JUDGMENT S.N. Srivastava, J.
1. Both the petitions have been tagged on by virtue of consideration of common issues involved in both the petitions. Reliefs sought in Writ Petition No. 47587 of 2003 may be quoted below :
"(a) to issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari quashing the impugned orders dated 18.7.1999 passed by courts below and after allowing the application under Order IX Rule 13 of the C.P.C. the court below may be directed to decide the suit afresh after affording opportunity of hearing to the writ petition.
(b) to issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus commanding and directing the respondents not to give effect to the impugned orders dated 18.7.2003 and 24.4.1999 passed by courts below and the respondents be directed not to interfere with the possession of the writ petitioners over their land bearing No. 2197 situated at Pukhta Vakye within Nagar Palika limits, Muzaffarnagar."
2. Impugned here in both the petitions are the orders dated 18.7.2003 passed by revisional court in Revision No. 140 of 1999 and the order dated 24.4.1999 passed in Misc. Case No. 59 of 1994 arising out of Suit No. 49 of 1994.
3. The facts in both the petitions are more or less similar. It will suffice to state the facts in the first case. The dispute in the petition relates to property described as A.B.C.D.E.F.G.H.I. in the plaint map. The plaintiff-respondents filed a suit for declaration that they were the owners of the land in dispute in possession. A further relief was claimed for permanent injunction restraining the defendant-petitioners from interfering with the land in dispute. The claim of the petitioners rests on the ground that the land in dispute was recorded prior to the year 1863 and it constitutes part of Khasra No. 21 admeasuring 67 acres 11 biswas (Pukhta) situated in Nagar Palika Muzaffarnagar. It is further alleged that old numbers assigned to the property in the year 1325 fasli are 2827, 2828 and 2829 and prior to that, in 1270 fasli, it was recorded as property No. 2630, 2631 and 2632. It is further stated that the plaintiff-respondents impleaded Union of India through Chief Secretary and also City Board, Muzaffarnagar through its Chairman. The suit filed in February, 1994 culminated in ex parte decree vide judgment and decree dated 26.5.1994. The trial court by the aforesaid judgment recorded a finding that inspite of service, nobody appeared on behalf of respondents. The Union of India filed an application under Order IX Rule 13, C.P.C. on 26.7.1994 thereby seeking setting aside ex parte decree on the premises that the land in dispute was the property of Central Government and was being used as camping ground for Military Commandoes and that the plaintiffs had no right, title or interest at all by reason of the fact that the property vested in the Central Government. It would transpire that while this application was pending, the plaintiff respondent No. 1 died on 27.3. 1997 and therefore, an application was filed for substitution on 13.11.1998. The ground mentioned therein is that they came to know about the death of opposite party No. 1 only recently though some application was moved on 16.4.1998 of which no copy/notice was served to the defendant applicant. An objection was filed to the effect that the same was not filed within three months and therefore, this application under Order IX Rule 13, C.P.C. has abated. After hearing the parties, the trial court dismissed the substitution application as abated due to non-substitution of the plaintiff respondent No. 1 within time as also the restoration application. The Revision No. 140 of 1999, Union of India v. Mohd. Nayyar, preferred in this regard was also dismissed.
4. Sri Subodh Kumar, Addl. Standing Counsel appearing for Union of India canvassed that proceeding under Order IX Rule 13, C.P.C., is not a proceeding for suit or appeal and limitation for filing substitution application will be three years as envisaged in Article 137 of the Limitation Act. He further urged that Article 120 of the Act cannot be called in aid as it is intended for application to suits, and appeals and therefore, opposite parties erred in law in dismissing the restoration application as having abated. The learned counsel in the alternative urged that delay in filing substitution application was already explained and opposite parties were required under Order XXII Rule 10A of the C.P.C. to intimate the death and copy of application for abatement moved was never served to him even if it be taken to be an information as required under the above provisions as copy of the said application was not given to the applicant. Besides, proceeds the submission, they had no knowledge about heirs of the defendants and when they came to know immediately before 13.11.1998, it was pointed out by the counsel for the plaintiffs that they had already intimated the Court and therefore, application for substitution was filed immediately thereafter on 13.11.1997. It is further submitted that the delay was properly explained and the court below has acted without jurisdiction in dismissing the restoration application as having abated. The learned counsel relied upon paragraph 7 of the writ petition and urged that the defendant was not properly described in the plaint and notices were not properly served and therefore nobody could appear on behalf of defendants in the suit. He further urged that in the counter filed by respondent, this paragraph has not been specifically denied to the effect that defendant has not been properly described and notices have not been properly served and ex parte decree is liable to be quashed. Per contra, Sri Ravi Kiran Jain, learned senior advocate assisted by P. K. Jain representing respondents urged that under Section 141, C.P.C. expression "proceedings" includes proceedings under Order IX and by this reckoning, procedure prescribed for suits are applicable. He further urged that provisions contained in Order XXII, Rule 4, C.P.C. will apply to miscellaneous applications under Order IX Rule 13, C.P.C. and in case, the application was not filed within 19 days, application under Order IX Rule 13, C.P.C. was rightly dismissed as having abated. He also urged that Article 120 of the Limitation Act extends it coverage to the matter at issue. It was further urged that delay in filing the substitution application was not explained properly and the case was rightly dismissed. He also submitted that ex parte decree was rightly passed after due service of notice.
