JUDGMENT O. P. Garg, J.
1. A dispute has been raised in this writ petition with regard to the appointment on the post of Sadar Munsarim in the Judgeship of Banda. As a preface, it may be mentioned that in the hierarchy of judicial administration at the district-level, the highest official in the ministerial cadre is Senior Administrative Officer which post is filled by promotion from the post of Sadar Munsarim. Sri Vinod Agnihotri, who was Senior Administrative Officer in the Banda Judgeship retired on 30.6.1999, in his place, Sri Aniruddha Krishna Maun who was admittedly working as Sadar Munsarim has been appointed as Senior Administrative Officer on 7.8.1999 by the District Judge, Banda, in this manner, the post of Sadar Munsarim fell vacant. The District Judge, Banda, constituted a committee of three Additional District Judges headed by Ist Additional District Judge. Banda. After screening of the record of the two seniormost officials, namely, the present petitioner and Deen Bandhu Awasthi, the Committee recommended that on the principle of seniority-cum-suitability', Deen Bandhu Awasthi-respondent No. 4, was well suited for appointment as Sadar Munsarim in preference to the petitioner. Accordingly, by order dated 12.8.1999, the District Judge, Banda, appointed Deen Bandhu Awasthi-respondent No. 4 as Sadar Munsarim initially for a period of three months, on probation. By means of the present writ petition, the petitioner has sought a writ, in the nature of writ of certiorari quashing the impugned order dated 12.8.1999, passed by District Judge. Banda. Annexure-6 to the writ petition, promoting respondent No. 4 to the post of Sadar Munsarim as well as other subsidiary reliefs, including promotion of the petitioner to the said post.
2. The grievance of the petitioner is that since he is senior to respondent No. 4 Deen Bandhu Awasthi, his claim for promotion to the post of Sadar Munsarim has been unjustifiably denied. He has made certain averments in the writ petition to Indicate the grounds on account of which the appointing authority was unhappy with him and was out to deprive him of the legitimate claim of promotion in the normal course to the post of Sadar Munsarim.
3. Notice of this writ petition was taken by Sri Sunil Ambwani, Advocate, on behalf of the respondent No. 1 to 3. Sri Sree Ram Gupta, Advocate appeared on behalf of the respondent No. 4 Deen Bandhu Awasihf. Sri Sunil Ambwani on behalf of respondent Nos. 1 to 3 and Sri Sree Ram Gupta, learned counsel for the respondent No. 4 stated that they shall not file counter-affidavit in view of the fact that the original service record, i.e., the character rolls of the petitioner and Deen Bandhu Awasthi respondent No. 4 as well as the report of the committee have been produced by Sri A. K. Tripathi, Additional District Judge, who was one of the members of the committee. Learned counsel for the parties prayed that the writ petition be disposed of on merits. In view of concession made by learned counsel for the parties, the petition was taken up for final decision at this stage.
4. After the judgment was reserved. Sri Shree Ram Gupta, learned counsel for the respondent No. 4 moved an application for taking on record a short counter-affidavit. It was staled by S. R. Gupta that a special adverse entry was recorded by the District Judge, Banda, in the character roll of the petitioner after conclusion of two enquires against him and since this is a subsequent development, it may be taken note of by this Court. The petitioner has filed a rejoinder-affidavit. Learned counsel for the parties were heard again on 24.9.1999 at some length.
5. It is an indubitable fact that the petitioner was the seniormost employee in the Judgeship of Banda for being considered for promotion to the post of Sadar Munsarim. The respondent No. 4 Deen Bandhu Awasthi, is next below the petitioner in the seniority list. On comparative assessment of merit on the basis of character roll entries, the report of the Committee, in substance, is that while the service record of Deen Bandhu Awasthi respondent No. 4 is. by and large, clean, the petitioner has earned a number of adverse entries and, therefore, the former is preferred for appointment as Sadar Munsarim. Sri Sunil Ambwani as well as Sri Sree Ram Gupta, learned counsel for the contesting respondents supported the report of the committee and order of the District Judge in appointing Deen Bandhu Awasthi as Sadar Munsarim in preference to the petitioner.
