IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 19TH DAY OF JULY, 2019 PRESENT THE HON’BLE MRS. JUSTICE B. V. NAGARATHNA AND THE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE K. NATARAJAN MISCELLANEOUS FIRST APPEAL NO.5159 OF 2016 (MV-D) BETWEEN:
UNITED INDIA INSURANCE CO. LTD. MICRO OFFICE, K.R. PURAM, BENGALURU, THROUGH ITS REGIONAL OFFICE, 6TH FLOOR, KRISHI BHAVAN, NRUPATHUNGA ROAD, HUDSON CIRCLE, BENGALURU - 560 001, REPRESENTED BY ITS MANAGER, SRI N. GOPAL REDDY.
(BY SRI S. KRISHNA KISHORE, ADVOCATE) ... APPELLANT AND:
1. SMT. YASMIN BEGUM @YASMIN W/O. LATE MOHAMMED JILAN @ MOHAMMED JILANI, AGED ABOUT 31 YEARS.
2. MASTER MOHAMMED FARHAN S/O. LATE MOHAMMED JILAN @ MOHAMMED JILANI, AGED ABOUT 6 YEARS.
3. MASTER MOHAMMED SUFIYAAN S/O. LATE MOHAMMED JILAN @ MOHAMMED JILANI, AGED ABOUT 5 YEARS.
4. MR. S. MOHAMMED ISAQUE S/O. LATE ABDUL LUKHMAN, AGED ABOUT 56 YEARS.
RESPONDENT NOS.2 AND 3 BEING MINORS, REPRESENTED BY THEIR MOTHER & NATURAL GUARDIAN, SMT. YASMIN BEGUM, THE FIRST RESPONDENT HEREIN.
ALL ARE RESIDING AT NO. 26, I CROSS, NEAR AKKAMAHADEVI TEMPLE, LAKKASANDRA, BENGALURU - 560 030. PERMANENT ADDRESS:
NO.92, NEAR BLOCK-7, DAR LANE, S.N. PET, BELLARY - 583 101.
5. MR. NAZEER AHAMED S/O. MR. SHAIK BUDDAN SAB, MAJOR IN AGE, RESIDING AT NO.103, 2ND CROSS, 2ND MAIN, OPP: GOVERNMENT URDU SCHOOL, OLD GURAPPANAPALYA, BENGALURU - 560 058, (R.C. OWNER OF TIPPER LORRY NO.GDZ-6538).
... RESPONDENTS (BY SRI N. GOPALKRISHNA, ADVOCATE, FOR R1-R4;
SRI G.S. VENKATA SUBBARAO, ADVOCATE, FOR R5) * * * THIS MISCELLANEOUS FIRST APPEAL IS FILED UNDER SECTION 173(1) OF THE MOTOR VEHICLES ACT AGAINST THE JUDGMENT AND AWARD DATED 18/11/2016 PASSED IN M.V.C. NO.4304 OF 2013 ON THE FILE OF THE VII ADDITIONAL JUDGE, COURT OF SMALL CAUSES, MEMBER, M.A.C.T-3, BENGALURU, AWARDING COMPENSATION OF Rs.70,82,000/- WITH INTEREST AT THE RATE OF 6% PER ANNUM FROM THE DATE OF PETITION TILL DEPOSIT.
THIS MISCELLANEOUS FIRST APPEAL COMING ON FOR ADMISSION, THIS DAY, NAGARATHNA, J., DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
J U D G M E N T Though this appeal was listed yesterday for admission, with the consent of learned counsel on both sides, it is heard finally and listed today for dictating judgment.
2. The insurance company has preferred this appeal assailing the judgment and award dated 18/1/2016 passed in M.V.C. No.4304 of 2013 by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Court of Small Causes, Bengaluru (hereinafter referred to as ‘Tribunal’, for the sake of brevity).
