JUDGMENT R.K. Agrawal, J.
1. The present special appeal has been filed against the judgment and order dated 11.8.1993 passed by the learned Single Judge in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 2584 of 1984, connected with Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 12932 of 1984, whereby the learned Single Judge had dismissed both the writ petitions and had upheld the order dated 20.6.1984 dismissing the appellant from service.
2. Briefly stated the facts giving rise to the present appeal are as follows :
According to the appellant he joined the Indian Army on 29.9.1962 as a recruit Clerk. He was promoted to Naik and subsequently, to the substantive rank of Havildar Clerk on 22.6.1971. He qualified for promotion to the rank of Naik Subedar w.e.f., 19.8.1976 and was actually due for promotion on the said post w.e.f., 13.12.1979. In January, 1976, he was posted as Motor Transport Clerk in Gorakhpur Recruiting Depot, Konark Ghat, Gorakhpur. The depot used to supply Petrol Oil Lubrication to Garrison Engineer (Air Force), Gorakhpur on book entry basis. He was transferred on 10.11.1979 to 7 Rajpootana Rifles Active Service. In respect of certain Petrol Oil Lubrication vouchers issued for the period September/October, 1979, some objection was raised by the local Audit Officer, Area-I, Allahabad on the basis of the letter issued by the Garrison Engineer having received Petrol Oil Lubrication on certain vouchers. A Court of Enquiry was convened by the Station Commander, Konark Ghat, Gorakhpur, where the petitioner was working as Motor Transport Clerk during the period when transaction of these vouchers were alleged to have taken place. According to the appellant, the Court of Enquiry was finalised by the General Officer, Commanding-in-Chief, Central Command, Lucknow and the appellant was directed to pay 35% of the total losses suffered. He deposited a sum of Rs. 2,103.50p. being his share. Thereafter, certain correspondence took place for issuance of no involvement certificate. According to the appellant certain other persons, who were also involved in the Court of Enquiry were also directed to deposit their share for the loses suffered and on depositing they were issued no involvement certificate by the concerned authority. When the appellant was not issued the no involvement certificate, he approached this Court by filling Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 2594 of 1984, seeking a writ of mandamus commanding the respondents to issue no involvement certificate. While the aforementioned writ petition was pending before this Court, the Commanding Officer 7 Rajpootana Rifles served a charge-sheet dated 27.4.1984, purporting to be under Section 57(n) of the Army Act for an offence alleged to have taken place on 2.5.1983. According to the appellant, he was tried by Summary Court Martial on 26.5.1984 and was reduced in rank from Havaldar to Naik. After considering the report of the Summary Court Martial and the explanation given by the appellant Commander Sub-Area, Allahabad vide order dated 20.6.1984, dismissed the appellant from service on the finding that he had falsified the Garrison Engineer (Air Force), Gorakhpur indent bearing No. 701-A/281/EM, dated 1.10.1979 with the intention to defraud. The said order was challenged by the appellant by means of Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 12932 of 1984, which had been dismissed by the learned Single Judge vide judgment and order dated 11.8.1993.
3. Since, the order of dismissal from service has been upheld by the learned Single Judge, the earlier Writ Petition No. 2594 of 1984, was also dismissed.
4. We have heard Sri Surya Narayan, learned Counsel for the appellant and Sri S.K. Rai, learned Standing Counsel appearing for the respondents.
5. The learned Counsel for the appellant submitted before us that in the Court of Inquiry held by the General Officer, Commanding-in-Chief, the appellant was inflicted with a penalty directing payment of 35% of the losses suffered, which he had deposited and therefore, he cannot be punished twice for the same offence. He further submitted that other persons involved in the same incident had been let off with a simple direction of payment of proportionate amount of losses suffered and he has been singularly chosen for the extreme punishment of dismissal from service in a separate enquiry, which is discriminatory and hit by Article 14 of the Constitution of India. He further submitted that the punishment awarded to the appellant is disproportionate to the gravity of the offence and should, therefore, be set-aside. According to the learned Counsel for the appellant is it a case of double jeopardy as for the same offence he had already been inflicted the punishment of depositing proportionate amount of losses and thus, the second enquiry was not permissible under law. The learned Counsel for the appellant relied upon the decision of Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of Major J.S. Kang v. Union of India and Ors. , 1987 (5) SLR 66 and Bhagat Singh and Anr. v. Emperor, AIR 1930 Lahore 226, for the proposition that a person cannot be punished twice for the same offence otherwise, it would amount to double jeopardy. He further relied upon a decision of Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of Lt. Colonel Kulbhushan Lal Sharma v. Union of India and Ors. , 1992 (3) SLR 792 and in the case of Union of India and Ors. v. K. Subramaniam Ex. J.C, AIR 2001 SC 1771, for the proposition that the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case ought to have been considered and if other persons have been let off the extreme penalty of dismissal should not have been passed. He also relied upon a decision of this Court in the case of Sher Singh v. Union of India and Ors. , 2003 (1) LBESR 68, wherein this Court has held that if no findings has been recorded by the Summary Court Martial, that he was making false accusation knowingly or having reason to believe it to be false, no punishment could have been awarded.
