1. Heard Sri Rahul Agarwal, learned counsel for the applicant and Sri Navneet Chandra Tripathi, learned counsel for the opposite party.
2. Present is an application filed under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act'). The application was filed on 12.07.2019 with a prayer to appoint an independent arbitrator, to adjudicate the disputes that have arisen between the parties under a written contract dated 01.03.2010 entered into between the applicant and the Chief Project Manager, Railway Electrification for the work "Design, Supply, Erection, Testing & Commissioning of 25 KV, AC, 50 Hz, Single Phase, Traction Overhead Equipments, Switching Stations, Booster Transformer Stations, LT Supply Transformer Stations and All Ancillary Equipments Madurai (Excl.)-Tuticorin-Vanchimaniyanchi-Nagercoil (Excl.) of Southern Railway", valued at Rs. 24,97,54,357/- (Rupees Twenty Four Crores Ninety Seven Lakhs Fifty Four Thousand Three Hundred Fifty Seven only).
3. Before approaching this Court, the applicant had issued the statutory notice dated 31.12.2018, invoking arbitration. Referring to Section 12(5) of the Act (as enforced w.e.f. 23.10.2015), the applicant expressed its desire for appointment of an independent arbitral tribunal and for that purpose nominated a retired Judge of this Court. It required the opposite party to nominate an arbitrator of its choice so that the two arbitrators (thus appointed), may nominate a third arbitrator. The three arbitrators together were to constitute the arbitral tribunal.
4. In response to the above notice, on 21.01.2019, the opposite party denied the request for arbitration. It stated, under Clause 1.2.54(b)(i), the arbitration could be sought only after 120 days and before completion of 180 days from the date of presentation of the final bill. Since, the final bill payment was made on 13.06.2016, the request for arbitration first made on 31.12.2018, was outside the said period. Therefore, it was stated to be lacking in 'locus standi'. Second, it was stated that the 'No Claim Certificate' issued by the applicant while obtaining the final payment contained an undertaking to the following effect:
"1. The undersigned is in receipt of the above referred letter in connection with the subject matter. Your attention is invited to Tender Clause No. 1.2.54(b)(i) wherein it is clearly stated that after 120 days but within 180 days of his presenting final claim on disputed matters shall demand in writing that the dispute or difference be referred to arbitration. But it is to inform that you had advised vide your letter No. TPL/RLY/VPT/019/3006-2 dated 30.06.2016 that you had received the final Bill payment on 13 June, 2016. As you have failed to seek any redressal of grievance within the aforesaid period, your demand for arbitration does not have any locus-standi at this distant date.
2. It shall be also noted that you have submitted a "No Claim Certificate" under Signature and seal of firm, in which it states "should any claim be raised by us in future under this agreement, the same shall be nullified by virtue of this indenture".
3. Similarly, your attention is invited to Clause No. 17 of the "Preamble" (Page No.8 of the tender paper) which states that General Conditions of Contract of concerned Railway as amended for advance correction slips issued up to date shall be part of the contract. The clause no. 63 of latest GCC provies that no such notice of dispute shall be served later than 30 days after the date of issue of completion certificate by the Engineer. The Completion Certificate was issued on 15.03.2015. Hence, it is regretted to inform you that Railway is not in a position to entertain your demand for arbitration at this farthest date as the same is not admissible at this juncture."
Third, referring to Clause 17 of the Preamble to the agreement and thereby invoking Clause 63 of the General Conditions of Contract (hereinafter referred to as the 'GCC'), it was further objected that no dispute could be raised for adjudication through arbitration, later than 30 days after the date of issuance of the Completion Certificate which in this case was 15.3.2015. Further, communications dated 22.1.2019 and 10.1.2019 appear to have been issued by other authorities of the opposite party, again taking an objection as to limitation, and no other.
5. It is at that stage that the present application was filed wherein, upon exchange of pleadings, the matter was heard on 24.10.2019 and an order proposing to appoint an independent arbitrator was passed on that date. It reads:
"1. Present application has been filed under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to Arbitration Act) seeking appointment of independent arbitrator with respect to payment dispute that are claimed to be existing between the parties under a written agreement dated 01.3.2010 between the Chief Project Manager, Railway Electrification, Chennai of the Ministry of Railways, Railway Board and the applicants for design, supply, erection, testing and commissioning of 25 KV, A.C. Single phase 50 Hz, Traction Overhead Equipments, Switching Stations, Booster Transformer Stations and LT supply Transformer Stations in Madurai (Excl)-Tuticorin-Vanchimaniyachi-Nagercoil (Excl) Gr. 154 of Southern Railway under RE-project Chennai.
2. The applicant claims to have successfully executed that work but is aggrieved by the fact that full payments have not been made to it. Relying on the arbitration clause 1.2.54 of the general terms of the contract, it has been submitted that in the first place, the applicant had issued a notice dated 8.8.2018 (Annexure-4 to the application) in terms of Clause 1.2.54 (a). The railways did not offer any resolution of that dispute within the prescribed period of 120 days. Therefore, again in accordance with Clause 1.2.54 (d) (i), the applicant issued a further notice to the respondent addressed to the Chief Project Manager, Railway Electrification, Chennai for appointment of an arbitrator. By means of paragraph-11, the applicant also proposed the name of an arbitrator proposed to be appointed.
3. As a fact, the respondent did not appoint any arbitrator and did not offer any panel of arbitrators to the applicants. In fact, by a communication dated 22.1.2019 issued by the Deputy CEE (PSI), the applicant was informed that no claim certificate had been issued by it on 26.5.2016, copy of the same was also annexed. In addition, it was mentioned that the notice dated 31.12.2018 should have been addressed to the General Manager/CORE, Allahabad as the dispute may have been referred only by the General Manager.
4. In such facts, the present application has been filed by the applicant claiming, in the first place, existence of arbitration clause whereunder the payment dispute is required to the resolution. Further, it has been claimed that despite all efforts made by the applicant and despite procedure having been followed, the respondents have failed to constitute the arbitral Tribunal and therefore, this Court may appoint an independent arbitrator in terms of Section 11 of the Act.
5. Heard Sri Varad Nath, Advocate holding brief for Sri Rahul Agarwal, learned counsel for the applicant and Sri N.C. Tripathi, learned counsel for the respondent.