6. Sri W. H. Khan, learned counsel for the petitioner assisted by Sri Jamal Ali, urged that the seniority of the petitioner could not be ignored unless a categorical finding was recorded that the respondent No. 4, who was junior to the petitioner, is of outstanding merit. A reference was made to the provisions of Rule 20 (3) of the U. P. Subordinate Civil Courts Ministerial Establishment Rules, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Rules of 1947'), which govern the promotion of the civil court employees. Rule 20 (3) of the Rules is extracted below :
"20. Promotion.--(1).....
(2)......
(3) Posts other than those mentioned in clause (2) above, for persons in the pre-1931 scale on post 1931 scale respectively shall be treated as selection posts, promotion to which shall be based on merit with due regard to seniority.
Note-In passing over a person for Inefficiency as well as promotion for a selection post due weight shall be given to his previous record of service and seniority should be disregarded only when the junior official promoted is of outstanding merit as compared with his seniors."
In view of the aforesaid Rule, the criterion for promotion to a selection post which also Includes the post of Sadar Munsarim is 'merit with due regard to seniority'. The aforesaid rule came to be interpreted before a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Hari Mohan Lal v. Satya Deo Singh and others, (1975) (1) SLR 699. Paras 4 and 5 of the aforesaid report may profitably be reproduced as below :
"4. Thus, the criterion for promotion to a selection post is merit with due regard to seniority. The quantum of due regard to seniority has been explained in the Note. Seniority can be disregarded only if it is found that a junior is of outstanding merit, as compared to his senior ; and for this purpose the previous record of service has not only to be considered but due weight should be given to it.
5. Properly construed the criterion is that seniority is to prevail if the junior is not of outstanding merit as compared to the senior. The Note provides this special meaning to the term merit used in Rule 20 (3). The term merit has to be understood in this special sense as outstanding merit comparatively. Of course, while Judging the merit of two, the factors like character. Integrity, devotion to duty, knowledge of rules and regulations, dealings etc., are all relevant. The note aforesaid emphasizes that due weight shall be given to the previous record of service. These various attributes of an employee have to be gathered from the previous record of service, and it is primarily from that record that it has to be seen whether the junior is of an outstanding merit compared to his senior."
Similar controversy was raised in another case which came to be decided by a Division Bench of this Court in Iqbal Bahadur Sriuastava v. District Judge, Sultanpur and another, (1989 (2) UPLBEC 569 (LB), wherein Hari Mohan Lal's case was relied upon and approved. It was held that a reading of Rule 20 (3) makes it clear that the post of Sadar Munsarim is a post reserved for members of clerical cadre and the promotion is to be made on consideration of merit with due regard to seniority. It was further held that the seniority can be disregarded only if the next person in the seniority list is of outstanding merit, meaning thereby that merely by judging a person of higher merit than his senior will not entitle the person for the promotional post. It was ruled that a person cannot be deprived of the promotion on the mere ground that there were certain charges against the employee who was by passed, as the pendency of disciplinary proceeding cannot be a ground for depriving the seniormost employee the promotion to which he is entitled. As said above, the petitioner, being the senior most employee of the Judgeship, was entitled for appointment to the post of Sadar Munsarim. His candidature could be rejected only if he is not found suitable and the person junior to him is found to be of 'outstanding' merit.
