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Uma Kant Tiwari vs Jai Prakash Srivastava And Ors.

High Court Of Judicature at Allahabad|25 February, 2019

JUDGMENT / ORDER

1. Heard the counsel for the parties on the Appeal, Application No. 1458 of 2000 filed by the appellant under Order 41 Rule 27, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as, 'C.P.C.') and the cross-objections filed by respondent Nos. 1 and 2.
2. The present appeal under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as, 'Act, 1988') has been filed by the owner of the vehicle against the judgement and award dated 7.7.2000 passed by the Vth Additional District & Sessions Judge/Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Kanpur Dehat (hereinafter referred to as, 'Tribunal') in Motor Accident Claim Petition No. 157/97, whereby the Tribunal has awarded a compensation of Rs. 50,000/- to the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 (hereinafter referred to as, 'claimants') and held the owner/appellant liable to pay the same. The claimants are the parents of the deceased.
3. Motor Accident Claim Petition No. 157/97 was filed by the claimants seeking a compensation of Rs. 4 lacs for the death of their son due to injuries suffered on 4.6.1997 in an accident caused due to rash and negligent driving of Scooter No. U.P. 78 M-2033 (hereinafter referred to as, 'offending vehicle'). The appellant is the owner of the vehicle which was alleged to be insured with respondent No. 3. It appears from the records of the case that at the relevant time, the appellant was the District Supply Officer. In the petition the driver of the offending vehicle and originally the Insurance Company were not impleaded as defendants and the particulars of the driver of the offending vehicle were also not disclosed in the claim petition. It appears that the Insurance Company-respondent No. 3 was subsequently impleaded as defendant in the claim petition. The claimants are the parents of the deceased and the deceased was 5 years old.
4. The appellant filed his written statement denying the factum of the accident and also stated that, at the time of accident, the vehicle was insured with respondent No. 3 and also provided the details of the insurance policy. In his written statement, the appellant also pleaded that the claim petition was not maintainable because of non-joinder of necessary parties because the Insurance Company, i.e., respondent No. 3 was not impleaded as a defendant in the claim petition. It is noticeable that in his written statement, the appellant did not raise any objection regarding maintainability of the claim petition on the ground that the alleged driver of the offending vehicle had not been impleaded as a defendant in the case. It is also relevant to note that in his written statement the appellant had not stated that, at the time of accident, the vehicle was driven by an authorised person having a valid driving license and therefore the vehicle was being operated in accordance with the policy of insurance. The written statement of the appellant is on record as Annexure No. 2 to the affidavit annexed with the application filed under Order 41 Rule 27 C.P.C.
5. The Insurance Company also filed its written statement denying the factum of accident as alleged by the claimants and also denied that the offending vehicle was insured with it. In its written statement, the Insurance Company also alleged that, at the time of accident, the driver of the offending vehicle did not have a valid driving license. On the said allegations, the Insurance Company denied its liability to pay any compensation to the claimants.
6. On the pleadings of the parties, the Tribunal framed issues regarding the factum of accident and the negligence of the driver of the vehicle in causing the accident and as to whether, at the time of accident, the driver of the vehicle had a valid driving license, the inter se liability of the defendants, i.e., the appellant/owner of the offending vehicle and the Insurance Company, i.e., respondent No. 3 to pay compensation to the claimants as well as the amount of compensation to which the claimants were entitled.
7. In the Tribunal, the claimants filed a copy of the first information report dated 6.6.1997, wherein the respondent No. 1, i.e., the father of the deceased had reported the incident as stated in his claim petition and had also reported that, at the time of accident, the offending vehicle was being driven by one Sanjay Kumar. The records of the investigation made by the police were also filed as evidence in the case. It is relevant to note that the appellant did not appear as a witness in the case and did not file any document to prove his case as pleaded in his written statement or to prove that, at the time of accident, the offending vehicle was driven by a person who held a valid driving license. The claimant-respondent No.1 appeared as P.W. 1 in the Tribunal to prove his case as alleged in the claim petition.
8. In its impugned award dated 7.7.2000, the Tribunal relying on the testimony of the claimant, i.e., respondent No. 1, who appeared as P.W. 1 in the Tribunal, held that the accident resulting in the death of the son of the claimants was caused due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. While deciding the interse liability of the defendants to pay compensation to the claimants, the Tribunal took note of the fact that the appellant, i.e., the owner of the offending vehicle had not filed the copy of the insurance policy or the driving license of the driver of the offending vehicle and, therefore, in the absence of the aforesaid documents, recorded a finding against the appellant and held him liable to pay compensation to the claimants and absolved the respondent no. 3, i.e., the Insurance company from paying the same. The Tribunal, without applying the multiplier method, awarded a compensation of Rs. 50,000/- to the claimants for the death of their son.