5. The learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon various decisions including decisions In 1989 ALJ 795 which is a decision of learned single Judge 1972 ALJ 504 (FB) ; 2004(2) AWC. 1282; AIR 1983 SC 1202, in support of his case.
6. The proceeding under Order IX Rule 13, C.P.C. has the complexion of a miscellaneous proceeding by virtue of Section 141, C.P.C. and is fully covered by Explanation to Section 141 which envisages that "in this section, the expression "proceedings" includes proceedings under Order IX, but does not include any proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution". The matter whether Order XXII Rules 3 and 4 of the C.P.C. is applicable to miscellaneous proceedings like Order IX Rule 13, C.P.C. was considered by a single Judge of this Court in Surat and Ors. v. Bhrigunath Upadhyaya and Ors., 1989 ALJ 795. Learned single Judge was of the view that the Order XXII Rules 3 and 4 and prescribed procedure is not applicable to such miscellaneous proceedings :
"It is significant, while under Rule 11 the provision of Order XXII has been made applicable to the appeals it was not made applicable either to revision or other miscellaneous proceedings. If Order XXII was applicable to all proceedings referred to in Section 141 apart from suit or original proceeding there was no need to include appeals by making such provision. This further clarifies that Order XXII since being procedure providing and refer to a substantive right like abatement has not been made applicable to other proceedings."
Even if, the provisions of substitution as interpreted under Order XXII Rule 3, C.P.C. are taken as applicable, the question would be what would be the limitation for filing application of substitution in miscellaneous proceedings and whether any proceedings abates on not filing substitution application within 90 days will be considered at subsequent stage in this judgment.
7. The provisions for substitution as contemplated in Order XXII Rule 3, C.P.C. will be applicable to suit. Order XXII Rule 4, C.P.C. and Rule 10A and Rule 11, C.P.C. make it clear that in case substitution application is not filed within the time prescribed by law, the suit shall abate as against the deceased defendant. It is eloquent from a perusal of Order XXII Rule 10A of the C.P.C. that it is the duty of pleader of deceased party to communicate to Court death of a party. It is further explicit from it that after receiving notice from pleader the Court shall thereupon give notice of such death to the other party and for this purpose, the contract between the pleader and the deceased party shall be deemed to subsist. Order XXII Rule 10A being relevant is quoted below :
"10A, Duty of pleader to communicate to Court death of a party.-Whenever a pleader appearing for a party to the suit comes to know of the death of that party, he shall inform the Court about it, and the Court shall thereupon give notice of such death to the other party, and, for this purpose, the contract between the pleader and the deceased party shall be deemed to subsist."
In this connection, Rule 11 of Order XXII of the C.P.C. is also very germane to the consideration of the question involved in the present case. It envisages that in the application of this order to appeals, so far as may be, the word "plaintiff" shall be held to include an appellant, the word "defendant" as respondent and the word "suit" an appeal. That does not include misc. proceeding even if procedure in relation thereto is applicable. Now the question that crops up for consideration is what is the limitation for moving application for substitution under Order IX Rule 13, C.P.C?
