JUDGMENT M. Katju, J.
1. This writ petition has been filed for a writ of certiorari to quash the impugned order dated 11.1.2003, passed by the respondent No. 1, Chairman and Managing Director, Indian Overseas Bank Ltd. (Annexure-10 to the petition). Petitioner has also prayed for a mandamus directing the respondents to accept the petitioner's option/ application for I.O.B. Officers/ Employees Voluntary Retirement Scheme, 2000.
2. Heard learned counsel for the parties.
3. The petitioner is presently working as Chief Manager (Scale-IV) in Indian Overseas Bank, Civil Lines, Branch, Allahabad. The date of birth of the petitioner is 1.7.1949. Thus, he has completed over 53 years of age. The petitioner joined the service of the bank on 26.10.1970 and had been working as Chief Manager (Scale-IV) since 1998.
4. In para 4 of the petition. It is stated that the petitioner's service as Chief Manager (Scale-IV) has been appreciated by his superior authorities in view of his sincerity and honesty throughout. In para 6 it is alleged that in the year 2000, the bank introduced the scheme called Indian Overseas Bank Officers/ Employees Voluntary Retirement Scheme, 2000 (hereinafter referred to as the scheme). The said scheme was floated on 2.12.2000, and it was to remain valid for a period of 5 years. The officers/employees of the bank were required to submit an application (for which proforma has been given in the scheme) within the period 15.12.2000 to 19.1.2001. The object of scheme is mentioned in paragraph 7 of the writ petition which states :
"A scheme to adopt measures to have optimum human resources at various levels in keeping with the business strategies, skill profile to achieve balanced age and requirement of the bank."
5. Under the scheme those who have completed 15 years permanent service or 40 years of the age and do not have the disqualification mentioned in para 4.2 of the scheme were eligible. The petitioner has alleged that he has completed much more than 40 years of age and his length of service is about 30 years and he does not have the disqualification as mentioned in para 4.2 of the scheme. True copy of the scheme is Annexure-1 to the petition. The petitioner submitted his application on 15.12.2000, opting for the V.R.S. scheme vide Annexure-2 to the petition.
6. In para 11 of the petition it is stated that on 21.2.2001, the respondent No. 2, under instruction from respondent No. 1, passed an order informing the petitioner that his application has been rejected. True copy of the order dated 21.2.2001 is Annexure-3 to the petition. This order states that the competent authority has decided not to accept the petitioner's application, considering the business/organizational requirements and administrative exigencies of the bank.
7. The petitioner filed a Writ Petition No. 41677 of 2001 challenging the order dated 21.2.2001. This Court quashed the order dated 21.2.2001 vide Annexure-6 to the petition. In that judgment this Court held that the bank has acted arbitrarily in the petitioner's case and had rejected his application without giving good reasons. Hence, the impugned order dated 21.2.2001, was quashed and the bank was directed to reconsider the matter in the light of the observations made in the judgment and decide the petitioner's application afresh within six weeks from the date of production of a certified copy of the order. This Court held that Article 14 of the Constitution requires that there should be no arbitrariness or discrimination and there must be some clear cut objective criteria as to whose application will be accepted and whose application will be rejected. In paragraph 6 of the supplementary counter-affidavit in that case it was stated that it was purely in the discretion of the bank as to whose application under V.R.S. will be accepted and whose will not. This was held to be arbitrary as it could give rise to pick and choose particularly since even applications of some officers/employees against whom disciplinary proceedings were pending or contemplated had been accepted. The petitioner has alleged that he was fully eligible for grant of the V.R.S. benefit and rejection of his application was illegal. There was no unfettered discretion in the matter and the petitioner was being penalized for his excellent work. It is alleged that the applications of Smt. Rekha Thapar, Senior Manager, Dehradun Branch. Sri L.S. Beri, Deputy Chief Officer, Regional Officer, Lucknow, R. S. Singh, Senior Manager, Lucknow, main branch of the bank etc., had been accepted although disciplinary proceedings against them were pending. Hence, there was pick and choose. It is alleged that the bank is violating Clause 4.2 of the V.R.S. scheme by granting V.R.S. to the persons who were disqualified while not granting it to the petitioner who was fully eligible. The name of many persons whose applications have been accepted although they were disqualified under Clause 4.2 of the scheme are mentioned in para 13 of the writ petition. The names of as many as 13 officers/employees have been mentioned in the said paragraph who were not eligible.