3. For the sake of convenience, parties herein shall be referred to in terms of their status before the Tribunal.
4. The respondents-claimants filed the claim petition under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, (for short, ‘the Act’) claiming compensation of Rs.75,00,000/- on account of death of Mohammed Jilan @ Mohammed Jilani in a road traffic accident that occurred on 23/2/2013. According to the claimants, on the said date at about 8:40 a.m., Mohammed Jilan @ Mohammed Jilani was proceeding on motorcycle bearing Registration No.KA-35/R-8238 on Bannerghatta Road. At that time, a tipper lorry bearing Registration No.GDZ-6538 driven by its driver came from same direction at a high speed in a rash and negligent manner and dashed against the motorcycle from behind, as a result, Mohammed Jilan @ Mohammed Jilani fell down, sustained grievous injuries and succumbed to the injuries on the way to the Hospital. Post-Mortem examination was conducted at Victoria Hospital and his funeral rites were performed. It is contended that Mohammed Jilan @ Mohammed Jilani was only 31 years of age and he was hale and healthy and working as a Business Analyst at Genpact Company and was earning a salary of Rs.32,000/- per month and utilising his salary for maintenance of his family, which was depending entirely upon his income. That account of untimely death of Mohammed Jilan @ Mohammed Jilani, the family had lost his earnings and love and affection of the deceased. Hence, they sought compensation on various heads.
5. In response to the claim petition and notice issued by the Tribunal, respondent No.1-owner of the vehicle did not appear, remained absent and was placed ex parte, while respondent No.2-insurance company appeared through its counsel filed its written statement denying the averments in the petition and contended that the offending vehicle neither had a valid and effective fitness certificate nor had a permit to ply on the road on the date of the accident. Hence, it sought for dismissal of the claim petition.
6. On the basis of the rival pleadings, the Tribunal framed the following issues for its consideration:
i. Whether the petitioners prove that Sri Mohammed Jilan @ Mohammed Jilani succumbed in a Road Traffic Accident that occurred on 23.02.2013, at about 8.40 a.m., near Bengaluru Dairy Underpass, Bannerghatta main Road, Bengaluru, which was due to rash and negligent driving of Tipper Lorry bearing Reg.No.GDZ-6538?
ii. Whether the petitioners are entitled for compensation? If so, how much and from whom?
iii. What order?
7. In order to substantiate their case, widow of the deceased was examined as P.W.1, another witness was examined as P.W.2 and they produced twenty documents which are marked as Exs.P.1 to P.20. The insurance company examined two witnesses as R.W.1 and R.W.2 and they produced five documents which are marked as Exs.R.1 to R.5. On the basis of evidence on record, the Tribunal answered issue No.1 in the affirmative and issue No.2 partly in the affirmative and awarded compensation of Rs.70,82,000/- with costs and future interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of claim petition till its realisation by directing respondent Nos.1 and 2 to jointly and severally satisfy the claim and respondent No.2-insurance company was directed to indemnify respondent No.1-owner of the offending vehicle. Being aggrieved by fastening the liability on the insurance company and also contending that the quantum of compensation awarded by the Tribunal is exorbitant, the insurance company has preferred this appeal.
8. We have heard Sri S. Krishna Kishore, learned counsel for the appellant-insurance company, Sri N. Gopal Krishna, learned counsel for respondent Nos.1 to 4, Sri G.S. Venkata Subbarao, learned counsel for respondent No.5 and perused the material on record as well as the original record.
9. Appellant’s counsel contended that the tipper lorry bearing Registration No.GDZ-6538 was of 1984 model and that, it did not possess the requisite fitness certificate. Further, the vehicle was plying on Bannerghatta Road and did not have a permit to ply on the said road. In the absence of the fitness certificate as well as the valid permit, there was violation of terms and conditions of the policy.
Therefore, the Tribunal could not have fastened the liability on the insurer. He contended that in order to prove the breach of the terms and conditions of the policy, R.W.1 and R.W.2 had let-in their evidence and they produced five documents, namely Exs.R.1 to R.5 and the Tribunal has appreciated the evidence on record and instead, has directed the insurance company to indemnify the owner. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of NATIONAL INSURANCE CO. Ltd v. CHALLA UPENDRA RAO reported in AIR 2004 SC 4882 and also in the case of M.S. MIDDLE HIGH SCHOOL v. HDFC ERGO GENERAL INSURANCE CO. LTD. AND OTHERS reported in LAWS (SC) 2017 11 102.
