JUDGMENT S.H.A. Raza and B.K. Sharma, JJ.
1. The petitioner, who was working as Branch Manager in Sanyukta Kshettriya Gramin Bank, Mau was charged for abuse of delegated lending powers despite the instructions/rules issued by the Head Office, disregarding the rules and regulations while sanctioning/disbursing the loan and also purposely doing the act detrimental to the office of the Bank, acting as unbecoming officer of the Bank and also not abiding the Regulation 19 of Staff Service Regulations, 1980. The enquiry officer Sri M.N. Ojha conducted the enquiry and submitted his report to the disciplinary authority exonerating the petitioner from all charges as none of the charges were proved against the petitioner. The disciplinary authority after perusing the document as well as the deposition of the witnesses during the enquiry disagreed with the finding of the enquiry officer pertaining to the charges levelled against the petitioner, and passed an order of punishment stopping one annual increment with cumulative effect and he was made responsible for the losses suffered by the bank. The disciplinary authority further directed that although the petitioner shall be reinstated but his period of suspension will be treated as period not on duty, meaning thereby that there was a forfeiture of salary excluding the allowances which would be paid to him and as that period would not be treated as on duty, his increment if became due would not be given.
2. The petitioner being aggrieved against the said order preferred an appeal before the Board. The Board after considering the appeal of the petitioner passed a resolution agreeing with the decision of the disciplinary authority. Neither the charges against the petitioner were mentioned nor the evidence adduced was discussed in the said decision by the disciplinary authority. Even this has also not been mentioned that the charges stood proved against the petitioner on the basis of the evidence. No reason has been indicated agreeing with the decision of the disciplinary authority and rejecting the appeal of the petitioner.
3. The question as to whether it is incumbent upon the disciplinary authority to have drawn the attention of the delinquent that the disciplinary authority disagreeing with the report of the enquiry officer intended to impose punishment or not deserves consideration.
4. In Narayan Misra v. State of Orissa SLR 1969 Page 368, Hon'ble Mr. Hidayatullah, C.J. as he then was, speaking for the Bench observed:
"If the Conservator of Forests intended taking the charges on which he was acquitted into account, it was necessary that the attention of the appellant ought to have been drawn to this fact and his explanation if any called for. This does not appear to have been done. In other words, the Conservator of Forests used against him the charges of which he was acquitted without warning that he was going to use them. This is against all principles of fair play and natural justice. If me Conservator of Forests wanted to use them, he should have apprised him of his own attitude and given him an adequate opportunity. Since that opportunity was not given, the order of the Conservator of Forests modified by the State Government cannot be upheld. We accordingly set aside the order and remit the case to the Conservator of Forests for dealing with it in accordance with law. If the Conservator of Forests wants to take into account the other two charges, he shall give proper notice to the appellant intimating to him that those charges would also be considered and afford him an opportunity of explaining them."
The case of the appellant stands on better footing than the case of Narayan Misra (supra). Certain charges against Narayan Misra were proved but he was exonerated from two charges only. As two charges from which Narayan Misra was exonerated were used by the disciplinary authority while imposing punishment against the delinquent, the aforesaid observations were made by Hon'ble Supreme Court. In the present case none of the charges were held by the inquiry officer proved against the petitioner and the same charges from which he was exonerated by the Enquiry Officer after appraisal of evidence on record were used by the disciplinary authority for imposing punishment against the petitioner.
5. The same question cropped up before the Division Bench in Dr. Ram Krishna Bansal v. State of U.P., 1990 (61) FLR 42 Alld. (Sum.) and R.S.Srivastava v. State Bank of India and Ors. 1990 (8) LCD Page 497, where relying upon the observations of Narayan Misra (supra) the order of punishment passed by the Disciplinary Authority was quashed. There is another issue which needs consideration.
6. In Sri Lekha Vidharthi v. State of U.P., 1991 (1) SCC Page 212, the Hon'ble Mr. Justice R.M.Sahai speaking for the Bench observed that expression 'without any cause' (as occurred in L.R.manual) means without communicating any cause to the appointee whose appointment is terminated and is not to be equated with "without existence of any cause", it simply means that reason for the termination is given but it need not be assigned or communicated to the appointee though decision is to be communicated. The non-assigning of the reasons or non-communication thereof may be based on the public policy but termination of appointment without existence of any cogent reasons in furtherance of the object for which power is given would be arbitrary and against the public policy. In AIR 1991 SC 1216, dealing with absence of recording of reasons by the administrative authority into such matter, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that if the order does not indicate reasons there is no illegality in such an order. It is always open to administrative authority to produce the evidence aliunde before the Court to justify its action.
7. In C. B. Gautam v. Union of India and Ors. 1993 (1) SCC Page 78, the Hon'ble Dr. A.S. Anand J. speaking for the bench indicated in para 31 of the report that the recording of reasons which lead to the passing of the order is basically intended to serve a two fold purpose:
(i) that the "party aggrieved" in the proceeding before (the appropriate authority) acquires knowledge of the reasons and, in a proceeding before the High Court or the Supreme Court (since there is no right of appeal or revision), it has an opportunity to demonstrate that the reasons which persuaded the authority to pass an order adverse to his interest were erroneous, irrational or irrelevant, and
(ii) that the obligation to record reasons and convey the same to the party concerned operates as a deterrent against possible arbitrary action by the quasi-judicial or the executive authority invested with judicial powers.
8. Learned counsel for the respondents drew attention of this Court over the recent pronouncement of Hon'ble Supreme Court in State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur v. P.D. Grover (1996-I-LLJ-288) (SC), where in para 13 of the report it was observed:
"This regulation also does not obligate the Appellate Authority to give any reasons for its order. Assuming that by necessary implication this regulation also requires the Appellate Authority to give the reasons still its order cannot be invalidated, as we find that it has discharged its obligation by considering the records and proceedings pertaining to the disciplinary action and the submissions made by Grover. In other words, the order clearly demonstrates that the Appellate Authority had applied its mind not only to the proceedings of the enquiry, but also the grounds raised by Grover in his appeal and on such appreciation found that there was no substance in the appeal."
The observation of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the foregoing paragraph did not deal with the sweep of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The reasonableness, rationality, fairness, justness are different facets of Article 14 and they cover the same field. They are like twin sisters. Any law and instructions and the directions, order or action which are unreasonable, irrational, arbitrary, unjust or unfair cannot escape the amplitude of Article 14 of the Constitution. But we need not delve on that question as the impugned order indicates that the petitioner was not made aware of by the punishing authority of its intention to use those charges for which he was exonerated and he was not given an opportunity to show cause against the same. However, it would have been better if the appellate authority had passed an order indicating the reasons.
9. In view of what we have indicated hereinabove, the writ petition succeeds. A writ in the nature of certiorari quashing the impugned orders dated October 24, 1989 contained in Annexure-1 and the appellate order dated November 29, 1991 contained in Annexure-7 is issued. However, the disciplinary authority is directed to revive the disciplinary proceedings from the stage, it had faulted.