6. Pleadings have been exchanged and the matter has been heard. At the outset, objections have been raised as to the maintainability of the present case. In that regard, it has been submitted that the work was executed at Chennai, though the headquarter of the respondent is at Allahabad, however, no part of the cause of action had arisen at Allahabad. In short, it is submitted that this Court does not have territorial jurisdiction to interfere the present application under Section 11 of the Act. The aforesaid preliminary objections has been met by the learned counsel for the applicant by placing reliance on a recent decision of Supreme Court in Brahmani River Pellets Ltd. Vs. Kamachi Industries Ltd., AIR 2019 SC 3658 wherein it has been observed as below:
"16. Where the contract specified the jurisdiction of the court at a particular place, only such court will have the jurisdiction to deal with the matter and parties intended to exclude all other courts. In the present case, the parties have agreed that the 'venue' of arbitration shall be at Bhubaneswar. Considering the agreement of the parties having Bhubaneswar as the venue of arbitration, the intention of the parties is to exclude all other courts. As held in Swastik, non-use of words like 'exclusive jurisdiction', 'only', 'exclusive', 'alone' is not decisive and does not make any material difference.
17. When the parties have agreed to have the 'venue' of arbitration at Bhubaneswar, the Madras High Court erred in assuming the jurisdiction under Section 11(6) of the Act, Since only Orrisa High Court will have the jurisdiction to entertain the petition filed under Section 11 (6) of the Act, the impugned order is liable to set aside."
7. In that case, the relevant clause with regard to venue was clause 18 between those parties which read as below:
"18. Arbitration shall be under Indian Arbitration and Conciliation Law 1996 and the Venue of Arbitration shall be Bhubaneswar".
8. Thus, in view of the fact that the parties had agreed to provide for venue of arbitration at Bhubaneswar, the Supreme Court has laid down the law that the jurisdiction to entertain an application under Section 11 (6) of the Act would have been with the High Court having jurisdiction over Bhubaneswar and not the High Court of Madras which has not jurisdiction over Bhubaneswar.
9. In the present case, the venue clause is contained in Clause 1.2.54(k) which is quoted below:
" The venue for an arbitration shall be the place from which the Letter of Acceptance of Tender is issued or such other place as the purchaser at his discretion may determine."
10. Undisputedly, the letter of acceptance of tender which would, in the first place, constitute venue of arbitration is at Allahabad. That letter of acceptance is dated 2.2.2010 (Annexure-1 to the application).
11. Therefore, in view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court, the preliminary objection raised by Sri Tripathi, learned counsel for the respondents cannot be accepted. Sri Tripathi has placed reliance on the orders of two learned Single Judges of this Court, passed in Arbitration and Conciliation Application U/s 11 (4) Nos.39 of 2012 and 148 of 2018 decided on 19.7.2017 and 29.4.2019 respectively which are no longer good law in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Brahmani River Pellets Ltd. (supra).
12. In the present case, the venue clause clearly provides that venue of arbitration would be at Allahabad in view of the letter acceptance having been issued from Allahabad. The further stipulation in venue clause providing for any other venue at the discretion of the respondent may not bar the jurisdiction of this Court, inasmuch as, no other place of arbitration has yet been provided or specified.
13. Then, second objection has been raised by Sri N.C. Tripathi of procedure for appointment of arbitrator being not complied with. In that regard, it has been submitted, under Clause 1.2.54 d (ii), the notice, seeking appointment of arbitration should have been issued to the General Manager. Inasmuch as, the notice was not issued to that authority, the procedure was not complied with to any extent. Second, it has been stated that in any case if at all, any arbitrator was to be appointed, it had to be in accordance with law, from the panel prepared by the respondent. The applicant had itself appointed an arbitrator suo moto, outside such panel, therefore, the procedure stood violated. In that regard, reliance has been placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India Vs. Parmar Construction Company (2019) 5 SCALE 453.
14. The aforesaid objection has been met by learned counsel for the applicant who would submit that as the applicant had fully complied with the procedure by first issuing the notice dated 8.8.2018 seeking resolution of the dispute by the Railway Authority themselves. Admittedly, that resolution was never offered by the Railway Authority. Accordingly, the applicant issued the notice dated 31.12.2018 after expiry of 120 days time period prescribed under Clause 1.2.54 (b) (i) of the general terms. Since the contract had been signed by the Chief Project Manager, Railway Electrification, Chennai, the notice was issued, addressed to him. Referring to Clause 1.2.54 (d) (ii), it has been submitted that the said clause does not stipulate issuance of notice to the General Manager. In so far as the applicant had issued the notice to the authority who had executed the contract on behalf of the Railway and who was the Chief Project Manager, Railway Electrification, there was no defect in issuance of the notice.
15. Referring to various clauses of the notice, it has then been submitted that clearly, the applicant had brought out the existence of unresolved dispute between the parties and sought appointment of arbitrator. Merely because the applicant had proposed the name of arbitrator, did not introduce an invalidity in the notice as may lead to the inference that the prescribed procedure for appointment of arbitrator had been violated. In face of that notice, it was clear that the applicant was seeking arbitration under the agreement for resolution of the dispute. It cannot be denied that there exists a dispute at least on a prima facie, basis. It would have remained for the respondent to omit the name of the arbitrator proposed by the applicant and in his place to propose the names of arbitrator as contained in the general terms and conditions.
16. In so far as the respondents did not give any such reply and did not propose any panel of arbitration, they cannot be heard to say that the procedure had been violated. In fact, referring to the reply dated 22.1.2019, it has been submitted that the arbitration was refused mainly not on account of the fact that the procedure prescribed had not been followed but on an understanding of the respondent that no dispute survived in face of no claim certificate dated 26.5.2016 having been issued.
17. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, in so far as the procedure prescribed is concerned, clearly the Railways did not respond to the first notice dated 8.8.2018 issued under Clause 1.2.54 (b) (i). To that extent, undisputedly, the procedure stood complied. Coming to the notice seeking appointment for arbitration, again perusal of the notice dated 31.12.2018 brings out the grievance of the applicant with respect to non-payment (claimed) and further non resolution of that dispute within a period of 120 days from the notice dated 8.8.2018.
18. Thereafter, though the applicant proposed the name of an arbitrator which it sought to appoint yet, in paragraph-12 of the same, notice had addressed the respondent to appoint its arbitrator in terms of the Act.
