Hon'ble Anjani Kumar Mishra,J.
Heard Sri Mahendra Bahadur Singh, learned counsel for the petitioners and Sri A.K.Dave, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent no.2.
By means of the present writ petition, the petitioners have challenged the order of Central Administrative Tribunal, Allahabad Bench, Allahabad dated 11.11.2002 passed in Original Application No.1320 of 2000, filed by the Suresh Singh, respondent no.2, whereby Tribunal has partly allowed the original application and set aside the appellate order dated 30.06.1998 and the revisional order dated 23.12.1998 and remanded back the matter to the appellate authority to decide the appeal afresh.
Brief facts of the case are that respondent no.2 was working as Extra Departmental Branch Post Master, Rampur Basant (Nigohi), Shahjahanpur since February, 1992. In respect of certain irregularities committed in the year 1993, an enquiry proceeding has been initiated. The charge-sheet has been issued, wherein, three charges have been levelled against the respondent no.2. The charge no.1 was that in account no.2184207, a sum of Rs.400/- had been received on 14.12.1993 while the same was deposited/credited in the account of the account holder on 31.12.1993 and on 22.06.1994 and 14.01.1995 a sum of Rs.600/- and Rs.700/- respectively had been received from the depositors while the same were deposited/credited in the account of the account holder on 31.01.1995. The charge no.2 was that the respondent no.2 had made manipulation in the pass book and changed the dates, 14.12.1993 as 31.12.1993, 22.06.1994 as 30.06.1994 and 14.01.1995 as 31.01.1995. Charge no.3 was that from account no.2184207, a sum of Rs.1390/- has been withdrawn on 01.02.1995 while the same has not been immediately handed over to the depositor and has been returned on 14.07.1995.
The respondent no.2 filed the reply.
On consideration of the reply, the enquiry officer found that the charges no.1 and 2 stood proved while charge no.3 was not found proved.
On the submission of enquiry report, a show cause notice was issued by the disciplinary authority and, thereafter, punishment order has been passed on 02.06.1997 by which the respondent no.2 has been removed from service on the basis of charges no.1 and 2.
The respondent no.2 filed appeal before the Post Master General, Bareilly Region, Bareilly, which has been dismissed vide order dated 30.06.1998. The respondent no.2 filed revision, which has also been dismissed vide order dated 23.12.1998.
Being aggrieved by the aforesaid orders, the respondent no.2 filed Original Application No.1320 of 2000, which has been partly allowed by the impugned order dated 11.11.2002. Tribunal has observed as follows:
"We have carefully perused the enquiry report. From perusal of the same it is established that Charges No.1 and 2 regarding violation of departmental rules and regulations are proved whereas charge no.3, which is a serious charge, is not proved. The disciplinary authority has inflicted the extreme punishment of removal from service. If he was in general agreement with the findings of the Enquiry Officer, in our opinion, extreme punishment of removal is disproportionate to the charges proved as the charge no.3 regarding temporary misappropriation is clearly stated to be not proved by the enquiry officer. However, if the punishment of removal was considered, the Disciplinary Authority should have issued a disagreement memo and only then after applying his mind he should have passed the order of extreme penalty of removal which unfortunately has not been done by the Disciplinary Authority. This aspect has not been considered by Appellate Authority as well as the Revisionary Authority."
Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the order of the Tribunal is wholly illegal. He submitted that the punishment of removal from the service has been awarded on the basis of charges no.1 and 2 and not on the basis of charge no.3. The disciplinary authority has agreed with the enquiry report and therefore, there was no question of recording any disagreement with the report in respect of charge no.3. To the contrary, enquiry report has been accepted by the disciplinary authority by recording specific finding. Therefore, the observation of the Tribunal that if the punishment of the removal would have been considered, the disciplinary authority would have issued a disagreement memo and only then after applying its mind he would have passed the order of extreme penalty of removal which unfortunately has not been done by the disciplinary authority, is baseless and irrelevant. He further submitted that the observation of the Tribunal that this aspect has not been considered by the appellate authority as well as by the revisional authority and, therefore, the matter has been remanded back to the appellate authority, is wholly unjustified. The only question for consideration was whether on the basis of charges no.1 and 2, punishment order removing the respondent no.2 from service is justified or not. He submitted that the charges no.1 and 2, are sufficient to remove the respondent no.2 from service. The respondent no.2 has misappropriated the money by not depositing the amount on the same day, when the amounts were received from the depositors and has made manipulation in the pass book by changing various dates. This action of the respondent no.2 amounts to misconduct and breach of faith and trust and, therefore, the punishment of removal from service was wholly justified.
