These appeals are directed against the common order of the learned Single Judge dated 30.6.2008 in W.P.No.10526 of 1998 and 7787 of 2002. While W.A.No.1098 of 2008 is filed by the petitioner in W.P.No.10526 of 1998, the other writ appeal is filed against the order in W.P.No.7787 of 2002. Both the writ petitions along with other two writ petitions, which were filed challenging the Board Proceedings of the Tamil Nadu Water Supply and Drainage Board (for short, 'TWAD Board') in Ms.No.233 dated 29.05.1998 with reference to paragraph 7(iii) and Board Proceedings Ms.No.230 dated 15.12.2001, came to be dismissed by the learned Judge upholding the validity of the said Board Proceedings. Under BP Ms.No.230 TWAD Estt (Per.) Wing dated 15.12.2001, the TWAD Board sought to refix the pay given to 18 petitioners in W.P.No.7787 of 2002 and directed the excess amount to be recovered.
2. The petitioners in W.P.No.7787 of 2002 who are members of the petitioner Association in W.P.No.10526 of 1998, which was an earlier writ petition filed challenging the Board Proceeding Ms. No.233 dated 29.5.1998, particularly paragraph 7(iii) of the order passed by the TWAD Board directing the Managing Director to implement any revision of the orders of the State Government in G.O.Ms.No.162 Finance Department dated 13.4.1998 and to rectify any defect/omissions as ordered by the Government from time to time.
3. Pending the above writ petitions, there was an interim order passed by this Court. It is also stated that consequent to the said interim order, the employees have given an indemnity bond to the Board. The learned Judge has taken up W.P.No.7787 of 2002 since the same is comprehensive one and the other writ petitions are relating to the same issue, and ultimately, the writ petitions have been disposed of, as stated above.
4. Admittedly, most of the employees except a few have reached the age of superannuation and are not in service. By virtue of the TWAD Board BP No.337 dated 6.10.1989 which empowers the Managing Director to implement the orders of the Government, the Managing Director by order dated 26.11.1991 while adopting the recommendations of the V Pay Commission introduced by the State Government, revised the scale of pay of Assistant Section Officers/ Confidential Stenographers from 1400-2600 to that of 1640-2900 with effect from 1.6.1988. By that, the said staff were brought on par with the staff holding similar posts in the Secretariat service.
5. When an objection was raised by the Audit on 23.11.1992 that the TWAD Board staff cannot be equated with the secretariat staff, especially when the TWAD Board has not taken a policy decision, ultimately, the TWAD Board in resolution in BP No.177 dated 12.9.1994 has set aside the order of the Managing Director dated 26.11.1991 and restored the original pay scale of 1400-2600 and ordered recovery of the excess amount paid. Some of the persons who were affected approached this Court by filing W.P.No.5129 of 1995 on the basis that they were not heard while ordering restoration of original scale of pay and this Court by order dated 12.10.2000 set aside the Board Proceedings in BP Ms.No.177 dated 12.9.1994 with a direction to the Board of Directors to hear the representations of the writ petitioners in W.P.No.5129 of 1995 and pass appropriate orders. This Court has also directed that till such orders passed, the recovery to be kept in abeyance.
6. It is seen that two of Board of Directors after conducting enquiry, submitted their report to the Board on 7.2.2001. It appears that the Board of Directors have recommended stating that the method of recruitment and qualifications are same for the Board secretariat and unit officers and they are recruited through Employment Exchange with the basic qualification of a degree from a recognised University and the employees are also transferrable from one unit to another unit. It was also stated that the appointments of Assistant Section Officers and Confidential Stenographers are no longer being made and the existing employees alone are continuing in the said posts. The Board of Directors have recommended two alternatives, as extracted by the learned Judge in his judgment in paragraph 5.5, which are as follows:
"In view of this and as the Government stated that their present pay may be protected, the following two alternatives are submitted to the Board of Directors for consideration:
Alternative I:
Since the sanction of posts of Asst. Section Officers and Confidential Steno-typist was stopped from 1987 onwards, these categories have now become vanishing categories. In view of this and as the Government have directed that the present pay of the Asst. Section Officers and Confidential Steno-typist have to be protected, while reducing their scales of pay, the Board may consider to allow the Asst. Section Officers and Confidential Steno-typists to continue to draw the revised scale of pay of Rs.1640 2900 by cancelling the orders issued in B.P.Ms.No.177/dt.12.9.94 and the approval of the Government obtained.
