ORDER I.S. Mathur, J.
1. By this application under Section 482, Cr. P.C. praying that the criminal proceedings against the applicant under Section 403/422, I.P.C. in Case No. 210 of 1991 S.K. Bawa v. Suresh Prasad Yadav pending in the Court of Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate VI, Bareilly including the summoning order and the search warrant dated 14-3-1991 are sought to be quashed. It is further prayed that the direction be also issued for the release of Truck No. B.H.Q. 8755 in favour of the applicant.
It appears that applicant Suresh Prasad Yadav is the registered owner of the Truck No. B.H.Q. 8755. Previously the Truck was owned by Sri Pramod Kumar who agreed to sell it to the applicant for a sum of Rs. 95,000/-. The applicant paid Rs. 30,000/-to Pradeep Kumar as advance and approached the respondent, who is the Financier, for a loan of Rs. 65,000/- in September 1986. The Bank drafts were given by the opposite party which was endorsed in favour of Pradeep Kumar and thus entire amount of Rs. 95,000/- has been paid. According to the applicant, the entire amount financed by the opposite party has been paid as per details given in para 9 of the application. It is said that the applicant had to pay an amount of Rs. 86,978.75 only up to 7-2-1990 and he had already paid Rs. 93,884/-. The opposite party did not issue the hire purchase termination letter. On the contrary on 18-8-1990 the opposite party along with other persons tried to take away the truck forcibly. The opposite party also tried to negotiate the transfer of this truck. The applicant filed a civil suit, being Suit No. 58 of 1990, against the opposite party in the Court of Civil Judge, Varanasi. The suit was decreed on 22-2-1991, vide copy of the judgment Annexure 13. However, the opposite party filed a Criminal complaint against the applicant thereafter under Sections 403/422, I.P.C. and the applicant was summoned by the Court for 14-3-1991. A search warrant was also issued and the truck was seized and is, at present, lying at P.S. Adampur, Varanasi. It is submitted that the criminal proceedings against the applicant are mala fide and the complaint has been filed with utterly false and concocted allegations, by concealing material facts.
2. The opposite party filed a counter-affidavit. It is not disputed that the opposite party is the financier, it is also admitted that a decree has been passed against the opposite party on 22-2-1991 but it is submitted that was ex parte decree. The factum of the filing of the complaint is admitted and it is stated that the applicant has not paid the money in accordance with agreement.
3. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the record and I am clearly of the opinion that this is a case, if there was any, "where" the criminal proceedings must be quashed in exercise of power Under Section 482, Cr. P.C. for being blatant abuse of the process of the Court. It would appear from the admitted facts that the matter is essentially of a civil nature. The opposite party is admittedly the financier and he advanced a sum of Rs. 65,000/- allegedly on hire purchase agreement. It is submitted by the applicant that he has paid back the entire amount while the opposite party contends that the amount has not been paid in terms of the agreement and the applicant dishonestly refused to pay the amount in accordance with the agreement. It is stated in the counter-affidavit that the amount had to be paid by 28-8-1988 but it has been paid by 7-2-1990 and some more amount would remain outstanding by way of interest. The matter essentially relates to accounting between the parties and that dispute could be settled by the civil Court only and not in the criminal proceedings.
4. The dispute, in fact, has already been adjudicated upon by the Civil Court in Suit No. 580 of 1990 Suresh Prasad v. Mercury Hire Purchase Finance Co. and Anr., decided on 22-2-1991 wherein the opposite party has been restrained from interfering with the applicant's possession over the truck and has also been directed to get his name removed from the registration document. The factum of this judgment has not been disputed by the learned counsel for the opposite party but it has been submitted by him that this decree is an ex parte decree. An ex parte decree could not be any less binding than a decree on contest. So long that decree still, (sic) it will have to be accepted that the opposite party has no right over the truck and no amount remains due. In this view of the matter, the filing of the complaint after this judgment is clearly mala fide and abuse of the process of the Court.