7. Sri W. H. Khan, learned counsel for the petitioner urged that the case be judged yet from another angle. Now the U. P. Government Servants (Criterion for Recruitment of Promotion) Rules, 1994 (hereinafter referred to as 'Rules of 1994'), as amended by Second Amendment Rules. 1998, taking within its sweep the employees drawing salary upto Rs. 18,300 per month, are operative and since these Rules have an overriding effect, the promotion to the post of Sadar Munsarim shall be governed by these Rules only. The Rules of 1994 made by the Governor in exercise of powers conferred by the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India and published in U. P. Gazette (Extraordinary) Part W Sec (Ka) dated October 10, 1994 by means of notification No. 13/34/19-Ka-1/1994 dated October 10, 1994 visualise the criterion of 'seniority subject to the rejection of unit', for promotion to the posts in all services to be filled by promotion excepting the posts of the Head of Department, a post one rank below the post of Head of Department and a post in any service carrying the pay scale, the maximum of which is Rs. 18,300 or above. The amended Rule 4 reads as under :
"4. Criterion for recruitment by promotion--Recruitment by promotion to the post of Head of Department, to a post just one rank below the Head of Department and to a post in any service carrying the pay scale, the maximum of which is Rs. 18,300 or above, shall be made on the basis of merit, and to rest of the posts in all services to be filled by promotion including a post where promotion is made from a non-gazetted post to a gazetted post or from one service to another service, shall be made on the basis of seniority subject to the rejection of the unfit."
The Rules apply to a recruitment by promotion to a post or service for which no consultation with the Public Service Commission is required and "have effect notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other service rules made by the Governor under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution, or Orders, for the time being in force." On the basis of the aforesaid Rules of 1994. Sri W, H. Khan contended that even the criteria of 'merit cum seniority' as originally contemplated in Rule 20 (3) of Rules of 1947 would stand substituted by 'seniority subject to the rejection of unfit'. A reference was also made to a decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Manna Prasad Jaiswal v. District Inspector of Schools, Deoria and others, (1999) 2 UPLBBC 1197, in which the expressions 'seniority-cum-merit' ; 'merit-cum-seniority' ; and 'seniority subject to rejection of unfit' came to be interpreted and explained, though in a different context of ad hoc promotion of a teacher under the provisions of U. P. Secondary Education Service Commission and Selection Board Act, 1982 as amended by Act No. 24 of 1992 and the rules framed thereunder. Nevertheless, the content and meaning given to the above expressions apply on all fours. The relevant para 11 of the decision reads as follows :
"11. It may be borne in mind that the criterion of ad hoc promotion is "seniority subject to rejection of unfit" and not "merit-cum-seniority" nor even "seniority-cum-merit" or "seniority-cum-efficiency". In B. V. Sivatah and others v. K. Addanki Babu and others, (1998) 6 SCC 720, the distinction between the twin principles of "merit-cum-seniority" and "seniority-cum-merit" has been explained by the Apex Court and it has been held that the principle of "merit-cum-seniority" lays greater emphasis on ability and seniority plays a less significant role. According to this principle seniority is to be given weight only when merit and ability are approximately equal. But the criterion of "seniority-cum-merit" lays greater emphasis on seniority. In State of Mysore v. Syed Mahmood, AIR 1968 SC 1113, while considering the Rule 4 (3) (b; of the Mysore State Civil Services General Recruitment Rules, 1957, which required promotion to be made by selection on the basis of "seniority subject to the fitness of the candidate to discharge the duties of the post from among persons eligible for promotion" it was held therein that where the promotion is based on "seniority-cum-merit" the officer cannot claim promotion as a matter of right by virtue of his seniority alone and if he is found unfit to discharge the duties of the higher post, he may be passed over and an officer junior to him may be promoted. As pointed out herein above, the criterion in the instant case is seniority subject to rejection of unfit. The word 'unfit' unlike the word 'merit' has a negative formulation. The principle of "seniority-cum-merit" or 'seniority-cum-efficiency' does envisage a comparative assessment of merit whereas the principle 'seniority subject to rejection of unfit'. In the context of clause (b) of the Explanation to Rule 16, does not visualize comparative assessment of the merits and performance of qualified and eligible teachers in that rejection of a senior teacher is to be based on his conduct related disqualification visualized by clause (b) of the Explanation appended to Rule 16 of the Rules."