8. It is alleged in para 18 of the petition that during the pendency of Writ Petition No. 41677 of 2001 the petitioner had been victimized by transferring him from Allahabad to Chennai vide order dated 15.11.2001. However, the petitioner filed Writ Petition No. 41678 of 2001 and this Court stayed the order dated 15.11.2001, but despite the High Court's orders it is alleged that the bank continued to harass the petitioner. The petitioner was made subordinate to an officer who is 3 years junior to the petitioner and the petitioner's designation was changed from Chief Manager to Officer on special duty.
9. By the impugned order dated 11.1.2003, the petitioner's application for V.R.S. has again been rejected vide Annexure-10 to the petition. In para 20 it is stated that all officers of scale V and VI were granted V.R.S. with effect from 28.2.2001. One Smt. Jailaxmi N., Senior Officer in scale VI was granted V.R.S. in May, 2001.
10. In the impugned order dated 11.1.2003, it is stated that the petitioner's representation dated 7.12.2002 and copy of the High Court's order dated 27.11.2002 were placed before a committee consisting of the Chairman and Managing Director, Executive Director and General Manager (Personnel) as constituted by the Board in its meeting held on 16.2.2001 for consideration. It is alleged therein that the committee perused the entire record of the petitioner. It is further stated that the applicant is an Agricultural Engineering Graduate and was appointed as a clerk in the bank on 26.10.1970. In view of his sincerity and hard work he was promoted as officer in Junior Management Grade Scale 1 on 1.6.1975. Since his performance in Junior Management Grade Scale 1 was exemplary, the bank decided to utilise his services abroad and posted him to Hong Kong Branch. Normally the bank provides overseas assignment to Middle Management Grade Officers in Scale II and above, but in the petitioner's case the bank provided him overseas assignment in view of his dedicated work and educational background even though he was only an officer in Junior Management Grade Scale I. He was promoted to Middle Management Grade Scale II on 1.7.1982, while he was serving abroad. After completing foreign assignment for a term, he was posted to Lucknow in August, 1982 and his services were utilized as Branch Manager at Varanasi Cantt. and Lucknow Branches. While he was working at Lucknow, he was able to canvass a good number of deposit accounts and provide satisfactory customer service, which earned the appreciation from the then Zonal Manager based on his rich experience in Lucknow city, the bank promoted him as Senior Manager at Kankhal Branch, and the management selected Kankhal Branch as the best Branch of the zone during his tenure. His services were utilized not only in core banking but also in specialized areas like Foreign Exchange. Overseas Credit etc. and he was also having a track record of unblemished services. He has scored good ratings in all confidential reports. He has got good exposure including foreign postings.
11. In the same order it has also been observed that the petitioner has a lot of potential and the bank would not like to lose the benefit of his services. Keeping in view his past record, specialized skill and expertise, it was opined by the committee that his service was required for development of the bank and hence it was resolved not to accept his application under the V.R.S. scheme.
12. It is stated in para 21 of the petition that the petitioner was given promotion to Senior Manager Grade Scale IV in 1998 after 6 years, while the other Identically situated officers in Scale III were promoted as Senior Manager Grade Scale-IV within 4 years, i.e., in the year 1996. Also, identically situated Scale-IV officers were promoted in Scale-V in 2001, while the petitioner was not given that promotion, and hence there was discrimination against the petitioner. However, in the impugned order a wrong impression has been created that the petitioner was given promotion out of turn.
13. It is alleged in para 22 of the petition that in the Impugned order it has also been falsely mentioned that the petitioner's services were utilized in specialized areas like Foreign Exchange and Overseas Credit, etc. It is alleged in para 24 that there is discrimination against the petitioner as the persons who were not eligible had been given benefit of the V.RS. scheme. Officers/Employees against whom disciplinary proceedings were pending or contemplated have been given the benefit of V.R.S. scheme. The impugned order does not mention anything about all this, and hence it is arbitrary.
