JUDGMENT N. K. Mitra, C.J. and S.R. Singh, JJ.
1. Present appeal has been filed impugning the judgment and order dated 15.9.1999. The facts necessary to shed light on the disputation involved in the matter are that the petitioner-appellant was suspended from service by means of the order dated 8.12.1998 passed by the Survey Commissioner, Wakfs, U.P. in contemplation of disciplinary enquiry. The appellant has already been served with charge-sheet. The charge as unfolded in the charge-sheet reads as under :
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2. The suspension order and the charge-sheet were sought to be quashed in the writ petition on the premises, inter alia, that evidence proposed to be adduced in aid of the charges framed against the appellant was inadmissible. The learned single Judge held the view that the question of admissibllity of evidence may aptly be raised before the enquiry officer/disciplinary authority and as a sequel, disposed of the petition studded with the direction that subject to active co-operation and regular participation of the petitioner towards conclusion of the enquiry, the appointing authority/enquiry officer would ensure that the departmental enquiry was brought to a logical conclusion within a period of four months from the date of production of a certified copy of the judgment and further that subsistence allowance for the month of July and August, 1999, would be paid positively to the appellant/petitioner within 15 days from the date of production of certified copy of the order.
3. Sri S. U. Khan, learned counsel for the appellant, while reiterating the submissions made by him before the learned single Judge, made a further submission that the charge which the petitioner was indicted of, was generalised and vague and therefore, the disciplinary proceeding commends Itself to be quashed. The question as to the admissibillty has been brought to bear with reference to the statement of one Mahesh Singh recorded under Section 161, Cr. P.C. in a Criminal Case in respect of malversation of scholarship money. The learned counsel submitted that the report dated 18.9.1998 (Annexure-4 to the Stay Application), made by the District Magistrate Jyotibha Phulenagar to Secretary. Minority Welfare and Wakf, U. P. Lucknow, has its genesis in the statement of Mahesh Singh recorded under Section 161, Cr. P.C. which, submitted the learned counsel, was inadmissible. The learned counsel placed credence on a decision of the Supreme Court in State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur v. Sri Nath Gupta, AIR 1997 SC 243. The said decision, in our opinion, is unavailing to the present case inasmuch as it has been clearly ruled in that case that "strict rules of evidence are not applicable and are not required to be followed in domestic inquiry". The statement under Section 161, Cr. P.C. may not be admissible In the criminal trial, but the said statement can be produced in a disciplinary inquiry and the person who made the statement, may be examined before the Inquiry officer. In such view of the matter, the learned single Judge has rightly held that the question of admissibillty of any evidence does not arise at this stage.
4. As regards the second limb of his submission, the learned counsel has placed reliance on a decision of the Surpeme Court in Transport Commissioner v. Radha K. Moorthy, 1995 (1) SCC 332. In that case, the respondent therein was served with a charge memo in respect of misappropriation of large amount of Government money in the office of the Regional Transport Officer, Madras Central, during the years 1983-84 and 1984-85. The Tamil Nadu Administrative Tribunal allowed the original application and quashed the memo of charges communicated to the respondent therein, inter alia, on the ground that the charges communicated to the delinquent were vague and nor were elucidated by the statement of particulars in or any other manner. The Supreme Court observed as under :
"A reading of charges would show that they are not specific and clear. They do not point out clearly the precise charge against the respondent, which he was expected to meet. One can understand the charges being accompanied by a statement of particulars or other statement furnishing the particulars of the aforesaid charges but that was not done. The charges are general in nature to the effect that the respondent along with either other official indulged in misappropriation by falsification of accounts. What part did the respondent play, which account did he falsify or help falsify, which amount did he individually or together with other named persons misappropriate, are not particularised. The charge is a general one. It is significant to notice that respondent has been objecting to the charges on the ground of vagueness from the earliest stage and yet he was not furnished the particulars."
The Supreme Court, in the ultimate analysis, endorsed the view taken by the Tribunal that the charges communicated to the respondents therein were vague but at the same time, observed that, in the ordinary course, the disciplinary authority or the authority which framed the charges, would have been directed to particularise the charges and then to proceed with the enquiry but regard being had to the fact that the respondent therein had hardly about 7 or 8 months to go for retirement, the Supreme Court felt that the matter should end there and accordingly, dismissed the appeal.
5. In the present case, the charge framed against the petitioner as abstracted supra, would manifest itself that It is vague based on generalisation in that necessary particulars have not been delineated therein. Be that as it may, the defect which permeates the charge, can still be cured and situation retrieved by giving specific particulars of the alleged siphoning of lacs of rupees sanctioned for minority scholarship in the district of Moradabad and the role and about the manner in which the appellant may have indulged in mal-practices and conspiracy and misue of office in respect of misappropriation/embezzlement of scholarship money. In our opinion, upon regard being had to the gravity of the charge, we are of the view that ends of justice should be best attained if the disciplinary authority be called upon to furnish specific particulars of the charge fastened upon the appellant before he submits his reply pursuant to the notice.
6. Accordingly, the appeal is disposed of finally in terms of the above directions the judgment of the learned single Judge shall stand modified to the above extent.