Sri W. H. Khan urged that the District Judge, Banda, has failed to take note of the well embedded proposition of law and has committed grave Illegality in overlooking the seniority of the petitioner and in bypassing him in the matter of promotion. It was stated that unless a finding was recorded that the petitioner, who was seniormost employee, was unfit for promotion, his junior could not be promoted to the post of Sadar Munsarim by making a comparison of their service record. It was also contended that neither the Committee nor the District Judge has recorded a finding that the respondent No. 4 was an employee of 'outstanding merit' and. therefore, he was entitled to eclipse the petitioner and take precedence over him. This submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner cannot be lightly brushed aside as it is in keeping with the two decisions of the Division Bench, referred to above. In the instant case, the District Judge appears to have been unnecessarily swayed away by the comparison of the entries made in the character rolls of the petitioner as well as respondent No. 4. Both the character rolls are before this Court. I have thoroughly scanned them. It is true that the petitioner was censured for his petty lapses in 1972 and 1973. An adverse entry was made in his character roll in 1982 and thereafter in 1989-90 an entry was made that the petitioner used to come late. Thereafter, right from 1991 to 1997, the petitioner has earned the following good entries :
^^Jh lS;n eqkdh jtk izekf.kr fd;k tkrk gS fd Jh ,l ,e jtk us [email protected] ds in ij esjs v/khu dk;Z fd;k gSA og fouez] O;ogkj&dq'ky] esgurh gSA mudh lR;fu"Bk izekf.kr dh tkrh gSA g vifBr izfrgLrk{kfjr ftyk tt cknk g vifBr oh ds [kjs r`rh; fo'ks"k U;k M iz {ks= cknk**A "Annual Confidential Remarks for 91-92 Sri Syed Muttaqui Raza-Reader, Ist, A.D.J.
He is bard-working and intelligent offical. Earlier he had been in the Court of Spl Judge (D.A.A.) Banda and is now working in the Court of Ist Addl. District Judge, Banda, which is lying vacant. He has good knowledge of Rules and Procedure. Integrity beyond doubtful.
On 16th June 1999, an adverse entry was made in the character roll of the petitioner on the ground that he had failed to obtain signatures of the complainant Bhagwan Prasad in Case Wo. 949/IX/98, Bhagwan Prasad v. Jugal while the petitioner was Reader in the Court of IInd ACJM Banda. The petitioner had submitted his explanation that he had given the statement to the Court Peon for signatures of the complainant who omitted to obtain in the same. Finding the explanation of the petitioner as unsatisfactory. Sri A. B. Shukla, District Judge, Banda, recorded the following adverse remarks in the character roll of the petitioner :
"Gross negligent and careless in discharge of official duty.
Sd/D. J.
16.6.99. "
8. It appears that this entry came in the way of the petitioner to seek promotion. The respondent No. 4 had also earned a censure entry in 1975 and there is record of a warning having been administered to him in 1976. Since thereafter, his work has been found either 'good' or 'satisfactory'. He has been assessed as 'hard working', 'dutiful' and 'punctual' official. A comparison of the character roll entries of the two officials would reveal that during the period 1991 and 1997 remarks made in the character roll of the petitioner are superior than the respondent No. 4. If the entries prior to 1991 besides the entry made on 16.6.1999 in respect of the petitioner are ignored, in that event it cannot be said that the petitioner was, in any manner, unsuitable for promotion or that respondent No. 4 is an employee of 'outstanding' merit.
