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Suresh Kumar Bansal vs Vijay Kumar Jain

High Court Of Judicature at Allahabad|03 February, 2005

JUDGMENT / ORDER

JUDGMENT S.N. Srivastava, J.
1. Impugned herein is the order dated 10.12.2004 passed by Addl. District Judge/Judge Small Causes Court (Court No. 9) Merrut whereby application filed under Section 10 of the C.P.C. was rejected.
2. Before adverting to the disputation involved in the suit, it would be useful to portray summary of facts bearing on the controversy involved in the matter. The dispute substantially is that the applicant having instituted a suit being suit No. 60 of 2003 earlier in point of time for the relief of restraining the respondent from forcibly evicting the applicant from the premises in question except in accordance with law, the subsequent suit bearing No. 28 of 2003 instituted by the respondent for eviction from the self-same premises and for arrears of rent and damages was liable to be stayed in view of the provisions of Section 10 of the C.P.C.
3. In so far as subsequent suit instituted by respondent is concerned, it would appear that the same was instituted in the Court of Judge Small Causes for the relief of a decree for eviction of the applicant from the house No. H 346, Shastri Nagar Meerut and for arrears of rent as well as for damages alongwith other ancillary reliefs as claimed in the plaint. It would further appear that the applicant, in the course of trial of the suit, moved an application in J.S.C.C. Suit No. 28 of 2003 attended with the prayer that by virtue of pendency of earlier suit No. 160 of 2003 in the Court of Civil Judge (J.D.) Meerut, the subsequent Suit i.e. suit No. 80 of 2003 was liable to be stayed in view of provision of Section 10 of the C.P.C. An objection was preferred by the respondent with the prayer to disallow the application of the applicant on the ground that the suit in question was for the relief of passing a decree for eviction in accordance with law. In the ultimate analysis, the application of applicant met the fate of rejection and it was set out in the order that the matter in issue in both the suits is distinct from each other and further; Section 10 of the C.P.C. is wholly inapplicable.
4. The learned Counsel for the applicant, in his bid to make his submission arguable, canvassed with vehemence that in both the suits, property involved is the same and parties in both the suits are also same. He also tried to bring home the point by arguing that the matter in issue is also same inasmuch as in earlier suit, the applicant had sought the relief against forcible eviction by the landlord-defendant and in the present suit, the landlord respondent has sought the relief of eviction against the applicant and by this reckoning, proceeded the argument, the subsequent suit filed for eviction of the applicant was liable to be stayed as envisaged in Section 10 of the C.P.C.
5. In connection with the controversy involved in this case, it would be advantageous to have acquaintance with the provisions of Section 10 of the C.P.C. and therefore, Section 10 of the C.P.C. is excerpted below.
"10. No Court shall proceed with the trial of any suit in which the matter in issue is also directly and substantially in issue in a previously instituted suit between the same parties, or between parties under whom they or any of them claim litigating under the same title where such suit is pending in the same or any other Court in India having jurisdiction to grant the relief claimed, or in any Court beyond the limits of India established or continued by the Central Government and having like jurisdiction, or before the Supreme Court."
6. It is eloquent from a bare perusal of this section that where a suit is instituted in a Court, such Court shall not proceed with the trial of the suit if the questions in controversy in the suit are also directly and substantially in issue in the previously instituted suit between the same parties. It is also envisaged that the previously instituted suit must be pending in the same Court in which the subsequent suit is brought or in a Court having jurisdiction to grant relief claimed in the subsequent suit. In my view, the object of this section seems to be to prevent Courts of concurrent jurisdiction from simultaneously trying two parallel suits relating to the same matter in issue. One of the test for its application seems to me whether final decision in the previous suit would operate as res judicata in the subsequent suit.
7. The two phrases used in section should also be examined before dwelling upon merits of the issues involved in the present case. One is "matter substantially and directly in issue". The word "substantially" signifies "in effect" and the word "directly" is used in contra-distinction to the word "incidentally". Considering the above meaning, I am of the view that the matter substantially and directly in issue in Section 10 of the Code mean all disputed material questions in the subsequent suit which are directly and substantially in question in the previous suit.
8. Now, I revert to the issues involved in the present case. The contentious issue is whether the proceeding in the subsequent suit can be stayed in view of Section 10 of the C.P.C. From a perusal of Section 10 of the C.P.C. three conditions are distilled and they are (1) that there must be two suit-one instituted earlier in point of time and other later; (2) a matter in issue in the later suit should also be directly and substantially in issue in the earlier instituted suit; and (3) such suits should between the same parties or between parties they or any of them claim litigating under the same title. In view of the above, the question that begs consideration is whether the matter in issue in the previous suit is directly and substantially in issue in both the suits. Quintessentially, the cause of action in the previous suit was that the applicant was being threatened with eviction by force otherwise than in accordance with law. The precise issue involved in that suit was whether there was any threat on behalf of the land-lord for eviction otherwise than in accordance with law, while in the subsequent suit, the landlord instituted suit for eviction and for rent and damages in the Court of Judge Small Causes which, to all appearances, is a Court of competent jurisdiction. It is also evident that the subsequent suit had genesis also in the cause of action that there was default on the part of the plaintiff in payment of rent and thus, it transpires that grounds for institution of suit for eviction are enumerated in the subsequent suit. It would also appear that by the subsequent suit, the landlord has prayed for passing a decree for eviction and therefore, it is inferable that the suit was filed for eviction in accordance with law. It would thus transpire that matter in issue and cause of action in both the suits are distinct from each other and cannot be lumped together to make out a case of identity of issues between the two suits.
9. in connection with the prosecutions argued across the bar, it would be useful to advert to what a Division Bench of Bombay High Court observed in Jain Hindi Iron Mart. v. Tulsiram Bhagwandas, AIR 1953 Bom 117. The Division Bench consisting of Chagla C.J. and Gajendragadkar, J. observed as follows:
"Section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not contemplated an identity of issues between the two suits, nor does it require that the matter in issue in the two suits should be entirely the same or identical. What the section requires is that the matter in issue in the two suits should be directly and substantially the same, and proper effect must be given to the language used by the Legislature in Section 10 that the identity required is a substantial identity. There must be an identity of the subject matter, the field of controversy between the parties in the two suits must also be the same, but the identity contemplated and the field of controversy contemplated should not be identical and the same in every particular, but the identity and the field of controversy must be substantially the same."
Likewise in Ram Narain v. Ram Swarup, AIR 1962 All 108, the Court observed as under:
Complete identity of the subject matter is not necessary to attract the application of Section 10 and if a matter directly and substantially in issue 8 in a previously instituted suit is also directly and substantially in issue in a later suit, then under Section 10 the later suit shall be stayed. But any matter common to the two suits will not attract the provisions of Section 10. The matter must be of substance so that its decision in one suit shall affect materially the decision of the other suit."
Considering the crux of the two decisions, and also the intendment of Section 10 C.P.C., I am of the view that both the suits had their genesis in different causes of action and matter in issue in both the suits is distinct from each other and it is amply borne out that there is no identity of the matter directly or substantially in issue in both the suits.
10. As a result of forgoing discussion, the revision filed is liable to be dismissed and I have not come across any illegality or irregularity in deciding issue No. 6.
11. In the result, the revision fails and is dismissed accordingly.
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Title

Suresh Kumar Bansal vs Vijay Kumar Jain

Court

High Court Of Judicature at Allahabad

JudgmentDate
03 February, 2005
Judges
  • S Srivastava