(or) Alternative II:
The orders issued in B.P.Ms.177/dt. 12.9.94 may be enforced however protecting the last pay drawn by the Asst. Section Officers and Confidential Steno-typist on the date of issue of these orders as directed by the Government in their letter (MS) No.103/dt.29.3.94 and an amendment may be issued to the above B.P. to this effect."
7. When the matter was placed before the Full Board, the resolution in B.P.No.230 dated 15.12.2001 was passed to enforce orders in B.P.No.177 dated 12.9.1994, by which the order of the Managing Director dated 26.11.1991 was set aside and the original pay scale of Rs.1400-2600 was decided to be restored. However, in order to protect the last pay drawn by the Assistant Section Officers and Confidential Steno-typists, based on the order of the Government dated 29.3.1994, it was resolved to allow the scale of pay as directed in the V Pay Commission and for the ordinary grade, it was fixed as 1400-2600, for the selection grade it was fixed as 1640-2900 and for the special grade it was fixed as 2000-3200. It was also decided to fix the last drawn pay in the lower scale and to treat the difference as personal pay which would be absorbed in subsequent increments as provided in the Fundamental Rules and also to regulate the future increments in the lower scale. Since it was found that by virtue of that decision, there would be a loss to the extent of Rs.150 to 235 per month with additional Dearness Allowance, the petitioner Association made representation which was not considered and hence, 18 affected individuals filed the writ petition in which there was an interim order as stated above.
8. Taking note of the fact that out of the two options recommended by the Committee of Board of Directors, the TWAD Board has accepted the second option with minimum hardship to the petitioners as the first option is to be exercised, it requires the approval of the Government. In view of the interim orders obtained on condition, the writ petitioners cannot go back refusing to refund the excess amount and that the writ petitioners have not made out a case for pay parity with that of Government secretariat, the learned Judge dismissed the writ petitions (W.P.No.7787 of 2002 and 10526 of 1998) holding that no sympathy can be shown merely on the ground that the petitioners were vanishing tribe and there would be a huge loss to them.
9. Mr.K.Doraisami, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants/petitioners would submit that while refixing the pay scale by the Chairman-cum-Managing Director, the higher scale was fixed for no fault on the part of the appellants and therefore, on the ground of just and equity, recovery should not be made. He would rely upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Shyam Babu Verma v. Union of India [(1994) 2 SCC 521] and submit that in similar circumstances when promotion was given for employees for no fault of them, the Supreme Court has held that it is not proper that recovery should be made. In support of his contention, he would also rely upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Purushottam Lal Das v. State of Bihar (2006 AIR SCW 5325) and the Division Bench judgment of this Court in P.Lingan v. The Union of India, rep. by the Secretary, Ministry of Defence Production & Supply, DHQ (PO), New Delhi 110 011 and others [2008(2) TLNJ 666 (Civil)] apart from another judgment of the Supreme Court in Sahib Ram v. State of Haryana (1995 Supp (1) SCC 18).
10. On the other hand, it is the contention of Mrs.Sudarshana Sundar, learned counsel appearing for the TWAD Board that the earlier order passed in W.P.No.5129 of 1995 dated 12.10.2000 at the instance of the petitioners is actually a consent order for the purpose of appointing an expert Committee and the expert Committee has given its findings with two options and the Board has accepted the second option and therefore, having accepted the Board's jurisdiction, the petitioners cannot go back, especially in the light of the undertaking given by them while obtaining interim order pending writ petitions.
11. On the factual matrix which has been discussed in detail by the learned Judge, it is not possible for this Court to interfere with the order. While it is true that the Chairman-cum-Managing Director of the TWAD Board had passed the order of revision of scale of pay on 26.11.1991 in respect of Assistant Section Officers/Confidential Stenographers by increasing it from Rs.1400-2600 to 1640-2900 with effect from 1.6.1988, the same was objected by the Audit on the ground that the revision was ordered without the approval of the Government or the Board. It was, in order to rectify the mistake, orders were issued reducing the scale of pay to its original viz., Rs.1400-2600. Challenging the said restoration of original scale of pay, some persons approached this Court by filing W.P.No.16618 of 1994 and there was an interim order which was made absolute on 3.7.1998, with the result those who had the benefit of revision of salary from 1400-2600 to 1640-2900 continued to get the said benefit. Such benefit, however, was not conferred to other persons employed in the Board Secretariat unit.