19. Accordingly, it has to be accepted that the arbitration had been sought by the applicant in terms of the Act and also it had exercised its objection permissible to be raised under Section 12 (5) of the Act. The fact that it had proposed the name of independent arbitrator may, therefore, remain a proposal made by the applicant but not a conduct as may be read to have violated the procedure itself. The railway-respondent may have been within its rights to oppose the name proposed by the applicant, however, they cannot claim that by proposing such name, the applicant had violated the procedure. Therefore, the second objection as to violation of procedure also does not merit acceptance.
20. Third, in view of the observation made above, the objection raised by Sri Tripathi to proposal to appoint an independent arbitrator outside the panel of arbitrators available with the respondent, also cannot be accepted. In the first place, the applicant had exercised its right to object to the appointment as arbitrator, any person who may have been a railway employee. Second, the railway never proposed any names to the applicant for appointment of arbitrator. Therefore, it has to be accepted that it remained from the parties to appoint the consented arbitrator.
21. Present application has been filed after expiry of statutory period from the issuance of notice dated 31.12.2018, therefore, in that regard, the application does not suffer from any infirmity. Last, it has been submitted that the applicant had submitted his no claim certificate in unequivocal terms. Though, prima facie, it appears that such no claim certificate had been issued, however, that issue pertains to merits of the claim proposed to be filed and not to the maintainability or merits of the present application which has to remain confined to provide for a forum where a claim may arise. Therefore, leaving all rights open to the respondent to object to the claim that is proposed to be filed before the learned arbitrator proposed to be appointed, that objection cannot be entertained at this stage.
22. In this context, it has been stated by learned counsel for the applicant that three other similar applications involving similar nature of disputes arising inter-parties, matters have been referred to arbitration to Mr. Justice Tarun Agarwala, Chief Justice (Retired) Meghalaya High Court, residing at Delhi/NCR: A-5, Sector 14, NOIDA, Tel. (0120) 2510066, 1515596 (Mob. No. 9415307976, 7705007976). In view of such facts, it is desirable that the parties may be at convenience, if they, are offered the same learned arbitrator.
23. In view of the above, this Court proposes to appoint Mr Justice Tarun Agarwala, Chief Justice (Retired) Meghalaya High Court, as the sole Arbitrator, subject to his consent under Section 11(8) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
24. The Registry is directed to obtain consent of the proposed Arbitrator, in terms of Section 11(8) of the aforesaid Act within three weeks.
25. List after four weeks."
6. Thus, the objections raised by the opposite party (at that stage) were rejected and a named arbitrator was proposed to be appointed. His consent was sought. It is a matter of record that the consent of the named arbitrator has been received.
7. In the meanwhile, the opposite party has filed Application No. 6 of 2020, in these proceedings (Arbitration And Conciliation Application u/s-11(4) No. - 68 of 2019) and has prayed for modification and/or recall of the order dated 24.10.2019. The said application has been pressed on two grounds only. First, relying on a later decision of the Supreme Court in Central Organization for Railway Electrification Vs. M/S ECI-SPIC-SMO-MCML (JV) A Joint Venture Company; 2019 SCC OnLine 1635, it has been submitted that the Court may appoint an arbitrator/arbitral tribunal only in accordance with the terms of the contract and not otherwise i.e. the arbitrator, if any, may be appointed from the panel of arbitrators of the said opposite party only. Second, relying on Appellate Tribunal and Other Authorities (Qualifications, Experience and other Conditions of Service of Member) Rules, 2020, it has been submitted, the named arbitrator, proposed by the order dated 24.10.2019, has incurred a legal ineligibility, to arbitrate the dispute between the parties.
8. Opposing the said objections/recall/review sought, Sri Rahul Agarwal has first invoked the principle that a later decision may never offer a ground to review any order. He relied a decision of the Supreme Court (majority view) in Beghar Foundation Vs. K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.); (2021) 123 taxman.com 344 (SC). He has also relied on a later order of the Supreme Court passed in Special Leave to Appeal (C) Nos. 12670/2020 (Union of India Vs. M/S Tantia Constructions Limited), dated 11.01.2021, whereby the correctness of the decision of the Supreme Court in Central Organization for Railway Electrification (supra) has been doubted and referred to a larger Bench of the Supreme Court.
9. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, first, the objection being raised by Sri Rahul Agarwal is found to be too technical to merit acceptance. By the order dated 24.10.2019, no final decision had been made by the Court. Only a named arbitrator had been proposed to be appointed after hearing the parties on the submissions as had been made, at that stage. However, the proceeding for appointment of the arbitrator has remained pending, as before.
10. Neither under the Act nor under the Rules of the Court, there is any stipulation as may require the Court to decide all objections to an application (moved under Section 11 of the Act), by one order and to appoint the arbitrator by another order. It is a rule of convenience adopted by the Court while dealing with such applications that first, upon any such application being filed, disclosing existence of arbitration agreement between the parties, prima facie existence of an arbitrable dispute and failure to constitute an arbitral tribunal in accordance with the procedure agreed to between the parties, a notice is issued to the opposite party/parties. At the second stage, any objection that is raised to the application is dealt with and thereafter consent of the proposed arbitrator is sought. At the third stage, after receipt of that consent, and normally, in the absence of any further objection, the appointment is made and the application disposed of. If, however, any other or further objection arises, then, there is nothing, either under Section 11 of the Act or otherwise, to prevent the Court from dealing with that objection at the third stage. Before any order could be passed to confirm the order dated 24.10.2019 and thus appoint the proposed arbitrator and decide finally the proceeding, the opposite party filed Application No. 6 of 2020. Though titled - application for review/recall the order dated 24.10.2019, in effect, and for all legal consequences, it is an application praying to the Court to not confirm its order dated 24.10.2019. Looked at in the context of the scope and the current status of the proceeding, the order dated 24.10.2019 is no better than a pure interlocutory/procedural order in a proceeding that is still pending. It is an order that neither decides the point in dispute finally nor it otherwise hinders the Court from passing a final order contrary to any observation made in it, on the basis of any further objection now raised. Accordingly, the matter has been heard again at length, at the stage of confirmation of the order dated 24.10.2019.