9. The main ground stated in the memorandum of appeal challenging the impugned award is that the claim petition was not maintainable because the driver of the offending vehicle was not impleaded as a defendant in the claim petition. The other ground stated in the memorandum of appeal is that the accident resulting in the death of the son of the claimants was caused due to the negligence of the driver of the offending vehicle, therefore, the appellant, i.e., the owner of the offending vehicle was not liable to pay compensation to the claimants. The award has been further challenged on the ground that the Insurance Company, i.e., respondent No. 3, was liable to pay compensation to the claimants as, at the time of the accident, the vehicle was insured with respondent No. 3.
10. It may be noticed that the appellant has not taken any ground in the memorandum of appeal that, at the time of accident, the driver of the offending vehicle had a valid driving license, and therefore, the findings of the Tribunal on the issue regarding the driving license and consequently the award of the Tribunal holding the appellant liable to pay compensation cannot be sustained.
11. Along with the memorandum of appeal, the appellant has filed an Application No. 1458 of 2000 under Order 41 Rule 27 C.P.C. annexing the original as well as photocopies of the insurance policy and the receipts of premium paid by the appellant to the Insurance Company as well as the photocopy of the alleged driving license of one Sanjay Kumar Shukla, i.e., the person who, at the time of the accident, was allegedly driving the offending vehicle. In the affidavit annexed with the application it has been stated that the documents relating to the insurance of the vehicle were handed over by the appellant to his counsel but the counsel did not file them in the Tribunal. There is no averment in the affidavit regarding the driving license and no explanation has been given for not filing the said driving license in the Tribunal itself. The driving license has been annexed as Annexure no. 7 to the affidavit and it has been prayed in the application that the appellant be permitted to file as additional evidence the documents annexed with the affidavit and the same may be admitted and taken on record.
12. The claimant-respondent Nos. 1 and 2 have also filed a cross-objection praying that the award of the Tribunal be modified by increasing the compensation awarded by the Tribunal.
13. As the appeal is pending in this Court since 2000, therefore I have heard the learned counsel for the parties on the Application No. 1458 of 2000 filed under Order 41 Rule 27 C.P.C. as well as on the appeal challenging the award passed by the Tribunal and the cross-objections filed by the claimants. The application, appeal and cross objections are being decided by a common judgement.
14. Challenging the award passed by the Tribunal, the counsel for the appellant has argued that admittedly, Sanjay Kumar was driving the offending vehicle at the time of accident and the said fact would be evident from the first information report lodged by respondent No. 1. It was argued that the said Sanjay Kumar was a necessary party in the case and as he was not impleaded as defendant in the claim petition, therefore, the claim petition was liable to be summarily dismissed and the award of the Tribunal allowing the claim petition was liable to be set aside. It was further argued by the counsel for the appellant that it was evident from the documents annexed with the application filed under Order 41 Rule 27 C.P.C. that at the time of accident, the driver of the offending vehicle had a valid driving license and the vehicle was insured with respondent no. 3 and therefore the Insurance Company, i.e., respondent No. 3 was liable to pay compensation to the claimants and the award of the Tribunal was liable to be accordingly modified. In support of his application filed under Order 41 Rule 27 C.P.C., the counsel for the appellant has reiterated the averments made in the affidavit annexed with the application stating that the appellant had handed over all the documents relating to the insurance of the offending vehicle to his counsel but they were not filed by the counsel in the Tribunal and the appellant should not be made to suffer because of the fault of his counsel. It has been argued that the application filed under Order 41 Rule 27 C.P.C. should be allowed in the interest of justice and the documents filed along with the same should be taken on record and considered while deciding the appeal. It was argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that, for the said reason, the appeal should be allowed by setting aside the award passed by the Tribunal so far as it holds the appellant liable to pay compensation to the claimants and in any case should be modified by holding respondent No. 3, i.e., the Insurance Company liable to pay compensation to the claimants.
15. The counsel for the respondent no. 3-Insurance Company has opposed the appeal and argued that the findings of the Tribunal are based on evidence on record and therefore, not liable to be interfered with in the present appeal. The counsel for respondent no. 3 has also argued that the application filed by the appellant under Order 41 Rule 27 C.P.C. was not maintainable and is liable to be dismissed as such.