14. It is alleged in para 29 that the V.R.S. scheme does not mention that those who are working honestly and sincerely can be denied the benefit of the V.R.S. scheme. In para 30 it is alleged that those who are disqualified have been given the benefit of the V.R.S. scheme but those who are excellent have been denied the benefit. This is clear discrimination and arbitrariness, and a pick and choose policy has been adopted. It is alleged in para 32 that under the scheme only the competent authority can decide the application for grant of V.R.S. scheme but in this case the matter has been delegated to a committee and hence it is illegal. It is alleged in para 38 that the petitioner fulfilled all the requisite eligibility to get the benefit of the V.R.S. scheme and he does not possess the disqualification mentioned in Clause 4.2. The petitioner has alleged in para 44 that due to ill health, family circumstances and his desire to spend his remaining life in religious and charitable work, his application should have been accepted.
15. A counter-affidavit has been filed by the respondents and we have perused the same.
16. In paragraph 2 of the same it is alleged that the competent authority has absolute discretion either to accept or to reject the application, and hence no right of the petitioner has been infringed. It is alleged in para 8 that all the applications under V.R.S. scheme had been considered and suitable orders had been passed by the bank. In para 11 it is stated that the petitioner has not been victimized. He is useful to the bank as he acquired knowledge in various fields and hence, it was decided by the competent authority to retain him in bank service and utilize his services for the development of the bank. In para 17 it is stated that the petitioner's application was placed before the committee on 11.1.2003, and the committee after going through the entire service record took a decision that the service of the petitioner was useful to the bank and he should be retained in the bank's service for the benefit of the bank as he has good exposure in various fields and experience. It is denied that there was mala fide intention on the part of the competent authority.
17. In para 18 it is stated that the officers whose names are mentioned in the writ petition have been considered by the competent authority. It is denied that the applications of these officers were considered while charge-sheet against them was pending. It is alleged that only after disposal of the charge-sheet a decision was taken by the competent authority. It is reiterated that it is the absolute discretion of the competent authority to accept or reject the applications.
18. A rejoinder-affidavit has also been filed and we have perused the same.
19. It is reiterated that V.R.S. was granted to those who were not even eligible as per Clause 4.2 of the scheme. In para 5 (c) of the rejoinder-affidavit it is stated that the contention of the respondents that there were no surplus officers in scales-IV, V and VI is self contradictory. If there were no surplus officers in these categories what was the need to grant V.R.S. to many officers? The respondents have granted V.R.S. to 22 officers of scale IV, 9 officers of Scale-V, and 2 officers of Scale-VI. This shows that these officers were favoured as they were granted V.R.S. although the respondents have contended that there were no surplus officers in these categories. It is alleged that pick and choose policy has been adopted by the respondents, and V.R.S. was granted on extraneous consideration. Most of these officers were not even eligible for V.R.S., e.g. Mr. Anthony Joseph who was not eligible for V.R.S. as he had done specialized training in Foreign Exchange and Credit, and thus, was ineligible as per Clause 4.2 (e) of the scheme, but yet he was granted V.R.S. Similarly, Mr. Soman Kutty and Mrs. Bala Vishwanathan were granted V.R.S. scheme while the same was denied to petitioner. The names of other officers who were granted V.R.S. are mentioned in para 6 of the rejoinder-affidavit.
20. It is alleged in para 7 that the bank had not framed any criteria/norms to decide the eligibility of the officers for granting V.R.S., and hence the bank has adopted a policy of pick and choose. The names of some of the officers who were not even eligible for grant of V.R.S. scheme as they were debarred by Clause 4.2 (c) and (e) of the scheme were given in paras 3 (b), 3 (d) and 3 (e) of the rejoinder-affidavit filed in Writ Petition No. 41677 of 2001 which has been allowed by this Court. The names of these officers are also mentioned in paragraph 15 of the present writ petition. The management first denied V.R.S. scheme to some of these officers but later on granted it to them. The letter declining V.R.S. benefit initially to them are Annexures-4 and 5 to the petition. Thus, there is gross misuse of discretion by the respondents.
21. It is alleged in para 11 that Mrs. Jay Laxmi, J. was granted V.R.S., 2001. If she was an indispensable officer why was her V.R.S. accepted after the scheme was closed? It is alleged that she was granted V.R.S. after three months of the closure of the scheme because she was attached to the office of the competent authority. Similarly, one Thammaiyya Bhatt Scale-V officer posted as A.G.M. at Mumbai was granted V.R.S. in the month of September, 2001, i.e., after eight months of the closure of the scheme. It is alleged that there was total lack of transparency as ineligible officers who were denied V.R.S. in February, 2001, were granted V.R.S. in May/June, 2001.