6. Sri S.K. Rai, learned Standing Counsel, however, submitted that the earlier Court of Enquiry held by the General Officer, Commanding-in-Chief related to the losses suffered by the Army and it did not relate to falsification of documents by the appellant. Thus, it is not a case of double jeopardy. He further submitted that before the Summary Court Martial, the appellant has admitted his guilt and therefore, there was no question of taking any lenient view. The punishment awarded to the appellant is just and proper in the circumstances of the case and calls for no interference. He relied upon a decision of this Court in the case of Rana Hari Ram Singh v. Union of India and Ors., reported in Military Law Journal 1999 Alld. 31 and submitted that it is not a case of double jeopardy. According to him the losses suffered by the Army was only one component of single conduct of the appellant, which has been made good by directing him to deposit the proportionate share of the amount. However, the falsification of the documents is Another offence, which can be tried and therefore, there is no question of any double jeopardy.
7. Having heard the learned Counsel for the parties, we find that the two offences, which were tried by at Army Authorities, were distinct in nature even though they related to the same transaction. The Court of Enquiry constituted by General Officer, Commanding-in-Chief was only concerned with the losses suffered by the Army. It was not concerned with the falsification of the documents for which a separate enquiry proceedings were held. The alleged falsification of the document is a serious offence and had been tried by the Summary Court Martial wherein the appellant had admitted his guilt. Thus, the authorities were justified in imposing punishment. We are in agreement with the decision given by this Court in the case of Rama Hari Ram Singh v. Union of India and Ors. , (supra). It is not a case of double jeopardy, The decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of Major J.S. Kong v. Union of India and Ors., 1987 (5) SLR 66 and Bhagat Singh and Anr. v. Emperor, AIR 1930 Lahore 226 (supra) would not be applicable as we have come to the conclusion that it is not a case of double jeopardy.
8. So far as the decision of Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of Lt. Colonel Kulbhushan Lal Sharma v. Union of India (supra) is concerned in that case, the Court was considering a case, where five blank railway warrant forms were lost. The Court came to the conclusion that there was no evidence that lost warrant had even been used by any person causing loss to the Army Authority and there was no evidence of negligence. In this background the order imposing penalty of severe displeasure and recovery was quashed. In the present case, the authorities have come to a definite conclusion and have recorded categorical findings that the appellant had falsified the documents. This offence is very serious in nature and on the findings recorded by the authorities, the punishment of dismissal of service cannot be said to be disproportionate or extreme or uncalled for. In the case of Union of India and Ors. v. K. Subramaniam (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court had declined to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India, in the appeal filed by the Union of India on the ground that the respect of some incident some proceedings were subjected to Court Martial proceedings while the respondents have been proceeded against under Section 120(1) of the Army Act read with Rule 17 of the Army Rules, the long lapse of time in between and the fact that the respondent was also in the meanwhile ordered to be promoted. No such fact exists in the present case so as to warrant any interference. In the case of Sher Singh v. Union of India and Ors. (supra), relied upon by the learned Counsel for the appellant is concerned the requirement under Rule 56 was that the false accusation made against any person should have been made knowingly or having reasons to believe such accusation to be false and in this view of the matter the Court came to the conclusion that if there is no finding that the false accusation against any person has been made knowingly or having reasons to believe such accusation to be false in that event no punishment can be awarded. In the present case, the question is of falsification of the documents, which had been admitted by the appellant and not of making any false accusation. Thus, no benefit can be derived from the aforesaid decision.
9. We are also not impressed by the submission advanced by the learned Counsel for the appellant that the punishment imposed is highly disproportionate to the gravity of the charge levelled against the appellant. The appellant was charged for falsification of documents, which in our view, is a serious offence if proved and requires no lenient punishment.
10. So far as the discrimination pleaded by the learned Counsel for the appellant is concerned, it may be mentioned here that at the relevant time the appellant was Motor Transport Clerk and the documents were falsified by him on the basis of which the Army had to suffer losses. The authorities were, therefore, justified in proceeding against the appellant alone.
11. In view of the foregoing discussions, we do not find any legal infirmity in the judgment and order passed by learned Single Judge. The special appeal fails and is dismissed. However, the parties shall bear their own costs.