16. Rebutting the arguments of learned counsel for the appellant, learned counsel for the claimants has argued that the negligence of the driver of the offending vehicle in causing the accident was proved in the courts below and therefore the claimants cannot be denied compensation under Section 166 of the Act, 1988. It was argued that the driver was not a necessary party in the claim petition and therefore the claim petition was not liable to be dismissed because of non-joinder of necessary parties. It was further argued by the counsel for the claimants that the appellant had not raised any objections in the Tribunal regarding the maintainability of the claim petition because of non-impleadment of the driver and can not be permitted to raise such objections for the first time in appeal and the award of the Tribunal can not be set aside in appeal on the ground of non-impleadement of the driver in the claim petition. In support of his cross-objections, the counsel for the claimants has argued that the Tribunal had erred in determining the compensation without applying the multiplier method and awarding a lump-sum compensation of Rs. 50,000/- to the claimants. It has been argued by the counsel for the appellants that the claimants are entitled to a higher compensation quantified by applying the multiplier method for assessing the pecuniary damages and also for compensation under the conventional heads.
17. I have considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties.
18. Application No. 1458 of 2000 filed under Order 41 Rule 27 C.P.C. has been filed by the appellant bringing on record the photo copy of the driving license and the documents relating to the insurance of the offending vehicle. It is relevant to note that while the original as well as photo-copies of the documents relating to the insurance of the vehicle have been annexed with the affidavit filed in support of the application but the original copy of the driving license has not been annexed with the affidavit and only the photo copy of the driving license has been annexed as Annexure No. 7 to the affidavit. In the affidavit filed in support of his application, the appellant has not stated the reasons for not filing the driving license in the Tribunal itself. Further, there is no averment in the affidavit explaining as to how the appellant came in possession of the said copy of the license and there is no statement that the copy of the license annexed as Annexure No. 7 is the true copy of the driving license. In his affidavit, the appellant has not stated that during the proceedings in the claim petition the Tribunal had refused to admit, as evidence, the driving license or that the appellant did not know that the driver of the vehicle held a valid driving license or the appellant could not produce it in the Tribunal despite exercising due diligence. A reading of the affidavit shows that so far as the driving license is concerned, the appellant has not stated any fact to include his case under Order 41 Rule 27 (1) (a) and (aa) C.P.C. In his appeal, the appellant has not challenged the findings of the Tribunal regarding the driving license of the driver of the offending vehicle and has not raised any ground in the memorandum of appeal that the award of the Tribunal holding the appellant liable to pay compensation and absolving the Insurance company from paying the same is liable to be set aside because, at the time of the accident, the driver of the vehicle held a valid driving license. In his written statement filed in the Tribunal, the appellant did not state that, at the time of the accident, the driver of the vehicle held a valid driving license and therefore the Insurance company was liable to pay compensation to the claimant because at the relevant time there was no violation of any condition of the insurance policy. The appellant has not filed any application praying to suitably amend his written statement. Thus, the driving license is not necessary to enable this Court to pronounce judgement in the appeal and the application is not covered by Order 41 Rule 27 (b) C.P.C. The application, so far as it is in regard to admitting the photo copy of the driving license as additional evidence is liable to be rejected.
19. In paragraph Nos. 4 and 7 of the affidavit, the appellant has explained his failure in filing the policy documents relating to the offending vehicle in the Tribunal itself. The reasons stated in the affidavit have been referred to before. No opinion is required to be expressed on the reliability of the averments made in the affidavit and the bona-fides of the appellant as well as whether the reasons stated in the affidavit are sufficient to admit additional evidence at the appellate stage. In his written statement the appellant had asserted that the vehicle was insured at the time of accident and has also given the details of the insurance policy. The policy documents in compensation cases under the Act, 1988 are required to prove the assertion of the owner of the vehicle that the vehicle was insured at the time of accident. The legality and correctness of the findings of the Tribunal on the issue as to whether the vehicle was insured at the time of accident would be considered later and in the light of assertion of the appellant in his written statement. At this stage it would be sufficient to record that, for reasons which would be stated while considering the legality of the findings of the Tribunal on the said issue, the policy documents are not necessary for a decision of the present appeal. Thus the application under Order 41 Rule 27 C.P.C. so far as it relates to the policy documents is also liable to be rejected.