In support of the argument, reliance has been placed on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan and others Vs. Ram Ratan Yadav, reported in 2003 (3) SCC, 437 and the decision of this Court in the case of National Airport Authority, Delhi Region, L.G.I. Airport, Palam, New Delhi and others Vs. Kamakhya Narain Singh, reported in 2000 UPLBEC, 1266.
Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent no.2 submitted that charge no.3 was the major charge, which was not stood proved and the charges no.1 and 2 were only regarding violation of the departmental Rules and Regulations and for such violation, the punishment of removal from service was disproportionate and, therefore, the Tribunal has rightly made the observation in this regard and has remanded back the matter to the appellate authority to decide the appeal afresh.
Reliance has been placed on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Kailash Nath Gupta Vs. Enquiry Officer, (R.K.Rai), Allahabad Bank and others, reported in 2003 SCC (L&S), 1137.
He further submitted that the writ petition ought to have been filed by the Union of India while the present writ petition has been filed by Superintendent of Post Offices, Shahjahanpur Division, Shahjahanpur, therefore, it is not maintainable.
We have heard the rival submissions and perused the record.
We are of the view that the Tribunal has proceeded on wrong premises and has illegally remanded back the matter to the appellate authority. In the present case, the disciplinary authority has awarded the punishment by way of removal from service on the basis of charges no.1 and 2 and not on the basis of charge no.3. The enquiry officer has recorded that charge no.3 was not proved and the enquiry report has been accepted by the disciplinary authority. No disagreement has been shown. Therefore, there was no question of recording any finding showing disagreement in respect of charge no.3. The observations in this regard by the Tribunal are wholly, erroneous. The only question for consideration is whether on the basis of charges no.1 and 2 punishment of removal from service is legally justified.
We are of the view that on the basis of charges no.1 and 2, the punishment awarding removal from service is wholly justified. The charges no.1 and 2 stood proved and there is no dispute in this regard. The respondent no.2 has admittedly not deposited the amount on the day when it was received from the depositors. A sum of Rs.400/- was received on 14.12.1993 and the same was deposited in the account of account holder on 31.12.1993. Sum of Rs.600/- and Rs.700/- were deposited on 22.06.1994 and 14.01.1995 respectively, but the same were deposited in the account of account holders on 31.01.1995. The amount had been deposited after putting a seal in the pass book and since the same was not deposited in the account of account holder, the respondent no.2 has manipulated the pass book and changed the dates of the deposit, 14.12.1993 has been changed as 31.12.1993, 22.06.1994 and 14.01.1995 has been changed as 31.01.1995. This establishes that the respondent no.2 has not only misappropriated the money for certain purpose but has also manipulated the pass book, which is a Government record. The charges no.1 and 2 were serious in nature and belies faith and trust. The act of the respondent no.2 amounts to misconduct. In this view of the matter, in case, if the disciplinary authority has removed the respondent no.2 from service on the basis of charges no.1 and 2, the same can not be said to be disproportionate A post office employee dealing with cash and discharging the function of receiving the money and payment, a greater integrity and devotion to duty is required. Post office runs on public confident and no leniency can be shown where lack of integrity or devotion in duty is found proved. The officer is required to maintain good conduct and discipline. Once the trust and faith is betrayed and lost, the only punishment would be removal from service. Tribunal was not justified in interfering with the punishment awarded by the disciplinary authority and remanding back the matter to the appellate authority for reconsideration.
In the case of Regional Manager, U.P. SRTC, Etawah and others Vs. Hoti Lal and another, reported in (2003) 3 SCC, 605, the Apex Court held as follows :
"9. The decision in U.P. SRTC case was really in a different factual background making it distinguishable from the facts of the present case, and has no application. In Karnataka SRTC v. B.S. Hullikatti, reported in (2001) 2 SCC 574 it was held that it is misplaced sympathy by courts in awarding lesser punishments where on checking it is found that the bus conductors have either not issued tickets to a large number of passengers, though they should have, or have issued tickets of a lower domination knowing fully well the correct fare to be charged. It is the responsibility of the bus conductors to collect the correct fare from the passengers and deposit the same with the Corporation. They act in a fiduciary capacity and it would be a case of gross misconduct if knowingly they do not collect any fare or the correct amount of fare. It was finally held that the order of dismissal should not have been set aside. The view was reiterated by a three-Judge Bench in Regional Manager, RSRTC v. Ghanshyam Sharma, reported in (2002) 10 SCC 330 where it was additionally observed that the proved acts amount either to a case of dishonesty or of gross negligence, and bus conductors who by their actions or inactions cause financial loss to the corporations are not fit to be retained in service.
