basis of the earlier decisions of the Supreme Court. Reference was made to Pratap Narain Singh v. Srinivas Sabata, (1976-I-LLJ-235) (SC) and Padma Srinivasan v. Premier Insurance Co. Ltd. 1982 ACJ 191. According to counsel in any view of the matter the decision rendered by the two Judges of the Supreme Court in Civil Appeals 16904-16909 of 1996 is not a law declared under Article 141 of the Constitution of India and hence not binding on all Courts within the territory of India. According to them, the said judgment was rendered by the Supreme Court by virtue of plenary powers under Article 142 of the Constitution to do justice to parties before it and it cannot have a universal application. It was contended that the earlier decisions of the Supreme Court were not brought before that Court when the two Judges decided Civil Appeal Nos. 16904-16909 of 1996. It is also their contention that the learned Judges did not consider the various provisions of law and the effect of the Amendment Act and well laid down rules of interpretation while deciding Civil Appeal Nos. 16904-16909 of 1996.
9. We heard learned counsel appearing for Insurance Companies M/s Mathew Jacob, N. Nandakumara Menon & A.A.Mohammed Nazir and also counsel appearing for the respondent M/s V. V. Surendran, Thomas Antony Kallampally, K.I. Mayankutty Mather, T. G. Rajendran & Ors. We have also gone through the various provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act as well as the provisions of the Amendment Act 30 of 1995.
10. The Workmen's Compensation Act is a special enactment enacted for the benefit of the workmen. This Act created new rights on the workmen and corresponding liabilities on the employer. Section 3 of the Act deals with the employer's liability for compensation. In order to fasten liability there must be an injury and it should be caused in an accident and should be in the course of employment. The employer becomes liable to compensation, as soon as personal injury is caused to the workman by accident. Section 4 deals with the amount of compensation. The amount of compensation allowable under the Act has been fixed by the Statute itself thereby leaving no option to the Commissioner, but to allow the compensation as fixed by the Statute once he holds the employee or his heirs entitled to claim compensation. Section 4(1) (a) deals with compensation payable in the case of death. Section 4(1)(b) deals with compensation payable in the case of permanent total disablement. The compensation to be awarded under various clauses of Section 4 is to be in accordance with the Schedule given in the Act. Section 4-A of the Act deals with the compensation to be paid when due and penalty for default. The three sub-sections constituting Section 4-A deal respectively with three different aspects of payment of compensation under the Act, namely (1) point of time at which compensation falls due (2) employer's liability to pay provisional compensation where he does not accept his liability to the extent claimed and (3) power of the Commissioner to award interest and penalty.
11. A combined reading of Sections 3(1), 4(1) and 4-A indicates that the injured workman becomes entitled to get compensation the moment he suffers personal injuries of the types contemplated by those provisions. The right of the injured employee or his heirs to receive compensation gets crystallised the moment the personal injury takes place. The corresponding liability of the employer to make good this claim also springs forth simultaneously and the liability has to be computed as per the relevant provisions of the Act. These legal positions have been clearly laid down by 5 Judges Bench of the Supreme Court in Pratap Narain Singh v. Srinivas (supra). While dealing with the relevant provisions in the Act, the Supreme Court held as follows:
"Section 3 of the Act deals with the employer's liability for compensation. Sub-section (1) of the Section provides that the employer shall be liable to pay compensation if personal injury is caused to a workman by accident 'arising out of and in the course of his employment'. It was not the case of the employer that the right to compensation was taken away under Sub-section (5) of Section 3 because of the institution of a suit in a civil court for damages, in respect of the injury, against the employer or any other person. The employer, therefore, became liable to pay the compensation as soon as the aforesaid personal injury was caused to the workman by the accident which admittedly arose out of and in the course of the employment. It is therefore, futile to contend that the compensation did not fall due until after the Commissioner's order dated May 7,1969 under Section 19. What the Section provides is that if any question arises in any proceeding under the Act as to the liability of any person to pay compensation of as to the amount or duration of the compensation it shall, in default of agreement, be settled by the Commissioner. There is, therefore, nothing to justify the argument that the employer's liability to pay compensation under Section 3 in respect of the injury, was suspended until after the settlement contemplated by Section 19. The appellant was thus liable to pay compensation as soon as the aforesaid personal injury was caused to the appellant and there is no justification for the argument to the contrary."