22. In para 12 of the rejoinder-affidavit it is stated that the petitioner was posted at Hong Kong as Junior Officer and was looking after work which does not require specialized training. He was posted at Hong Kong as Junior Officer about 24 years back, and he looked after dispatch, current account and Saving Bank Account and operation of locker. Foreign Exchange Work is a specialized job and unless proper training is given the officer cannot function on the said post. The petitioner was never trained in Foreign Exchange or Credit. On the other hand, one Sri Antony Joseph also of Scale-IV whose bio-data is enclosed as Annexure-5 to the petition was given specialized training in both Foreign Exchange and Credit but he was given V.R.S. although he was not eligible as per Clause 4.2 (e) of the scheme. Similarly a large number of other examples have been given in para 15 of the writ petition of officers who were granted V.R.S. benefit although they were not eligible. The petitioner is being harassed for the last two years and he was removed from the post of Chief Manager and was forced to work under an officer junior to him by three years, and hence he suffered severe mental depression.
23. In para 14 it is stated that V.R.S. is meant for good officers but the management has done the opposite by awarding V.R.S. to those who are debarred.
24. After having considered the record of the case in great detail, we are constrained to observe that the respondents have acted in a highly arbitrary, discriminatory and mala Side manner and have shown no respect to this Court by totally flouting our judgment dated 27.11.2002 in Writ Petition No. 41677 of 2001, copy of which is Annexure-6 to the petition. In that judgment we specifically observed as follows :
"There must be some clear cut objective criteria as to whose application under the V.R.S. will be accepted and whose application will be rejected. In paragraph 6 of the supplementary counter-affidavit it is stated that it is purely in the discretion of the bank as to whose application under V.R.S. has to be accepted and whose will not. This is not a tenable argument in view of Article 14 of the Constitution. There cannot be arbitrary pick and choose in the matter."
25. Despite the above clear observation in the aforesaid judgment the respondents have again dared to take the stand in paragraphs 2, 5 and 18 of the counter-affidavit that it is the absolute discretion of the competent authority either to accept or reject the application.
26. This counter-affidavit has been filed by the Chief Regional Manager of the respondent bank, and the aforesaid averments made in the counter-affidavit show that the aforesaid officer has absolutely no respect for this Court. This Court has clearly held in its judgment in Writ Petition No. 41677 of 2001 decided on 27.11.2002 that the competent authority does not have absolute discretion in the matter. Despite this judgment, again, a stand has been taken by the respondents that the competent authority has absolute discretion in the matter whether to allow or reject the application for V.R.S.
27. We were at first inclined to issue contempt of court notice to Shri Samir Baruah, the Chief Regional Manager of the respondent bank at Lucknow Branch for the grossly contemptuous averments mentioned above, but we have refrained from doing so since we are of the opinion that he was probably not able to understand what he was saying in his affidavit, and the impropriety he was committing. Contempt jurisdiction is discretionary jurisdiction and this Court ordinarily tries to avoid taking action under the Contempt of Court Act although it has power to do so. However, we are giving a stern warning to the officers of the bank to refrain from doing this kind of contemptuous behaviour in future. The Rule of Law prevails in this country, and the Supreme Court has often observed. "Be you however so high, the law is above you." There can be no 'islands of Insubordination to the Rule of Law" vide J.P. Kulshrestha v. Chancellor, 1980 (3) SCC 418.
28. On the facts of the case it is evident that the respondents have acted in a grossly arbitrary and discriminatory matter. The petitioner has been penalized for the good work he has done and totally false averments have been made by the respondents that the petitioner could not have been spared as he was indispensable to the bank. As rightly pointed out by the petitioner in his writ petition and the rejoinder-affidavit, if there was no surplus staff then it is difficult to understand why a large number of officers/employees have been given the benefit of the V.R.S. Many officers/employees in fact have disciplinary proceedings pending against them and hence they are disqualified under Clause 4.2 of the V.R.S., but yet they were granted the V.R.S. This shows that a policy of pick and choose has been adopted by the respondents. Under Clause 4.2 (e) the employees against whom disciplinary proceedings are pending or contemplated, are not eligible for the V.R.S. We cannot understand what the respondents mean by saying in para 18 of the counter-affidavit that "after disposal of the charge-sheet decision was taken by the competent authority." The averment is wholly vague. Does it mean that the employee was found guilty or does it mean that he was exonerated? Or does it mean that the charge-sheet was withdrawn? Charge-sheets are not 'disposed of, and we feel that this observation has been deliberately made for obfuscation of the matter in issue.
