JUDGMENT M. Katju, J.
1. By means of this petition, the petitioner has prayed for a mandamus directing the respondents to give benefit of disability claim of L.I.C. policy.
2. We have heard learned counsel for the parties.
3. The petitioner had taken two policies of L.I.C. being policy Nos. 58545803 and 58545804 vide Annexure-1 to the writ petition. While going on a scooter, he met with an accident with a truck on 17.2.1990 due to which his right leg had to be amputated above the knee as is evident from Annexure-4 to the writ petition. Also, his right hand was paralysed in the same accident, as stated in para 4 of the petition and as is evident from Annexure-4. These facts have not been disputed by the respondents.
4. However, the L.I.C. refused to make payment to the petitioner on the ground that the disability of the petitioner is not total, vide Annexure-11.
5. Under the Insurance Policy in para 10, it is stated that the L.I.C. will make payment to the assured in case of accident which results in death or permanent disability. The expression permanent disability has been defined to mean :
"The disability above referred to must be disability which is the result of an accident and must be total and permanent and such that there is neither then nor at any time thereafter any work, occupation or profession that the Life Assured can ever sufficiently do or follow to earn or obtain any wages, compensation or profit. Accidental injuries which independently of all other causes and within ninety days from the happening of such accident, result in the irrecoverable loss of the entire sight of both eyes or in the amputation of both hands at or above the wrist, or in the amputation of both feet at or above ankles, or in the amputation of one hand at or above the wrist and one foot at or above the ankle shall also be deemed to constitute such disability."
The above definition indicates that if the accident results in amputation of one hand and one foot, it will be deemed to be a permanent disability.
6. Learned counsel for the L.I.C. submitted that the petitioner's hand was not amputated but was only paralysed, and hence the petitioner was not entitled to the claim. We are unable to accept this contention. In our opinion, a purposive and not literal interpretation should be given to the words, "amputation of one hand at or above the wrist".
7. In this connection, tt may be mentioned that Maxwell in his 'Interpretation of Statutes' gives an Instance of a law in England which stated "No one shall lay hands on a priest". Maxwell says that a literal Interpretation of this expression will lead to the absurd result that while a person cannot strike a priest with his hands, he can attack a priest with a pistol or a sword. Hence the correct interpretation of the Law should be that no one can commit violence on a priest.
8. In our opinion, the L.I.C. should not take a rigid interpretation in the matter. After all, the L.l.C. scheme is a beneficial measure and hence a liberal interpretation should be given to a claim in the policy. If a person's hand is totally paralysed, it is as bad as losing the hand.
9. In this connection, it may be mentioned that, as pointed out by Lord Denning in Notham v. Bamet Council, (1978) 1 WLR 220. the literal Interpretation is now completely out of date and has been replaced by the purposive approach referred to by Lord Diplock in Kommins Ballrooms Co. v. Zenith investments Ltd., (1971) AC 850 (881). vide Lord Denning's "The Discipline of Law". Chapter II.
10. In Workmen of American Express International Banking Corporation v. Management. AIR 1986 SC 458. the Supreme Court observed :
"The principles of statutory construction are well-settled. Words occurring in statutes of liberal import such as social welfare legislation and Human Right's legislation are not to be put in procrustean beds or shrunk to Llliputlan dimensions. In construing these legislations the imposture of literal construction must be avoided and the prodigality of its misapplication must be recognised and reduced. Judges ought to be more concerned with the 'colour', the 'content' and the 'context' of such statutes. We have borrowed the words from Lord Wilberforce's opinion in Prenn v. Simmonds. 1971 (3) All ER 237. In the same opinion Lord Wilberforce pointed out that law is not to be left behind in some island of literal Interpretation but is to enquire beyond the language, unisolated from the matrix of facts in which they are set ; the law is not to be interpreted purely on internal linguistic considerations. In one of the cases cited before us. that is, Surendra Kumar Verma v. Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, we had occasion to say," Semantic luxuries are misplaced in the interpretation of 'bread and butter' statutes. Welfare statutes must, of necessity, receive a broad Interpretation. Where legislation is designed to give relief against certain kinds of mischief, the Court is not to make Inroads by making etymological excursions."