9. The overall performance of a public servant in the discharge of his duties is a highly relevant matter while considering his entitlement to certain benefits-particularly those related to career advancement, i.e., promotion. There are several dicta of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in relation to the object and purpose of maintaining confidential reports. It has been said that the object is to give an opportunity to a public servant to improve excellence. In this connection, reference may be made to State of U. P. v. Yamuna Shankar Misra, 1997 (2) SLR 311. In another case Swatantar Singh v. State of Haryana, AIR 1997 SC 2105, the Apex Court has further elucidated that the object is to afford an opportunity to the concerned official to make amends for his remissness, to reform himself, to mend his conduct and to be disciplined, to do hardwork, to bring home his lapse in his integrity and character so that he corrects himself and Improves the efficiency in public service. In State Bank of India v. Kashinath Kher. AIR 1996 SC 1328, the Supreme Court has pointed out that the object of such report is two fold ; i.e., to give an opportunity to the officer to remove deficiencies and to inculcate discipline and secondly it seeks to serve improvement of quality and excellence and efficiency of public service also see Union of India v. N. R. Banerjee, 1997 (1) SLR 751.
Thus, from the conspectus of aforesaid decisions. It is crystal clear that the purpose of censure/ admonition entries is never to mar the future prospects of an outstanding official/officer.
10. While considering the question of promotion of an employee, the general principle is that although the entire service record of the employee is considered, the service record of the immediately preceding ten years should provide a just and reasonable guideline, as has been held by the Apex Court in Brij Mohan Singh Chopra v. State of Punjab, AIR 1987 SC 948. The State Government has also adopted the yardstick of ten years in G. O.
dkfeZd foHkkx vuqHkkx & 1] la[;k 2908&dk&1&83 fnukad 22] ekpZ 1987 printed in the Compilation of the Manual of Government orders and Services Manual, to consider the past entries earned by an employee--whether good or adverse. In the Instant case, the case of the petitioner for promotion came to be considered in the month of August, 1999. Therefore, the entries earned by the petitioner for the period 1989 onwards are to be looked into. The previous stale adverse entries or the censure remarks, incorporated in the character roll in the years prior to 1989, which virtually stood wiped off, could not be looked into. Consideration of the remarks existing prior to last ten years would tantamount to digging up the past to get some material for taking action. In the year 1989-90, the work and conduct of the petitioner was found to be satisfactory and his integrity was certified but a remark has been made that he used to come late in office. The petitioner has explained the cause of being late. At the relevant point of time, he was posted in the outlying court of Addl. District Judge, Karwi, in district Banda and had to commute on every day from Banda to Karwi. It was also urged that after the award of said entry, the petitioner has been granted promotion and has been allowed to cross the efficiency bar, and, therefore, the effect of the said entry stands effaced. In support of his contention, learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on the decisions in Noharia Mal v. State of Haryana, 1990 16) SLR 116 (P&H) : J. D. Srivastava v. State of M. P., 1984 (1) SLR 342 (SC) and Mohan Lal Capoor v. State of U. P., 1984 (2) SLR 370, (by a Division Bench of this Court). The gamut of these decisions is that any adverse remarks prior to the date of crossing of efficiency bar or where the employee has been promoted subsequent to such remarks, cannot be taken into account. In the case of State of Punjab v. Kulwantbir Singh, 1993 (1) SLR 647, a Full Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court further clarified that if the employee has been granted promotion to the feeder post from which he is now seeking promotion, in spite of existence of an adverse entry, it will lose significance. Grant of promotion or allowing an employee to cross the efficiency bar amounts to condonation of the allegations against him. If the entry of the year 1989-90 is ignored for the aforesaid reason, it would be apparent that no adverse entry exists during the last ten years in the character roll of the petitioner, on the contrary he has earned good or very good entries till 1997. No entry was recorded for the year 1998.