8. According to the learned counsel for the petitioners, Article 120 of the Limitation Act is not intended for application inasmuch as this Article will be attracted for application to suits and appeals and by this reckoning, limitation of 90 days will not be made applicable to misc. proceedings which are not suits. To the contrary, Sri Ravi Kiran Jain asserted that by virtue of Section 141, C.P.C. self-same procedure is prescribed for other misc. proceedings including Order IX Rule 13, C.P.C. and by this reckoning this provision will be applicable. Article 120 of the Limitation Act being relevant is quoted below for ready reference :
"Under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 to have the legal representative of a deceased plaintiff or appellant or of a deceased defendant or respondent made a party.
Ninety days The date of death of the plaintiff, appellant, defendant or respondent as the case may be."
9. It would crystallise from a punctilious reading that Legislature has taken into account matters of substitution pertaining to suits or appeals as is clear from Order XXII Rules 1 to 9 and 11, C.P.C. In Rule 11 of Order XXII, the words "plaintiff and "appellants" and "defendant" and "respondent" have been mentioned for the substitution of deceased parties and therefore Article 120 will be applicable to suits and appeals only and not to misc. proceedings as defined in Section 141 of the C.P.C. There are other articles in the Limitation Act by which limitation has been provided in other applications. As there is no other specific Article in the Limitation Act for application to misc. proceeding, Article 137 will have to be called in aid to apply to miscellaneous proceeding according to which (in case the matter is not covered by any Article), "any other application for which no period of limitation has been provided elsewhere in this division, when right to apply "accrues" within 3 years. The learned counsel for the respondents has not adverted attention of the Court to any other Article in the Limitation Act save saying that Article 120 shall also apply to miscellaneous proceeding. Considering the facts and circumstances and regard being had to the relevant provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure as indicated above and also upon regard being had to Article 137 of the Limitation Act, I converge to the view that limitation for filing substitution application in relation to misc. proceeding including proceeding under Order IX Rule 13, C.P.C. will be three years, I receive reinforcement in my view by a decision of this Court in Surat and Ors. v. Bhrigunath Upadhayay and Ors., (supra) wherein this Court found the substitution filed within three years not barred by limitation. In this case, this Court considered the question as to what would be the limitation of filing application of substitution of heirs of deceased. A case Chandradeo Pandey and Ors. v. Sukhdeo Rai and Ors., clearly held that in revision, application for substitution would be governed by Article 137 of the new Limitation Act and could be filed within three years. Similarly, in Smt Sayeeda Begam and Anr. v. Ashraf Hussain and Ors., AIR 1980 MP 12, it has been held that Article 137 and not Article 120 of the Limitation Act will be attracted for application in proceeding for restoration of suit. In the case referred to above, it was observed that : "Order XXII contains penal provisions which affect substantive rights of the plaintiff or the appellant, as the case may be, when an application for substitution is not filed within time. The penal provisions have to be construed strictly. Unless they expressly declare the provisions to be applicable to a proceeding other than a suit or appeal, those provisions cannot be applied by analogy to such a proceeding." It was further observed that : "Article 120 of the Limitation Act governs the application for substitution in suit or appeal. This Article cannot be extended in its operation by analogy or otherwise to an application for substitution when an applicant or non-applicant dies in a proceeding for restoration under Order IX". The Division Bench aforesaid further held that : "Section 141 of the C.P.C. may permit the procedure for a suit to be followed in a proceeding initiated under Order IX but the provisions of the Limitation Act could not be amended by any process of reasoning so as to read applicant" for "plaintiff and "non-applicant" for "defendant" and unless that could be done, the application for substitution in such a case would be governed by the residuary Article, there being no special provision."
10. Yet another argument advanced across the bar by the learned counsel for the petitioner pertains to the aspect that in the suit, the Union of India was represented through "Chief Secretary" instead of being represented through "Secretary" and therefore, the Union of India was not properly described. Section 80 of the C.P.C. being germane is quoted below.
"80 (l)(a) In the case of a suit against the Central Government (except where it relates to a railway), a Secretary to that Government...."