He further contended that the quantum of compensation awarded by the Tribunal is exorbitant. He submitted that a sum of Rs.69,12,000/- awarded towards loss of dependency, which is contrary to the evidence on record. Further, a sum of Rs.1,00,000/- awarded towards loss of consortium is exorbitant and awarding compensation of Rs.40,000/- towards loss of love and affection is also on the higher side.
Placing reliance on the recent dictum of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED v. PRANAY SETHI AND OTHERS reported in (2017) 16 SCC 680 (PRANAY SETHI), he contended that the award of compensation on various heads may be scaled down and the appeal filed by the insurance company may be allowed.
10. Per contra, learned counsel for the claimants- respondents supported the judgment and award of the Tribunal and contended that even if for a moment, it is assumed that there was no fitness certificate or there was no permit, nevertheless, the claimants being innocent third parties cannot be denied compensation and that insurance company must be made liable to pay compensation. Alternatively, he contended that the Hon’ble Supreme Court in AMRIT PAUL SINGH AND ANOTHER v. TATA AIG GENERAL INSURANCE CO. LTD. AND OTHERS reported in AIR 2018 SC 2662 (AMRIT PAUL SINGH)and also in RANI AND OTHERS v. NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY LTD.
AND OTHERS reported in (2018) 8 SCC 492, has held that even if the insurance company is able to establish that the vehicle was plying without a valid permit, in such a circumstance also, the insurance company must pay compensation to the victims and the families of the victims and thereafter could recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. In the circumstance, learned counsel contended that the Tribunal was justified in asking the insurer to satisfy the award and that, there is no merit in the appeal filed by the insurance company.
11. Learned counsel further submitted that the award of compensation of the Tribunal is in accordance with law. That the deceased was working in a company and earning a handsome salary and on the basis of the documentary evidence on record, the Tribunal has rightly assessed the compensation of Rs.70,82,000/- with interest at the rate of 6% per annum which would not call for any interference.
12. Learned counsel for the respondent-owner of the vehicle supported the judgment and award of the Tribunal and contended that the Tribunal has rightly fastened the liability jointly and severally on the owner of the vehicle as well as on the insurance company and that the same would not call for modification in this appeal.
13. Learned counsel further contended that this is not a case where a vehicle did not have a permit at all. It is a case of non-renewal of permit which cannot be equated to a case of there being no permit at all to the vehicle. He submitted that under Sub-section (5) of Section 81 of the Act, pending renewal of a permit, deeming provision would apply and it must be held that once a permit is renewed, it would be with effect from the date of expiry. In the instant case, the permit has been issued subsequent to the date of the accident i.e., from 11/3/2013 up to 10/3/2018. But as on the date of the accident i.e., 23/2/2013 having regard to the object and purpose of Sub-section (5) of Section 81 of the Act, it must be held that it is a deeming provision which would apply insofar as vehicle in question is concerned. He contended that AMRIT PAUL SINGH is a case where the owner of the offending vehicle did not possess a permit at all, even in such a case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court directed pay and recovery. But the said judgment could be distinguished as in the instant case it is a case of non-renewal of permit and not a case of the owner of the vehicle not having a permit in respect of the vehicle in question. Therefore, the Tribunal was justified in directing both the insurance company as well as the owner to jointly and severally satisfy the award and that the appellant-insurance company is bound to indemnify the respondent-owner.
14. Alternatively, he contended that if this Court follows the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court and modifies the award and issues a direction to pay and recover, in that case, the insurance company must first pay the compensation to the claimants and thereafter may take steps for recovering the amount from the owner. That the award of compensation to the respondents-claimants is on the higher side and this Court may reduce the same.