20. For the aforesaid reasons, the Application No. 1458 of 2000 filed by the appellant under Order 41 Rule 27 C.P.C. is rejected.
21. So far as the merits of the appeal challenging the award of the Tribunal are concerned, it is relevant to note that the findings of the Tribunal regarding the negligence of the driver in causing the accident have not been challenged by the appellant in the memorandum of appeal. Even during the course of argument, learned counsel for the appellant did not raise any argument regarding the findings of the Tribunal on the issue of negligence of the driver of the offending vehicle in causing the accident. Apart from the aforesaid, the accident as alleged by the claimants in their claim petition was proved by respondent No. 1, who testified in the Tribunal as P.W. 1. The appellant did not participate in the proceedings before the Tribunal and did not produce the driver of the vehicle as a witness to prove his case that no accident as alleged by the claimants took place. Thus, the findings of the Tribunal on the issue regarding the factum of accident and the negligence of the driver in causing the accident as alleged by the claimants in their claim petition are upheld.
22. It was argued by the counsel for the appellant that the claim petition was not maintainable due to non-joinder of necessary parties as the driver of the offending vehicle was a necessary party but had not been impleaded as a defendant in the claim petition and, therefore, the award passed by the Tribunal was liable to be set aside.
23. The argument of the counsel for the appellant on the maintainability of the claim petition because of non-impleadment of the driver of the vehicle as a defendant is not acceptable in view of the judgement of the Supreme Court in Machindranath Kernath Kasar Vs. D.S. Mylarappa, AIR 2008 SC 2545, wherein it was held that in compensation cases under the Act, 1988 the driver of the vehicle was not a necessary party in the sense that in his absence, the entire proceeding would not be vitiated as the owner of the vehicle was a party in his capacity as a joint tort feaser. The observations of the Supreme Court in paragraph No. 18 of the judgement are relevant for the present appeal and are reproduced below:-
"18. The Karnataka Rules, therefore, were required to be construed having regard to the appropriate interpretative principles applicable thereto. Common law principles were therefore required to be kept in mind. In this case, we are not required to lay down a law that even in absence of any rule, impleadment of the driver would be imperative.
It is however, of some interest to note the provisions of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act. In terms of this aforementioned provision, the Tribunal is mandatorily required to specify the amount which shall be paid by the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident or by or any of them. As it is imperative on the part of the Tribunal to specify the amount payable inter alia by the driver of the vehicle, a fortiori he should be impleaded as a party in the proceeding. He may not, however, be a necessary party in the sense that in his absence, the entire proceeding shall not be vitiated as the owner of the vehicle was a party in his capacity as a joint tort feaser."
(Emphasis supplied)
24. It is thus held that the claim petition was not liable to be dismissed because of not impleading the driver as a defendant. While considering the effect of non-impleadment of the driver as a defendant in the claim petition this Court has also taken notice of the fact that in his written statement, the appellant had not pleaded that at the time of accident the vehicle was driven by an unauthorised person and therefore the appellant was not liable for the tortious acts of the driver. In his written statement the appellant did not provide the particulars of the driver and did not raise any objections regarding the maintainability of the claim petition because of non-impleadment of the driver of the vehicle.
25. On the issue as to whether, at the time of accident, the offending vehicle was insured with respondent no. 3 the Tribunal has recorded a finding against the appellant/owner because of the failure of the appellant to file the policy documents. The Tribunal held that in his written statement the appellant had not stated the period during which the insurance policy was effective and had also not given the date when the policy was issued as well as the Branch which issued it. The reasoning of the Tribunal to justify its finding on the issue can not be sustained. In his written statement, the appellant had asserted that on 4.6.1997, i.e., at the time of accident the offending vehicle was insured with respondent No. 3 and had also given the particulars of the insurance policy. In paragraph No. 4 of his written statement the appellant had disclosed the policy number. The said disclosures were sufficient for the Insurance company to verify the correctness of the averments made by the appellant in his written statement. After the appellant provided the details of the insurance policy in his written statement, the burden was on the Insurance Company to plead and prove that the details of the insurance policy given in the written statement were not correct and the policy, the details of which had been disclosed in the written statement, either did not relate to the offending vehicle or the said policy was not issued to the appellant or that the said policy was not operative at the time of accident. It is true that in his written statement, the appellant did not specifically state the date on which the policy was issued or the period during which the said policy was effective and had also not named the branch which issued the policy. But the said facts were not material after the appellant had disclosed the policy number in his written statement and had also categorically stated that on 4.6.1997, i.e., on the date of accident, the vehicle was insured with respondent no. 3. In case the period of the policy, the date on which the said policy was issued by respondent no. 3 and the branch which issued the said policy were material facts to enable the Insurance company to raise an effective defence denying its liability, the Insurance company could have sought the details from the appellant through an appropriate application filed in the Tribunal. No such steps were taken by the Insurance company. Because of the failure of the Insurance company to take any such steps or to challenge the correctness of the disclosures made by the appellant in his written statement, the assertions made by the appellant in his written statement stood unrebutted by the Insurance company and there was no requirement for the appellant to file the policy documents to prove his assertion that the vehicle was insured with respondent No. 3. Consequently, the findings of the Tribunal on the issue as to whether, at the time of accident, the offending vehicle was insured with respondent no. 3 is liable to be set aside and is hereby set aside and it is held that on 4.6.1997, Scooter No. U.P.78/M 2033 owned by the appellant was insured with respondent no. 3, i.e., United India Insurance Company Ltd., Kanpur.