11. It is noticeable that Section 80 has been engrafted in two parts. Firstly, it pertains to suits against Government and secondly it relates to suits against public officers. The words "acts purporting to be done" qualify the public officers. In the circumstances, when notice under Section 80 is necessary for all suits against Government notice is mandatory against public officers when the suit is In respect of an act purporting to be done by him in official capacity. In sub-section (3) of Section 80 it is envisaged that if the name, description and the residence of the plaintiff have been so given in the notice that the appropriate authority or public officer concerned can identify the person serving the notice and further that such notice has been delivered or left at the office of the appropriate authority in sub- section (l). The phraseology of Section 80 warrants that notice is to be delivered or left at the office. The third question remains whether any notice was served to the defendant as required under law. In this regard paragraph 7 of the writ petition may be referred to and it is being quoted below :
"7. That, it is made clear here that the defendant has not been properly described in the plaint, hence notice was not properly served. Therefore, it was not possible to attend the Court."
12. Reply to aforesaid para 7 is contained in para 11 of the affidavit filed by Sri Hussain Nawaz, respondent No. 6, which being relevant is quoted below for ready reference :
"That the contents of paragraph Nos. 4 to 9 of the writ petition are not admitted as stated. Only this much is admitted that a suit was filed and after due service. Suit was decreed by the trial court No. 26.5.1994. Thereafter, restoration application was filed on 27.7.1994 and neither any stay application was moved nor any interim order was passed by the trial court."
13. Considering the averments made in para 7 of the writ petition and reply thereto, it is deducible that there was no service on Union of India having been sought to be served through Chief Secretary instead of Secretary as embodied in Section 80(1)(a) of the C.P.C. it cannot be inferred that notice was delivered or left at the office when Union of India was not correctly represented through Secretary. The expression in para 7 of the writ petition "therefore, it was not possible to attend the Court" are eloquent enough that notice was not delivered or left at the office. In the above perspective, it is thus amply proved that ex parte decree was obtained behind the back of Union of India. The suit is for declaration and for permanent injunction. Admittedly, the suit property is recorded as camping ground for commandoes force of the Army and is recorded as property of Union of India. The notices were not served to Union of India and the order was obtained behind the back. It is also clear from a perusal of the averments made in para 27 of the writ petition and a perusal of averments contained in para 29 of the writ petition that : "copy of the application dated 15.7.1997 was not given by the contesting opposite party to the applicant. Therefore, the applicant was not aware about the application dated 15.7.1997. For the first time on 6.4.1998 when the application for abatement was moved, the petitioner came to know about the death." By this reckoning application was rightly filed immediately after having knowledge on 13.11.2004 as mentioned in the order. The provision of Order XXII Rule 10A was not taken note of while dismissing application under Order IX Rule 11, C.P.C., as having abated.
14. In the conspectus of the above discussion, I am inclined to hold that limitation for substitution in an application under Order IX Rule 13, C.P.C. and all other misc. proceeding as defined under Section 141, C.P.C. will be three years as contemplated under Article 137 of the Limitation Act and it will not be governed by Article 120 of the Limitation Act according to which limitation of suits and appeals is only 90 days. It is further held that provision of Order XXII Rule 10A of the C.P.C. was not complied with inasmuch as no notices were issued to the applicant under Order IX Rule 13, C.P.C. by the Court and also that no copy of the application giving intimation to the Court of death was given to the applicant. In the light of the above, the application for substitution was filed within time of three years.
15. Lastly, the learned counsel for Union of India urged that the land in dispute is governed by Cantonment Act and Rules framed thereunder and under the management of Union of India and its Officers and authorities appointed for the same under the Rules and therefore, the plaintiffs' claim for declaration of rights as owners cannot be decreed. Since I am relegating the matter to the trial court for adjudication of issues including the issue of ownership of plaintiffs, I would forbear from expressing any view on merits of this issue. It needs hardly be said that issues involved in the case shall be adjudicated upon after affording opportunity of hearing to both the parties in accordance with the procedure prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure. I would also not scruple to say that the trial court will proceed to decide the suit untrammelled by any observations If made on merits in the body of Judgment.
16. In the result, both the petitions succeed and are allowed. The impugned orders dated 18.7.2003 passed by Additional District Judge Court No. 7 Muzaffarnagar in Misc. Appeal No. 132 of 1999 and ex parte judgment and decree dated 24.4.1999 in Misc. Case No. 59 of 1994 and also the ex parte decree dated 26.5.1994 passed in O.S. No. 59 of 1994 are quashed and trial court is directed to decide the suit following the procedure prescribed under the C.P.C. and after allowing the parties to complete their pleading, adduce their evidence and also after affording opportunity of hearing in accordance with law.