Heard counsel for the parties.
This writ petition arises out of proceedings for allotment of chaks and it is directed against the order dated 16.9.1996 passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation, Gorakhpur (the DDC) in Revision No. 2991; Jaldhar Vs. Mewa Lal and Revision No. 2483 Deep Vs. Om Prakash and others decided by a common judgment.
Sri AB Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner has assailed this order primarily on two grounds.
The first ground taken is that the revisions were time barred. The DDC has entertained the revisions and passed orders effecting the chak of the petitioners without condoning the delay in filing the revisions. He submits that the DDC was not competent to enter into merits of the revisions till such time he has condoned the delay.
The second submission made by the counsel for the petitioner is that the petitioners were not impleaded as party in the revisions before the DDC and, therefore, the order impugned is ex parte against them and is liable to be set aside on this ground alone. In support of his contention, he has referred the memo of revision which is filed as Annexure-4 to this writ petition. A perusal of the same shows that the petitioners are not party thereto.
I have heard Sri AP Tiwari, who appears for Mewa Lal (Respondent no. 2). Sri Tiwari has tried to support the impugned order while making a statement that he is not aggrieved in any way by the impugned order and is not even effected by it. He has also placed reliance upon the order of the Settlement Officer of Consolidation, Gorakhpur wherein also his statement has been recorded that his chak has not been effected at any stage. In view of the statement so made, there is no necessity either to hear the learned counsel for respondent no. 2 or to consider the submissions made by him.
Sri Tiwari at this stage has submitted that he is forced to make his submission for the reason that he is impleaded in the writ petition as respondent no. 2. Be that as it may only because an unnecessary party have been impleaded in the writ petition, the same does not give a right to such party to address the court unless and until he or she is effected by the order either way and therefore entitled to either assail or defend the same. Admittedly, it is not the case here.
It would be appropriate to first deal with the second submission made by the counsel for the petitioner. Since the contention of the petitioner is that the order is ex parte, normally it would have been a fit case for the petitioner to avail alternative remedy by way of a restoration application. However, since the writ petiiton is pending since 16 years, it would not be appropraite to relegate the petitioners to avail the alternative remedy that may have been available to them at the time of filing of the writ petition. Since the memo of revision clearly shows that the petitioners were not party therein, it is safe to say that the submission of the counsel for the petitioner that order is ex parte, against his client is liable to be accepted.
Even on the other pont, the DDC has entertained the revisions and allowed them partly without condoning the delay in filing them. The impugned order is silent onthe question of delay. It is settled law that a court is entitled to enter into the merits of a revision filed belatedly only after condoning the delay. Since there is nothing on record to show that the delay was actually condoned, the impugned order cannot be sustained and is liable to be set aside.
I accordingly, allow this writ petition and set aside the order dated 16.9.1996 and remand the matter to the DDC to pass a fresh order in accordance with law after hearing all concerned parties as expeditiously as possible.
Order Date :- 5.8.2014 SKS