10. It needs to be emphasized that the court or tribunal while dealing with the quantum of punishment has to record reasons as to why it is felt that the punishment was not commensurate with the proved charges. As has been highlighted in several cases to which reference has been made above, the scope for interference is very limited and restricted to exceptional cases in the indicated circumstances. Unfortunately, in the present case as the quoted extracts of the High Court's order would go to show, no reasons whatsoever have been indicated as to why the punishment was considered disproportionate. Reasons are live links between the mind of the decision taken to the controversy in question and the decision or conclusion arrived at. Failure to give reasons amounts to denial of justice. [See Alexander Machinery (Dudley) Ltd. v. Crabtree, reported in 1974 LCR 120 (NIRC)]. A mere statement that it is disproportionate would not suffice. A party appearing before a court, as to what it is that the court is addressing its mind. It is not only the amount involved but the mental set-up, the type of duty performed and similar relevant circumstances which go into the decision-making process while considering whether the punishment is proportionate or disproportionate. If the charged employee holds a position of trust where honesty and integrity are inbuilt requirements of functioning, it would not be proper to deal with the matter leniently. Misconduct in such cases has to be dealt with iron hands. Where the person deals with public money or is engaged in financial transactions or acts in a fiduciary capacity, the highest degree of integrity and trustworthiness is a must and unexceptionable. Judged in that background, conclusions of the Division Bench of the High Court do not appear to be proper. We set aside the same and restore order of the learned Single Judge upholding the order of dismissal."
In the case of V.K. Bahadur Vs. State Bank of India, Lucknow and another, reported in (2000) 2 UPLBEC, 1462, the Apex Court held as follows :
"13. Thus the submission of learned Counsel for the petitioner that there was no mala fide intention on the part of the petitioner and there was no personal gain is not tenable. Learned counsel for the petitioner has referred only to the concluding part of the findings, but it is settled law that a document has to be read as a whole, and stray observations in a document or order cannot be read in isolation. As already stated by us above a Bank runs on public confidence and no leniency can be shown where allegations of lack of integrity or devotion to duty are found proved against a Bank employee. In this respect greater integrity and devotion to duty is required from Bank employees as compared to employees of other organisation. Any leniency shown in such matters would be wholly uncalled for and misplaced, vide Disciplinary Authority v. N. B. Patnaik, 1996 (9) SCC 69.
14. In Ram Pratap Sonkar's case (supra), this Court has distinguished the decisions of the Supreme Court in Kailash Nath Gupta v. Enquiry Officer, 1997 ACJ 896, and in State Bank of India v. T. J. Paul, JT 1999 (3) SC 385. In fact in State Bank of India v. T. J. Paul (supra), the Supreme Court held that in the case of a Bank employee even if there was no actual loss to the Bank the employee can yet be held guilty of major misconduct."
