JUDGMENT Rajes Kumar, J.
1. By means of the present writ petition, petitioner has challenged the award dated 11.01.2001 passed by the Presiding Officer Labour Court (IV), U.P., Kanpur in Misc. case No. 146 of 2000 initiated by the respondent No. 2.
2. Petitioner, M/s Swadeshi Cotton Mills was earlier owned and controlled by private management. On 01.04.1985 mill was nationalized by the Government of India by Act of Parliament known as Act No. 30 of 1986 and after being nationalized transferred to National Textile Corporation (U.P.), Limited (hereinafter referred to as "NTC") under the provisions of Act itself. NTC is also Government company, wholly owned and controlled by the Government of India.
3. Section 12 of U.P. Act No. 30 of 1986 provides that the employee would continue with the same remuneration, terms and condition of his employment.
4. Respondent No. 2 was working as clerk in the petitioner mill. He raised dispute claiming designation of Godown Incharge and accordingly pay scale of Rs. 650-1250, which was Swadeshi Pay Scale based on IDA pattern where as NTC pay scale was Rs. 425-700 based on CDA pattern On 28.09.1982 reference was made by State Government under Section 4-K of U.P. Industrial Dispute Act (hereinafter referred to as "Act") before the Labour Court, On 19.12.1987 Labour Court has given the award wherein the respondent No. 2 was given the designation of Godown Incharge and pay scale of Rs. 650-1250. Writ Petition against the said award has been dismissed on 15.07.1999. Thereafter, award was implemented by the petitioner and the respondent No. 2 was given the designation of Godown Incharge in the pay scale of Rs. 600-1250. On 03.04.2000 respondent No. 2 filed Misc. case No. 146 of 2000 before the Labour Court under Section 33-C(2) of the Act claiming the wages from 01.01.1987 in the pay scale of Rs. 1400-2300 and from 01.01.1996 in pay scale of Rs. 4500-7000 in NIC pay scale based on CDA pattern, total amount of Rs. 3,13,222/-. On 22.06.2000 petitioner filed reply stating therein that the application under Section 33-C(2) of the Act was not maintainable, in as much as there did not exist any existing right. It was stated that the respondent No. 2 claimed for NIC pay scale based on CDA pattern, which was not available to him. Right to get NTC pay scale was not existence in favour of the respondent No. 2. It was also submitted that the respondent No. 2 was not workman as he was working in supervisory cadre. Labour Conn vide order dated 11.01.2001 allowed the claim of the respondent No. 2, hence present writ petition.
5. It may be mentioned here that the respondent No. 2 retired from service of the petitioner on 31.01.2001.
6. Heard Sri Devendra Pratap Singh, learned Counsel for the petitioner and Sri K.P. Agarwal, Senior Advocate, assisted by Ms. Sumati Rani Gupta, learned Counsel for the respondent.
7. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the provisions of Section 33-C(2) of the Act can be invoked only in a situation when there is entitlement of the respondent No. 2 for the benefit. In other words there must be pre-existing right of the workman to claim the benefit. He submitted that if the entitlement has not been adjudicated and there is dispute about the same, such claim can not be allowed under Section 33-C(2) of the Act. He submitted that under Section 33-C(2) of the Act is applicable only in a case where the claim of benefit has already been adjudicated and settled in respect thereof and only computation is required to be made and the dispute as such can not be adjudicated. He submitted that Section 33-C(2) of the Act Labour Court act as an Execution Authority and while acting as an execution authority can only compute the benefit and if situation arises can also interpret the award or any order by virtue of which the claim is made. He submitted that in the present case the respondent No. 2 has opted for Swadeshi Pay Scale on IDA pattern at Rs. 650-1250 and the same has been accepted by Labour Court vide order dated 19.12.1987 and the Writ Petition filed against the said order has been dismissed, Thus, it was not open to the respondent No. 2 to raise any claim under NIC pay scale based on CDA pattern. He submitted that in any view of the matter for the settlement of his claim of wages under NIC pay scale based on CDA pattern, a reference should be sought under Section 4-K of the Act for adjudication of claim but in the present case without getting the issue adjudicated the respondent No. 2 moved an application under Section 33-C(2) of the Act asking the Labour Court first to adjudicate the claim whether it falls under NTC pay scale based on CDA pattern and, thereafter, proceed for computation of the salary. He submitted that in respect of such claim, there was no adjudication order or any scheme or provisions. Thus, there was no pre-existing right in respect thereof and claim could not be allowed under Section 33-C(2) of the Act. In support of his claim, he relied upon the decisions in the case of Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Ganesh Razak and Anr. reported in 1995 (1) SC, 235, Adarsh Gahmar Sadhan Sahkari Samiti Ltd. v. The Labour Court, U.P., Varanasi and Ors. reported in 2000 (86) FLR, 859, State Bank of India v. Ram Chandra Dubey and Ors. reported in AIR 2000 SC, 3734, State of U.P. and Anr. v. Brijpal Singh .
8. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 2 submitted that it is not correct to say that under Section 33-C(2) of the Act Labour Court is completely debarred to examine the claim. He submitted that under Section 33-C(2) of the Act power is wider than Section 33-C(1) of the Act and the Labour Court while calculating the benefit can also examine the claim. In support of this contention, he relied upon the decision of Apex Court in the case of The Central Bank of India Ltd. v. P.S. Rajagopalan etc. , Shri Ambica Mills Co. Ltd. v. Shri S.B. Bhatt and Anr. , Chief Managing Engineer, East India Coal Co. Ltd. v. Rameshwar and Anr. reported in 1968 S.C.R. (Vol.1), 140.