15. Having heard learned counsel for the respective parties and on perusal of the material on record, the following points would arise for our consideration:
i. Whether the Tribunal was right in fastening the liability on the insurance company to satisfy the award passed in the instant case?
or Whether a direction issued against the insurance company calls for any modification?
ii. Whether the quantum of compensation awarded by the Tribunal calls for any interference?
iii. What order?
16. Respondents-claimants have established the fact that Mohammed Jilan @ Mohammed Jilani died in a road traffic accident that occurred on 23/2/2013 at about 8:40 a.m. when he was proceeding on motorcycle bearing Registration KA-35/R-8238 on Bannerghatta Road. At that time, tipper lorry bearing Registration No.GDZ-6538 came from behind and hit the motorcycle, as a result, Mohammed Jilan @ Mohammed Jilani sustained grievous injuries and succumbed to the same on the way to the Hospital. There is no controversy with regard to negligence on the part of the driver of the tipper lorry.
17. The controversy is with regard to there being any breach in the terms and conditions of the policy which according to learned counsel for the appellant-insurer would call for exoneration of the insurance company. In this regard, learned counsel for the appellant-insurance company drew our attention to Section 66 of the Act which deals with necessity for permit of vehicle used as a transport vehicle in any public place and Section 56 of the Act which deals with regard to transport vehicle possessing a certificate of fitness. He contended that both these are mandatory requirements and in the instant case, the offending vehicle, the tipper lorry neither possessed a certificate of fitness nor had a permit to ply the vehicle on Bannerghatta Road. He further drew our attention to column No.7 of the charge-sheet wherein, it has been stated that the vehicle did not possess the fitness certificate as well as the permit.
18. Section 56 of the Act states that subject to the provisions of Sections 59 and 60 of the Act, a transport vehicle shall not be deemed to be validly registered for the purposes of Section 39, unless it carries a certificate of fitness in such form containing such particulars and information as may be prescribed by the Central Government, issued by the prescribed authority, or by an authorised testing station mentioned in sub-section (2), to the effect that the vehicle complies for the time being with all the requirements of the Act and Rules made thereunder.
19. The contention of appellant-insurer is that vehicle did not possess a fitness certificate, but the fact remains that in the instant case, the vehicle being a transport vehicle, had a valid registration under Section 39 of the Act. Registration of the vehicle under Section 39 of the Act would call for compliance of a condition precedent namely, possessing of a valid fitness certificate. In the instant case, since the vehicle in question was validly registered, it implies that it had a fitness certificate. Further, this is not a case where there has been cancellation of the fitness certificate. When once registration of the vehicle has been made under Section 39 of the Act, it is presumed that the vehicle possesses a valid fitness certificate. There is no evidence on record to the effect that the fitness certificate of the vehicle had expired and if so, as to on what date it had expired. In the circumstance, we do not find any substance in the contention of learned counsel for the appellant-insurance company on the aspect that the offending vehicle did not possess a valid fitness certificate on the date of the accident. Further, it is noted that this is not a case where the Registration Certificate of the vehicle in question had been cancelled on account of the cancellation of the fitness certificate. No evidence has been let-in in that regard by the insurance company. Moreover, the necessity of the vehicle having a fitness certificate is not a condition of the policy at the time of issuance of the insurance policy. But before a vehicle could be registered, there is a need for such a vehicle to have a fitness certificate and in the instant case even as per Ex.R.3, the vehicle in question had a valid Registration Certificate.
20. Next contention is with regard to breach of the insurance company on the aspect of the offending vehicle not possessing a valid permit on the date of the accident. It is noted that in this case, the vehicle had a valid permit till 14/12/2012 and the date of the accident is 23/2/2013. Subsequently, the permit was issued on 11/3/2013 up to 10/3/2018 as per Ex.R.5, which is dated 8/10/2015. In this regard, learned counsel for the appellant-insurance company contended that it has been established by the insurance company before the Tribunal that the vehicle did not possess a permit on the date of the accident and therefore, there being a breach of the terms and conditions of the policy as well as Section 66 of the Act and hence, the insurance company ought to be exonerated.
