K.T.Sankaran, J. The questions which arise for consideration in these O.P. (RC)s are:
i. Whether a compromise entered into before the Lok Adalat between the landlord and the tenant in a Rent Control Petition can be executed by the Civil Court? if so, whether it should be before the Munsiff's Court or before the Sub Court having pecuniary jurisdiction over the amount involved in the decree?
ii. Whether attachment of immovable property is compulsory before the court auction sale and whether such an objection can be raised by the judgment debtor before the sale?
2. The petitioners and others filed a Rent Control Petition before the Rent Control Court, Tirur, against the 1st respondent under Section 11(3) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act (hereinafter referred to as the “Act”). Originally, the Rent Control Petition was filed before the Rent Control Court, Parappanangadi and it was transferred to the Rent Control Court, Tirur. The parties to the Rent Control Petition settled their disputes before the Lok Adalat, organised by the Taluk Legal Services Committee, Tirur. The tenant agreed to vacate the petition schedule building in the Rent Control Petition. The landlords (revision petitioners) agreed to re-pay to the tenant, a sum of `4,75,000/-, the amount being the advance taken at the time of entering into the lease transaction. The landlords paid a sum of `1,00,000/- to the tenant before the Lok Adalat itself. The balance amount was agreed to be paid in the event of the tenant vacating the premises within six months. It was also agreed that if the landlords failed to pay the amount within the time stipulated, it would carry interest at 6% per annum.
3. In terms of the compromise, the tenant vacated the building. However, the landlords did not pay the amount payable to the tenant. Therefore, the tenant filed an Execution Petition before the Munsiff's Court, Tirur, for realisation of `3,75,000/- together with interest. The landlords raised a contention that the petition schedule building being situated within the territorial limits of the Munsiff's Court, Parappanangadi, the Execution Petition was maintainable only before that court. Accordingly, the Execution Petition was returned for presentation before the court having jurisdiction. The tenant filed Execution Petition before the Munsiff's Court, Parappanangadi. That Execution Petition was returned stating that the amounts claimed in the Execution Petition exceeded the pecuniary limits of the jurisdiction of the Munsiff's Court. Thereafter, the tenant was compelled to file the Execution Petition before the Sub Court, Tirur.
4. The landlords (respondents in the Execution Petition) raised a contention that the award passed by the Lok Adalat is not an executable decree and the Sub Court, Tirur has no jurisdiction to proceed with the execution. The executing court dismissed the Execution Petition by the order dated 06.07.2011. The executing court, relying on the decision of a learned Single Judge in Govindankutty Menon v. Shaji [2010(1) KLT 43], held thus:
“The Rent Control Court has jurisdiction to pass an order either eviction or dismissal in a petition. The Rent Control Court has no jurisdiction to pass any amount for payment of compensation or amount. If so, the award passed by the Lok Adalat to pay `4,75,000/- to the petitioner in a matter referred from Rent Control Court is beyond jurisdiction. Further if the Award passed by the Lok Adalat is executable, the petitioner has to file Execution Petition before the Munsiff Court.”
5. In Govindankutty Menon's case (supra), it was held that when a criminal case is referred to Adalat and it is settled before the Adalat, the award passed has to be treated only as an order of that Criminal Court and it cannot be executed as a decree of Civil Court. The decision of the Kerala High Court in Govindankutty Menon's case (supra) was reversed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Govindan Kutty Menon v. Shaji [2011 (4) KLT 857(SC)], wherein it was held thus:
“17. From the above discussion, the following propositions emerge:
1) In view of the unambiguous language of S.21 of the Act, every award of the Lok Adalat shall be deemed to be a decree of a civil court and as such it is executable by that Court.
2) The Act does not make out any such distinction between the reference made by a civil court and criminal court.
3) There is no restriction on the power of the Lok Adalat to pass an award based on the compromise arrived at between the parties in respect of cases referred to by various Courts (both Civil and Criminal), Tribunals, Family Court, Rent Control Court, Consumer Redressal Forum, Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and other Forums of similar nature.