12. In the meantime, some other employees like, Assistants and Section Officers of the Board appeared to have filed W.P.No.10501 of 1985 seeking for pay parity along with Assistant Section Officers/Confidential Stenographers and the said writ petition came to be dismissed. In the meantime, VI Pay Commission has come into effect and the Board had to adopt the same. It was, in those circumstances, since W.P.No.16618 of 1994 was pending, in which an interim order was made absolute as stated above, the Board passed BP Ms.No.233 dated 29.5.1998. In para 7(iii) of BP Ms.No.233 it is stated that in respect of Assistant Section Officers/ Confidential Steno-typists, the revised pay scale would be implemented after the stay granted by this Court in W.P.No.16618 of 1994 is vacated and the said para 7(iii) is as follows:
"(iii) for the categories of Assistant Section Officer/Confidential Steno-typist, the revised scales of pay should be implemented after the vacation of stay granted by the High Court (or) after the disposal of W.P.No.16618 of 1994".
13. In respect of Assistant Section Officers/Confidential Steno-typists of the Board, the TWAD Board Secretariat Staff Association filed an interlocutory application in W.P.No.16618 of 1994 viz., W.M.P.No.13477 of 1998 for direction to implement the revised pay scale of Rs.5500-9000 as per VI Pay Commission with effect from 1.1.1996 and that petition came to be dismissed with liberty to the petitioner Association to work out its remedy in separate proceedings. It was, thereafter, the petitioner Association filed another writ petition in W.P.No.10526 of 1998 challenging the said para 7(iii). Pending the said writ petition this Court by order dated 3.7.1998, granted interim say for four weeks. In the light of various orders, the Government issued BP.Ms.No.331 dated 8.10.1998 in the following terms:
"It is hereby ordered that the orders issued in the G.O. first above be extended to the Assistant Section Officers and confidential steno-typists of TWAD Board Secretariat Unit with effect from 1.1.1998 without prejudice to the outcome of the W.P.No.16618 of 1994 and W.P.No.10526 of 1998 based on the directions issued by the Court in W.M.P.No.16080 of 1998 and these two categories be allowed the revised scale of pay of Rs.5,500-175-9,000 with effect from 1.1.1996. Further, it was categorically ordered to recover the arrears in one lump sum, if it is found ineligible to them at a later date after duly obtaining an undertaking from the employees concerned."
That was challenged in W.P.No.16385 of 1998. Pending the above said writ petitions, after hearing the parties, interim order was passed in W.M.P.Nos.24753, 25307, 25957 and 26677 of 1998 in W.P.Nos.16385 and 17138 of 1998 by order dated 6.1.1999, wherein the learned Judge has observed as follows:
"17. Without prejudice to the contentions of the respective parties, 87 employees listed by TWAD Board will get revised pay of Rs.5,500-9,000 corresponding to Rs.1,640-2,900 with effect from1.1.1996. This is because of the stay granted in W.P.No.16618 of 1994. This will be subject to the specific undertaking from the said 87 employees to repay the amount received, if any, in lumpsum, if it is found that they are ineligible at a later date. The others will get scale of pay corresponding to Rs.1,400-2,600 as the case may be."
14. It is not in dispute that pursuant to the said interim order, the employees have given undertaking as elicited by the learned Judge in the following lines:
" I hereby agree to repay any amount received from TWAD Board towards the annual increment sanctioned to me for the period from 2002 to 2006 and also for subsequent years which is found inadmissible to me at a later date, without prejudice to the final decision to be taken by the TWAD Board based on the final disposal of the Court case in the above matter."
15. In the meantime, in the writ petition filed by another set of aggrieved persons, 69 in number, in W.P.No.5129 of 1995, having dealt with their grievance that while restoring the original scale of pay of Rs.1400-2600, they were not given opportunity, the learned Judge by order dated 12.10.2000, with the consent of both the parties, permitted the petitioners to make another representation before the members of the Board of Directors. The operative portion of the order is as follows:
"It is also further agreed by both the counsel that two of the Board of Directors shall hear the representations of the petitioners in detail and in such case, the petitioners could represent their case either in person or through any counsel, if they so desire. The materials which have been placed before this Court shall be taken into consideration by the Board of Directors while disposing of the representations. It is directed that the representatives of the Board shall submit a report to the Board of Directors and the Board of Directors shall take a decision on such report, within eight weeks from the date of submission of the report. It is also made clear that if the Board desires to have the assistance of the Standing Counsel, it may avail the same. The other contentions raised in the writ petition are left open to the petitioners to raise the same before the Board. With the above observations the above writ petition W.P.No.5129 of 1995 is disposed of."
