JUDGMENT Ashok Bhushan, J.
1. This is an application filed by the petitioner praying for setting aside the report of Stamp Reporter dated 5th October, 2004 and the order of the Taxing Officer dated 12th October, 2004, upholding the deficiency in the stamp amounting to Rs. 16,065/-.
2. Heard Sri K.P. Agarwal, learned senior advocate appearing for the petitioner, Sri S.M.A. Kazmi, learned chief standing counsel appearing for the State and Sri K.R. Sirohi, learned counsel appearing for respondent No. 4.
3. The writ petition has been filed by Track Parts of India Mazdoor Sabha, which is a registered trade union under the Trade Union Act, 1926, praying for a mandamus commanding respondent No. 3 to pay the workmen the money that they had claimed in their applications filed under the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Peace (Timely Payment of Wages) Act, 1978 which was rejected by the Deputy Labour Commissioner vide order dated 23rd September, 2003. It has further been prayed that a writ be issued for quashing the order dated 23rd September, 2003 passed by Deputy Labour Commissioner, Kanpur Region, Kanpur (Annexures-10, 11 and 12) and direction be issued for issuing recovery certificate in respect of the wages of the workmen for the period January, 2003 to June, 2003.
4. The Stamp Reporter vide his report dated 5th October, 2004 reported deficiency of stamp amounting to Rs. 16,065/- in the writ petition. The writ petition has been filed paying stamp duty of Rs. 100/- only. Against the report of the Stamp Reporter, the petitioner filed an objection before the Taxing Officer. The objection filed by the petitioner against the report of the Stamp Reporter has been rejected by the Taxing Officer vide its order dated 12th October, 2004. The Taxing Officer while rejecting the objection gave following reasons:
"The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that a single set of court fees is payable. In my opinion, every member of the petitioner has a separate and individual cause of action. Hence a single set of court fees is not payable as directed by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Mota Singh v. State of Haryana, AIR 1981 SC 484.
The petitioner to make good the deficiency of court fees."
5. Learned counsel for the petitioner, challenging the aforesaid order of Taxing Officer, contended that the view of Taxing Officer that every member of the petitioner's Trade Union is liable to pay separate court fee for entertainment of the writ petition is erroneous and is not in accordance with law laid down by the Full Bench of this Court in Umesh Chand Vinod Kumar and Ors. v. Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti and Anr., AIR 1984 All 46; Akhil Bhartiya Soshit Karamchari (Railway) Sangh v. Union of India and Ors., AIR 1981 SC 298; A. N. Pathak and Ors. v. Secretary to the Government, Ministry of Defence and Anr., AIR 1987 SC 716.
6. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the order of Taxing Officer has been passed in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on Taxing Officer by Section 5 of the Court Fees Act, 1870. The contention is that decision of the Taxing Officer being not in accordance with law, this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution may quash the report, hold the court fees already paid in the writ petition as sufficient and entertain the writ petition. Learned counsel for the petitioner further contended that this Court has also jurisdiction to determine the question of payment of court fees, which is incidental to giving relief to the petitioner as claimed in the writ petition. Reliance has also been placed by counsel for the petitioner on Central Bank of India Ltd. v. P. S. Rajagopalan, etc., AIR 1964 SC 743.
7. Learned chief standing counsel, Sri S. M. A. Kazmi, appearing for the State, has submitted that the question regarding payment of court fees in the writ petition is to be determined by the Taxing Officer and in case his order is being contested, at best, direction can be issued to the Taxing Officer to refer the question of any general importance to the Judge nominated by Hon'ble the Chief Justice under Section 5 of the Court Fees Act. Sri Kazmi contended that although the order of the Taxing Officer is subject to jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution but the jurisdiction by this Court can be exercised only to the extent of directing the Taxing Officer to refer any question of general importance to the Judge nominated under Section 5 of the Court Fees Act. Reliance was placed by Sri Kazmi on Full Bench judgment of this Court in Smt. Gindori Bibi v. Taxing Officer and Ors., AIR 1973 All 490; Sushmakar Dubey v. Taxing Officer and Ors., AIR 1998 All 396; Om Prakash and Anr. v. State of U. P. and Anr., AIR 1977 All 122 and Shyam Singh and Ors. v. Meerut Mandal Vikas Nigam and Ors., 1997 (Supp) AWC 516 : 1997 (2) ACJ 1496. Sri Kazmi has also placed reliance on the Full Bench judgment of this Court in Umesh Chand Vinod Kumar's case (supra) and contented that according to principles laid down by the Full Bench each member of the petitioner-Union is liable to pay court fee and Taxing Officer has rightly placed reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in Mota Singh's case (supra).