9. Section 33-C(1) and (2) of the Act reads as follows:
33C. Recovery of money due from an employer,- (1) Where any money is due to a workman from an employer under a settlement or an award or under the provisions of the workman himself or any other person authorized by him in writing in this behalf, or, in the case of the death of the workman, his assignee or heirs may, without prejudice to any other mode of recovery, make an application to the appropriate Government for the recovery of the money due to him, and if the appropriate Government is satisfied that any money is so due, it shall issue certificate for that amount to the Collector who shall proceed to recover the same in the same manner as an arrear of land revenue:
Provided that every such application shall be made within one year from the date on which the money became due to the workman from the employer:
Provided further that any such application may be entertained after the expiry of the said period of one year, if the appropriate Government is satisfied that the applicant had sufficient cause for not making the application within the said period.
(2) Where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any money or any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money and if any question arises as to the amount of money due or as to the amount at which such benefit should be computed, then the question may, subject to any rules that may be made under this Act, be decided by such Labour Court as may be specified in this behalf by the appropriate Government within a period not exceeding three months;
Provided that where the presiding officer of a Labour Court considers it necessary or expedient so to do, he may, for reasons to be recorded in writing extend such period by such further period as he may think fit.
10. Section 33-C(2) of the Act came up for consideration before the Apex Court as well as before the High Court number of times. In the case of The Central Bank of India Ltd. v. P.S. Rajagopalan etc. (Supra) , Apex Court held as follows:
The legislative history to which we have just referred clearly indicates that having provided broadly for the investigation and settlement of industrial disputes on the basis of collective bargaining, the legislature recognized that individual workmen should be given a speedy remedy to enforce their existing individual rights, and so, inserted Section 33-A in the Act in 1950 and added Section 33-C in 1956. These two provisions illustrate the cases in which individual workmen can enforce their rights without having to take recourse to Section 10(1) of the Act, or without having to depend upon their Union to espouse their cause. Therefore, in construing Section 33-C we have to bear in mind two relevant considerations. The construction should not be broad as to bring within the scope of Section 33-C cases which would fall under Section 10(1). Where industrial disputes arise between employees acting collectively and their employers, they must be adjudicated upon in the manner prescribed by the Act, as for instance, by reference under S. 10 (1). These disputes cannot be brought within the purview of Section 33C. Similarly, having regard to the fact that the policy of the Legislature in enacting Section 33C is to provide a speedy remedy to the individual workmen to enforce or execute their existing rights, it would not be reasonable to exclude from the scope of this section cases of existing rights which are sought to be implemented by individual workmen. In other words, though in determining the scope of Section 33C we must take care not to exclude cases which legitimately fall within its purview, we must also bear in mind that cases which fall under Section 10(1) of the Act for instance, cannot be brought within the scope of Section 34C.
Let us then revert to the words used in Section 33C(2) in order to decide what would be its true scope and effect on a fair and reasonable construction. When Sub-section (2) refers to any workman entitled to receive from the employer any benefit there specified, does it mean that he must be a workman whose right to receive the said benefit is not dispute by the employer ? According to the appellant, the scope of Sub-section (2) is similar to that of Sub-section (1) and it is pointed out that just as under Sub-section (1) any disputed question about the workmen's right to receive the money due under an award cannot be adjudicated upon by the appropriate Government, so under Sub-section (2) if a dispute is raised about the workmen's right to receive the benefit in question, that cannot be determined by the Labour Court. The only point which the Labour Court can determine is one in relation to the computation of the benefit in terms of money. We are not impressed by this argument. In our opinion, on a fair and reasonable construction of Sub-section (2) it is clear that if a workman's right to receive the benefit is disputed, that may have to be determined by the Labour Court. Before proceeding to compute the benefit in terms of money, the Labour Court inevitably has to deal with the question as to whether the workman has a right to receive that benefit. If the said right is not disputed, nothing more needs to be done and the Labour Court can proceed to compute the value of the benefit in terms of money; but if the said right is disputed, the Labour Court must deal with that question and decide whether the workman has the right to receive the benefit as alleged by him and it is only if the Labour Court answers this point in favour of the workman that the next question of making the necessary computation can arise. It seems to us that the opening clause of Sub-section (2) does not admit of the construction for which the appellant contends unless we add some words in that clause. The Clause "Where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any benefit" does not mean "where such workman is admittedly, or admitted to be, entitled to receive such benefit". The appellant's construction would necessarily Introduce the addition of the words "admittedly, or admitted to he" in that clause, and that clearly is not permissible. Besides, it seems to us that if the appellant's construction is accepted, it would necessarily mean that it would be at the option of the employer to allow the workman to avail himself of the remedy provided by Sub-section (2), because he has merely to raise an objection on the ground that the right claimed by the workman is not admitted to oust the jurisdiction of the Labour Court to entertain the workman's application. The claim under Section 33C(2) clearly postulates that the determination of the question about computing the benefit in terms of money may, in some cases, have to be preceded by an enquiry into the existence of the right and such an enquiry must be held to he incidental to the main determination which has been assigned to the Labour Court by Sub-section (2). As Maxwell has observed "where an Act confers a jurisdiction, it impliedly also grants the power of doing all such acts, or employing such means, as are essentially necessary to its execution". We must accordingly hold that Section 33C(2) takes within its purview cases of workmen who claimed that the benefit to which they arc entitled should be computed in terms of money, even though the right to the benefit on which their claim is based is disputed by their employers. Incidentally, it may be relevant to add that it would be somewhat odd that under Sub-section (3), the Labour Court should have been anthorized to delegate the work of computing the money value of the benefit to the Commissioner if the determination of the said question was the only