11. Then, learned counsel for the applicant submits that the applicant had been awarded a contract for the work - "Design, Supply, Erection, Testing & Commissioning of 25 KV, AC, 50 Hz, Single Phase, Traction Overhead Equipments, Switching Stations, Booster Transformer Stations, LT Supply Transformer Stations and All Ancillary Equipments Madurai (Excl.)-Tuticorin-Vanchimaniyanchi-Nagercoil (Excl.) of Southern Railway", on 1.3.2010. The said agreement contained General Conditions of Contract 1.2.2, which reads as below:
"Conditions of Contract : 1.2.2 If the Tender submitted by a Tenderer is accepted and the contract awarded to the Tenderer, the various works coming under the purview of the contract shall be governed by the terms and conditions included in the Tender papers covering the following :
(i) Preamble to the Tender Papers.
(ii) Instructions to Tenderers and conditions of Tendering, as included in Part-I, Chapter-I.
(iii) Conditions of contract, as included in this chapter.
(iv) Prices and Payments, as included in Part-I Chapter-III.
(v) Explanatory notes of Schedule 1, Schedule of prices, Part-I, Chapter-IV.
(vi) General specifications, as included or referred to in Part-II and
(vii) Particular specifications, as included or referred to in Part-III, and
(viii) Annexures under Part-IV and Forms under Part-V and as modified or amended by the letter of acceptance of the tender.
12. The arbitration clause is found contained in Clause 1.2.54 of that agreement. It reads as under:
"ARBITRATION: 1.2.54
(a) MATTERS FINALLY DETERMINED BY THE RAILWAY:
All disputes and differences of any kind whatsoever arising out of or in connection with the contract, whether during the progress of the work or after its completion and whether before or after the determination of the contract shall be referred by the contractor to the Railway Electrification and the Railway Electrification shall within 120 days after receipt of the Contractor's representation make and notify decisions on all matters referred to by the contractor in writing provided that matters for which specific provision has been made in clauses 1.1.10(b), 1.2.9, 1.2.14(a)(v), 1.2.14(d)(i), 1.2.14(d)(ii), 1.2.23, 1.2.29, 1.2.57, 1.2.59, 1.2.60, 1.2.61, 1.2.62, 1.3.2(j) and 1.3.17(c) of this tender paper shall be deemed as 'excepted matters' and decisions of the Railway Electrification authority, thereon shall be final and binding on the contractor provided further that 'excepted matters' shall stand specifically excluded from the purview of the arbitration clause and not be referred to arbitration.
(b)(i) DEMAND FOR ARBITRATION In the event of any dispute or difference between the parties hereto as to the construction or operation of this contract, or the respective rights and liabilities of the parties or any matter in question, dispute or difference on any account or as to the withholding by the Railway Electrification of any certificate to which the contractor may claim to be entitled to, or if the Railway Electrification fails to make a decision within 120 days, then and in any such case, but except in any of the 'excepted matters' referred to in clause 1.2.54(a) above of these conditions, the contractor, after 120 days but within 180 days of his presenting his final claim on disputed matters, shall demand in writing that the dispute or difference be referred to arbitration.
(b) (ii) The demand for arbitration shall specify the matters which are in question or subject of the dispute or difference as also the amount of claim itemwise. Only such dispute(s) or difference(s) in respect of which the demand has been made together with counter claims or set off shall be referred to arbitration and other matters shall not be included in the reference.
(A) The Arbitration proceedings shall be assumed to have commenced from the day a written and valid demand for arbitration is received by the Railway.
(B) The claimant shall submit his claim stating the facts supporting the claims along with all relevant documents and the relief or remedy sought against each claim within a period of 30 days from the date of appointment of the arbitral tribunal.
(C) The Railway Electrification shall submit its defence statement and counter claim(s), if any, within a period of 60 days of receipt of copy of claims from Tribunal thereafter, unless otherwise extension has been granted by Tribunal.
(b) (iii) No new claim shall be added during proceedings by either party. However, a party may amend or supplement the original claim or defence thereof during the course of arbitration proceedings subject to acceptance by Tribunal having due regard to the delay in making it.
(b) (iv) If the contractor(s) does/do not prefer his/their specific and final claims in writing, within a period of 90 days of receiving the intimation from the Railway Electrification that the final bill is ready for payment, he/they will be deemed to have waived his/their claim(s) and the Railway Electrification shall be discharged and released of all liabilities under the contract in respect of these claims.
(c) Obligation during pendency of arbitration Work under the contract shall unless otherwise directed by the engineer, continue during the arbitration proceedings, and no payment due or payable by the Railway Electrification shall be withheld on account of such proceedings, provided, however, it shall be open for arbitral tribunal to consider and decide whether or not such work should continue during arbitration proceedings.
(d)(i) In cases where the total value of all claims in question added together does not exceed Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees ten lakhs only), the arbitral tribunal consist of a sole arbitrator who shall be either the General Manager or a gazetted officer of Railway not below the grade of JA grade nominated by the General Manager in that behalf. The sole arbitrator shall be appointed within 60 days from the day when a written and valid demand for arbitration is received by Railway.
(d)(ii) In cases not covered by clause 1.2.54 (d)(i), the arbitral tribunal shall consist of a panel of three Gazetted Railway Electrification Officers not below JA grade, as the arbitrators. For this purpose, the Railway Electrification will send a panel of more than 3 names of Gazetted Railway Officers of one or more departments, of the Railway Electrification to the contractor who will be asked to suggest to General Manager upto 2 names out of the panel for appointment as contractor's nominee. The General Manager shall appoint at least one out of them as the contractor's nominee and will, also simultaneously appoint the balance number of arbitrators either from the panel or from outside the panel, duly indicating the presiding arbitrator from amongst the 3 arbitrators so appointed, within 60 days. While nominating the arbitrators it will be necessary to ensure that one of them is from the Accounts department. As officer of Selection Grade of the Accounts department shall be considered of equal status to the officers in SA grade of other departments of the Railways for the purpose of appointment of arbitrators.
(d)(iii) If one or more of the arbitrators appointed as above refuses to act as arbitrator, withdraws from his office as arbitrator, or vacates his/their office/offices or is/are unable or unwilling to perform his functions as arbitrator for any reason whatsoever or dies or in the opinion of the General Manager fails to act without undue delay, the General Manager shall appoint new arbitrator/arbitrators to act in his/their place in the same manner in which the earliest arbitrator/arbitrators had been appointed. Such re-constituted Tribunal may at its discretion, proceed with the reference from the stage at which it was left by the previous arbitrator(s).
(d)(iv) The arbitral tribunal shall have power to call for such evidence by way of affidavits or otherwise as the arbitral tribunal shall think proper, and it shall be the duty of the parties thereto to do or cause to be done all such things as be necessary to enable the arbitral tribunal to make the award without any delay.