8. Shri K. R. Sirohi, learned counsel appearing for the High Court has adopted the arguments of Sri Kazmi in support of his submission.
9. I have considered the submissions of both the parties and perused the record.
10. From the facts of the present case and submission made by counsel for the parties, following questions arise for decision in the present case:
(i) Whether the order of Taxing Officer passed under Section 5 of the Court Fees Act, 1870 can be challenged only by a reference before the Judge nominated by Hon'ble the Chief Justice or judicial review of the said order is also permissible by this Court under Article" 226 of the Constitution of India?
(ii) Even if the order of Taxing Officer is subject to judicial review by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, judicial review by this Court shall confine only to the question as to whether the Taxing Officer has erred in forming his opinion as to whether the question is one of the general importance which require reference to the Judge nominated under Section 5 of the Court Fees Act?
(iii) Whether the present writ petition filed by Track Parts of India Mazdoor Sabha, which is a registered trade union, can be entertained only when each workman who is member of the trade union for whose benefit the application was made before the Deputy Labour Commissioner, pays separate court fees?
11. The first and second questions being interrelated are being considered together.
12. Section 5 of the Court Fees Act provides:
"5. Procedure in case of difference as to necessity or amount of fee.-When any difference arises between the officer whose duty it is to see that any fee is paid under this Chapter and any suitor or attorney, as to the necessity of paying a fee or the amount thereof, the question shall, when the difference arises in any of the said High Courts, be referred to the taxing officer, whose decision thereon shall be final, except when the question is, in his opinion, one of general importance, in which case he shall refer it to the final decision of the Chief Justice of such High Court, or of such Judge of the High Court as the Chief Justice shall appoint either generally or specially in this behalf."
Section 5 of the Court Fees Act lays down that decision of the Taxing Officer, in the event of any difference between the report of the stamp reporter and the petitioner or his counsel arises, shall be final. The section further provides that there is only one exception regarding finality of the order of Taxing Officer, i.e., except when the question is, in the opinion of Taxing Officer, one of general importance, in which case he shall refer it to the final decision of the Chief Justice of such High Court, or of such Judge of the High Court as the Chief Justice shall appoint either generally or specially in this behalf. The order of Taxing Officer, thus, is final except when he makes a reference to the Judge nominated by the Chief Justice when he is satisfied that the question which has arisen in the case is of general importance. In the present case, no reference has been made by the Taxing Officer to the Judge nominated by Hon'ble the Chief Justice. The order of Taxing Officer, thus, is final under Section 5 of the Court Fees Act. The opinion which has to be formed by the Taxing Officer as to whether the question is one of general importance although is subjective opinion but while forming the said opinion the Taxing Officer has to act judicially. In case while forming the opinion the Taxing Officer disregards any statutory provision governing the field or his opinion is contrary to law laid down by this Court and the Apex Court, the said opinion can be put to scrutiny. The Full Bench of this Court in Smt. Gindori Bibi's case (supra) while analysing the provisions of Section 5 of Court Fees Act made following observations in paragraph 13:
"13.......................................Once a question is referred to the Taxing Officer on a difference arising between the Stamp Reporter and the suitor, it is the duty of the former to render a decision thereon irrespective of the fact whether the question was of ordinary importance or of general importance. The Taxing Officer is under a duty to render his decision on merits. Having done that the Taxing Officer has to consider whether the question is one of general importance and once he is of opinion that the question is one of general importance, then the decision rendered by him on merits will not be final and he will be under a duty to refer the question for the final decision of the Taxing Judge. Thus, the procedural scheme under the section is that the Taxing Judge will get the jurisdiction to render a final decision on the question of the court-fee only when the Taxing Officer refers the question."
