JUDGMENT Gokul Prasad, J.
1. The facts of this case briefly are these:That Dhommi Singh brought a suit for sale on a mortgage against the accused. Part of the consideration of the mortgage consisted of two promissory notes. The defense by the accused was that those promissory notes were without consideration. This defence was repelled by the Trial Court which passed a decree for the full amount claimed. Dhommi Singh then put in an application for sanction to prosecute the accused. The sanction was ultimately granted and the accused was tried under Section 193 of the Indian Penal Code and has been convicted. The conviction has been confirmed by the learned Sessions Judge of Meerut. The chief point taken before me is that the lower Appellate Court has erred in throwing upon the accused the burden of proving that he had not received the consideration for the promissory notes and had, therefore, committed perjury punishable under Section 193 of the Indian Penal Code. There is no doubt that the learned Judge seems to have taken this view. For the purposes of the Civil Courts the Negotiable Instruments Act lays down that the presumption is that a promissory note has been passed for consideration. That rule of law would not necessarily apply to a criminal trial in which every element which goes to constitute a particular offence has to be proved by the prosecution. In the present case it was necessary for the prosecution to prove that the promissory notes were for consideration and it was not for the accused to prove the contrary. A perusal of the judgment of the trying Magistrate, however, shows that all the circumstances connected with this case went conclusively to prove that the promissory notes were for consideration. There were, at least, the admissions of the accused himself which, coupled with the evidence of the complainant, clinched the case against him and showed that his statement made in the civil suit that the promissory notes were without consideration was false. Having regard to the social position of both the parties I think the Trial Court exercised a sound discretion in awarding the punishment it did. I see no reason to interfere in revision and dismiss the application.