(d)(v) While appointing arbitrator(s) under sub-clause 1.2.54 d(i), d(ii) and d(iii) above, due care shall be taken that he/they is/are not the one/those who had an opportunity to deal with the matters to which the contract relates or who in the course of his/their duties as Railway servant(s) expressed views on all or any of the matters under dispute or differences. The proceedings of the arbitral tribunal or the award made by such Tribunal will, however, not be invalid merely for the reason that one or more arbitrator had, in the course of his service, opportunity to deal with the matters to which the contract relates or who in the course of his/their duties expressed views on all or any of the matters under dispute.
(e)(i) The arbitral award shall state item wise, the sum and reasons upon which it is based.
(e)(ii) A party may apply for corrections of any computational errors, any typographical or clerical errors or any other error of similar nature occurring in the award and interpretation of a specific point of award to tribunal within 30 days of receipt of the award.
(e)(iii) A party may apply to tribunal within 30 days of receipt of award to make an additional award as to claims presented in the arbitral proceedings but omitted from the arbitral award.
(f) In case of the Tribunal, comprising of three Members, any ruling or award shall be made by a majority of Members of Tribunal. In the absence of such a majority, the views of the Presiding arbitrator shall prevail.
(g) Where the arbitral award is for the payment of money, no interest shall be payable on whole or any part of the money for any period till the date on which the award is made.
(h) The cost of arbitration shall be borne by the respective parties. The cost shall inter-alia include fee of the arbitrator(s) as per the rates fixed by the Railway Administration from time to time.
(i) Subject to the provisions of the aforesaid Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 and the rules there under and any statutory modification thereof shall apply to the arbitration proceedings under this clause.
(j) ASSESSMENT OF COST Upon every and any such reference the assessment of the cost incidental to the reference and award respectively shall be at the decision of the sole arbitrator or of the presiding arbitrator as the case may be.
(k) VENUE The venue for an arbitration shall be the place from which the Letter of Acceptance of Tender is issued or such other place as the Purchaser at this discretion may determine."
13. Referring to the aforesaid clause, specifically Clause 1.2.54(d)(ii), it has been submitted that the value of the dispute being in excess of Rs. 1 crore, that clause would govern the arbitration sought by the applicant. Next, referring to the stipulation in the aforesaid sub-Clause (d)(ii), providing for a panel of three arbitrators - all Gazetted Railway Electrification Officers, not below JA grade, it has been submitted that the said clause falls foul with Section 12(5) of the Act that came into force w.e.f. 23.10.2015. Since, no arbitrator could be appointed under that clause, it has been submitted that the applicant had not erred in seeking appointment of an independent arbitral tribunal, as proposed by the notice dated 31.12.2018. Further, the present application is also wholly maintainable and there is no error in the order dated 24.10.2019. It may be confirmed.
14. Also, it has been submitted, by virtue of Clause 1.2.2 read with the Clause 17 of the Preamble to the Tender Papers to the contract, as was executed on 01.03.2010, the terms and conditions contained in the GCC as they existed on the date of the execution of the contract alone would bind the parties. In that regard, Clause 17 of the Preamble to the contract entered into between the parties, is quoted below:
"17. General Conditions of the Contract - 'General Conditions of Contract' of concerned Railway as amended for advance correction slips issued upto date, shall be part of the contract. This may be obtained by the tenderer/contractor on payment from any Divisional Railway Manager's office of concerned Railway in which the present section lies."
15. Then, referring to Clause 64(3)(a)(ii) of the GCC as was existing in the year 2010, he would submit, the invalidity in the arbitral tribunal proposed by the railway by virtue of Section 12(5) of the Act would attract to that clause as well. Clause 64(3) of the GCC (2010), reads as below:
"64(3)(a)(i) - In cases where the total value of all claims in question added together does not exceed Rs. 10,00,000/- (Rupees ten lakhs only), the arbitral tribunal shall consist of a sole arbitrator who shall be a gazetted officer of Railway not below JA grade, nominated by the General Manager. The sole arbitrator shall be appointed within 60 days from the day when a written and valid demand for arbitration is received by GM.
64(3)(a)(ii) - In cases not covered by the clause 64(3)(a)(i), the arbitral tribunal shall consist of a Panel of three Gazetted Rly. Officers not below JA grade or 2 Railway Gazetted Officers not below JA Grade and a retired Railway Officer, retired not below the rank of SAG Officer, as the arbitrators. For this purpose, the Railway will send a panel of more than 3 names of Gazetted Rly. Officers, of one or more departments of the Rly. which may also include the name(s) of retired Railway Officer(s) empanelled to work as Railway arbitrator to the contractor within 60 days from the day when a written and valid demand for arbitration is received by the GM. Contractor will be asked to suggest to General Manager at least 2 names out of the panel for appointment as contractor's nominee within 30 days from the date of dispatch of the request by Railway. The General Manager shall appoint at least one out of them as the contractor's nominee and will, also simultaneously appoint the balance number of arbitrators either from the panel or from outside the panel, duly indicating the 'presiding arbitrator' from amongst the 3 arbitrators so appointed. GM shall complete this exercise of appointing the arbitral tribunal within 30 days from the receipt of the names of contractor's nominees. While nominating the arbitrators it will be necessary to ensure that one of them is from the Accounts department. An officer of Selection Grade of the Accounts Department shall be considered of equal status to the officers in SA grade of other departments of the Railway for the purpose of appointment of arbitrator.
64(3)(a)(iii) - If one or more of the arbitrators appointed as above refuses to act as arbitrator, withdraws from his office as arbitrator, or vacates his/their office/offices or is/are unable or unwilling to perform his functions as arbitrator for any reason whatsoever or dies or in the opinion of the General Manager fails to act without undue delay, the General Manager shall appoint new arbitrator/arbitrators to act in his/their place in the same manner in which the earlier arbitrator/arbitrators had been appointed. Such re-constituted Tribunal may, at its discretion, proceed with the reference from the stage at which it was left by the previous arbitrator(s).
64(3)(a)(iv) - The arbitral tribunal shall have power to call for such evidence by way of affidavits or otherwise as the arbitral tribunal shall think proper, and it shall be the duty of the parties hereto do or cause ot be done all such things as may be necessary to enable the arbitral tribunal to make the award without any delay. The arbitral tribunal should record day-to-day proceedings. The proceedings shall normally be conducted on the basis of documents and written statements.