16. Pursuant to the said order passed by consent, two Directors of the Board have considered the representations and submitted their report with two alternative recommendations as elicited by the learned Judge as follows:
"Alternative I:
Since the sanction of posts of Asst. Section Officers and Confidential Steno-typist was stopped from 1987 onwards, these categories have now become vanishing categories. In view of this and as the Government have directed that the present pay of the Asst. Section Officers and Confidential Steno-typist have to be protected, while reducing their scales of pay, the Board may consider to allow the Asst. Section Officers and Confidential Steno-typists to continue to draw the revised scale of pay of Rs.1640 2900 by cancelling the orders issued in B.P.Ms.No.177/dt.12.9.94 and the approval of the Government obtained.
(or) Alternative II:
The orders issued in B.P.Ms.177/dt. 12.9.94 may be enforced however protecting the last pay drawn by the Asst. Section Officers and Confidential Steno-typist on the date of issue of these orders as directed by the Government in their letter (MS) No.103/dt.29.3.94 and an amendment may be issued to the above B.P. to this effect."
17. It is not in dispute that the Board has accepted the second alternative to enforce BP Ms.No.177 dated 12.9.1994, however protecting the last pay drawn by Assistant Section Officers/ Confidential Steno-typists and the said report was accepted by the Board in its resolution in BP No.230 TWAD Estt.(Per.) Wing dated 15.12.2001 which is impugned in W.P.No.7787 of 2002
18. The main contention of the learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants, by placing reliance on the above referred judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court is that originally when the revision of pay was made, based on the V Pay Commission introduced by the State Government, by the order of the Managing Director dated 26.11.1991, revising the pay of Assistant Section Officer/Confidential Steno-typists from 1400-2600 to 1640-2900 with effect from 1.6.1988, it was not at the instance of the appellants or its Association and therefore, according to the learned senior counsel, since the appellants are not at fault, the recovery is not proper as laid down in the judgments of the Supreme Court.
19. A reference to the judgments referred to by the learned senior counsel would show that those are cases where the authorities competent to revise the scale of pay made such revision and later when it was found that the fixation was erroneous, recovery was ordered to be made and in such circumstances, the Hon'ble Apex Court interfered and held that the recovery is not proper. In Shyam Babu Verma v. Union of India [(1994) 2 SCC 521] the petitioners therein were duly registered pharmacists in the U.P.State Pharmacy Council and were appointed in the scale of pay of Rs.130-240 and the revised pay scale was adopted from 1973 at Rs.330-560 and accordingly, the seniority list was prepared and at that time, the impugned order came to be passed on 15.6.1984, saying that since under
section 31(d) of the Pharmacy Act, 1948, their salary had to be fixed at Rs.330-480 instead of Rs.330-560 with effect from 1973 and they would be entitled to get the scale of pay, Rs.330-560 only after completion of 10 years, and consequently, recovery order was made after several years of implementation of the said scale. It was, in those circumstances, the Supreme Court has held that, " 11. Although we have held that the petitioners were entitled only to the pay scale of Rs.330-480 in terms of the recommendations of the Third Pay Commission w.e.f. January 1, 1973 and only after the period of 10 yeas, they became entitled to the pay scale of Rs.330-560 but as they have received the scale of Rs.330-560 since 1973 due to no fault of theirs and that scale is being reduced in the year 1984 with effect from January 1, 1973, it shall only be just and proper not to recover any excess amount which has already been paid to them. Accordingly, we direct that no steps should be taken to recover or to adjust any excess amount paid to the petitioners due to the fault of the respondents, the petitioners being in no way responsible for the same."