13. The Full Bench in Smt. Gindori Bibi's case (supra) also laid down that there is nothing in the scheme of Section 5 preventing a suitor to invite by application the Taxing Officer to form an opinion as to the importance of the question. In the present case, the petitioner is not praying for a direction to the Taxing Officer to form an opinion with regard to importance of question involved in the case. The prayer of the petitioner is that order be quashed and it be held that court fee already paid is sufficient. The Full Bench in Smt. Gindori Bibi's case (supra) laid down following in paragraph 16 :
"16. The Taxing Officer has to perform a judicial function under Section 5. In forming an opinion as to the importance of the question he is under a duty to act judicially and not arbitrarily. We think any opinion rendered by him on the importance of the question may be amenable to a writ of certiorari if in forming his opinion the Taxing Officer proceeded arbitrarily and against established judicial principles. It is not open to the Taxing Officer to decline at his sweet will forming of an opinion on the importance of the question.............................."
14. The question which arises for consideration is as to whether the order of Taxing Officer passed under Section 5 of the Court Fees Act is final and only subject to decision by Judge nominated by Hon'ble the Chief Justice under Section 5 of the Court Fees Act on a reference made by Taxing Officer or such decision can be subject to judicial review by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. From the scheme of the Court Fees Act, it is clear that for the purposes of the Act the order of Taxing Officer is final. The only exception provided under Section 5, on which finality of the order of Taxing Officer is put in jeopardy, is when a reference is made by the Taxing Officer after forming an opinion that question is of general importance and in that case decision given on the reference of Taxing Officer by the Judge nominated under Section 5 is final. Now taking a situation when after order of Taxing Officer no reference is made by the Taxing Officer to the Judge nominated under Section 5 whether the order of the Taxing Officer is final and cannot be even challenged in proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution, is question for consideration. At this stage, it is relevant to note the Division Bench judgment of this Court in Shyam Singh's case (supra) where this Court observed that the order of Taxing Officer was final and could not be questioned either in the Court or by filing special appeal. The relevant observations were made in paragraph 10 of the judgment which is extracted below :
"10. In the present case, the Taxing Officer by his order dated 19th January, 1993, rejected the objection of the appellants and upheld the report of the office showing deficiency of Rs. 1,785/- in the writ petition in terms of Section 5. This order of the Taxing Officer was final and could not be questioned either in the Court or by filing special appeal. The question has been examined by learned single Judge and he also agreed with the report of the Taxing Officer. However, in our opinion, as the decision of the Taxing Officer was final it could not be subjected to scrutiny of the Court. Since incidentally in this case the learned Judge has not reversed the order of Taxing Officer and the learned Judge has simply upheld the same, no order is required to be passed by this Bench in this behalf. The legal position about the maintainability of the special appeal against the decision of the Taxing Officer or Taxing Judge under Section 5 of the Act arose for consideration before the Division Bench of this Court in case of Om Prakash and Anr. v. State of U. P. and Anr., AIR 1977 All 122 (DB). The Division Bench has held that the decision of the Taxing Officer or the Taxing Judge under Section 5 of Court Fees Act shall be final and conclusive for all purposes and the decision shall not be open to revision or appeal. The Division Bench has placed reliance on the judgment of the Full Bench of this Court in Balkaran Rai v. Gobind Nath Tiwary, (1890) ILR 12 All 129; Kunwar Karan Singh v. Gopal Rai, (1910) ILR 32 All 59; Lurkhur Chaube v. Ram Bhajan Chaube, (1903) All WC 214 and Sathappa Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar, AIR 1958 SC 245)."
The above judgment was rendered by Division Bench of this Court in special appeal filed against order of learned single Judge in a writ petition in which legality of the order of Taxing Officer was challenged. The Division Bench ultimately found the special appeal not maintainable and made following observations in paragraph 13:
"13. For the reasons stated above, in our opinion, this special appeal is not legally maintainable and is liable to be dismissed as such. In the circumstances, it is not necessary for us to examine other questions raised by learned counsel for the parties on merits of the appeal. The appeal is accordingly, dismissed as not maintainable."