4) Even if a matter is referred by a criminal court under S.138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and by virtue of the deeming provisions, the award passed by the Lok Adalat based on a compromise has to be treated as a decree capable of execution by a civil court.
6. The order passed by the executing court dismissing the Execution Petition was challenged by the decree holder/tenant in CRP No.393 of 2011. A learned Single Judge of this Court, relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in Govindan Kutty Menon v. Shaji [2011(4) KLT 857(SC)], set aside the order passed by the executing court and directed the executing court to proceed with the Execution Petition. The order in CRP No.393 of 2011 was passed after hearing the landlords/judgment debtors.
7. Thereafter, the landlords/judgment debtors raised a contention before the executing court that going by Section 14 of the Act, the court of the Subordinate Judge has no jurisdiction and only the Munsiff has jurisdiction. The landlords also contended that the said question required to be considered as a preliminary point. Since the executing court was proceeding with the Execution Petition, the landlords filed O.P.(RC) No.5 of 2014, for an order directing the executing court to consider the objections raised by the landlords regarding the question of maintainability and to pass an order of stay of all further proceedings.
8. Meanwhile, the executing court proceeded with the Execution Petition. Another objection was raised by the landlords/judgment debtors that the immovable property belonging to them cannot be sold in court auction without there being an order of attachment. The landlords/judgment debtors also raised a contention that the value shown for the item of immovable property sought to be sold is quite less. The executing court passed an order dated 11.2.2014 rejecting the contention raised by the judgment debtors regarding valuation.
The landlords/judgment debtors, thereupon, filed an application for review (E.A.No.106 of 2014) to review the order dated 11.2.2014. The judgment debtors also filed E.A.No.107 of 2014 to stay the execution proceedings. The executing court closed E.A.No.107 of 2014 stating that the sale can be proceeded with and the confirmation will be subjected to the result of E.A.No.106 of 2011. The item of immovable property belonging to the landlords was sold in court auction. Thereupon, they filed an application under Order XXI Rule 90 of the Code of Civil Procedure to set aside the sale (E.A.No.147 of 2014). The landlords/judgment debtors filed O.P.(RC) No.70 of 2014 for issuing a direction to the executing court to hear and dispose of the review petition (E.A.No.106 of 2014) and the application filed by them to set aside the sale under Order XXI Rule 90.
9. Section 14 of the Act is extracted below for the sake of convenience:
“14. Execution of orders: Every order made under Section 11 or Section 12 or Section 13 or Section 19 or Section 33 and every order passed on appeal under Section 18 or on revision under Section 20 shall, after the expiry of the time allowed therein, be executed by the Munsiff or if there are more than one Munsiff, by the Principal Munsiff having original jurisdiction over the area in which the building is situated as if it were a decree passed by him:
Provided that an order passed in execution under this section shall not be subject to an appeal but shall be subject to revision by the Court to which appeals ordinarily lie against the decisions of the said Munsiff.”
10. The learned senior counsel for the petitioners submitted that the order passed by the Rent Control Court shall be executed by the Munsiff having original jurisdiction over the area, in which, the building is situated. The building is situated within the territorial limits of the Munsiff's Court, Parappanangadi. It is submitted that, therefore, the Sub Court, Tirur, has no jurisdiction at all to execute the decree.
