Is leave of the appellate authority required to maintain an appeal by a person not party to the proceedings of the land tribunal? The issue arises in the context of Section 102 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963 ('the Act' for short).
2. Suo motu proceedings were initiated under Section 72 C of the Act for assignment of the right, title and interest of the land owner and intermediary vested in the government in respect of the holding. The revision petitioner and the second respondent (since deleted) were alone arrayed as the tenant and land owner in the proceedings before the land tribunal. The Land Tribunal- III, Malappuram by order dated 12.09.1997 assigned the right, title and interest of the land owner and intermediary in favour of the revision petitioner. It is not disputed before me that the said order of the land tribunal under Section 72 F(5) of the Act is appealable before the appellate authority under Section 102 of the Act.
3. The first respondent who was not a party to the order of the land tribunal filed an appeal therefrom under Section 102 of the Act along with an application to condone the delay of 6 years, 4 months and 7 days. The first respondent contended that the revision petitioner had not produced any document to establish his tenancy under the land owner - Manjeri Kovilakam - well before 01.04.1964. The first respondent asserted that it was his grand father who took the property on lease which was later allotted to the share of his father in the partition effected in the family in the year 1986. The first respondent added that his father subsequently assigned the property to him under sale deed (document No. 1766/1997, SRO Manjeri) and that he is the cultivating tenant entitled for certificate of purchase.
4. The Appellate Authority (Land Reforms), Thrissur by order dated 21.06.2012 condoned the delay in filing the appeal and set aside the order of the land tribunal further remanding the case for denovo consideration. The appellate authority felt that an order has been obtained by the revision petitioner from the land tribunal behind the back of the first respondent warranting a fresh disposal of the lis on merits. The order of the appellate authority is impugned in this Civil Revision Petition by the revision petitioner under Section 103 of the Act raising many factual and legal issues. The main thrust of the argument of the revision petitioner is that no leave was obtained by the first respondent from the appellate authority in order to maintain an appeal from the order of the land tribunal.
5. I heard Mr. M.A. Abdul Hakhim, Advocate on behalf of the revision petitioner, Mr. S.A. Saju, Advocate on behalf of the first respondent and Mr. K.K. Saidalavi, Senior Government Pleader on behalf of the State.
6. The contention that the first respondent who was not a party to the order of the land tribunal should have obtained leave from the appellate authority to file an appeal is rested on Jacob Vs. Jayakumar [2010 (3) KLT 389]. My attention was drawn to the following observations in the said decision:
“13. ............................... The first thing to be noticed is that the appellant, being a third party to the proceedings before the Land Tribunal, whatever be the right claimed by him by virtue of a sale deed executed more than three decades after the issue of the purchase certificate, cannot maintain an appeal without preferring an application seeking leave of the Appellate Authority to entertain his appeal. He must prima facie show that he is an aggrieved party by the issue of the purchase certificate as he being a third party to the proceedings. The leave applied, if any, by him has to be considered with notice to the parties interested, the legal representatives of the tenant in whose favour the certificate was issued by the Land Tribunal. No such leave was applied for by the appellant, and the Appellate Authority also did not examine that question before entertaining the appeal preferred by the appellant - a third party. The general rule is that only parties to the proceedings are bound and affected by the decision of a Court or tribunal and he has a right to challenge the adverse order, if so provided by law. But the entertainability of the appeal depends upon the question whether he is really aggrieved by the decision rendered by the Appellate Court. Though S.72(K)(2) of the Act casts a statutory presumption that the certificate of purchase is conclusive proof of title and possession of the party in whose favour it has been issued it is open to a third party to challenge such order showing that he is an aggrieved party. Such a third party has necessarily to seek the leave of the Appellate Authority showing the ground substantiating in what way he is aggrieved by the order of the Tribunal, to entertain his appeal. The appeal preferred in the present case, without applying for leave before the Appellate Authority, on the solitary ground - itself, was not at all entertainable.”
It is the case of the revision petitioner that the appellate authority should have rejected the appeal filed by the first respondent who was a third party to the order of the land tribunal in the absence of any application for leave.
7. I shall immediately refer to Section 102 of the Act which enables either the government or any person aggrieved by an order of the land tribunal to prefer an appeal within such time as may be prescribed. It is as follows:
“102. Appeal to appellate authority-
(1) The Government or any person aggrieved by any order of the land Tribunal under sub-section (2) of Section 12, sub-section (3) of Section 13A, Section 22, Section 23, sub-section (2) of Section 26 (where the amount of arrears of rent claimed exceeds five hundred rupees), Section 31, Section 47, sub-section (3) or sub-
section (4) of Section 48, sub-section (3) of the Section 49, subsection (6) of Section 52, Section 57, sub-section (5) of the Section 66, Section 72F, Section 73, sub-section (2) of Section 77, Section 80B, sub-section (4) of Section 90, Section 106 or Section 106A may appeal against such order within such time as may be prescribed to the appellate authority.
(2) The appellate authority may admit an appeal presented after the expiration of the period prescribed under sub-section (1) if it is satisfied that the appellant had sufficient cause for not presenting it within that period.
(3) In deciding appeals under sub-section (1), the appellate authority shall exercise all the powers which a Court has and follow the same procedure which a Court follows in deciding appeals against the decree or an original Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.
(4) Where there has been any modification in appeal from any decision or order of the Land Tribunal, such decision or order shall be modified accordingly.”