15. From above observations made by the Division Bench of this Court in Shyam Singh's case (supra), it appears that Division Bench took the view that order of the Taxing Officer being final under Section 5 of the Court Fees Act could not have been challenged in the Court or by means of special appeal. The observations of the Division Bench in the said judgment have to be read in context of finality of the order of the Taxing Officer under Section 5 of the Court Fees Act. The observations made by the Division Bench cannot be read as denying challenge of the order of Taxing Officer under Article 226 of the Constitution since even in the Full Bench decision of this Court in Smt. Gindori Bibi's case (supra) while considering Section 5 of the Court Fees Act, the Full Bench itself had laid down in paragraph 16, ".............We think any opinion rendered by him on the importance of the question may be amenable to a writ of certiorari if in forming his opinion the Taxing Officer proceeded arbitrarily and against established judicial principles..............". The order of the Taxing Officer rendered on difference between the Stamp Reporter and the petitioner or forming an opinion with regard to importance of the question is an order under Section 5 and when the opinion formed by the Taxing Officer with regard to importance of the question is amenable to writ of certiorari why cannot the order of Taxing Officer passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 5 of the Court Fees Act can also be subject to writ of certiorari in which order he has not formed any opinion with regard to importance of the question. There is one more aspect, which needs to be noted. According to scheme of Section 5 of the Court Fees Act. the reference by Taxing Officer to a Judge nominated by Hon'ble the Chief Justice is permissible when in the opinion of Taxing Officer the question is one of general importance. The statutory provisions, thus, contemplate reference to a Judge under Section 5 only when the question is of general importance and if the question is not of general importance, the reference cannot be made under Section 5 and the order of Taxing Officer in that event is final. Where decision of Taxing Officer in a case which does not involve any question of general importance but it prejudicially affects the petitioner of a case is not subject to any judicial scrutiny is a question which is to be answered. The finality of the order of Taxing Officer under Section 5 of the Court Fees Act is finality for the purposes of the said Act. Finality attached to any order in a statute is finality to that order qua that statute and jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution to have judicial review of the said order passed under any statute which is final for that statute is not excluded. The right of judicial review given under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot be whittled down by attaching finality to any order under any statute. The right of judicial review of any decision by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot curtailed by any statute be enacted by Parliament or State Legislature.
16. A Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Bharat Kala Bhandar Ltd. v. Municipal Committee, Dhamangaon, AIR 1966 SC 249, had occasion to consider the provisions of Section 84 (3) of the Municipalities Act which provided that no objection shall be taken to any valuation, assessment, or levy, nor shall the liability of any person to be assessed or taxed be questioned, in any other manner or by any other authority than is provided in this Act. The Apex Court held that the said provision does not affect the remedy provided under Article 226 of the Constitution to a citizen. Following was observed in paragraph 30:
".................................. Under Article 226 the Constitution has provided a remedy to a citizen to obtain redress in respect of a tax levied or collected under an invalid law. This remedy will not be affected by any provision like Section 67 of the Indian Income-tax Act or like Section 84 (3) of the Municipalities Act."
17. Similarly the Apex Court had occasion to consider Section 9(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 in State of Haryana v. Haryana Co-operative Transport Ltd. and Ors., AIR 1977 SC 237. Section 9(1) of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 provided that no order of the appropriate Government or of the Central Government appointing any person as the Chairman or any other member of a Board or Court or as the Presiding Officer of a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal shall be called in question in any manner. Considering the above provisions, the Apex Court observed in paragraph 14:
"............. But it is impossible to construe the provisions as in derogation of the remedies provided by Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. The rights conferred by those articles cannot be permitted to be taken away by a broad and general provision in the nature of Section 9(1) of the Act .............................."