12. A three Judges Bench of the Supreme Court in Maghar Singh v. Jashwant Singh, 1997 ACJ 517 was dealing with the claim of a workman who lost both his hands in course of employment. The accident occurred on July 26, 1984 resulting in permanent disability with 100% functional loss. When the case was decided by the Supreme Court on September 24, 1996 the relevant provisions of Act 30 of 1995 were in force. However, the Supreme Court did not apply the amended provisions, but applied only unamended provisions of Section 4(1)(b) and held that he would be entitled to get compensation at 50 per cent of the monthly wages multiplied by the relevant factor in Schedule IV to the Act. Supreme Court did not award compensation or interest or penalty as per the Amending Act, but only applied the law which was in force as on July 26, 1984. Going by the principle laid down by the 5 Judges Bench of the Supreme Court in Partap Narain Singh 's case (supra) as well as the decision of the three Judges Bench of Supreme Court in Maghar Singh's case (supra) we are inclined to take the view that when two Judges Bench of the Supreme Court decided the case, in the New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. V.K. Neelakandan Civil Appeal Nos. 16904 to 16909 of 1996, their Lordships never intended the same to be of general application.
13. We may also notice that various High Courts while dealing with the claims for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act, have uniformly taken the view that the relevant date for determining the rights and liabilities of parties is the date of the accident. The Gujarat High Court in General Manager, Western Railway v. Lala Nanda, 1985 ACJ 57 (Guj), The Bombay High Court in Margarida Gomes v. Mackinnon Mackenzie & Co. Ltd., AIR 1968 Bom, 328, Allahabad High Court in Saraswati Press v. Nand Ram, 1971 Lab IC 134, Jammu & Kashmir High Court in Vijay Ram v. Janak Raj, 1981 ACJ, 84, Rajasthan High Court in Ramlal v. Regional Manager Food Corporation, of India 1981 Lab IC 1281, etc. have taken the same view.
14. In this connection, it is useful to refer to the principle laid down by the Supreme Court with regard to the claims arising under the Motor Vehicles Act as well. In Padma Srinivasan v. Premier Insurance Co. Ltd., (supra) the Supreme Court considered the question as to the crucial date which is relevant, while considering the claim of the insurer under Section 95(1)(a) of the Motor Vehicles Act. The policy issued in the said case was valid for a period of one year from June 10, 1969. It provides coverage for the statutory liability under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. Amendment to Section 95(2) was brought in by Act 56 of 1969 increasing the quantum of liability with effect from March 2, 1970. In the said case, the accident happened on April 5, 1970. While rejecting the arguments of the Insurance Company, the Supreme Court held that the crucial date for assessing the liability is the date of the accident. In Ved Prakash Garg v. Premi Devi and Ors. (1998-I-LLJ-363) while dealing with the provisions of Motor Vehicles Act as well as the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, the Supreme Court reiterated that the relevant date for determination of compensation, payment of interest and penalty is the date of accident. While considering the applicability of the provisions contained in Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 the Full Bench of this Court in Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Sheela Ratnam, 1996 (2) KLT 695 took the same view that the liability to pay compensation arises only from the date of the accident and amended provisions have no application to pending proceedings. In National Insurance Co. v. Roy George, 1993 (1) KLT 308, a Full Bench of this Court held that since the liability of the insurer to pay a claim under a Motor Accident Policy arises on the occurrence of the accident and not until then, one must necessarily have regard to the state of the law obtaining at the time of the accident for determining the extent of the insurer's liability under a statutory policy. Therefore, the material date is the date of the accident and on that date the rights of the parties crystalised.