5. In Sardar Trilok Sing v. Satya Deo Tripathi, 1979 A Cr 335 : (1980 Cri LJ 822), the facts were similar. The matter related to a dispute between the financier and purchaser of the truck. The financier seized the truck on default of payment and the criminal complaint was filed against him. The Supreme Court held that the matter was clearly of a Civil nature and the criminal proceedings ought to have been quashed by the High Court under Section 482, Cr.P.C.
6. The learned Counsel for the opposite party submitted that the case of Sardar Trilok Singh v. Satya Deo Tripathi, 1979 A Cr 335 is distinguishable on the ground that in that case, it was the purchaser who had launched the proceedings against the financier who had seized the truck in terms of the hire-purchase agreement. I do not think that this factual difference is relevant at all. What has been laid down in the case is that, where there is a dispute of civil nature, criminal proceedings are wholly uncalled for and are abuse of the process of the court. Whether it is the financier who seized the truck and purchaser filed the complaint or the purchaser defaulted and financier filed the complaint, the basic question that remains is that, in such facts and circumstances, the matter would be of a civil nature and, as such, the criminal proceedings will clearly be abuse of the process of the court.
7. The learned Counsel for the opposite party vehemently submitted that, in proceedings under Section 482, Cr. P.C. this Court could only go by the averments in the complaint and if the complaint discloses an offence, the proceedings cannot be quashed. I do not find any substance in this submission. As would appear from the decision in Sardar Trilok Singh's case, this Court will be within the jurisdiction to quash the proceedings under Section 482, Cr. P.C. even if the complaint or the first information report prima facie disclosed commission of an offence, if it is found from the available facts and circumstances that the dispute is of a civil nature or that a complaint has been filed without any sufficient basis. In State of Karnataka v. L. Muni, AIR 1977 SC 1489 : 1977 Cri LJ 1125 also the Supreme Court has observed that in the exercise of wholesome power under Section 482, Cr. P.C., the High Court is entitled to quash the proceedings if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceedings to continue would be an abuse of the process of the court or that the ends of justice requires that proceedigns ought to be quashed.
8. Nothing to the contrary has been laid down in the cases relied upon by the learned Counsel for the opposite party. The cases relied upon are Mrs. Dhanalakshmi v. R. Prasanna Kumar, 1990 All Crl C (SC) 39 : (1990 Cri LJ 320); State of Haryana v. Chaudhary Bhajari Lal, AIR 1992 SC 604; Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Ram Krishna Rastogi, AIR 1983 SC 67 : (1983 Cri LJ 159) and Hans Ramchander v. State of U.P., 1984 AWC (Suppl) 197. I have gone through all these cases and I do not find anything therein to the contrary to what has been noted above. In none of these cases, it has been laid down that if the court finds a case of civil nature and the launching the criminal proceedings to be; clearly mala fide and abuse of the process of the court, the court could not interfere merely because the first information report discloses a prima facie case.
9. Accordingly, the submission of the learned Counsel that this Court cannot consider the other relevant facts and circumstances and should confine its enquiry to the averments made in the first information report and the complaint is untenable.
10. The learned Counsel for the opposite party then referred to the provisions of Section 422, I.P.C. and submitted that the offence under that section would appear to have been prima facie made out. Even if it were possible to consider this submission in spite of the facts and legal position noted above, it must be rejected without much ado. A perusal of Section 422, I.P.C. would show that necessary ingredients of that section is that the debt due must have not been "paid dishonestly or fraudulently". It has already been noted that matter is essentially of civil nature and there is already a decision of a Civil Court to the effect that no such amount is due and the opposite party has been restrained from interfering with the applicant's possession over the truck. Therefore, there could be no question of any dishonest or fraudulent intention being attributed to the applicant or there being any prima facie case under Section 422 or 403, I.P.C. If in spite of all these facts and circumstances, the opposite party filed a criminal complaint, it cannot but be clear and blatant abuse of the process of the Court.
The application is accordingly allowed. The proceedings against the applicants in case No. 210 of 1991, S. K. Bawa v. Suresh Prasad Yadav and another under Sections 403 and 422, I.P.C., pending in the Court of Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate VI, Bareilly are quashed. The truck No. BHQ 8755, registered in the name of applicant, shall be released in his favour forthwith.