18. A seven-Judge Bench in L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India and Ors., (1997) 3 SCC 261, considered the provisions of Articles 323A and 323B of the Constitution, which provided for making of appropriate law by the Parliament excluding the jurisdiction of all courts except the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution, thus by constitutional amendment the right of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution was taken away. The seven-Judge Bench in the said judgment has held that power of judicial review conferred on the High Court under Article 226 /227 of the Constitution cannot be excluded. The provisions of Clause 2 (d) of Article 323A and Clause 3 (d) of Article 323B of the Constitution to the extent they excluded the jurisdiction of the High Courts and the Supreme Court under Articles 226 /227 and 32 of the Constitution were struck down and provisions of Section 28 of the Administrative Tribunals Act which excluded the jurisdiction of the High Court was also held to be unconstitutional. The Apex Court laid down following in paragraph 99 of the said judgment :
"99. In view of the reasoning adopted by us, we hold that Clause 2 (d) of Article 323A and Clause 3 (d) of Article 323B, to the extent they exclude the jurisdiction of the High Courts and the Supreme Court under Articles 226 /227 and 32 of the Constitution, are unconstitutional. Section 28 of the Act and the "exclusion of jurisdiction" clauses in all other legislations enacted under the aegis of Article 323A and 323B would, to the same extent, be unconstitutional. The Jurisdiction conferred upon the High Courts under Article 226 /227 and upon the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution is a part of inviolable basic structure of our Constitution. While this jurisdiction cannot be ousted, other courts and Tribunals may perform a supplemental role in discharging the powers conferred by Articles 226 /227 and 32 of the Constitution .........................."
19. A recent judgment of the Apex Court in Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai and Ors., (2003) 6 SCC 675 had considered the scope of Article 226 /227 of the Constitution. The Apex Court has laid down in the said judgment that the jurisdiction conferred to the High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot be taken away by any legislative enactment or by judicial pronouncement. The Apex Court while endorsing the view of the Division Bench of Delhi High Court, held following in paragraph 29 of the said judgment:
"29. The Constitution Bench in L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India dealt with the nature of power of judicial review conferred by Article 226 of the Constitution and the power of superintendence conferred by Article 227. It was held that the jurisdiction conferred on the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution and on the High Courts under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution is a part of the basic structure of the Constitution, forming its integral and essential feature, which cannot be tampered with much less taken away even by constitutional amendment, not to speak of a Parliamentary legislation. A recent Division Bench decision by the Delhi High Court (Dalveer Bhandari and H. R. Malhotra, JJ.) in Govind v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) makes an in-depth survey of decided cases including almost all the leading decisions by this Court and holds :
"74. The powers of the High Court under Article 226 cannot be whittled down, nullified, curtailed, abrogated, diluted or taken either by amendment of the Constitution. The power of juridical review is an inherent part of the basic structure and it cannot be abrogated without affecting the basic structure of the Constitution."
The essence of constitutional and legal principles, relevant to the issue at hand, has been correctly summed up by the Division Bench of the High Court and we record our approval of the same."
20. In view of the law laid down by the Apex Court, as noted above, the order of Taxing Officer is not immune from judicial review of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. The order of Taxing Order is final only for the purposes of the Court Fees Act. The Full Bench of this Court in Smt. Gindori Bibi's case (supra) has also taken the view that opinion formed by Taxing Officer with regard to importance of the question is subject to writ of certiorari. A Division Bench of this Court in Saroja Nand Jha and Ors. v. Hari Fertilizers and Anr., (1994) 1 CRC 16, while exercising the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution has set aside the report of the Taxing Officer. The judgment of Division Bench of this Court in Sushmakar Dubey's case (supra) also entertained a writ petition challenging the order of Taxing Officer which writ petition was ultimately allowed. In that case, however, the Division Bench issued a direction to Taxing Officer to refer the matter to Taxing Judge for opinion. However, the Division Bench after referring to the judgment of Smt. Gindori Bibi's case (supra) of this Court made following observations in paragraph 13:
"13. In view of the aforesaid dictum of the Full Bench the question of the matter being of general importance alone can be examined by the writ court in the event of a contrary finding having been recorded by the Taxing Officer or in the event of his having not deciding the said issue."