15. The Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 as well as the Workmen's Compensation Act have created new rights to the victims and their legal representatives to claim compensation. They have also created corresponding liabilities on the employers or the insurer, as the case may be, rights and liabilities created under the above legislations are new rights and liabilities created by Statutes outside the tort system. In Neeli v. Padmanabha Pillai 1992 (2) KLT 807, a Full Bench of this Court held that the non-fault liability introduced under Section 92-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, was held to be a substantive law. While dealing with the question as to whether the said liability would have retrospective operation or not, the Full Bench held as follows:
" If the law is procedural there is, no doubt, a presumption that it applies to pending proceedings. If the law is substantive in nature, the normal presumption against retrospectivity it still holds good subject to the principle that the court must look to the question whether the rights of the parties at the commencement of proceedings were intended to be notified, either expressly or by necessary implication. When the Amending Act proposes to give different dates of commencement to different sections, there is presumption against retrospectivity. Again if a provision is capable of two interpretations, namely, prospective or retrospective, the former is to be preferred. Section 92 A cannot be invoked unless the provision is either procedural or if the amendment belongs to substantive law, the amendment contains provisions which either expressly or by necessary implication modify the rights vested at the very commencement of the action. The amendment is, as already held, not procedural law. Again as pointed out above, the language of the provisions in Section 92-A(1) or 92- A(3) does not either expressly or by necessary implication, affect the right of the respondents existing at the commencement of the proceedings, the right not to be burdened unless the ingredients of negligence are pleaded and established. Therefore, this argument based on pending proceedings being subject to Section 92-A to be rejected Section 92-A cannot apply to cases of accidents occurring before October 1, 1982."
16. We have examined the provisions of the Amendment Act 30 of 1995. There is nothing to indicate that the amended provisions would operate retrospectively. In fact Section 1(2) of Act 30 of 1995 itself says that the amended provisions would come into force on such date or dates as the Central Government may by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint and different dates may be appointed for different provisions of this Act. In fact, Legislature has left it to the Central Government to fix dates from which various provisions have come into effect. Further, when an Amendment Act proposes to give different dated of commencement of different Sections, there is a presumption against retrospectivity. See State of M.P. and Ors. v. Rameshwar Rathod AIR 1990 SC 1849 and New India Assurance Co. Ltd. Gwalior v. Nafis Begam and Ors., AIR 1991 MP 302. If the Legislature wanted to have the provisions of the Act to operate retrospectively the same would have been provided in the Amendment Act itself. It is a well settled rule of construction that no provisions in a statute should be given retrospective effect unless the Legislature by express terms or by necessary implication has made it retrospectively and that when a provision is made retrospective, care should be taken not to extend its retrospective effect beyond what was intended. The general presumption is that every statute is prima facie prospective unless it is expressly or by necessary implication made to have retrospective effect: See Keshavan Madhava Menon v. State of Bombay AIR 1951 SC 128: Mahadeolal v. Administrator General of W.B. AIR 1960 SC 939; State of Bombay v. Vishnu Ramchandra, AIR 1961 SC 307; Mithilesh Kumari and Anr. v. Prem Behari Kharu, AIR 1989 SC 1247; State of M.P. and Ors. v. Rameshwar Rathod (supra) and K.S. Paripoornan v. State of Kerala and Ors. 1994 5 SCC 593.
17. Right to claim compensation as well as the obligation to pay the same are created by the Statute itself. It is well settled rule of interpretation that if the law is procedural, there is, no doubt, a presumption that it applies to pending proceedings. If the law is substantive in nature, the normal presumption against retrospectivity still holds good, subject to the principle that the Court must look to the question whether the rights of the parties at the commencement of the proceedings were intended to be modified either expressly or by necessary implication: Neeli v. Narayana Pillai (supra). If the amended provisions are given effect to in the matter of awarding enhanced compensation even with regard to the accident which occurred prior to September 15, 1995, that will affect the existing rights and obligations of the parties. Suppose an accident occurred prior to September 15, 1995, and the claim was decided prior to the said date, the law applicable is the unamended provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923. But if the claim could not be settled prior to September 15, 1995 going by the Division Bench decision in Asokan's case, those claimants would get the benefits of the Amendment Act. In other words, the benefit would depend on when the case is decided, either prior to September 15, 1995 or subsequent. This was never the intention of the Legislature. If the Legislature wanted to give the benefit to all pending proceedings the same could have been provided in the Amendment Act itself. There must be some provision in the Statute which either expressly or by necessary implication would lead to an inference that the rights and liabilities of the parties were intended to be altered. We do not find anything in the Amendment Act which seeks to alter the liability of employer as it stood on the date of the accident. The amended provisions may be beneficial to the victims or their legal representatives or the Act may be a welfare legislation, but it does not automatically lead to the inference that such provisions are retrospective in nature.
