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T D Nagaraj vs State Of Karnataka And Others

High Court Of Karnataka|03 December, 2019
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JUDGMENT / ORDER

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 03RD DAY OF DECEMBER, 2019 BEFORE THE HON’BLE MR.JUSTICE G.NARENDAR CRL.P.NO.7955/2019 BETWEEN T D NAGARAJ AGED ABOUT 33 YEARS, POLICE INSPECTOR, EAST POLICE STATION, MANGALORE-575006 (BY SRI SACHIN B S, ADV.) AND 1. STATE OF KARNATAKA BY THE STATION HOUSE OFFICER, URVA POLICE STATION, MANGALORE-6 (D.K) REPRESENTED BY LEARNED STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, HIGH COURT BUILDING, BANGALORE-01.
2. UTTAM KUMAR RAI S/O JAYARAM RAI, AGE 32 YEARS, R/AT SWATHI HOUSE, ESWARA MANGAL POST-575006 PUTTUR TALUK, D.K.
...PETITIONER …RESPONDENTS (BY SMT. B.G.NAMITHA MAHESH, HCGP FOR R1, SRI ARUNA SHYAM.M, ADV. FOR R2.) THIS CRIMINAL PETITION IS FILED UNDER SECTION 482 CR.P.C PRAYING TO QUASH THE COMPLAINT AND ENTIRE PROCEEDINGS IN CRIME NO.56/2015 REGISTERED IN URVA POLICE STATION FILED BY THE PRINCIPAL CIVIL JUDGE (SR.DN.) AND CJM COURT, MANGALURU CITY MANGALURU AGAINST THE PETITIONER FOR THE OFFENCE P/U/S.341,504,506,323,384,511,394 R/W SEC.34 OF IPC BY THE RESPONDENT NO.1 POLICE PURSUANT TO THE COMPLAINT GIVEN BY RESPONDENT NO.2 AS PER DOCUMENT.1.
THIS CRIMINAL PETITION COMING ON FOR ORDERS THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:
ORDER 1. Heard the learned Counsel for the petitioner, learned Counsel for respondent no.2 and the learned HCGP.
2. Petitioner is a Police Inspector working in East Police Station, Mangaluru, and respondent no.2-Complainant is a practicing advocate.
3. That the police had commenced an enquiry and the persons named in the complaint were summoned for enquiry. That respondent no.2-Complainant accompanied one Sandeep and the petitioner who was investigating the complaint found that one Ratnakar had been named and hence asked them to come back on the next date along with the said Ratnakar. That an exchange of words led to an altercation and in the altercation, it is alleged that the petitioner and respondent no.2 pushed each other and in the melee, both are said to have suffered minor injuries and damage to the clothing.
4. The incident led to a complaint and counter complaint. The complaint by respondent no.2 was registered as Crime No.56/2015 and the complaint by the petitioner was registered as Crime No.55/2015. Though various non-compoundable provisions of IPC have been invoked, a B report came to be filed in the complaint filed by respondent no.2, wherein the Investigating Officer after recording the statement of witnesses filed a B Final Report which came to be accepted by the Trial Court.
5. It is submitted that no ingredients of commission of offences punishable under Sections 384 & 394 IPC have been disclosed in the enquiry. That the other offences are compoundable and hence there is no legal impediment to allow the petition by recording the compromise.
6. The petitioner and respondent no.2 are present before the Court and are identified by their respective Counsels.
7. Learned Counsel for the petitioner places reliance on the ruling of the Apex Court rendered in the case of SHIJI ALIAS PAPPU & OTHERS VS RADHIKA & ANOTHER – (2011)10 SCC 705. Learned Counsel for the petitioner would invite the attention of the Court to paragraph 17 of the said ruling, to contend that mere mentioning of an offence which is non-compoundable would not come in the way of the High Court to exercise its inherent powers and quash the complaint if the Court comes to the conclusion that no meaningful purpose would be served by directing the parties to take the proceedings to its logical end. Paragraph 17 of the aforesaid ruling reads as under:
“17. It is manifest that simply because an offence is not compoundable under Section 320 Cr.PC is by itself no reason for the High Court to refuse exercise of its power under Section 482 Cr.PC. That power can in our opinion be exercised in cases where there is no chance of recording a conviction against the accused and the entire exercise of a trial is destined to be an exercise in futility. There is a subtle distinction between compounding of offences by the parties before the trial court or in appeal on the one hand and the exercise of power by the High Court to quash the prosecution under Section 482 Cr.PC on the other. While a court trying an accused or hearing an appeal against conviction, may not be competent to permit compounding of an offence based on a settlement arrived at between the parties in cases where the offences are not compoundable under Section 320, the High Court may quash the prosecution even in cases where the offences with which the accused stand charged are non-compoundable. The inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 Cr.PC are not for that purpose controlled by Section 320 Cr.PC.”