21. Per contra, learned counsel for the claimants- respondents submitted that even if it is held to have been established by the insurance company that there was no permit as on the date of the accident, in view of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, insurance company must be directed to satisfy the claim in the first instance and recover the compensation from the owner of the vehicle. He submitted that the claimants cannot be deprived of the compensation even when there is a breach of the terms and conditions of the policy. In this regard, reliance has been placed in the case of AMRIT PAUL SINGH. In the said case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has discussed the need to have or the necessity for a transport vehicle having a permit and use of transport vehicle in a public place without a permit being fundamental statutory infraction. In such a case, the insurer is liable to pay the compensation to the claimants and is entitled to recover from the owner of the vehicle. In the said case, it was held that use of a vehicle in a public place without a permit is a fundamental statutory infraction. Despite observing the same and on coming to the conclusion that the vehicle therein did not have a permit on the date of the accident, nevertheless, directed the insurer to pay the compensation to the claimants therein with interest with the stipulation that the insurer was entitled to recover the same from the owner and the driver. The said direction was held to be in consonance with the principles stated in NATIONAL INSURANCE CO. LTD. v. SWARAN SINGH AND OTHERS reported in (2004) 3 SCC 297.
22. But, in the instant case, it is on record that the permit in respect of the vehicle in question had expired on 14/12/2012. Subsequently, as per Ex.R.5, the permit was renewed for a period from 11/3/2013 to 10/3/2018. In fact, on 11/3/2013 payment of Rs.850/- was made for renewal of the permit. Section 81 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 deals with duration and renewal of permits. It reads as under:
“ 81. Duration and renewal of permits. – (1) A permit other than a temporary permit issued under section 87 or a special permit issued under sub-section (8) of section 88 shall be effective from the date of issuance or renewal thereof for a period of five years. Provided that where the permit is countersigned under sub-section (1) of section 88, such countersignature shall remain effective without renewal for such period so as to synchronise with the validity of the primary permit.
(2) A permit may be renewed on in application made not less than 15 days before the date of its expiry.
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (2), the Regional Transport Authority or the State Transport Authority, as the case may be, may entertain an application for the renewal of a permit after the last date specified in that sub-section if it is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by good and sufficient cause from making an application within the time specified.
(4)The Regional Transport Authority or the State Transport Authority, as the case may be, may reject an application for the renewal of a permit on one or more of the following grounds, namely :-
(a) the financial condition of the applicant as evidenced by insolvency, or decrees for payment of debts remaining unsatisfied for a period of thirty days, prior to the date of consideration of the application ;
(b) the applicant had been punished twice or more for any of the following offences within twelve months reckoned from fifteen days prior to the date of consideration of the application committed as a result of the operation of a stage carriage service by the applicant, namely :-
(i) plying any vehicle – (1) without payment of tax due on such vehicle;
(2) without payment of tax during the grace period allowed for payment of such tax and then stop the plying of such vehicle;
(3) on any unauthorised route;
(ii) making unauthorised trips:
Provided that in computing the number of punishments for the purpose of clause (b), any punishment stayed by the order of an appellate authority shall not be taken into account :
Provided further that no application under this sub- section shall be rejected unless an opportunity of being heard is given to the applicant.
(5) Where a permit has been renewed under this section after the expiry of the period thereof, such renewal shall have effect from the date of such expiry irrespective of whether or not a temporary permit has been granted under clause (d) of section 87, and where a temporary permit has been granted, the fee paid in respect of such temporary permit shall be refunded. ”
Sub-Section (1) states that a permit other than a temporary permit issued under Section 87 or a special permit issued under Sub-section (8) of Section 88 shall be effective from the date of issuance or renewal thereof for a period of five years. A permit may be renewed on an application made not less than fifteen days before the date of its expiry vide Sub-section (2) of Section 81, but Sub-section (3) of Section 81 of the Act begins with a non-abstante clause. It states that the Regional Transport Authority or the State Transport Authority as the case may be can entertain an application for the renewal of a permit after the last date specified in that Sub-section if it is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by good and sufficient cause from making an application within the time specified. Sub-section (5) of Section 81 of the Act states that where a permit has been renewed under the said Section after the expiry of the period thereof, such renewal shall have effect from the date of such expiry irrespective of whether or not a temporary permit has been granted under clause (d) of Section 87, and where a temporary permit has been granted, the fee paid in respect of such temporary permit shall be refunded.