The Division Bench in the said case, thus, took the view that writ court can only examine the question as to whether the matter is of general importance or not. The said observation of the Division Bench has been made relying on dictum of Full Bench in Smt. Gindori Bibi's case (supra). It is relevant to note the facts of Smt. Gindori Bibi's case (supra) and the law laid down by this Court in the said judgment. A first appeal was filed in this Court by Smt. Gindori Bibi in which Stamp Reporter reported deficiency. Objection was raised to the Stamp Reporter's report. The Taxing Officer rejected the objection of the appellant and upheld the report of the Stamp Reporter. An application was made by the appellant before the Taxing Officer praying that Taxing Officer be pleased to refer the case for final decision to the Chief Justice or any Hon'ble Judge to be appointed by the Chief Justice under Section 5 of the Court Fees Act. The Taxing Officer rejected the application taking view that Taxing Officer has no reason to make any reference to the Court, as prayed. Thereafter writ petition was filed by Smt. Gindori Bibi questioning the report of the Stamp Reporter and the order of the Taxing Officer. A prayer was also made for directing the Taxing Officer to refer the question of deficiency in the court fee to the Court under Section 5 of the Court Fees Act. The observation made by the Full Bench in paragraph 16 of the said judgment is to the effect that any opinion rendered by Taxing Officer on the importance of the question may be amenable to the writ of certiorari if in forming his opinion the Taxing Officer proceeded arbitrarily and against established judicial principles. The Full Bench was neither called upon to express any opinion as to the limit of the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution while considering the order of Taxing Officer nor the Full Bench observed that exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution shall be limited alone to examine the opinion of the Taxing Officer regarding general importance of the question. The observation of the Division Bench in Sushmakar Dubey's case (supra) in paragraph 13, as noted above, thus is not based on any such ratio laid down in the Full Bench. No fetter can be put on the exercise of writ jurisdiction by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution by any legislative enactment or by any judicial pronouncement as laid down by the Apex Court in Surya Dev Rai's case (supra).
21. From what has been said above, it is clear that order of the Taxing Officer is subject to scrutiny by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution and there cannot be any fetter in exercise of jurisdiction by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution while considering the order of Taxing Officer. The jurisdiction of this Court shall not confine only to issue a writ directing the Taxing Officer to refer the question under Section 5 of the Court Fees Act. It is true that this Court while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can always issue direction to the Taxing Officer to make a reference under Section 5 of the Court Fees Act but apart from that the Court can always set aside the order and pass any appropriate order in the ends of justice including an order setting aside the report of the Stamp Reporter as well as the order of the Taxing Officer and making a declaration with regard to sufficiency of the court fee.
22. Now the question remains as to whether in the writ petition filed by the petitioner court fee was liable to be paid by all the workmen who are members of the Trade Union or not. The Taxing Officer has placed reliance on judgment of Mota Singh's case (supra) while upholding the report of the stamp reporter. In Mota Singh's case (supra) independent truck operators filed writ petition challenging the tax imposed on each of the truck owner. The facts and reason given for holding that each truck owner was liable to pay separate court fee was given in paragraph 1 of the judgment, which is quoted below :
"1. We have carefully gone through the office report prepared pursuant to the directions given by us. We are prima facie satisfied that the petitioners have not paid court fees legally payable and that the petitioners have so modeled the title clause of the petitions as may indicate that the payment of the legally payable court fee could be evaded. Having regard to the nature of these cases where every owner of a truck plying his truck for transport of goods has a liability to pay tax impugned in the petition, each one has his own independent cause of action. A firm as understood under the Partnership Act or a Company as understood under the Indian Companies Act, if it is entitled in law to commence action either in the firm name or in the Company's name, can do so by filing a petition for the benefit of the company or the partnership and in such a case court fee would be payable depending upon the legal status of the petitioner. But it is too much to expect that different truck owners having no relation with each other either as partners or any other legally subsisting jural relationship of association of persons would be liable to pay only one set of court-fee simply, because they have joined as petitioners in one petition. Each one has his own cause of action arising out of the liability to pay tax individually and the petition of each one would be a separate and independent petition and each such person would be liable to pay legally payable court-fee on his petition. It would be a travesty of law if one were to hold that as each one uses highway, he has common cause of action with the rest of truck pliers."