64(3)(a)(v) - While appointing arbitrator(s) under sub-clause (i), (ii) & (iii) above, due care shall be taken that he/they is/are not the one/those who had an opportunity to deal with the matters to which the contract relates or who in the course of his/their duties as Railway servant(s) expressed views on all or any of the matters under dispute or differences. The proceedings of the arbitral tribunal or the award made by such Tribunal will, however, not be invalid merely for the reason that one or more arbitrator had, in the course of his service, opportunity to deal with the matters to which the contract relates or who in the course of his/their duties expressed views on all or any of the matters under dispute.
64(3)(b)(i) - The arbitral award shall state item wise, the sum and reasons upon which it is based. The analysis and reasons shall be detailed enough so that the award could be inferred there from.
64(3)(b)(ii) - A party may apply for corrections of any computational errors, any typographical or clerical errors or any other error of similar nature occurring in the award of a tribunal and interpretation of a specific point of award to tribunal within 60 days of receipt of the award.
64(3)(b)(iii) - A party may apply to tribunal within 60 days of receipt of award to make an additional award as to claims presented in the arbitral proceedings but omitted from the arbitral award."
16. Here, it has been submitted that at no stage of the proceedings, the applicant waived his rights arising from Section 12(5) of the Act. To further his submissions, Sri Agarwal states, in the present case, the work awarded on 01.03.2010 was completed on 15.03.2015, when the completion certificate came to be issued. Therefore, by no stretch of imagination, the amended GCC (2016) or GCC (2019) would ever attract to these proceedings as the amendments made to the GCC after 01.03.2010 came into existence after the work stood completed.
17. It has also been pointed out that earlier the applicant had instituted before the Court at Hyderabad, a proceeding under Section 8 of the Act. In that proceeding, an objection had been raised by the railway, relying on Clause 1.2.54 of the terms of the contract. Clause 1.2.54 constitutes the special terms of contract entered into between the parties. Hence, the general arbitration clause contained in Clause 64 of the GCC (2010) would not be applicable.
18. Responding to the above, Sri Navneet Chandra Tripathi, learned counsel appearing for the opposite party would submit that the learned named arbitrator (as proposed) cannot be appointed as the arbitrator, in light of the decision of the Supreme Court in Central Organization for Railway Electrification (supra). In that case also, this Court had appointed an independent arbitrator overlooking the stipulations contained in Clause 64(3)(a)(ii) and Clause 64(3)(b) of the GCC (2016). The Supreme Court held - even while making an appointment under Section 11 of the Act, the Court could not have overlooked the conditions of contract between the parties governing the constitution of the arbitral tribunal. In fact, the Court was bound to apply those conditions and appoint the arbitrator/arbitral tribunal, accordingly.
19. Further, it has been submitted, even in that case, the amended GCC (2016) was taken into consideration by the Supreme Court and the arbitral tribunal was constituted from the panel of retired railway officers with respect to a contract executed prior to coming into existence of the GCC (2016). Last, it has been submitted that, in the present case, the claim made for appointment of an arbitrator is wholly time barred, as has been clearly stated by the opposite party in their communications dated 21.1.2019, 22.1.2019 and 10.1.2019, all in response to the statutory notice for appointment of an independent arbitrator dated 31.12.2018. No other or further objection has been raised.
20. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and having perused the record, in the first place, it is undisputed between the parties that the contract had been awarded to the applicant on 01.03.2010 and the completion certificate was issued on 15.03.2015. According to the opposite party the final bill payment was made to the applicant on 13.06.2016. Therefore, in the first place, the arbitration clause contained in the agreement dated 01.03.2010, being Clause 1.2.54 (as extracted above) would be relevant. That clause clearly stipulated an arbitral panel of three Gazetted Railway Officers, not below JA grade. Upon the railway proposing a panel containing names of three such officers, the applicant would be required to nominate two names from that proposal. Of that, one would have to be necessarily appointed as a member of the arbitral tribunal. Then, it also cannot be denied, under the conditions of that contract, Clause 1.2.2 (as quoted above), the Preamble to the Tender Papers are also part of the contract entered into between the parties. In turn, by virtue of Clause 17 thereto, Clause 64 of the General Conditions of the Contract also became part of the contract. Therefore, the submission of Sri Agarwal, seeking overriding effect in favour of the specific conditions of contract (Clause 1.2.54) over clause 64 (of the GCC), loses significance as both clauses are part of the arbitration agreement between the parties. Also, no overriding effect has been created in favour of clause 1.2.54 and there is nothing in the language of the contract to draw that inference.
21. Therefore, a question does arise - how much or which version (amended or unamended) of the GCC would be part of the contract entered into between the parties? Here, in the first place, it may be noted that the General Conditions of Contract were created and issued by the railways purely by way of a unilateral action. The GCC have been revised by the railways from time to time, which act is also a unilateral act of the railway authorities alone. Then, the terms of the General Conditions of Contract got incorporated into the particular contract - by reference and not as part of the set of documents signed by the parties. It became part of the contract, by virtue of the enabling Clause 17 of the Preamble to the Tender Papers that again became part of the contract by virtue of Clause 1.2.2 of the contract entered into between the parties herein. Hence, it needs examination whether the GCC has been made part of the contract 'by reference' or 'by incorporation'.
22. To examine that question, it is the language of Clause 17 of the Preamble to the Tender Papers alone that may be relevant. It clearly reads that the GCC of the concerned railway, as amended for advance correction slips would become part of the contract. Therefore, Clause 17 provides that the exact updated version of the GCC, would govern the rights of the parties. However, by virtue of the phrase "issued up to date", suffixed to the words "as amended for advance correction slips", provides and limits only that amendment to the GCC to be applied to the contract in question as may have been in existence on the date the contract being signed. It is so, because as only such correction slips may be open to inspection and issued as may be in existence on the date of the contract being signed. Clearly Clause 17 of the Preamble to the Tender Papers is in the nature of a private law made by incorporation and not law made by reference. Therefore, the future/amended GCC (2016) and (2019) would have no enforceability viz a viz the present contract.
