ORDER D.P.S. Chauhan, J.
1. In the present case the conviction was recorded against the applicant Under Section 7/16(1)(a)(i) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) on the ground that the sample of biscuits taken from the shop of the applicant, which were kept in the shop for sale, were reported by the Public Analyst to contain alcoholic acidity of extracted fat of 2% as against the maximum permissible limit of 1.5%. The applicant was sentenced to six months' R.I. together with a fine of Rupees 1000.00. In default of payment of fine, he was required to undergo 2 months' imprisonment. The appellate Court upheld the guilt of the applicant and also the sentence. This revision is the outcome of the aforesaid conviction and sentence, which was admitted by this Court on 22-6-1984 only on the question of sentence.
2. Since the revision was admitted on the question of sentence, it is not necessary to go into the merits of the matter.
3. The applicant is a person dealing with the biscuits. Appendix B to the Rules framed under the Act contains the standards of quality of various articles of food. Item A. 18.07 of appendix B relates to biscuits which says that biscuits shall be made from maida, vanaspati or refined edible oil or table butter or deshi butter or margarine or ghee or their mixture and it may contain any one or more of the following ingredients:--
"Edible common salt; permitted anti-oxi-dents; emulsifying and stablishing agents; permitted preservatives and colours; leavening agents such as baking powder; ammonium bicarbonate; ammonium carbonate; butter, milk powder; cereals and their products; cheese; citric acid; cocoa; coffee extract; edible desiccoted coconut; dextross; fruits and fruit products; dry fruit and nuts; egg edible vegetable products; amylases and other enzymes; permitted flavouring agents; flavour improvers and fixers; flour improvers; ginger; gluten; groundnut flour milk and milk products; honey; jellyfying agents; liquid glucose; malt products; edible oilseeds; flour and meals; spices and condiments; edible starches such as potato starch and edible flour; sugar and sugar products; invert sugar; jaggery; protein concentrates and other nutrients; sodium bisculphites, sodium metabisculphite and other dough conditioners; vitamins, calcium and ferrous salts; potassium iodide, malic and lactic acids; tartaric acid vinegar and acetic acid; yeast."
4. The biscuits so prepared were required to conform the following standards, namely:--
(a) Ash insolubla in dilute hydrochloric acid (on dry basis) shall not be more than .1 per cent.
(b) Acidity of extracted fat (as oleic acid) shall not exceed 1.5 per cent."
5. In the present case, alcoholic acidity of extracted fat was found to be 2% by the Public Analyst.
6. Learned counsel for the applicant has submitted that the applicant is convicted under Section 16(1)(a)(i) of the Act, i.e. his biscuits were found to be adulterated within the meaning of Section 2(ia)(m) of the Act. Section 2(ia)(m) of the act provides that an article of food shall be deemed to be adulterated if the quality or purity of the article falls below the prescribed standard or its constituents are present in quantities not within the prescribed limits of variability but which does not render it injurious to health. The proviso says that where the quality or purity of the article, being primary food, has fallen below the prescribed standards or its constituents are present in quantities not within the prescribed limits of variability, in either case, solely due to natural causes and beyond the control of human agency, then, such article shall not be deemed to be adulterated within the meaning of this Sub-clause. The sample of the biscuit was taken as back as on 10-12-1978, but the Public Analyst gave his report on 12-7-1979 and during this period of more than 7 months the natural causes have reacted, and as such the belated report of the Public Analyst cannot be taken to be the proper report for the purposes of sentencing the applicant. He further submits that the sample was taken as back as on 10-12-1978 and the prosecution was launched on 17-12-1979 and since then the matter is pending in one Court or the other and a long period of litigation is also one of the mitigating factors so far as the question of sentence is concerned. He states that the applicant has already undergone about three weeks' imprisonment. In this connection, he has placed reliance on a decision of the Supreme Court in Brahma Dass v. State of Himachal Pradesh, AIR 1988 SC 1789 : 1988 Cri LJ 1816 where the Supreme Court reduced the sentence of six months' imprisonment to that already undergone and took the view that no useful purpose would be served in sending the applicant to prison at this point of time for serving the remaining period if sentence though ordinarily in ante-social offence punishable under the Act, the Court should take strict view in the matter. In that case the occurrence took place 8 years back. In the present case, the occurrence had taken place 11 years back.
7. I find it difficult to take the similar view by reducing the sentence to that already undergone in view of the provisions of Section 16(1) of the Act whereunder it is provided that the offender shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than six months and which may extend to three years and a fine which shall not be less than Rs. 1000.00. This is the mandate of law and the sentence cannot be reduced to beyond what is minimum. Supreme Court, in the case supra, has neither laid down any law nor has made any observation having any binding efficacy of the other Courts, but has only granted a concession in a particular case, Apart from it, Article 142 of the Constitution has armed the Supreme Court with the power of widest amplitude. Article 142(1) of the Constitution is as extracted below:--
"142. Enforcement of decrees and orders of Supreme Court and orders as to discovery etc.---
(1) The Supreme Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction may pass such decree or make such order as is necessary for doing complete justice in any cause or matter pending before it, and any decree so passed or order so made shall be enforceable throughout the territory of India in such manner as may be prescribed or under any law made by Parliament and, until provision in that behalf is so made, in such manner as the President may by order prescribe."
8. Under this power, Supreme Court can make such order as may be necessary for doing complete justice in any cause and the same shall be binding on all authorities. Doing of complete justice has been made supreme.
9. Supreme Court in (1989) 4 SCC 81, Arjun Khiamal v. Jamnadas Fulinni, has held that the basic concept is that Article 142 does not contemplate doing justice to one party by ignoring statutory provisions and thereby doing complete injustice to the other party by depriving such other party of the benefit of the statutory provisions.
10. The learned counsel thereafter took the shelter of the proviso whereunder the Court has been empowered to impose a sentence of imprisonment which shall not be less than three months and which may extend to two years and with a fine which shall not be less than Rs. 500/- for adequate and special reasons to be mentioned in the judgment and he prayed that under this proviso the sentence of imprisonment and the penalty of fine may be reduced in the background of the fact that the occurrence as already stated above, is as old as 11 years and also the fact that there was a delay in the report of the Public Analyst and on account of that the sample being retained for such a long period, there might have occurred some changes due to natural causes, which resulted in the increase of alcoholic acidity of extracted fat. The submission so; made by the learned counsel has substance I find that the occurrence is as old as of 10-12-1978 and since then the criminal prosecution is pending in one Court or the other and a period of 11 years have elapsed, it would be harsh to give a heavy punishment to the applicant in the background of the present facts. Further for the reasons that the sample was taken as back as on 10-12-1978 and the report of the Public Analyst was given on 12-7-79, there might have come into existence the circumstances of natural causes which resulted in the increase of alcoholic acidity of extracted fat, which, in the present case, is only .5% in excess of the prescribed standard. Further, for the reason that the alcoholic acidity of the extracted fat is neither the constituent of the Biscuit nor is its ingredient present at the time of manufacture of the biscuit and this is generated subsequent to preparation of the biscuit and as generation is by natural process. I find that the rules have provided only the standards of quality of various articles of food and not the variability.
11. For these reasons, I reduce the sentence of imprisonment as imposed on the applicant to three months and also the fine to Rs. 500.00. If the fine as imposed on the applicant had been deposited by him, the excess amount of the fine shall be refunded to the applicant.
12. With the above direction and modification in the sentence, the revision is dismissed. The applicant is on bail. He need not surrender. His bail bonds shall stand cancelled and sureties shall stand discharged.