18. We have therefore no doubt in our minds that the amended provisions of Sections 4 and 4-A were intended to operate only prospectively, that too from the dates fixed by the Central Government in accordance with Section 1(2) of Act 30 of 1995. We, therefore hold that the decision reported in Majeed's case (supra) and Abdul Nazar's case (supra) are correctly decided.
19. We may now consider whether the decision in Majeed's case (supra) is impliedely overruled by the decision of the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal Nos. 16904 to 16909 of 1996 as held by the Division Bench of this Court in Asokan's case. The decision in Asokan's case (supra) was decided solely relying upon the above mentioned Supreme Court judgment. Division Bench followed the dictum laid down by the Supreme Court which is extracted below:
"We are finally determining the rights of the workmen today, The Act is a special legislation for the benefit of labour. Keeping in view the scheme of the Act we are of the view that the only interpretation which can be given to the amendment is that if any benefit is conferred on the workman and the said benefit is available on the date when the case is finally adjudicated, the said benefit should be extended to the workmen. We, therefore, hold that the compensation to be paid to the heirs of the workmen has to be calculated on the basis of the actual wages-Rs. 1800/- drawn by them."
Accordingly the learned Judges who decided the case in Asokan's case (supra), the above dictum laid down by the Supreme Court is conclusively with regard to the scope of the Amendment Act 30 of 1995. Counsel for the Insurance Companies however, maintained the stand that the decision of the Supreme Court above mentioned is not the law declared under Article 141 of the Constitution of India, so as to have general application according to counsel, the Supreme Court was only adjudicating the rights of parties in that case in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. In this connection, it is worthwhile to examine the scope of Article 141 of the Constitution of India.
20. Supreme Court under Article 141 is enjoined to declare law. As held by the Supreme Court in Delhi Transport Corporation v. D.T.C. Mazdoor Congress, (1991-I-LLJ-395) the expression 'declared' is wider than the words 'found' or 'made'. To declare is to announce opinion. Indeed latter involves a process while the former expresses result. Interpretation, ascertainment and evolution are parts of process, while that interpreted, ascertained or evolved is declared as Law. Law declared by the Supreme Court is a law of the land. A decision which is not express and is not founded on reasons nor it proceeds on consideration of issue cannot be deemed to be a law declared to have a binding effect as is contemplated by Article 141 of the Constitution of India. In State of U. P. v. Synthetics & Chemicals Ltd. 1991 4 SCC 139, the Supreme Court held:
"Any declaration or conclusion arrived without application of mind or proceeded without any reason cannot be deemed to be declaration of law or authority of a general nature binding as a precedent. Restraint in dissenting or overruling is for sake of stability and uniformity but rigidity beyond reasonable limits is inimical to the growth of law. Law declared is not that can be culled out, but that which is stated as law to be accepted and applied. A conclusion without reference to relevant provisions of law is weaker than even casual observation."
21. In the above mentioned decision, in a concurring judgment, Sahai, J. has dealt with in detail the scope of Article 141 of the Constitution of India. The dispute centered round the levy of purchase tax on industrial alcohol. The High Court held that the State Legislature was competent to enact a law imposing purchase tax on it, in exercise of power under Entry 54 of List II. However, it struck down the levy as it would disturb price structure regulated by Central Government. It was held that control of alcohol industry having been taken over by the Parliament, for purpose of regulation and development, the state stood denuded of its taxing power under Entry 54 of List II to the extent the field of price fixation was covered by the price control order issued by the Government. And the purchase price being component of price fixation, which squarely fell within the power of Central Government, the imposition of purchase tax amounted to intrusion into the forbidden area of price fixation by Central Government. Support for this was drawn from the two Constitution Bench decisions in India Cement Ltd. v. State of Tamil Nadu 1990 1 SCC 12, and Synthetic and Chemicals v. State of UP., 1990 1 SCC 109.