11. Sri Sunil Ambwani, learned counsel for the respondents pointed out that there is an adverse entry dated 16.6.1999 which is prior to the date of selection of the petitioner to the promotional post of Sadar Munsarim. The District Judge, Banda, has found the petitioner as "gross negligent and careless in discharge of official duty". Sri W. H. Khan, learned counsel for the petitioner suggested that the said adverse remark was made by the District Judge, Banda, Just before the question of promotion cropped up for consideration. The conclusion of the District Judge, with regard to the carelessness and negligence of the petitioner is based on the fact that the petitioner failed to obtain signatures on the statement of complainant Bhagwan Prasad in Case No. 949/1X of 1998 while he was Reader in the Court of IInd ACJM, Banda. The petitioner had submitted a very plausible explanation that he had handed over the statement for the signatures of the complainant to the Court Peon but he, somehow, omitted to obtain the same. The statement was recorded by the petitioner on the dictation of the Presiding Officer. This fact has been certified by the Presiding Officer himself. The fact that the statement of the complainant was recorded is not in dispute. The statement gives the true account of what the witness deposed is also beyond the pale of controversy. It is common knowledge that in the criminal courts, there is great rush of work and the signatures of a witness on the statement recorded by the Reader on the dictation of the Presiding Officer are obtained by the Court Peon to whom the statement is passed over for the purpose. Since the veracity, or otherwise, of the contents of the statement of the complainant was not the subject-matter of dispute, omission of the petitioner to get the signatures of the witness on the statement was not such a grave lapse as to brand him "gross negligent or careless official". The petitioner obviously had some real difficulty in this regard. In the instant cage, the learned District Judge rested its opinion regarding the negligence and carelessness of the petitioner on the basis of the fact situation of one case and that too with reference to his trivial lapse of no consequence. There appears to be considerable weight in the submission on behalf of the petitioner that the aforesaid remark was made in the character roll of the petitioner on the eve of consideration of question of promotion by the District Judge to water down the previous good record with a view to exclude the petitioner from the zone of consideration. This fact is further fortified by the fact that even during the pendency of the present petition, the District Judge has made all out attempts to overreach this Court. After the arguments were heard in this case and the judgement was reserved, the District Judge awarded a special adverse entry to the petitioner on 15.9.1999, which is contained in the short counter-affidavit filed by respondent No. 4. This adverse entry was designed to mar the future prospects of the petitioner. In any case, on 12.8.1999, on which date the committee submitted its report and the District Judge promoted the respondent No, 4, the special adverse entry dated 15.9.1999, which has now been set up by the respondent No. 4 as a subsequent event, was not in existence. The Committee, therefore, could not have anticipated that an adverse entry shall be made at some future point of time against the petitioner. The adverse entry dated 16.6.1999 as well as special adverse entry made during the pendency of the writ petition, dated 15.9.1999, have to be totally Ignored. The adverse remark that the petitioner used to come late, made in 1989-90, cannot be taken into consideration as the petitioner has thereafter been granted promotion and has been allowed to cross the efficiency bar.
12. It is needless to emphasize that the career prospect of a subordinate employee largely depends upon the work and character assessment by the reporting officer. The latter should adopted fair objective. dispassionate and constructive commends/comments in estimating or assessing the character, ability, Integrity and responsibility displayed by the concerned employee during the relevant period for the above objectives if not strictly adhered to in making an honest assessment, the prospect and career of the subordinate employee being put to great jeopardy. The reporting officer is bound to lose his credibility in the eyes of the subordinates and fail to command respect and work from them. Any adverse remark in the confidential reports (CRs) of an employee by his superior cannot be made on the basis of his handling of a particular case but by taking into account an objective view of the material about his overall performance. The CRs of official are basically the performance appraisal and go to constitute vital service record in relation to his career advancement. Any adverse remark in the CRs can mar entire career of the official. It is necessary that in the event of a remark being called for the CRs, the authority directing this must first come to the conclusion that fact situation is such that it is imperative to make such remarks to set right the wrong done by the official concerned.