29. It has been stated in para 22 of the writ petition that the petitioner never served in specialized areas like Foreign Exchange or in Overseas Credit and had never been given training in 'these fields, and hence the averments in the impugned order are baseless. The reply to para 22 of the writ petition is contained in para 13 of the counter-affidavit which is a very vague averment. No specific denial has been made to the petitioner's averments that he had not been given training in Foreign Exchange or in Overseas Credit and he had no experience in these fields.
30. Under Order VIII, Rule 5, C.P.C., if a specific averment in a petition has not been specifically denied in reply, it will be deemed to have been admitted. Although the C.P.C. does not in terms apply to writ proceedings, in our opinion, the general principles of the C.P.C. applied. Hence, Order VIII, Rule 5, C.P.C. is applicable to writ proceedings also. The petitioner's averments in paragraphs 15, 20, 43, 45, 46, 47, etc. of the writ petition have mentioned the names and details of a large number of officers who were Ineligible for grant of V.R.S. but they have been granted the same.
31. In the counter-affidavit these specific averments have not been specifically denied.
32. For example, the reply to paragraph 15 of the writ petition is contained in paragraph 10 of the counter-affidavit which states :
"That paras 13, 14 and 15 of writ petition are matter of record. The writ petition filed by the petitioner and the counter and rejoinder filed in that case be looked into if this Court find it necessary. The petitioner had mentioned certain names in the rejoinder and their cases were examined by the management and only then suitable orders were passed."
33. A perusal of para 10 of the counter-affidavit shows that while in para 15 of the writ petition details with the names of the officers who were not entitled to get V.R.S. but were still granted the same, has been given, in para 10 of the counter-affidavit there is no specific denial of the averments of para 15 at all. Hence, the allegations in para 15 of the writ petition have to be treated as admitted.
34. Similarly, allegations in the other paragraphs of the petition referred to above e.g. paragraphs 20, 43, 45, 46 and 47 in which it was specifically mentioned that persons who are not entitled for V.R.S. have been granted the same has not been specifically denied in the counter-affidavit. Hence, these allegations have also to be treated as correct, in view of Order VIII, Rule 5, C.P.C. which we have held to be applicable to writ proceedings. In our opinion, the stand of the respondents in the counter-affidavit and in the impugned order that the petitioner cannot be spared, is wholly baseless, arbitrary and discriminatory. In our opinion, the reference of the matter by the Chairman to the committee was merely an eyewash. The observation in the impugned order that in view of the petitioner's experience and skill his service was required for the development of the bank is totally false, arbitrary and baseless, particularly since a large number of officers have been given benefit of V.R.S. many of whom were not even qualified for the same in view of Clause 4.2 of the scheme.
35. The bank had granted the V.R.S. to the charge-sheeted employees as well as to the employees who were issued show cause notice in contemplation of disciplinary proceedings, and were Ineligible as per Clause 4.2 (c) of the V.R.S. scheme. The names of those employees are as follows :
(a) Mrs. Rekha Thapar, Sr. Mgr., Dehradun Branch (She was issued charge-sheet, V.R.S. was declined but later on granted V.R.S.).
(b) P. Krishnamurti, Harldwar, already charge-sheeted. His application was initially rejected but later on he was granted V.R.S. by the bank.
(c) Lakhvir Singh, D.C.O., Lucknow, was charge-sheeted, V.R.S. rejected but later on granted him V.R.S.
(d) Alam Singh, Dehradun Branch was charge-sheeted, V.R.S. first declined but later on granted.
(e) K.G. Sharma, Daliganj, Lucknow was charge-sheeted, V.R.S. first declined but later on granted.
(f) M.K. Rao of Jhansi Branch was charge-sheeted, V.R.S. first declined but later on granted.
