The petitioner is aggrieved with Exhibit P1 order and the dismissal of the revision as per Exhibit P3 order.
2. The petitioner is the wife of an employee of the 1st respondent-Bank. The husband of the petitioner had availed of a housing loan from the 1st respondent after mortgaging the property belonging to himself and his wife. On default having been committed, the respondent-Bank approached the Arbitration Court with A.R.C.No.57 of 2003. The husband of the petitioner appeared before the Arbitration Court and contested the matter. The wife/the petitioner herein, remained ex parte. Subsequently, after evidence and consideration, an award was passed as indicated in Exhibit P1.
3. The award was passed as early as on 16.12.2004.
The husband of the petitioner died on 25.06.2007. Neither the deceased-1st defendant nor the wife-2nd defendant filed a revision from the above order. The above order became final. Subsequently, in the year 2010, belatedly a revision was filed before the Kerala Co-operative Tribunal, which was rejected as per Exhibit P3.
4. The petitioner has two contentions to assail Exhibit P3. One, limitation would not be applicable, since there is no period stipulated in the statute, specifically under Section 84 of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act [“for brevity “KCS Act”]. The learned counsel for the petitioner would rely on a decision of this Court in Lalithamma v. M.S.Co- operative Society [1979 KLT 894] to contend that there would be no requirement for condonation of delay, since the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 would not apply. The said decision merely declared that the Limitation Act would not apply to the proceedings under Section 82 of the KCS Act; since the provision provides the period in which an appeal could be filed. But, this does not help the petitioner, since the Court laid down that there would be no question of condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, accepting the contention raised by the respondent-Bank, therein.
5. A Full Bench of this Court has in Moideen Koya v.
Kunhammed Haji [1992 (2) KLT 646 (F.B.)], with respect to Rent Control Proceedings and the revision provided therein, held that even if there is no limitation provided, the revision ought to have been filed within a reasonable time. The Full Bench approved the decision of a learned Single Judge in Narayanan v. Rent Controller [1988 (2) KLT 74]. A learned Single Judge applied the dictum in the afore-cited decisions to the KCS Act in Thajuddin Shameer v. Secretary, Coastal Urban Co- op. Bank Ltd. [2004
(1) KLT 909]. In the present case, admittedly the revision was filed after six years which, by no stretch of imagination, can be said to be a reasonable time.
6. The next contention raised by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner was that, the order should be communicated to the defaulter, as contemplated under Rule 68 of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Rules, 1969. However, Rule 68 is only a mode of communication with respect to orders; and it is not a mandate that recovery can be effected only after such service is made. Lalithamma (supra) was cited to contend that the provision was mandatory. This Court does not see any such declaration in Lalithamma (supra). What the Court said was looking at the period provided for appeal under Section 82 and the impact of Rule 68, the time taken for obtaining the certified copy should also be excluded in determining the period of limitation.
7. It is also pertinent that the petitioner herein was a party before the Arbitration Court and she chose not to appear, presumably for reason of her husband having participated in the proceedings. The petitioner's specific contention in the writ petition is that her husband had been conducting the case. The award itself was passed in the year 2004 and the husband is said to have expired only in the year 2007. The Tribunal also specifically found that no dates are disclosed as to the date of application, receipt of certified copy, etc. to reckon the period of limitation. The writ petition too, is devoid of such details.
8. The further contention that the petitioner was not a party to the equitable mortgage executed for a housing loan, is belied by the specific finding in the award, which indicates that "the defendants deposited the original title deed No.1358 dated 16/5/85 relating to the plaint schedule property and created equitable mortgage in favour of the plaintiff Bank" (sic).
In the above circumstances, the writ petition is found to be devoid of merit and the same would stand dismissed. Parties are left to suffer their respective costs.
vku.
Sd/- K.Vinod Chandran, Judge ( true copy )