8. This court as early as in Bhaskaran Vs. Aisabi [1987 (2) KLT 213] has held that the government or any person aggrieved by any order of the land tribunal under Section 72F of the Act may appeal against such order. It was observed therein as follows:
“8. Having understood the position thus, let us consider the scope of S.102 which provides for an appeal against certain orders. This section states that the Government or any person aggrieved by an order of the Land Tribunal (leaving out unnecessary parts of the Section) under S.72F, may appeal against such order within such time as may be prescribed, to the Appellate Authority. The order of the Land Tribunal falling under S.72 (F) thus is an appealable order.”
Again this Court in Govinda Pillai Vs. Madhavan Pillai [1988 (2) KLT 522] has held that a person even if not a party to the proceeding but nevertheless aggrieved has a right to file an appeal against the order. It was observed therein as follows:
“10. ................................ The content of S. 102 requires to be considered in this context. Sub-s. 1 thereof gives an aggrieved person the right to file an appeal against the order which is likely to affect his rights prejudicially. Sub-s. 2 provides that the Appellate Authority may admit an appeal presented after the expiration of the period prescribed under sub-s. 1 if it is satisfied that the appellant had sufficient cause for not presenting it within the prescribed period. The plain and unambiguous language employed in these two sub-sections make it clear that the legislature intended that a person even if he is not a party to the proceeding but nevertheless aggrieved by an order passed by the authority under any of the provisions made mention of in sub-s.1 of S.102, has a right to file an appeal against the said order.” (emphasis supplied) I have followed the aforequoted decisions in Rajammal and others Vs. Hajira and others [2012 (3) KLT 420] which has since been approved by another learned Judge in CRP(LR) No. 503/2012 about which I shall deal now.
9. Mr. Justice Thomas P. Joseph in Kattalappurath Lakshmi and another Vs. Paipparambath Janardhanan and others [CRP(LR) No. 503/2012] has dealt with the necessity of leave to file an appeal as follows:
“7. Section 102(1) of the KLR Act enables the Government or any person aggrieved by the order of the Tribunal to prefer appeal against such order to the Appellate Authority. Going by the plain, unambiguous words of that section, the right of appeal is not confined to a party aggrieved but, to “any person aggrieved”. The “person aggrieved” by the order of the Tribunal need not necessarily be a party to the proceeding. Hence, even if the person aggrieved is not a party to the proceeding before the Tribunal, he is entitled, as of right to prefer an appeal to the Appellate Authority. For that, leave of the Appellate Authority is not required. Of course it is for the Appellate Authority to decide whether the person preferring the appeal is aggrieved by the order appealed against.” (emphasis supplied).
10. I fully endorse the view of Mr. Justice Thomas P. Joseph in holding that 'any person aggrieved' by the order of the land tribunal may appeal going by the plain and unambiguous words in Section 102 of the Act. The statutory provision is elastic to contain an appeal filed by any person aggrieved for which no leave of the appellate authority is required to be granted with notice to the parties interested. The difference between 'any person aggrieved' and the person 'aggrieved by any order' of the land tribunal is significant and obviates the necessity to obtain leave to appeal. It is ofcourse for the appellate authority to decide as to whether the third party filing the appeal is any way aggrieved or his interests prejudicially affected by the order impugned. Leave to file an appeal is insisted only if the statutory provision enabling the appeal to be filed confines the power available to the person aggrieved by the order sought to be impugned.
11. The plea to refer the question to a larger bench has been turned down by the same learned Judge in Kattalappurath Lakshmi and another Vs. Paipparambath Janardhanan and others [CRP(LR) No. 503/2012]. It was observed therein as follows:
“10. .............................. Since it is against the plain, unambiguous language of Sec. 102 (1) of the KLR Act and without noticing the decisions in Bhaskaran V. Aisabi and Govinda Pillai V. Madhavan Pillai, Vareed Jacob V. Jayakumar cannot be taken as laying down the correct law. Nor is a reference to a larger Bench required as the earlier decisions are not considered in the latter decision. Bhaskaran V. Aisabi, Govinda Pillai V. Madhavan Pillai and Rajammal V. Hajira being in accordance with the intention of the legislature expressed in Sec. 102(1) of the KLR Act lay down the correct position of the law.”
I concur with the learned Judge that Vareed Jacob Vs. Jayakumar [2010 (3) KLT 389] in so far as it holds that a third party cannot maintain an appeal without seeking leave of the appellate authority does not lay down the correct law. The plain and unambiguous language of Section 102 of the Act is overlooked and the earlier decisions on the point had not been referred to in Vareed Jacob's case.
12. A very liberal approach has to be adopted in the matter of condonation of delay when a person not party to the proceedings files an appeal stating that his rights are prejudicially affected by the order impugned. The specific case of the first respondent is that the revision petitioner has obtained the certificate of purchase from the land tribunal without impleading him in respect of the lands owned and possessed by him. The first respondent has stated in the application for condonation of delay that he knew about the order of the land tribunal granting certificate of purchase only very recently while he was tilling the lands. The appellate authority has in its discretion thought it fit to condone the delay reckoning the period of limitation from the date of knowledge also taking note of the stakes involved. The appellate authority has found that the first respondent is a 'person aggrieved' by the order of the land tribunal granting certificate of purchase to the revision petitioner in respect of the lands. I do not intend to interfere with the course adopted by the appellate authority even though I vacate all the observations on merit lest it influences the land tribunal in the proceedings after remand. I confirm the order of remand making it clear that the land tribunal shall endeavour to take the proceedings to a logical end within a period of six months after notice to the parties interested.
The Civil Revision Petition is dismissed. No costs.
ncd V. CHITAMBARESH JUDGE