22. Supreme Court noted that the problem has arisen due to the conclusion in the case of Synthetic and Chemicals (supra). Question that arose in that case was as to whether State Legislature could levy vend fee or excise duty on industrial alcohol. The Bench answered the question in the negative as industrial alcohol being unfit for human consumption, the State Legislation was incompetent to levy any duty of excise either under Entry 51 or Entry 8 of List II of the Seventh Schedule. While doing so, it was not preceded by any discussion. No reason or rationale could be found in the order. This gave rise to an important question, if the conclusion is law declared under Article 141 of the Constitution, or it is per incuriam and is liable to be ignored. Supreme Court explained the meaning of the words 'per incuriam' and dealt with the rule of sub-silentio. Supreme Court in the above mentioned decision held:
"'incuria' literally means 'carelessness'. In practice per incuriam appears to mean per ignoratium. English Courts have developed this principle in relaxation of the rule of stare decisis. The 'quotable in law 'is avoided and ignored if it is rendered, in ignoratium of a statute or other binding authority': Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Co. Ltd., 1944 1 KB 718. Same has been accepted, approved and adopted by this Court white interpreting Article 141 of the Constitution which embodies the doctrine of precedents as a matter of law."
After examining various principles, the Supreme Court concluded:
"The Bench further was not apprised of earlier Constitution Bench decisions in Hoechst Chemicals v. State of Bihar, AIR 1983 SC 1019, and Ganga Sugar Mill v. State of U.P., 1980 1 SCC 223, which specifically dealt with the legislative competence of levying sales tax in respect of any industry which had been declared to be of public importance. Therefore, the conclusion of law by the Constitution Bench that no sales or purchase tax could be levied on industrial alcohol with utmost respect fell in both the exceptions, namely, rule of subsilentio and being in per incuriam, to the binding authority of the precedents."
23. It is therefore well settled that what is the essence of a decision is its ratio and not every observation, nor what logically follows from various observations made in it. In this connection it is profitable to refer to the dictum laid down by Lord Halsbury, L.C., in Quinn v. Leathern, 1901 AC 495, 506:
"........... there are two observations of a general character which I wish to make and one is to repeat what I have very often said before, that every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which may be found there are not intended to be expositions of the whole law, but governed and qualified by the particular facts of the casein which such expressions are to be found. The other is that a case is only an authority for what it actually decides. I entirely deny that it can be quoted for a proposition that may seem to follow logically from it. Such a mode of reasoning assumes that the law is necessarily a logical code, whereas every lawyer must acknowledge that the law is not always logical at all."
The above dictum was quoted with approval by the Supreme Court in Orient Paper & Industries Ltd. v. State of Orissa, AIR 1991 SC 672, 680. As held by the Supreme Court any conclusion without any reference to the relevant provisions of law is weaker than even casual observation. It is also held by the Supreme Court that any declaration made or conclusion arrived at without application of mind or preceded without any reason cannot be a declaration of law, or authority, as a binding precedent.
24. Bearing in mind the above mentioned legal principles, we have to examine as to whether the dictum laid down by the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal Nos. 16904 to 16909 of 19% is a binding precedent. Those appeals were preferred by the Insurance Companies. That was a case where claim petitions are filed by heirs of six deceased workmen. It was noted by the Supreme Court that the deceased workmen were drawing wages at the rate of Rs. 1800/- per month. Compensation was however assessed under the Act deeming it to be Rs. 1000/- per month. Supreme Court issued however notice to the Insurance Companies to show cause why the compensation amount be not increased. Supreme Court, however, did not grant the benefit of interest under Section 4-A(3)(a) of the Act as amended by the Act 30 of 1995, whereby for belated payment, interest has to be given by the employer. Supreme Court has also not imposed the penalty for belated payment under Section 4-A(3)(b) of the Act as amended by Act 30 of 1995. Even though under Sub-section 4(4) employer in addition to compensation under Sub-section (l) has to bear the funeral expenses in the case of death, which was fixed at Rs. 1000/- the Supreme Court did not give that benefit to the legal representatives of the workmen. This would indicate that the Supreme Court never wanted to give the entire benefit of the Amendment Act to the legal heirs of the deceased workmen. In other words, all the benefits which are conferred by Act 30 of 1995 have not been extended to workmen in that case. On the facts and in the circumstances of that case, the Supreme Court felt that it was reasonable to fix compensation on the basis of actual wages drawn by them. Consequently, the Court directed the Insurance Companies to file statements. Statements were filed by the Insurance Companies, and Supreme Court granted the benefit as per the statements. It is true that while awarding the said amount, the Court made certain observations which we have extracted earlier.