11. Similarly, in Hindustan Lever Ltd. v. Ashok Vishnu Kate. 1995 (6) SCC 326. the Supreme Court said :
"Francis Bennton in his Statutory Interpretation Second Edn.. has dealt with the Functional Construction Rule in Part XV of his book. The nature of purposive construction is dealt with in Part XX at page 659 thus :
"A purposive construction of an enactment is one which gives effect to the legislative purpose by :
(a) following the literal meaning of the enactment where that meaning is in accordance with the legislative purpose (in this Code called a purposive-and-literal construction), or,
(b) applying a strained meaning where the literal meaning is not in accordance with the legislative purpose (in the Code called a purposive-and-strained construction)."
At p. 661 of the same book, the author has considered the topic of "Purposive Construction" in contrast with literal construction. The learned author has observed as under :
"Contrast with literal construction--Although the term 'purposive construction' is not new, its entry into fashion betokens a swing by the appellate courts away from literal construction. Lord Diplock said in 1975 : 'If one looks back to the actual decisions of the [House of Lords) on questions of statutory construction over the last 30 years one cannot fail to be struck by the evidence of a trend away from the purely literal towards the purposive construction of statutory provisions'. The matter was summed up by Lord Diplock in this way :
..... I am not reluctant to adopt a purposive construction where to apply the literal meaning of the legislative language used would lead to results which would clearly defeat the purposes of the Act. But in doing so the task on which a Court of justice is engaged remains one of construction, even where this involves reading into the Act words which are not expressly included in it."
The above decisions thus clearly show that in our country also, now the purposive approach is being preferred to the literal approach in construction.
12. We may also consider the matter from the point of view of our traditional principles of interpretation. The great Sanskrit grammarian Nagesh Bhatt in his book "Param Laghu Manjusha" has said that a word or phrase can have three meanings :
(i) Abhidha, te., literal meaning ;
(ii) Lakshana, te., Indicative meaning, or
(iii) Vyanjana, te., the suggestive 'or figurative' meaning. Usually the literal meaning is followed, but some times the indicative or suggestive meanings are adopted. As regards the indicative meaning (Lakshana). the oft-quoted example is ^^xaxk;ke~ ?kks"k%**-, i.e., "I live on the Ganges". This sentence cannot be literally interpreted because no one can live on the surface of the Ganges river. Hence it has to be interpreted to mean "I live on the bank of the Ganges river".
As regards the third meaning Vyanjana, the oft-quoted example is ^^xrks vLredZ%** which means "The sun has set". Here the real meaning has in fact nothing to do with the sun or its setting, but it really means "light the lamp" or "let us go home" (because the sun has set).
13. In the present case, the literal meaning has not to be given but the indicative meaning (Lakshana) has to be adopted. In this connection, there is the oft-quoted sentence : ^^dkdsH;ks nks/k j{krke~** which means "protect the curd from crows". This sentence has not to be literally Interpreted because such. literal interpretation would Imply that one should only protect curd from the crows but not from dogs, cats, etc.. which would be an absurdity. The Intention in the sentence was that the curd was to be protected from any animal which may cause damage or which may eat it (See in this connection 'Kavya Prakash' of Mammat and 'Sahitya Darpan' by Vishwanath as well as 'Shloka Vartik' by Kumarlla Bhatta).
14. Similarly, in the present case, amputation of the' hand should be interpreted to mean the hand becoming useless "whether by amputation. paralysis or otherwise). Amputation of the hand is only illustrative, and not exhaustive, of the intent.
15. In view of the above discussion, in our opinion, a purposive interpretation should be given to the definition of permanent disability and not a literal interpretation. The Intention has to be seen and the intention clearly was that if the hand becomes totally useless due to any reason, it will amount to amputation of the hand.
16. In view of the above, this petition is allowed. A mandamus is Issued to the respondents to give benefit of disability claim of L.I.C. policies to the petitioner within two months of production of a certified copy of this order before the respondent No. 3 along with Interest at the rate of 12% from the date of the accident till the date of payment.