23. On a reading of the aforesaid provisions, it becomes clear when the permit is issued, in the first instance, it is effective from the date of issuance for a period of five years. But subsequently when a permit which has expired is renewed, it is from the date of expiry. Having regard to Sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 81 of the Act, where there could be a delay in making of an application for renewal of permit and also keeping in mind the fact that renewal application would take sometime for it to be considered, processed and ultimately the permit being renewed even though such an application has been made well within time. Sub-section (5) of Section 81 of the Act takes care of a period during which the vehicle is plying on the public road, pending renewal of the permit. In such a case, Sub-section (5) of Section 81 of the Act states that where a permit is renewed after the expiry of its period, such renewal shall have an effect from the date of such expiry. In other words, Sub-section (5) of Section 81 of the Act deals with a case of deemed permit or takes care of a situation where pending renewal of the a permit, a transport vehicle is plying on a public road. In such a situation, it cannot be considered to be a case where the transport vehicle is plying without a permit rather the vehicle is plying pending renewal of the permit i.e. on a deemed permit. Renewal of the permit could take place only if a permit had been issued in the first instance and not otherwise. Hence, the object of a provision incorporating a legal fiction must be given its fullest scope and application.
24. AMRIT PAUL SINGH is a case where the offending vehicle therein did not have a permit at all. In such circumstance, the Hon’ble Supreme Court bearing in mind the interest of the claimants and the object and purpose of the Act held that the insurance company must pay to the claimants in the first instance and recover the compensation from the owner of the vehicle. But, in the instant case, as already noted, the offending vehicle did possess a permit. The permit had expired on 14/12/2012. It was subsequently renewed on 11/3/2013 up to 10/3/2018 and for the period from 14/12/2012 up to 10/3/2013, there was deemed permit in so far as the offending vehicle herein is concerned. The offending vehicle, in the instant case, cannot be considered to be a vehicle plying without a permit. Therefore, the direction in the case of AMRIT PAUL SINGH and RANI AND OTHERS cannot be straight away applied in the instant case. As already stated, this is not a case where the offending vehicle did not have a permit at all. It is a case of non-renewal of permit as on the date of the accident, but the vehicle being covered under a deemed permit under Sub- section (5) of Section 81 of the Act.
25. In this regard, reliance could be placed on the judgment of a learned Single Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High court in C.LAKSHMAN REDDI vs. THE STATE TRANSPORT AUTORITY, reported in AIR 1977 AP 299. In the said case, the Court was considering Section 58(4) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, which is a provision similar to Section 81 of the Act. In the said case, it was observed that once the renewal of a permit is granted, it has retrospective effect and if the vehicle is run on a temporary permit, the fee paid in respect of such temporary permit is liable to be refunded. So once renewal has been granted, it has retrospective effect from the date of expiry of the permit and the vehicle must be deemed to be having a valid permit from the date of expiry of the permit. This is irrespective of whether or not a temporary permit has been granted. If so, it follows that the vehicle must be deemed to have been run on a valid permit after the expiry of the permit though the renewal was granted subsequently. It is open for an operator either to apply for a temporary permit pending disposal of the application for renewal of the permit or he may also run the vehicle in anticipation of the renewal of the permit. Of course, in a case where the permit has not been renewed, the operator will take the risk of having to pay the maximum tax and also penalty. But, if the permit has been renewed, it will take effect from the date of the expiry of the original permit and it cannot be said that the vehicle was run without a valid permit.