(g) R.L. Acharya, Malleshwaram Branch, enquiry was pending, V.R.S. was declined by competent authority but later on given V.R.S. on extraneous consideration.
(h) T.S. Krisha Prasad, R.O., Goa, enquiry was pending, V.R.S. was declined by competent authority but later on given V.R.S. on extraneous consideration.
(i) K.P. Bhatt, Shantinagar Branch, enquiry was pending, V.R.S. was declined by competent authority but later on given V.R.S. on extraneous consideration.
(j) Anjana Sachdeo, Nehru Place Branch, enquiry was pending, V.R.S. was declined by competent authority but later on given V.R.S. on extraneous consideration.
(k) P.N. Kapoor, Yusuf Sarai Branch, enquiry was pending, V.R.S. was declined by competent authority but later on given V.R.S. on extraneous consideration.
(l) M. Alexender, Delhi Cantt., enquiry was pending, V.R.S. was declined by competent authority but later on given V.R.S. on extraneous consideration.
36. The bank had acted arbitrarily against their own V.R.S. scheme 4.2 (e) and granted the V.R.S. to the Officers who were ineligible being given specialized training in the area of Credit and Foreign Exchange.--
The name of those officers are as follows :
(a) Mr. Anthony Joseph, Pondichery Branch.--He had been given specialized training in Foreign Exchange and Credit. The bank has admitted giving V.R.S. to him. His bio-data is filed with supplementary affidavit.
(b) Mr. Abdul Rahoof, Overseas Credit Deptt., Central Office Chennai.--He was given specialized training in credit.
(c) Mr. R. Shankerraman, Central Office, Chennai.--
Specialized training in Credit.
(d) Mr. R. Sunderrajan, F.E.D.--He was given specialized training in Foreign Exchange.
(e) Mr. S. Mahadeuan, F.E.D.--He was given Foreign Exchange training.
37. In our opinion, the bank has adopted a policy of pick and choose and has thus, grossly violated Article 14 of the Constitution. It seems that there is gross favouritism going on in the bank in the matter of granting of V.R.S. and this calls for serious inquiries by the Central Government about the functioning of the Indian Overseas Bank.
38. In our opinion, the petitioner is fully eligible for the V.R.S., 2000, and his application has been rejected arbitrarily and he has been discriminated against. He has also been unnecessarily harassed by the respondents, as stated in para 18 of the petition, by first transferring him to Chennai during the pendency of his writ petition and then by posting him under an officer 3 years his junior.
39. The respondents themselves have admitted that the petitioner has been working with utmost sincerity, honesty and diligence in discharging his duties in the bank. It seems that the policy of the bank is to punish the good, honest and competent officers and to reward those who are not. This, in our opinion, will lead to total demoralization of the good, honest and competent officers and employees of the bank if it is permitted to continue any further. The V.R.S. scheme was floated for giving the benefit to the good officers and not for those who are having a bad service record, but it seems that the bank in total disregard of the scheme has adopted a policy of pick and choose. Thus, merit has in fact become demerit in the bank. Those who are competent are denied V.R.S. but those having a bad record are being given benefit of the V.R.S.
40. In Manjushree Pathak v. Assam Industrial Development Corporation Ltd. and Ors., 2000 (7) SCC 390, the Supreme Court observed that the discretion of an authority to accept or reject the application under the V.R.S. is not an unfettered or absolute discretion, but has to be exercised reasonably, fairly and judiciously.
The Supreme Court observed :
"No doubt, as per clause 8.1 of the scheme, the management had discretion to accept or reject the request from any employee for voluntary retirement viewing the organizational requirement and any other relevant facts, but that does not mean that the respondent Corporation being an authority coming within the purview of Article 12 of the Constitution can abdicate its duty to act reasonably, fairly and judiciously in exercise of discretion."
41. It is a well-settled principle that in certain circumstances a power can be regarded as coupled with a duty. Thus, in de Smith's Judicial Review of Administrative Action, Fourth Edn., at pages 283 and 285 it is stated :
"An authority may have a discretion whether to exercise a power, and a discretion in the manner of exercising it. But discretionary powers are frequently coupled with duties. A Minister may be empowered to confirm or refuse to confirm a compulsory purchase order. In making his decision, he is entitled to exercise a very wide discretion, but he ts under a legal duty to determine the application for confirmation one way or the other. Again, to the extent that a discretionary power is not absolute, the repository of a discretion is under a legal duty to observe certain requirements that condition the manner in which its discretion may be exercised."