26. The findings recorded above on the issue as to whether the vehicle was insured shows that the policy documents are not necessary for a decision of the present appeal also.
27. However, merely because, at the time of accident, the vehicle was duly insured with respondent no. 3 would not be sufficient to hold the respondent no. 3, i.e., the Insurance Company liable to pay compensation and indemnify the appellant. In order to avoid his liability to pay compensation to the claimants and shift the said responsibility on respondent no.3, i.e., the Insurance company, the appellant had to plead and prove that the vehicle was not only duly insured with respondent no. 3 but was being driven by an authorised person holding a valid driving license. Without pleading the aforesaid fact in his written statement and without producing any evidence to prove it, the owner of the vehicle (the appellant in the present case) can not be absolved of his liability to pay compensation and the responsibility can not be fastened on the Insurance company. The Insurance company can be held liable only if such foundational facts are pleaded and proved by the owner of the offending vehicle [See Pappu and others Vs. Vinod Kumar Lamba and others (2018) 3 SCC 208 (Paragraph no.13)].
28. In his written statement the appellant had not stated that at the time of accident the vehicle was being driven by an authorised person having a valid driving license. The details of the driving license of the person driving the offending vehicle had also not been disclosed by the appellant in his written statement. The written statement is conspicuously silent regarding any reference to the driver of the vehicle. In the claim petition the Tribunal framed an issue as to whether at the time of accident the driver of the vehicle held a valid driving license. The appellant did not file any evidence in the Tribunal to prove that the driver of the vehicle held a valid driving license despite issue to that effect having been framed by the Tribunal. In the absence of any such evidence the Tribunal decided the issue against the appellant. In the present appeal, the appellant has filed an application under Order 41 Rule 27 C.P.C. whereby he has sought to file, as additional evidence, the photo copy of the alleged driving license of the driver of the vehicle. It has been held earlier that the application is liable to be rejected. Thus, there is no evidence to hold that at the time of accident the driver of the vehicle had a valid driving license. Further, in the memorandum of appeal the appellant has not raised any ground challenging the findings of the Tribunal on the issue relating to driving license. For the aforesaid reasons the findings of the Tribunal that the appellant had not been able to prove that, at the time of the accident, the driver of the offending vehicle had a valid driving license cannot be faulted and the findings of the Tribunal on the said issue are affirmed. For the said reason, it is also held that the appellant cannot be absolved of his liability to pay compensation to the appellants and the said liability cannot be fastened on the Insurance company, i.e., the respondent no.3.
29. For all the aforesaid reasons the appeal lacks merit and is liable to be dismissed.
30. So far as the cross-objections filed by the claimants are concerned, a reading of the award passed by the Tribunal shows that the Tribunal has computed the compensation payable to the claimants without applying the multiplier method. The aforesaid approach of the Tribunal is contrary to law as laid down by the Supreme Court in General Manager, Kerala State Road Transport Corporation Vs. Susamma Thomas (Mrs) & Ors. 1994 (2) SCC 176, wherein the Supreme Court held that the proper method to compute compensation was the multiplier method as it introduces consistency, uniformity and an element of predictability in assessment of compensation. Thus, the compensation, in the present case, had also to be assessed by applying the multiplier method and after determining the multiplicand in the case.