26. Further, the judgment of the larger Bench of five Judges of the Kerala High Court in the case OF RAMANKUTTY AND ANOTHER vs. PAREED PILLAI AND ANOTHEr reported in 2018 SCC OnLine Ker. 3542, relied by the learned counsel for the appellant-insurer by which the earlier judgment of the Full Bench of the Kerala High Court in V.M.AUGUSTINE vs. AYYAPPANKUTTY @ MANI, reported in 2015 (2) KLT 139 (FB), is held to be not applicable to the present case, as the present case is one of the subsequent renewal of the permit and not a case of the vehicle not having any permit at all.
27. Similarly, another judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED vs. CHALLAN UPPENDRA RAO AND OTHERS, reported in AIR 2004 SC 4882 is not applicable to the present case as in that case also the vehicle was plying without a valid permit and it was held to be an infraction of law.
28. Having regard to the deeming provision under Sub-section (5) of Section 81 of the Act, it is held that there is no fundamental breach of the terms and conditions of the policy vis-à-vis the permit in the instant case. Therefore, the Tribunal was justified in directing the owner and insurer to jointly and severally satisfy the award. Hence, point No.1 is answered against the insurance company and in favour of the respondents-claimants.
29. This takes us to the next point for consideration with regard to the quantum of compensation awarded by the Tribunal. The Tribunal awarded Rs.70,82,000/- with cost and interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of the claim petition till realisation on the following heads:
Heads Compensation awarded by the Tribunal (in Rs.) Towards loss of dependency 69,12,000.00 Towards loss of consortium 1,00,000.00 Towards funeral expenses 30,000.00 Towards loss of love & affection 40,000.00 Total : 70,82,000.00 30. The deceased was aged about 31 years and he was working as a Business Analyst in a Company known as Genpact, Bellandur, Bengaluru. In support of the said fact, Ex.P.20-pay slip has been produced. We have perused the same. The gross salary is Rs.32,953/-. Out of that, we have deducted the Professional Tax and income tax and the net salary arrived at is Rs.30,077/-. Even though the deceased was working in a private company, 40% of the said amount would have to be added towards his future prospects which would be Rs.12,030/-. Thus, the total salary would be Rs.42,107/-. Since there are four claimants, 1/4th of the said amount has to be deducted towards the personal expenses of the deceased which comes to Rs.31,580/- which has to be annualised and by applying the appropriate multiplier of ‘16’ the compensation on the head of ‘loss of dependency’ would be Rs.60,63,360/- instead of Rs.69,12,000/- awarded by the Tribunal.
31. Having regard to the dictum of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of PRANAY SETHI, a sum of Rs.40,000/- is awarded towards loss of spousal consortium to the widow of the deceased and to the children of the deceased a sum of Rs.60,000/- together is awarded towards loss of parental consortium and a sum of Rs.30,000/- is awarded to the father of the deceased towards loss of filial consortium. A sum of Rs.15,000/- is awarded towards ‘loss of estate’ and Rs.15,000/- towards ‘funeral expenses’. Thus, the total compensation would be “Rs.62,23,360/-” instead of “Rs.70,82,000/-”. The reassessed compensation shall carry interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of claim petition till realisation.
32. The directions regarding apportionment issued by the Tribunal is affirmed. However, it is stated that 50% of the compensation awarded to the widow of the deceased must be deposited in any Nationalised or Scheduled Bank for a period of three years only. However, we feel that the same must be deposited for a period of ten years, having regard to the young age of claimant No.1. She is at liberty to deposit the said amount in any Post Office or Nationalised Bank deposit for a period of ten years and she shall be entitled to draw periodical interest on the said deposit. The other directions regarding deposit are also affirmed.
33. In the result, the appeal filed by the insurance company is allowed-in-part only on the question of quantum of compensation and not on the question of liability. The appellant-insurer is directed to satisfy the award and indemnify the respondent-insured.
The amount in deposit to be transferred to the Tribunal.
Parties to bear their respective costs.
In view of disposal of the appeal, I.A. No.2 of 2016 stands disposed.
SD/- JUDGE kvk/hnm SD/- JUDGE