The above observation has been quoted with approval by the Supreme Court in Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal and Ors., 1998 (7) SCC 353.
42. In Julius v. Lord Bishop of Oxford, 1880 (5) AC 214, the House of Lords observed :
"There may be something in the nature of the thing empowered to be done, something in the object for which it is to be done, something in the conditions under which it is to be done, something in the title of the person or persons for whose benefit the power is to be exercised, which may couple the power with a duty, and make it the duty of the person in whom the power is reposed, to exercise that power when called upon to do so."
The above observation of the Lord has been followed by our Supreme Court in Commissioner of Police, Bombay v. Gordhandas Bhanji, AIR 1952 SC 616, in which the Supreme Court observed :
"Public authorities cannot play fast and lose with the powers vested in them, and persons to whose detriment orders are made are entitled to know with exactness and precision what they are expected to do or forbear from doing and exactly what authority is making the order."
43. In Comptroller and Auditor General of India v. K.S. Jagannathan and Anr., (1987) SC 537, the Supreme Court observed :
"There is thus, no doubt that the High Courts in India exercising their jurisdiction under Article 226 have the power to issue a writ of mandamus or a writ in the nature of mandamus or to pass orders and give necessary directions where the Government or a public authority has failed to exercise or has wrongly exercised the discretion conferred upon it by a statute or a rule or a policy decision of the Government or has exercised such discretion mala fide or on irrelevant considerations or by ignoring the relevant considerations and materials or in such a manner as to frustrate the object of conferring such discretion or the policy for implementing which such discretion has been conferred. In all such cases and in any other fit and proper case a High Court can, In the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226, issue a writ of mandamus or a writ in the nature of mandamus or pass orders and give directions to compel the performance in a proper and lawful manner of the discretion conferred upon the Government or a public authority, and in a proper case, in order to prevent injustice resulting to the concerned parties, the Court may itself pass an order or give directions which the Government or the public authority should have passed or given had it properly and lawfully exercised its discretion."
44. In Dai-Ichi Karkaria Ltd. v. Union of India and Ors., 2000 (4) SCC 57, the Supreme Court observed that discretion must be exercised in a reasonable way so as to comply with Article 14 of the Constitution.
45. In Consumers Action Group and Anr. v. State of Tamil Nadu and Ors., 2000 (7) SCC 425, the Supreme Court observed (vide para 29) :
"Whenever any statute confers any power on any statutory authority including a delegatee under a valid statute, howsoever, wide the discretion may be, the same has to be exercised reasonably within the sphere that statute confers and such exercise of power must stand the test of judicial scrutiny. This judicial scrutiny is one of the basic features of our Constitution."
Similarly, in Praveen Singh v. State of Punjab and Ors., 2001 (1) AWC 293 (SC) : 2000 (8) SCC 633, the Supreme Court observed :
"Arbitrariness being opposed to reasonableness is an antithesis of law. There cannot, however, be any exact definition of arbitrariness ; neither there can be any straitjacket formula evolved therefor, since the same is dependant on the varying facts and circumstances of each case."
46. In Delhi Administration v. Mohan Lal, 2002 (7) SCC 222, the Supreme Court observed (vide para 7) :
"We are also of the view that even the appropriate Government may not, as a matter of routine course, indulge in exercise of such powers on its sweet will, pleasure and whim or fancy. The exercise of any power vested by the statute in a public authority is to be always viewed as in trust, coupled with a duty to exercise the same in the larger public and societal interest."
47. We are, therefore, clearly of the view that the impugned order is arbitrary, discriminatory and contemptuous of the decisions of the Supreme Court in Manjushree Pathak's case (supra) and this Court in the petitioner's own case in Writ Petition No. 41677 of 2001 decided on 27.11.2002, and hence, it is quashed.
48. Ordinarily, we would have demanded the matter to the competent authority to decide the petitioner's application for grant of V.R.S. in accordance with law, but we feel that now no useful purpose would be served by doing so since the respondents are evidently adamant and they have no respect for this Court as already mentioned above. This Court has already remanded the matters once and keeping on remanding it to the respondents knowing that they will again reiterate the same order would be an exercise in futility.