In the case of Disciplinary Authority-Cum-Regional Manager and others Vs. Nikunja Bihari Patnaik, reported in (1996) 9 SCC, 69, the Apex Court held as follows :
"7. It may be mentioned that in the memorandum of charges, the aforesaid two regulations are said to have been violated by the respondent. Regulation 3 requires every officer/employee of the bank to take all possible steps to protect the interests of the bank and to discharge his duties with utmost integrity, honesty, devotion and diligence and to do nothing which is unbecoming of a bank officer. It requires the officer/employee to maintain good conduct and discipline and to act to the best of his judgment in performance of his official duties or in exercise of the powers conferred upon him. Breach of Regulation 3 is 'misconduct' within the meaning of Regulation 24. The findings of the Inquiry Officer which have been accepted by the disciplinary authority, and which have not been disturbed by the High Court, clearly show that in a number of instances the respondent allowed overdrafts or passed cheques involving substantial amounts beyond his authority. True, it is that in some cases, no loss has resulted from such acts. It is also true that in some other instances such acts have yielded profit to the Bank but it is equally true that in some other instances, the funds of the Bank have been placed in jeopardy; the advances have become sticky and irrecoverable. It is not a single act; it is a course of action spreading over a sufficiently long period and involving a large number of transactions. In the case of a bank--for that matter, in the case of any other organisation--every officer/employee is supposed to act within the limits of his authority. If each officer/employee is allowed to act beyond his authority, the discipline of the organisation/bank will disappear; the functioning of the bank would become chaotic and unmanageable. Each officer of the bank cannot be allowed to carve out his own little empire wherein he dispenses favours and largesse. No organisation, more particularly, a bank can function properly and effectively if its officers and employees do not observe the prescribed norms and discipline. Such indiscipline cannot be condoned on the specious ground that it was not actuated by ulterior motives or by extraneous considerations. The very act of acting beyond authority--that too a course conduct spread over a sufficiently long period and involving innumerable instances--is by itself a misconduct. Such acts, if permitted, may bring in profit in some cases but they may also lead to huge losses. Such adventures are not given to the employees of banks which deal with public funds. If what we hear about the reasons for the collapse of Barings Bank is true, it is attributable to the acts of one of its employees, Nick Leeson, a minor officer stationed at Singapore, who was allowed by his superiors to act far beyond his authority. As mentioned hereinbefore, the very discipline of an organisation and more particularly, a bank is dependent upon each of its employees and officers acting and operating within their allotted sphere. Acting beyond one's authority is by itself a breach of discipline and a breach of Regulation 3. It constitutes misconduct within the meaning of Regulation 24. No further proof of loss is really necessary through as a matter of fact, in this case there are findings that several advances and overdrawals allowed by the respondent beyond his authority have become sticky and irrecoverable. Just because, similar acts have fetched some profit--huge profit, as the High Court characterises it--they are no less blameworthy. It is wrong to characterise them as errors of judgment. It is not suggested that the respondent being a Class I Officer was not aware of the limits of his authority or of his powers. Indeed, Charge 9, which has been held established in full is to the effect that in spite of instructions by the Regional Office to stop such practice, the respondent continued to indulge in such acts. The Inquiry Officer has recorded a clear finding that the respondent did flout the said instructions and has thereby committed an act of disobedience of lawful others. Similarly, Chage 8, which has also been established in full is to the effect that in spite of reminders, the respondent did not submit "Control Returns" to the Regional Office. We fail to understand how could all this be characterised as errors of judgment and not as misconduct as defined by the Regulations. We are of the opinion that the High Court has committed a clear error in holding that the aforesaid conduct of the respondent does not amount to misconduct or that it does not constitute violation of Regulations 3 and 24.
8. We must mention that Shri V.A. Mohta, the learned counsel for the respondent, stated fairly before us that it is not possible for him to sustain the reasoning and approach of the High Court in this case. His only submission was that having regard to the age of the respondent (37) years and the facts and circumstances of the case, this Court may substitute the punishment awarded to the respondent by a lesser punishment. The learned counsel suggested that any punishment other than dismissal may be imposed by this Court. We considered this request with the care it deserves, but we regret that we are unable to accede to it. The learned counsel for the Bank, Shri V.R. Reddy, Additional Solicitor General, also stated, on instructions of the Bank, that it is not possible for the Bank to accommodate the respondent in its service in view of his conduct."
In a recent decision in the case of of Rajasthan State Transport Corporation & Another v. Bajrang Lal, Civil Appeal No. 4104 of 2007, decided on 14.3.2014, the Apex Court has held that the only punishment in case of the proved case of corruption is dismissal from service.
We do not find any substance in the argument of learned counsel for the respondent no.2 that the writ petition, filed by Superintendent of Post Offices, Shahjahanpur Division, Shahjahanpur, is not maintainable. The Superintendent of Post Offices, Shahjahanpur Division, Shahjahanpur was the party before the Tribunal in the Original Application, filed by the respondent no.2 and was the main contesting party and, therefore, the writ petition filed by the Superintendent of Post Offices, Shahjahanpur Division, Shahjahanpur is maintainable.
The decision of the Apex Court in the case of Kailash Nath Gupta Vs. Enquiry Officer, (R.K.Rai), Allahabad Bank and others (Supra), cited by learned counsel for the respondent is not applicable to the present case. It is based on its own facts and is clearly distinguishable.
In view of the above, the writ petition is allowed. The order dated 11.11.2002 passed by Central Administrative Tribunal, Allahabad Bench, Allahabad is hereby quashed and the order of appellate authority dated 30.06.1998 and order of revisional author