31. In Kishan Gopal & Anr. Vs. Lala & Ors. 2014 (1) SCC 244, the Supreme Court observed that in compensation cases under the Act, 1988 relating to the death of children, it would be just and reasonable to assess compensation on the basis of a notional income of Rs.30,000/- per annum and after applying a multiplier of 15. The aforesaid judgment of the Supreme Court was also followed by a Division Bench of this Court in its judgment and order dated 14.2.2017 passed in First Appeal From Order No. 1580 of 1993 (Nagma Bano vs Harish Chandar Gupta & 3 Others). Thus, in the present case, the pecuniary damages payable to the claimants due to the death of their son in the accident had to be calculated according to the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Kishan Gopal (supra) and followed by the Division Bench of this Court in Nagma Bano (supra). For the aforesaid reasons, the claimants are entitled to a compensation of Rs. 4,50,000/- as pecuniary damages for the death of their son in the accident.
32. Apart from the pecuniary damages, the claimants are also entitled to compensation under the conventional heads in accordance with the judgments of the Supreme Court in National Insurance Company Ltd. Vs. Pranay Sethi & Ors. (2017) 16 SCC 680 read with Magma General Insurance Company Ltd. Vs. Nanu Ram 2018 SCC OnLine SC 1546. In Pranay Sethi (supra), the Supreme Court held that Rs. 40,000/- would be a reasonable compensation for loss of consortium. Subsequently in Magma General (supra), the Supreme Court, after referring to Pranay Sethi (supra), held that parents were entitled to loss of Filial Consortium where they had lost their minor child, or unmarried son or daughter in motor vehicles accident under the Act, 1988. In Magma General (supra), the Supreme Court awarded a compensation of Rs. 40,000/- each for loss of Filial Consortium to the claimants. From a reading of Paragraph nos. 8.7 and 9 of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Magma General (supra), it can be concluded that the compensation of Rs. 40,000/- fixed by the Supreme Court in Pranay Sethi (supra) for loss of consortium is to be awarded separately to each of those claimants who are entitled to compensation for loss of Filial Consortium. Further, in Magma General (supra), the Supreme Court treated loss of love and affection as a category distinct from loss of consortium and awarded a compensation for loss of love and affection in addition to compensation for loss of consortium. The Supreme Court upheld the judgment of the High Court awarding Rs. 1,00,000/- as compensation for loss of love and affection with Rs. 50,000/- to each of the claimants.
33. Apart from compensation for loss of filial consortium and for loss of love and affection, the claimants are also entitled to a compensation of Rs. 15,000/- for loss of estate and Rs. 15,000/- for funeral expenses.
34. It is evident that the compensation awarded by the Tribunal to the claimants is much less than what they are entitled to under the law.
35. The compensation payable to the claimants is computed as follows:-
38. The respondent no. 3 is directed to deposit the balance amount of compensation with the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Kanpur Dehat within a period of three months from today. The amount so deposited by respondent no. 3 under the order of this Court shall in turn be deposited by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Kanpur Dehat in the highest interest bearing fixed deposit schemes either of the post office or of any nationalized bank. The receipts of the fixed deposits shall be handed over to the claimants who shall be entitled to withdraw the maturity amount on the expiry of the period of fixed deposits. The maturity amount shall be credited by the bank/post office in any savings account held singly by the claimants. The concerned bank or post office shall not permit any loan or advance against the fixed deposits made in favour of the claimants. The Tribunal, while depositing the amount in the fixed deposit schemes, shall communicate the directions issued by this Court to the concerned bank/post office.
39. The respondent no. 3 is entitled to recover from the appellant-owner, the compensation amount paid by it to the claimants in accordance with law. The Tribunal shall expeditiously dispose of the proceedings which would be instituted by the respondent No. 3 claiming reimbursement from the appellant owner the amount paid by it to the claimants.
40. With the aforesaid directions and observations the Application No. 1458 of 2000 filed under Order 41 Rule 27 C.P.C. and the Appeal are dismissed. The cross-objections filed by the claimants-respondent nos. 1 and 2 is allowed. The award dated 7.7.2000 passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Kanpur Dehat in Motor Accident Claim Petition No. 157/97 is modified to the extent indicated above.
Order Date :- 25.2.2019 Anurag/-
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Title

Uma Kant Tiwari vs Jai Prakash Srivastava And Ors.

Court

High Court Of Judicature at Allahabad

JudgmentDate
25 February, 2019
Judges
  • Salil Kumar Rai