13. For the reasons stated above, the adverse entry dated 16.6.1999 as well as the special adverse entry of 15.9.1999 have also to be ignored. The effect of this finding would be that the record of the petitioner during the period under consideration, has been neat and unblamesworthy. Where the rules provide for a scheme which is commonly referred to as 'seniority-cum-merit', although promotion is again not automatic, implications of such a rule are slightly different. Here the proper way to proceed is to prepare a list of all the candidates in the feeder post in the order of seniority and thereafter consider each on merits and reject the unfit. In other words, the seniors in the feeder cadre are selected subject to suitability. For rejecting the unfit, ten years' record preceding the date of consideration is required to be perused as stated above. Past record of performance of an employee is normally a useful indicator of his future efficiency and since suitability for discharging the responsibilities of the promotional post is the real objective of the employer, past record of employee limited to a period of ten years constitutes a significant relevant factor in considering whether he is fit for promotion. The promotion of an employee has to be on objective and fair considerations. The authority considering the candidature for promotion can legitimately decide to withhold promotion on the basis of such adverse entry depending, of course, on how adverse is the entry. The promotion cannot be withheld merely because there were certain adverse remarks on record which are not of vital importance.
14. I very plausible, forceful and pertinent submission was made by learned counsel for the petitioner to which the respondents had virtually no reply., that if the provisions of Section 20 (3) of the Rules of 1947 are found to be applicable, in that event, the petitioner cannot be bypassed in the matter of promotion unless, as has been held in the decisions in Hari Mohan Lal and Iqbal Bahadur Srivastava, (supra) the respondent No. 4 was found to be a person of outstanding merit, and, if the Rules of 1994, as amended in 1998, are applied in that event, the petitioner being seniormost, was entitled to be promoted to the post of Sadar Munsarim, unless his claim was rejected as being unfit. It appears that the learned District Judge, Banda, was swayed away with the finding of the committee that the previous record of Deen Bandhu Awasthi, respondent No. 4 was better than that of the petitioner. The yardstick applied by the learned District Judge is not enough to satisfy the requirement either of Rule 20 (3) of the Rules of 1947 or of the Rules of 1994. as amended in the year 1998. The petitioner is admittedly senior to respondent No. 4. His seniority could not be disregarded simply because the character roll of respondent No. 4 was better. The difference in the character rolls of the two officials is only of degree and not of kind. As held in Hari Mohan Lal's case (supra), the note of Rule 20 (3) of the Rules of 1947 emphasizes that the difference between the two must be of a category, i.e., junior is found of 'outstanding merit' while the senior is not. The criterion of 'seniority subject to rejection of unfit' in the matter of promotion postulates that given the minimum necessary merit requisite for efficiency, competency as well as knowledge of rules, the senior, even though less meritorious shall have priority and a comparative assessment of merit is not required to be made. The committee constituted by District Judge, as well as the District Judge himself have not come to the conclusion that the respondent No. 4 Deen Bandhu Awasthi was a person of outstanding merits and, therefore, he could not be appointed. If the criteria of seniority subject to rejection of unfit is applied in that event, the question of comparison of character rolls of various employees did not arise. The petitioner was not found to be unfit. In the absence of a finding of petitioner being unfit, he being the senior-most employee, his claim could not be ignored. On the other hand, his seniority was to be respected. There can be no escape from the finding that the promotion of Deen Bandhu Awasthi-respondent No. 4 stands faulted on account of the fact that the petitioner who admittedly is senior to him has been denied the promotion in an arbitrary manner on insufficient and untenable grounds.