23. Even otherwise, to accept the submission of Sri Tripathi, that the phrase "upto date" would include the date when the dispute has arisen cannot be accepted as there is no other clause or stipulation of contract shown to exist as may allow for a new contract condition to arise unilaterally at the instance of the railway. Also, there is no intention to apply to the contract in question (i.e. the arbitration Clause), the GCC, as may be amended from time to time, in future. In Build India Construction System v. Union of India, (2002) 5 SCC 433, the successful bidder signed the letter of acceptance on 22.02.1985, specifically undertaking to abide by the terms and conditions of GCC "as modified", if any, elsewhere. Later, on 4.9.1986, the Government of India, sanctioned an amendment in the GCC. Upon disputes arising thereafter, the award made was set aside by the High Court relying on the amended GCC. Reversing that decision, the Supreme Court observed as below:
"A plain reading of the acceptance letter dated 22-2-1985 signed by the appellant clearly suggests a copy of general conditions of contract with (i) Errata Nos. 1 to 27, and (ii) Amendment Nos. 1 to 27 having been supplied by the respondents to the appellant and having been read and understood by the appellant followed by the appellant's agreement to abide by the terms and conditions thereof. The expression "as modified", qualifies the terms and conditions contained in the general conditions of contract as on and till that day. There is nothing contained in the acceptance letter, either expressly or by necessary implication, to spell out the appellant having authorized the respondents to carry out modifications in the terms and conditions of the contract otherwise than by mutual agreement and to hold the appellant bound by such modifications though not consented to by him and though not even brought to his knowledge."
24. In the instant case, undisputedly, the contract was executed by the parties on 01.03.2010. On that date, the applicant could have been aware of only such terms and conditions forming part of the contract as were in existence on that date. Undisputedly, on that date, GCC (2010) alone was in existence and the amendments that have been cited by Sri Tripathi, as were made, in the years 2016 and 2019, were not in existence. It may be safely assumed that on that they were not in contemplation. In fact, the amendment made to the GCC, in the year 2016 (with reference to arbitration clause) arose solely on account of the statutory amendment made whereby Section 12(5) of the Act was introduced w.e.f. 23.10.2015. Thus, though this issue is common to the facts of the present case as also to the facts obtaining in Central Organization for Railway Electrification (supra), apparently, it was not raised before this Court and therefore, not decided by it. On the other hand, the decision of the Supreme Court has proceeded on the assumption that the amended GCC (2016) was applicable to the contract that had been executed in that case on 20.09.2010. Careful perusal of the decision of the Supreme Court does not bring out any objection was by the claimant, raised in that regard. Also, it does not consider the ratio in Build India Construction System (supra).
25. Undisputedly, if the GCC (2016) or (2019) was to be read into the present contract, retired railway officers would be empanelled on the alternative panel of arbitrators and the ineligibility accruing to the serving employees by virtue of Section 12(5) of the Act would stand cured upon that panel of arbitrators being offered for appointment. However, since, in my opinion, the amended GCC (2016) or amended GCC (2019) are not part of the private law between the parties, they do not apply to the facts of the present case.
26. The fact that paragraph no. 19 of that decision tends to support appointment of serving railway officers to the arbitral tribunal (by applying Clause 64 of the GCC), clearly, that observation has to be read in the context of the amended GCC (2016) that was considered by the Supreme Court. It did not contemplate appointment of serving railway officers as a mandatory condition. In effect, Clause 64(3)(b) [as amendment of GCC (2016)] introduced a proviso to Section 12(5) of the Act in it's application to such agreements. In the event of the contractor nor waiving his right to object to the panel of arbitrators, the railway gave to itself a right to cure the defect in it's panel and offer an alternative panel of retired officers in place of the panel of serving officers. Obviously, the alternative panel would not be hit by Section 12(5).
27. Then, the ratio of that decision of the Supreme Court contained in paragraph no. 26 as concluded in paragraph no. 27 thereof is also of no help to the opposite party as the same pertains to retired railway officers only. Since, Clause 1.2.54 of the contract dated 01.03.2010 and the GCC (2010) did not allow for a panel of retired railway officers only (as noted above) and since the GCC (2010) did not contain any clause equivalent to clause 64(3)(b) introduced by GCC (2016), for that reason alone, the decision of the Supreme Court is wholly distinguishable. The ineligibility in the appointment of serving railway officers arose on account of legislative intervention, upon introduction of Section 12(5) of the Act w.e.f. 23.10.2015. Thereby the private law created by the parties (Clause 1.2.54 read with Clause 64 of the GCC (2010), stood overridden and unenforceable.
28. Since, the applicant herein did not waive its right to object to serving railway officers to be appointed as arbitrators (after the dispute had arisen), and since, in fact, it outrightly proposed to appoint an independent arbitrator after voicing its objection to the contractual stipulation, there was no defect in the applicant approaching this Court for appointment of an independent arbitrator under Section 11 of the Act. The procedure prescribed under the contract was invoked by the applicant upon issuance of notice dated 31.12.2018. Since the opposite party failed to appoint a consented arbitrator, the applicant was left with no option but to approach this Court in that regard. The application is found to be wholly maintainable. That is the ratio of another decision of the Supreme Court in Bharat Broadband Network Ltd. Vs. United Telecoms Ltd.; (2019) 5 SCC 755 which is wholly attracted to the present facts as well. While, dealing with the de jure inability of an arbitrator to act as such - arising from the legal effect of Section 12(5) of the Act read with the Seventh Schedule thereto, the Supreme Court held as under:
"Section 12(5), on the other hand, is a new provision which relates to the de jure inability of an arbitrator to act as such. Under this provision, any prior agreement to the contrary is wiped out by the non obstante clause in Section 12(5) the moment any person whose relationship with the parties or the counsel or the subject-matter of the dispute falls under the Seventh Schedule. The sub-section then declares that such person shall be "ineligible" to be appointed as arbitrator. The only way in which this ineligibility can be removed is by the proviso, which again is a special provision which states that parties may, subsequent to disputes having arisen between them, waive the applicability of Section 12(5) by an express agreement in writing. What is clear, therefore, is that where, under any agreement between the parties, a person falls within any of the categories set out in the Seventh Schedule, he is, as a matter of law, ineligible to be appointed as an arbitrator. The only way in which this ineligibility can be removed, again, in law, is that parties may after disputes have arisen between them, waive the applicability of this sub-section by an "express agreement in writing". Obviously, the "express agreement in writing" has reference to a person who is interdicted by the Seventh Schedule, but who is stated by parties (after the disputes have arisen between them) to be a person in whom they have faith notwithstanding the fact that such person is interdicted by the Seventh Schedule."