49. In Dr. Sangeeta Srivastava v. University of Allahabad and Ors., 2002 (3) AWC 2088 ; 2002 (3) UPLBEC 2502, a Division Bench of this Court observed :
"In our opinion if a statute requires that a decision on a matter is to be taken by a certain authority, and if that authority does not take the decision on relevant considerations or totally misdirects itself, and the objective material on the basis of which such decision is to be taken is before the Court, then the Court, in certain exceptional circumstances, can Itself take that decision instead of remanding the matter to the authority, particularly when such remand would entail further delay and hardship. This proposition gets support from the decision of the Supreme Court in B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, 1995 (6) SCC 749, where it was held (in para 18) that although ordinarily it is for the authority concerned to decide the punishment of an employee found guilty, in exceptional circumstances the High Court itself can impose the punishment. It also gets support from the observations of the Supreme Court in Comptroller and Auditor General v. K.S. Jagannathan (supra) already quoted above.
50. In State of Bihar v. Dr. Braj Kumar Mishra and Ors., 1999 (9) SCC 546, the Supreme Court observed (in paragraph 7) :
"It is true that normally the Court in exercise of its power under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, after quashing the impugned order should remand the matter to the authority concerned particularly when such authority consists of experts for deciding the issue afresh in accordance with the direction issued and the law laid down by it but in specified cases, as the instant case, nothing prevented the Court from issuing directions when all the facts were admitted regarding the eligibility of respondent No. 1 and his possessing the requisite qualifications. Remand to the authorities would have been merely a ritual and ceremonial. Keeping in mind the lapses attributable to the Commission which had failed to take appropriate action despite recommendation made in favour of respondent 1, the learned single Judge as also the Division Bench of the High Court felt it necessary to declare respondent No. 1 promoted with effect from 1.2.1985. We do not find any illegality or error of jurisdiction."
51. It may be mentioned that in Dr. Sangeeta Srivastava's case (supra), the petitioner had prayed for regularization of service as Lecturer in the University under Section 31 (3) (c) of the U.P. State Universities Act, but the Executive Council of the University rejected the petitioner's claim stating that the petitioner did not fulfil the essential qualifications under Section 31 (3) (c). The Court held that the petitioner fulfilled all the qualifications under Section 31 (3) (c) except that there was no finding by the Executive Council that she was suitable for regular appointment. This Court held that ordinarily we would have remanded the matter to the Executive Council for a finding about the suitability of the petitioner, but since the Executive Council had already disclosed its mind, a remand would be an exercise in futility. Such a remand would entail further delay and harassment to the petitioner. The Court further observed :
"Ordinarily suitability is to be Judged by the Executive Council and not by this Court. But what are we to do when the Executive Council acts in a patently unfair manner, as it has done in this case? This Court is a Court of Justice. No doubt it has to be Justice based on law, but the Court will interpret law in a way that leads to justice and not injustice.
On the facts of this case, and in view of the fact that the Executive Council has acted on irrelevant considerations and has misdirected itself, and since a remand to it would lead to a further delay and harassment of the petitioner, we ourselves have judged the petitioner's suitability and we find her suitable to be appointed as regular lecturer, and we hold that she fulfils all the requirements of Section 31 (3) (c) of the Act.
52. Against the judgment in Sangeeta Srivastava's case, an S.L.P. was filed in the Supreme Court which was dismissed by the Supreme Court. The principle in Sangeeta Srivastava's case applies in this case also. We have examined the petitioner's case ourselves and have carefully considered the V.R.S. scheme, and we are of the opinion that the petitioner is fully eligible for grant of V.R.S.
53. Ordinarily, we would have remanded the matter to the competent authority to decide the petitioner's application for V.R.S. scheme, but we are of the opinion that no useful purpose would be served in the circumstances already mentioned above. Hence, following the decision of this Court in Sangeeta Srivastava's case (supra) and the other decisions referred to above we quash the impugned order and direct the respondent to accept the petitioner's application for grant of V.R.S. Scheme, 2000 forthwith.
54. The writ petition is allowed. No order as to costs. Let the Registrar General of this Court send a copy of this judgment to the Secretary, Company Affairs, Government of India forthwith.