15. Now the question is whether this Court should straightaway direct the District Judge to grant promotion to the petitioner in view of the observations and findings recorded above. This anxiety is the product of the fact that there are certain decisions of the Apex Court that the Court exercising the power of judicial review and interference with the process of promotion or selection has to adopt a cautious approach. In Indian Airlines Corporation v. Capt. K. C. Shukla, 1993 (1) SCC 17, the Apex Court observed that the Court cannot substitute its opinion and devise its own method of evaluating fitness of a candidate for a particular post as adjusting equities in exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction is one thing but assuming the role of selection committee is another. In another case in State of Mysore v. C. R. Seshadri, AIR 1974 SC 460, the Apex Court, per Krishna Iyer, J., observed that the judiciary cannot promote or demote officials but may demolish a bad order of Government or order reconsideration on correct principles. The gamut of the various decisions of the Apex Court, therefore, is that the Court cannot direct that the promotion should be granted to the person who claims before the Court that he should have been promoted and the proper course to adopt for the Court is to direct the authorities concerned that the case be considered afresh by the selection committee indicating the broad framework within which the committee should act and the principles which it should follow. In this connection, a reference may be made to the decision of the Apex Court in Gurdial Singh Fijji v. State of Punjab, ASR 1979SC 1622 and State of Mysore v. Syed Mahmood, AIR 1968 SC 1113. But this is not an inflexible and rigid principle. In the facts and circumstances of a given case, and for the ends of justice, the Courts might even direct that the promotion be released to the aggrieved person instead of remitting the matter back to the committee for a fresh consideration. For example, in State of Gujarat v. S. Triapthi, AIR 1987 SC 479, the Supreme Court, instead of directing the Government of Gujarat to consider afresh the claim of the respondents in that case, for promotion to the selection grade and the super time scale, declared that they should have been given such promotion and directed the Government to give the consequential monetary benefits. Prior to the aforesaid decisions, in District Registrar v. M. B. Koyyakutty, AIR 1979 SC 1060, the Supreme Court considered whether it was proper for the High Court to issue a positive direction requiring the authority to promote the employee concerned to the Upper Division and thereafter to determine his rank in the cadre of Upper Division Clerks. After observing that "ordinarily, the Court does not issue a direction in such positive terms", the Court proceeded to do so having regard to the peculiar features of the case, namely, the employee satisfying the statutory criteria, the state of the affidavits and the fitness of the employee for promotion not being in issue. In the Instant case, no counter-affidavit has been filed on behalf of the District Judge, Banda.
16. There is another angle with which the aforesaid controversy may be viewed. It is elementary that if it is found that in considering the matter, the concerned committee acted arbitrarily or unfairly or in violation of rules or failed to consider relevant factors or considered irrelevant factors, then the decision or recommendation of such a committee would be vitiated and promotions, if any released on the basis of such decision or recommendation would be liable to be set aside by the Courts. When the action of the authority concerned is under challenge on the ground of arbitrariness, unfairness or unreasonableness, it is the duty of the Court to step-in to rectify the mistake. The above observations flow from the decisions of the Apex Court in Vijay Kumar, I.A.S. v. State of Maharashtra and others. AIR 1988 SC 2060 ; Smt. Kamla Gaind v. State of Punjab and others, 1990 (3) SCSR 282 ; M/s. Frick India Ltd. and another v. State of Haryana and others, AIR 1994 SC 2410 ; State of Maharashtra v. Manubhai Pragaji Vashi and others, AIR 1996 SC 1 as well as decision of this Court in Sushil Chandra Srivastava v. State of U. P. and others, (1996) I ESC 396. In view of the fact that the appointment on promotion of Deen Bandhu Awasthi, espondent No. 4 was made clearly in flagrant violation of law, and has been founded on entirely untenable considerations. I am inclined to straightaway pass an order of promotion in favour of the petitioner in the light of the decisions aforesaid. It appears that the learned District Judge himself was shaky and hesitant in giving regular promotion to the respondent No. 4 and it was precisely for this reason that the promotion was made for a period of three months on probation.
17. In the conspectus of the facts and law discussed above, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order dated 12.8.1999, Annexure-6 to the writ petition, passed by respondent No. 1- District Judge, Banda, promoting the respondent No. 4 for a period of three months on probation, is hereby quashed. The respondent No. 1 is hereby commanded to pass appropriate orders for promoting the petitioner to the post of Sadar Munsarim soon after the certified copy of this order is produced before him. The original service record, i.e., the character rolls of the petitioner and Deen Bandhu Awasthi-respondent No. 4 as well as the report of the committee, which have been produced by Sri A. K. Tripathi, Additional District Judge. Banda, be returned to the District Judge, Banda.
through Sri T. M. Khan. Officer on Special Duty in the Registry of this Court.