29. Further, as to the observation made by the Supreme Court (in paragraph no. 37 of the report) in Central Organization for Railway Electrification (supra), in the first place, the observation of the Supreme Court has been made while deciding the issue whether the General Manager himself being ineligible by operation of law to appoint an arbitrator was eligible to nominate the arbitrator. That issue does not arise in the facts of the present case as in response to the notice dated 31.12.2018, the opposite party did not appoint of any arbitrator and did not offer for appointment any panel of arbitrators to the applicant. In fact, the opposite party refused arbitration. The question of the eligibility of the General Manager to appoint an arbitrator would have arisen if, as in the facts of Central Organization for Railway Electrification (supra), any offer had been made by the opposite party to appoint the arbitral tribunal in terms of the contract entered into between the parties. In this regard, provisions of Section 11(4)(a) of the Act are specific. Inasmuch as the opposite party failed to appoint an arbitrator, the applicant was within it's rights to approach this Court for appointment of an independent arbitrator. Here, it may be noted, the correctness of this view expressed by the Supreme Court in Central Organization for Railway Electrification (supra) on the above noted point has been doubted in Union of India Vs. M/S Tantia Constructions Limited (supra). That matter is engaging the attention of the Supreme Court.
30. As to the other objection raised by the Sri Tripathi that the claim for appointment is wholly time barred, it is true that a specific stand had been taken by the opposite party in its reply dated 21.01.2019 on three counts. First, it has been objected that the claim for appointment of an arbitrator was not made after 120 days and before completion of 180 days from the presentation of the final claim. Second, it has been submitted that the applicant had clearly nullified any future claim by issuing the no-claim certificate while receiving the final payment. Third, it has been submitted that claim is time barred, it having been made more than 30 days after issue of the completion certificate.
31. Though, the nature of objections raised are specific and, if correct, they go to the root of the matter as limitation may disentitle the claimant to the remedy, yet, it cannot be disputed that such objection is always a mixed question of fact and law. At the present stage, in a summary proceeding confined to the appointment of an arbitrator, it is not for this Court to allow the parties to lead evidence and thereafter to reach a conclusion that the claim made is time barred. That process would itself involve adjudication as to facts. Thus, what fate may arise upon that objection being raised by the opposite party may remain to be examined in the proceedings before the arbitrator where, amongst others, it would be specifically open to the opposite party to raise the plea of limitation. That appears to be consistent with the legislative intent contained in Section 11(6A) of the Act.
32. No other objection has been pressed as to the appointment of the sole independent arbitrator. For the purposes of clarity, though the original contract contemplates an arbitral tribunal of three arbitrators, at present, it is not the case of the opposite party that an arbitral tribunal comprising of three arbitrators be provided.
33. Then, the consent of the proposed arbitrator had been sought by the order dated 24.10.2019. It has been received on record. In that regard, Sri Tripathi has further brought on record the Appellate Tribunal and Other Authorities (Qualifications, Experience and other Conditions of Service of Member) Rules, 2020, notified on 12.02.2020. The same have been enforced w.e.f. 12.02.2020. Relying on Rule 2(f) read with Rule 18(3) of the Rules, it has been submitted that the proposed arbitrator being Presiding Officer of the Security Appellate Tribunal, he cannot undertake any arbitration work while functioning in that capacity w.e.f. 12.02.2020. He therefore submits that the proposed arbitrator has incurred a legal ineligibility, to conduct the arbitration from 12.02.2020.
34. On the other hand, Sri Rahul Agarwal, learned counsel for the appellant has placed on record copies of letter dated 14.05.2020 and e-mail communication dated 04.06.2020 being communications made between the Registrar (SAT), Mumbai and the Deputy Director, Ministry of Finance, in response thereto. It has thus been pointed out that the Ministry of Finance has itself allowed the proposed arbitrator (herein) to continue to complete such arbitration cases as are mentioned in the communication dated 14.05.2020 written by the Registrar (SAT). Referring to the case mentioned at item no. 10 of that list, it has been submitted that the present arbitration matter is included in that list of arbitrations allowed to be conducted and concluded by the nominated arbitrator. Having addressed the propriety issue, Sri Rahul Agarwal has also brought to the attention of the Court the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Madras Bar Association Vs. Union of India & Anr.; 2020 SCC OnLine SC 962, wherein it has been held has below :
"The 2020 Rules which came into force from the date of their publication in the Official Gazette, i.e. 12.02.2020, cannot be given retrospective effect. The intention of Government of India to make the 2020 Rules prospective is very clear from the notification dated 12.02.2020. In any event, subordinate legislation cannot be given retrospective effect unless the parent statute specifically provides for the same."
He submits, undisputedly, the proposed arbitrator was appointed Presiding Officer of the SAT before enforcement of the aforesaid Rules on 12.02.2020. Therefore, those Rules do not apply to him. There is no legal impediment found to be existing in his continuance as an arbitrator.
35. In view of such facts, the objection raised by Sri Tripathi is found to be lacking in force. Neither on ground of legality nor of propriety, the learned proposed arbitrator is inconvenienced. There being no other objection, the order dated 24.10.2019 is confirmed, as above.
36. Accordingly, Mr. Justice Tarun Agarwala, Chief Justice (Retired), Meghalaya High Court, residing at Delhi/NCR: A-5, Sector 14, NOIDA, Tel. (0120) 2510066, 1515596 (Mob. No. 9415307976, 7705007976), is appointed the arbitrator to enter upon the reference and adjudicate the dispute in accordance with the provisions of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
37. The arbitrator shall be entitled to fees and expenses, in accordance with the provisions of the Fourth Schedule inserted by Act No.3 of 2016.
38. Accordingly, the present application under Section 11 of the Act thus, stands allowed.
Order Date :- 2.2.2021 Abhilash/Prakhar/Salman Court No. - 38 Case :- ARBITRATION AND CONCILI. APPL.U/S11(4) No. - 68 of 2019 Applicant :- Tata Projects Ltd.
Opposite Party :- Central Organization Far Railway Electrification Counsel for Applicant :- Rahul Agarwal Counsel for Opposite Party :- Navneet Chandra Tripathi Hon'ble Saumitra Dayal Singh,J.
Re: Civil Misc. Application No. 6 of 2020 For the reasons contained in the order of the same date passed in Arbitration and Conciliation Application U/S 11(4) No. 68 of 2019, the present application stands disposed of.
Order Date :- 2.2.2021 Abhilash