20. The judgment in Sahib Ram v. State of Haryana (1995 Supp (1) SCC 18) was dealing with the appointment of Librarian in the Government College, and the Government of India and U.G.C. upgraded pay scale of Librarians with effect from 1.1.1973 to Rs.700-1600, if they possessed the minimum educational qualifications of First or Second Class M.A., M.Sc., M.Com. plus First or Second Class B.Lib.Science or a Diploma in Library Science, a degree in M.Lib. Science being a preferential qualification, however, based on certain representations made by various persons who were appointed prior to 31.12.1972 and on the recommendations of the U.G.C., the Government of India on 16.1.1987 relaxed the qualification of securing First Class or Second Class in M.A., M.Sc., M.Com. It was, based on the same, the Principal of the college allowed the Librarian who was before the Supreme Court to get the revised pay scale of Rs.700-1600, but the Government of Haryana directed the Principal to withdraw the said pay scale which was ultimately challenged in the Supreme Court. In those circumstances, while holding that the petitioner therein was not entitled to the relaxation since he had no qualification, the Supreme Court held that the recovery should not be made since there was no misrepresentation and the relevant portion of the judgment is as under:
" 5. Admittedly the appellant does not possess the required educational qualifications. Under the circumstances the appellant would not be entitled to the relaxation. The Principal erred in granting him the relaxation. Since the date of relaxation the appellant had been paid his salary on the revised scale. However, it is not on account of any misrepresentation made by the appellant that the benefit of the higher pay scale was given to him but by wrong construction made by the Principal for which the appellant cannot be held to be at fault. Under the circumstances the amount paid till date may not be recovered from the appellant. The principle of equal pay for equal work would not apply to the scales prescribed by the University Grants Commission. The appeal is allowed partly without any order as to costs."
21. In P.Lingan v. Union of India, rep. By Secretary, Ministry of Defence, Production and Supply, DHQ (PO), New Delhi 110 001 and others [2008 (2) TLNJ 766 (Civil)], the Division Bench consisting of P.K.Misra,J. and K.Chandru,J., in the case where a direction to recover excess amount paid on misconception of Government Order was made, held that the higher salary paid was not on the basis of false representation and therefore, the amount already paid cannot be recovered. It was, in that judgment, the Division Bench has referred to the above said Supreme Court judgments and the operative portion of the Division Bench judgment is as follows:
" 6. The other contention is relating to recovery of the amount already paid stands on a better footing. It is not the case of the Department that the petitioner himself has managed to obtain higher salary by making any false representation. The salary in the scale of pay applicable to primary teachers was paid by the authorities concerned not on the basis of any representation, for less any misrepresentation, made by the petitioner. In such a scenario, the ratio of several decisions of the Supreme Court such as (1994) 2 SCC 521 (Shyam Babu Verma and others v. Union of India and others), 1995 Supp (1) SCC 18 (Sahib Ram v. State of Haryana and others) and (2006) 11 SCC 492 (Purshottam Lal Das and others v. State of Bihar and others), which have been followed in several decisions of the Madras High Court, would be applicable. Since such amount had been paid not on the basis of any representation, far less misrepresentation made by the petitioner, it would be unjust to direct recovery of such amount".
22. That was also the view taken by the Supreme Court in Purushottam Lal Das v. State of Bihar (2006 AIR SCW 5325). By referring to the above said Supreme Court judgments, the Apex Court has held as follows:
" 10. High Court itself noted that the appellants deserve sympathy as for no fault of theirs, recoveries were directed when admittedly they worked in the promotional posts. But relief was denied on the ground that those who granted had committed gross irregularities."
23. On the facts of the case, it is seen that the original revision of pay made by the Chairman-cum-Managing Director itself had no basis since as per the relevant Rules, the approval of the Government has to be obtained and therefore, the decision of the Chairman-cum-Managing Director had no legs to stand. It is also not in dispute that while such benefit was conferred on the Assistant Section Officers/Confidential Steno-typists, that was not extended to other employees of the Board based on the V Pay Commission. When the interim order was passed in this case, the writ petitioners have given a categorical undertaking that they would repay the amount if it is found inadmissible on a later stage. Therefore, it is not as if the writ petitioners were not aware of the dispute regarding revision of pay which was granted in their favour by the Chairman-cum-Managing Director without the approval of the Government, in his order dated 26.11.1991 and immediately, after the Audit objection, the reversion to original position was made by the TWAD Board in BP.Ms.No.177 dated 12.9.1994. In such view of the matter, especially when an undertaking was given as stated above, as early as in 1999, it cannot be said that the writ petitioners have received the enhanced salary without any knowledge about the illegality or irregularity of the same. On the factual matrix of this case as stated above, the petitioners cannot be compared to the parties who were given relief by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the above said cases.