11. The argument put forward by the learned senior counsel for the petitioners may, on the first look, appear to be quite attractive. The opening part of Section 14 states about the execution of orders passed under Sections 11, 12, 13, 19 or 33. The provision for the order be executed by the Munsiff relates only to an order under the Sections mentioned in Section 14 of the Rent Control Act. The award in the present case was passed by the Lok Adalat exercising the jurisdiction under the Legal Services Authorities Act. An award can be passed by the Lok Adalat on agreement between the parties. The agreement between the parties need not be confined to the grounds mentioned in Section 11 of the Rent Control Act. The parties can settle their disputes in respect of the whole issue between them in respect of the building, including a dispute with respect to the repayment of the advance amount by the landlord. The Rent Control Court cannot pass an order directing the landlord to repay the advance amount, while dealing with an application under Section 11(3) of the Rent Control Act. However, there is no such restriction for the parties to enter into an agreement with respect to the advance amount also while they settle the matter before the Lok Adalat. The parties having settled all their disputes and differences before the Lok Adalat, it cannot be said that it is an order under Section 11(3) of the Act. If so, the provision in Section 14 of the Act, that the order shall be executed by the Munsiff having original jurisdiction over the area, in which, the building is situated, would not apply at all. On the other hand, Section 21 of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 would apply, which provides that every award of the Lok Adalat shall be deemed to be a decree of the civil court. In the present case, the agreement to repay `3,75,000/- by the landlords to the tenant is a decree coming under Section 21 of the Legal Services Authorities Act. It is not an order under Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. Therefore, Section 14 of the said Act has no application for the purpose of executing the money part of the settlement arrived at between the parties. Since the amount sought to be realised exceeds the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Munsiff's Court, necessarily, the court of the Subordinate Judge alone will have jurisdiction to execute the decree.
12. For the aforesaid reasons, we reject the contention put forward by the petitioners that the Sub Court, Tirur, has no jurisdiction to execute the decree.
13. As regards the contention that the sale of immovable property cannot be effected without a prior order of attachment is equally without any substance. An attachment of immovable property sought to be sold is a step-in-aid in execution. An order of attachment interdicts the judgment debtor from dealing with the attached property. If he does so, Section 64 of the Code of Civil Procedure would apply which provides that where an attachment has been made, any private transfer or delivery of the property attached or of any interest therein and any payment to the judgment debtor of any debt, dividend or other moneys contrary to such attachment, shall be void as against all claims enforceable under the attachment. Attachment is a remedy afforded to the decree holder for his own protection and the protection of the purchaser who may bid in court auction. By the order of attachment, the judgment debtor is put to disadvantage that if he transfers the property, he would be faced with the consequences under Section 64 of the Code of Civil Procedure. An omission to attach the property cannot be taken as a ground of objection by the judgment debtor against the court auction sale. (See Pedda Edla Ram Kishtiah v. Manne Pochiah [AIR 1967 AP 148], Seshagiri Aiyar v. Valambal Ammal and others [AIR 1952 Madras 377] and Haji Rahim Bux and Sons and others v.
Firm Samiullah and Sons [AIR 1963 Allahabad 320]. In Desh Bandhu Gupta v. N.L.Anand and Rajinder Singh [(1994) 1 SCC 131], the Supreme Court held that the purpose of attachment under Rule 54 of Order XX1 CPC is to make the judgment debtor aware that attachment has been effected and that he should not make any transfer or encumber the property thereafter. Sale is not void for non-service of the attachment order, since it is only an irregularity.
14. In Kerala Ceramics Ltd. v. Sebastian (1970 KLT 949), it was held that under Section 51(b) of the Code of Civil Procedure, the court has power to first attach the property and then sell it, or to direct the sale of the property without any attachment. Absence of attachment by itself would not make a sale void.
15. An explanation was added to Rule 90 of Order XXI by the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1976, which provides that the mere absence of, or defect in, attachment of the property sold shall not, by itself, be a ground for setting aside a sale under that Rule. We are of the view that the contention raised by the petitioners that the execution cannot be proceeded with, without there being an attachment of the immovable property is without substance.
16. For the aforesaid reasons, we are of the view that the only relief that can be granted to the petitioners is with respect to prayer (b) made in O.P.(RC) No.70 of 2014 for a direction to the executing court to dispose of the application filed by them under Rule 90 of Order XX1.
Accordingly, we partly allow O.P(RC) No.70 of 2014 and direct the executing court to dispose of the application filed by the petitioners/judgment debtors under Rule 90 of Order XX1 (E.A.No.147 of 2014), after affording an opportunity of being heard to both parties. Rest of the reliefs prayed for in O.P.(RC) No.70 of 2014 are rejected. O.P.(RC) No.5 of 2014 is also dismissed.
Sd/-
K.T.SANKARAN, JUDGE Sd/-
A.MUHAMED MUSTAQUE, JUDGE ln /True copy/ P.A. to Judge