25. Supreme Court did not analyse or consider the scope of any provision of law, as amended. No argument was advanced either by claimants, employers or by Insurance Companies with regard to the scope of various amendments effected by Act 30/1995. No decision of the Supreme Court was cited. The question as to whether Sections 4 and 4-A as amended by Act 30/1995 have retrospective effect or not and whether the rights and liabilities have been altered by the Amendment Act were not considered by the Supreme Court.
26. We are of the view that the dictum laid down by the Supreme Court cannot be a binding precedent so as to have general application. Counsel appearing for the Insurance Companies are right in their contention that the Supreme Court rendered its decision on the facts and in the circumstances of that case, so as to render justice between the parties in exercise of the jurisdiction conferred under Article 142 of the Constitution of India.
27. In this connection, it is also pertinent to note that the decision in Pratap Narain Singh's case (supra) was rendered by a five Judge Bench of the Supreme Court. So also the decision in Maghar Singh's case (supra) was rendered by the three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court. We have already mentioned that those decisions of the Supreme Court laid down the principle while considering the claims of the workmen under the Workmen's Compensation Act. The judgment rendered by the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal Nos. 16904 to 16909 of 1996 is by a Bench of two Judges. Supreme Court time and again held that decision rendered by more Judges will prevail over the decision rendered by lesser number of Judges. Applying the said principle also, we are of the view that the decision rendered in Civil Appeal Nos. 16904 to 16909 of 1996 was never intended to be of general application.
28. Therefore, the decision of the Division Bench in Asokan's case (supra) stating that the judgment in Civil Appeal Nos. 16904 to 16909 of 1996 impliedly overruled the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Majeed's case (supra) is not correctly decided. We therefore, overrule that decision and declare that Sections 4 and 4-A of Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, as amended by Act 30 of 1995, enhancing the amount of compensation and rate of interest be not applicable to claim originated in respect of death or permanent total disablement of workman resulting from accidents which occurred prior to September 15, 1995, the date on which the amended provisions came into effect.
29. In the light of the above findings, we hold that the claimants in all these appeals are not entitled to get the benefit of Amendment Act 30 of 1995, since accidents occurred prior to September 15, 1995.
30. M.F.A.No.134 of 1990 is filed by the Insurance Company against the order of the Deputy Labour Commissioner, Kozhikode in W.C. No. 52 of 1988. The claimant, first respondent, while working as driver of the bus 9392, met with an accident on August 20, 1986. Second respondent was the owner of the bus. The bus collided with a wall and in that accident first respondent sustained injuries including fracture of nasal bone and maxilla right with palatal split. Employer and employee relationship was admitted by the second respondent. First respondent was earning a monthly income of Rs. 1800/-. He claimed a total compensation of Rs. 50,000/-. First respondent got himself examined as AW-1 and produced Exts.A-1 to A-8. On the side of the Insurance Company no witness was examined and no document was produced. Ext.A-7 is a disability certificate dated December 5, 1989 issued by the Doctor of the Medical College Hospital,Kozhikode. The Doctor certified mat the first respondent was having 15% permanent disability. While determining the compensation, Commissioner has however fixed the disability at 40%. This according to counsel for the Insurance Company is illegal, going by the decision of the Full Bench of this Court in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Sreedharan (1995-II-LLJ-362). It is also the contention of counsel for the Insurance Company, the quantum fixed is excessive. Cross-objection has been filed on behalf of the first respondent, for the entire claim. Going by the decision of the Full Bench referred to above, we are of the view that the Commissioner has committed an error in fixing the disability at 40% instead of 15%. Counsel on either side agreed to fix the percentage of disability at 25%, so as to avoid a remand. According to us, this suggestion is reasonable and can be accepted. Accordingly, we fix the compensation at Rs. 26,910/-. We, therefore, direct the Insurance Company to pay the above mentioned amount to the first respondent together with simple interest at 6% per annum with effect from August 20, 1986 till date of payment. If any amount has already been paid, needless to say, the same would be given credit to. The amount as fixed above would be disbursed to the first respondent within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment. MFA and Cross objection are disposed of accordingly.