23. In the present case, there is only one petitioner, i.e., registered Trade Union. The petitioner being one, the writ petition is maintainable at the instance of the Trade Union. The Judgment in Mota Singh's case (supra) is not attracted simply because there are not more than one petitioner in the present case.
24. The Full Bench of this Court in Umesh Chand Vinod Kumar's case (supra) considers in detail the question of payment of court fee with regard to petitioners. One of the questions considered by the Full Bench is the question of payment of court fee when a writ petition is filed by registered association/union for enforcement of rights of its members as distinguished from the enforcement of its own rights. The present case is a case which may fall in Question No. 1 as framed by the Full Bench in Umesh Chand Vinod Kumar's case (supra). It is necessary to note relevant facts of this writ petition before applying the proposition laid down by the this Court in Umesh Chand Vinod Kumar's case (supra). Annexures- 10, 11 and 12 of the writ petition has been prayed to be quashed. From a perusal of Annexures-10, 11 and 12, it is clear that case was instituted by the petitioner-union. The first line of the order states that present case has been filed by Track Parts of India Mazdoor Sabha. The Deputy Labour Commissioner by the impugned order dated 23rd September, 2003 has taken the view that establishment has since been closed on 16.1.2003, the application for payment of wages under Uttar Pradesh Industrial Peace (Timely Payment of Wages) Act, 1978 is not maintainable. From reading of the orders, Annexures-10, 11 and 12, it is clear that claim under Uttar Pradesh Industrial Peace (Timely Payment of Wages) Act, 1978 was raised by the petitioner itself. A copy of the order has also been endorsed to President/ Secretary of the petitioner-union. When the order impugned was passed on the application filed on behalf of the petitioner, the petitioner has right to challenge the said order. There cannot be any dispute that petitioner being registered Union, which union has been registered under the provisions of the Trade Union Act, is entitled to espouse the cause of its members. When the application was filed by the Union itself before the Deputy Labour Commissioner which is apparent from the impugned order itself, the writ petition is maintainable on behalf of the petitioner-union and only one set of court-fee is liable to be paid in accordance with the proposition as laid down in Annexure 1 of the Full Bench judgment in paragraph 45. Annexure-10 to the writ petition also makes it clear that application was filed before the Deputy Labour Commissioner by the petitioner. The judgment of this Court dated 24.9.2003 in Writ Petition No. 33138 of 2003 (Akhil Bhartiya Safai Mazdoor Congress v. Nagar Palika Parishad, Ghaziabad and Ors.), relied by counsel for the petitioner, copy of which has been filed as Annexure-4 to the writ petition, fully supports the contention of the petitioner. In above case also, the writ petition was filed by registered Trade Union praying for quashing the order by which it was held that Safai Mazdoor were drawing house rent allowance higher than the amount to which they were entitled and recovery was directed.
25. Only one set of court-fee was payable in the present case in view of the proposition laid down by the Full Bench in Umesh Chand Vinod Kumar's case (supra) since the petitioner which is registered trade union is entitled to espouse the case of its members and the order which was challenged was the order passed on the applications of the petitioner itself. The applications filed by the petitioner before the Deputy Labour Commissioner were annexed to the writ petition as Annexures-1, 2 and 3. There is a specific averment in the writ petition, in paragraph 2, that petitioner-Trade Union had right to sponsor the case of all the members before the Deputy Labour Commissioner under the provisions of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and the rules and regulations framed therein. The judgment of the Apex Court in Akhil Bhartiya Soshit Karamchari (Railway) Sangh's case (supra) do support the contention of counsel for the petitioner that writ petition filed by petitioner-union is fully maintainable.
26. In result, the order of the Taxing Officer dated 12th October, 2004 and the report of the Stamp Reporter dated 5th October, 2004 are quashed. The writ petition filed by the petitioner is held maintainable on payment of one set of court-fee.
27. The application stands allowed accordingly.