24. Further, as correctly pointed out by the learned Judge in the impugned order, the Apex Court in S.C.Chandra and others v. State of Jharkhand and others [(2007) 8 SCC 279], has held that the question of pay parity or equation of posts is a policy decision in which the Courts have no proactive role by recommending either a particular scale or equation of post with some other post. While discussing about the separation of powers by referring to the earlier judgment of a Three Judge Bench in Asif Hameed v. State of J & K (AIR 1989 SC 1899 = 1989 Supp.(2) SCC 364), in para-34, the Supreme Court has illustrated various judgments regarding judicial restraint including that of the U.S. Supreme Court and the relevant portion of the judgment is as follows:
"Para 34: There is broad separation of powers under the Constitution, and the judiciary should not ordinarily encroach into the executive or legislative domain. The theory of separation of powers, first propounded by the French philosopher Montesquieu in his book The Spirit of Laws still broadly holds the field in India today. Thus, in Asif Hameed v. State of J&K a three-Judge Bench of this Court observed (vide paras 17 to 19): (SCC pp. 373-74) "17. Before adverting to the controversy directly involved in these appeals we may have a fresh look at the inter se functioning of the three organs of democracy under our Constitution. Although the doctrine of separation of powers has not been recognised under the Constitution in its absolute rigidity but the Constitution makers have meticulously defined the functions of various organs of the State. Legislature, executive and judiciary have to function within their own spheres demarcated under the Constitution. No organ can usurp the functions assigned to another. The Constitution trusts to the judgment of these organs to function and exercise their discretion by strictly following the procedure prescribed therein. The functioning of democracy depends upon the strength and independence of each of its organs. Legislature and executive, the two facets of peoples will, they have all the powers including that of finance. Judiciary has no power over sword or the purse nonetheless it has power to ensure that the aforesaid two main organs of State function within the constitutional limits. It is the sentinel of democracy. Judicial review is a powerful weapon to restrain unconstitutional exercise of power by the legislature and executive. The expanding horizon of judicial review has taken in its fold the concept of social and economic justice. While exercise of powers by the legislature and executive is subject to judicial restraint, the only check on our own exercise of power is the self-imposed discipline of judicial restraint.
18. Frankfurter, J. of the U.S. Supreme Court dissenting in the controversial expatriation case of Trop v. Dulles observed as under: (US pp. 119-20) All power is, in Madisons phrase, "of an encroaching nature". ... Judicial power is not immune against this human weakness. It also must be on guard against encroaching beyond its proper bounds, and not the less so since the only restraint upon it is self-restraint. ...
Rigorous observance of the difference between limits of power and wise exercise of power-between questions of authority and questions of prudence-requires the most alert appreciation of this decisive but subtle relationship of two concepts that too easily coalesce. No less does it require a disciplined will to adhere to the difference. It is not easy to stand aloof and allow want of wisdom to prevail, to disregard ones own strongly held view of what is wise in the conduct of affairs. But it is not the business of this Court to pronounce policy. It must observe a fastidious regard for limitations on its own power, and this precludes the Courts giving effect to its own notions of what is wise or politic. That self-restraint is of the essence in the observance of the judicial oath, for the Constitution has not authorised the judges to sit in judgment on the wisdom of what Congress and the Executive Branch do.
19. When a State action is challenged, the function of the court is to examine the action in accordance with law and to determine whether the legislature or the executive has acted within the powers and functions assigned under the Constitution and if not, the court must strike down the action. While doing so the court must remain within its self-imposed limits. The court sits in judgment on the action of a coordinate branch of the Government. While exercising power of judicial review of administrative action, the court is not an appellate authority. The Constitution does not permit the court to direct or advise the executive in matters of policy or to sermonise qua any matter which under the Constitution lies within the sphere of legislature or executive, provided these authorities do not transgress their constitutional limits or statutory powers." (emphasis supplied)
25. As pointed out by the learned Judge in the impugned judgment, the Supreme Court in the subsequent judgment in State of Punjab v. Surindar Singh and another [2007 (12) Scale 602] has upheld its earlier view.
26. In view of the above said discussion, it is not possible to accept the contention of the learned senior counsel for the appellants and as correctly found by the learned Single Judge, simply because the posts held by the appellants were vanishing posts, sympathy cannot be shown. In view of the same, the writ appeals stand dismissed. No costs.
kh To The Managing Director Tamil Nadu Water Supply and Drainage Board 31 Kamarajar Salai Chepauk, Chennai 600 005