31. M.F.A. No. 522 of 1990 is filed by the Insurance Company against the order in W.C.C. No. 58 of 1987 on the file of the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation Court, Kozhikode. Application was preferred by the first respondent claiming a compensation of Rs. 1 lakh for the injuries sustained by him on October 10, 1985 while working as a cleaner-cum-loading worker in lorry KLM 991 under the employment of 5th and/or 6th respondent. In the accident, he sustained grievous injuries i.e., crush injury left heel with compound fracture of talus and multiple injuries. He was getting monthly wages or Rs. 1,125/-. Before the Commissioner, he got himself examined as AW-1 and he produced Exts. A-1 to A-5. Ext. A-5 is a disability certificate issued from the Medical College Hospital, Kozhikode, which certifies that first respondent has got 40 % permanent disability. However, Commissioner concluded that on the basis of the disability certificate as well as on his personal verification, first respondent has got 100% loss of earning capacity, and therefore, he is entitled to compensation on that basis. Commissioner therefore, fixed the total compensation at Rs. 1,08,455/-. Aggrieved by the same Insurance Company has come up in appeal. Going by the decision of the Full Bench of this Court, referred to above, Commissioner has no power to fix the percentage of disability. We thought we would remand the matter for examining the doctor. However, considering the fact that the accident had occurred in the year 1986, it is agreed by counsel on either side that disability could be fixed at 75 %. Accordingly we fix the disability at 75% and award compensation of Rs. 81,341/-. We, therefore, direct the Insurance Company to pay the above mentioned amount to the first respondent together with simple interest at 6% per annum with effect from October 10, 1985 till date of payment. If any amount has already been paid, needless to say, the same would be given credit to. The amount as fixed above would be disbursed to the first respondent within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment. M.F.A. is disposed of accordingly.
32. M.F.A. No. 107 of 1990 is filed by the Insurance Company against the order of the Deputy Labour Commissioner, Kozhikode in W.C.C. No. 120 of 1987. First respondent was the claimant. He sustained injury in an accident which occurred on August 11, 1987 while he was working as driver in the bus KLM 6756 under the second respondent. He sustained fracture of right leg and fracture of knee cap. Doctor assessed the disability at 40%. Before the Commissioner, the first respondent examined himself as AW-1, and produced Exts. A-1 to A-5. There was no evidence on the side of the Insurance Company or other respondents. Eventhough the certificate stated that first respondent was having 40% disability, the Commissioner certified that he has got 100% disability. This finding of the Commissioner cannot be supported in view of the decision of a Full Bench of this Court, referred to above. After considering the entire facts and circumstances of the case, and after hearing counsel on either side, it was felt that the disability could be fixed at 75%, and compensation calculated accordingly. We fix the compensation at Rs. 61,151/-. We therefore, direct the Insurance Company to pay the above mentioned amount to the first respondent together with simple interest at 6% per annum with effect from August 11, 1987 till date of payment If any amount has already been paid, needless to say, the same would be given credit to. The amount as fixed above would be disbursed to the first respondent within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment. MFA is disposed of accordingly.
33. M.F.A. No.366 of 1990 is filed by the Insurance Company against the order in W.C.No. 128 of 1987 of the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner, Calicut. First respondent was the applicant. He was the driver of the vehicle owned by the second respondent. He met with an accident on October 6, 1987 while he was driving the bus. He sustained compound fracture on his right scapula. He made a claim for Rs. 25,000/-. He produced a certificate from a doctor who certified that he has got 15% permanent disability. However, Commissioner on personal examination found that first respondent was having 100% loss of earning capacity. His monthly wages was Rs. 1,500/-. After considering all the facts and circumstances of the case, the Commissioner fixed compensation at Rs. 94,780/-. Considering the decision of a Full Bench of this Court mentioned above, we are of the view that the commissioner has committed a grave error in fixing the compensation overlooking the certificate issued by a Medical Officer. In this case, it is pointed out that whole amount has already been disbursed to the first respondent years back, and he had already withdrawn the amount. Considering the facts and circumstances of this case, we think that this Court is not justified to give a direction to the workman to refund the entire amount at this distance of time. We are not therefore, inclined to interfere with the decision already taken by the Commissioner. This appeal accordingly stands dismissed.