8. Learned Counsel for the petitioner would also place reliance on another ruling of the Apex Court in the case of YOGENDRA YADAV & OTHERS VS STATE OF JHARKHAND & OTHERS - (2014)9 SCC 653, wherein the Apex Court in paragraphs 4 to 6 has held as under: “4. Now, the question before this Court is whether this Court can compound the offences under Sections 326 and 307 IPC which are non-compoundable? Needless to say that offences which are non- compoundable cannot be compounded by the court. Courts draw the power of compounding offences from Section 320 of the Code. The said provision has to be strictly followed (Gian Singh v. State of Punjab). However, in a given case, the High Court can quash a criminal proceeding in exercise of its power under Section 482 of the Code having regard to the fact that the parties have amicably settled their disputes and the victim has no objection, even though the offences are non- compoundable. In which cases the High Court can exercise its discretion to quash the proceedings will depend on facts and circumstances of each case. Offences which involve moral turpitude, grave offences like rape, murder, etc. cannot be effaced by quashing the proceedings because that will have harmful effect on the society. Such offences cannot be said to be restricted to two individuals or two groups. If such offences are quashed, it may send wrong signal to the society. However, when the High Court is convinced that the offences are entirely personal in nature and, therefore, do not affect public peace or tranquility and where it feels that quashing of such proceedings on account of compromise would bring about peace and would secure ends of justice, it should not hesitate to quash them. In such cases, the prosecution becomes a lame prosecution. Pursuing such a lame prosecution would be waste of time and energy. That will also unsettle the compromise and obstruct restoration of peace.
5. In Gian Singh, this Court has observed that:
“58. Where the High Court quashes a criminal proceeding having regard to the fact that he dispute between the offender and victim has been settled although the offences are not compoundable, it does so as in its opinion, continuation of criminal proceedings will be an exercise in futility and justice in the case demands that the dispute between the parties is put to an end and peace is restored;
securing the ends of justice being the ultimate guiding factor.”
Needless to say that the observations are applicable to this Court also.
6. The learned counsel for the parties have requested this Court that the impugned order be set aside as the High Court has not noticed the correct position in law in regard to quashing of criminal proceedings when there is a compromise. Affidavit has been filed in this Court by complainant Anil Mandal, who is Respondent 2 herein. In the affidavit he has stated that a compromise petition has been filed in the lower court. It is further stated that he and the appellants are neighbours, that there is harmonious relationship between the two sides and that they are living peacefully. He has further stated that he does not want to contest the present appeal and he has no grievance against the appellants. The learned counsel for the parties have confirmed that the disputes between the parties are settled; that parties are abiding by the compromise deed and living peacefully. They have urged that in the circumstances pending proceedings be quashed. The State of Jharkhand has further filed an affidavit opposing the compromise. The affidavit does not persuade us to reject the prayer made by the appellant and the second respondent for quashing of the proceedings.”
9. Further reliance is placed on another ruling of the Apex Court in the case of NARINDER SINGH VS STATE OF to say that the PUNJAB & ANOTHER – (2014)6 SCC 466, wherein the Apex Court has laid down certain guidelines that are to be adhered by the Courts in the event of parties desiring to give a quietus and close the criminal proceedings. In the said ruling, the Apex has held that the guiding factors in such cases would be, (i) to secure the ends of justice; (ii) to prevent any abuse of the process of any court.
10. In the instant case, it is fairly submitted that no injury has been suffered nor is any weapon being used and is a mere altercation. On a query, the respondent no.2, who is present would categorically submit that he desires to withdraw the complaint.
11. The compromise arrived at between the parties is also reflected in the order dated 17.08.2019 passed by the Trial Court, wherein the court has been pleased to accept the B report in view of the complainant expressing lack of interest to further prosecute the case.
12. In that view of the matter, petition is allowed. The entire proceedings pending before the Prl. Civil Judge (Sr.Dn.) & CJM, Court, Mangaluru, arising out of Crime No.56/2015 registered with the respondent-Police stands quashed.
Sd/- JUDGE KK CT-HR
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Title

T D Nagaraj vs State Of Karnataka And Others

Court

High Court Of Karnataka

JudgmentDate
03 December, 2019
Judges
  • G Narendar