ORDER S.C. Mathur, J.
1. This application has been made on behalf of defendant No. 2, Paramhans Uam Chandra Das, to decide the matter mentioned therein as preliminary issues. The application has been made under Order XIV R. 2(2)(b) and S. 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. According to the applicant in view of the finding recorded by the learned Civil Judge, Faizabad, on issue No. 17 by order dated 21-4-1966 the suit filed by Sunni Central Board of Waqfs is liable to be dismissed without recording findings on other issues. On this basis the applicant prays that the suit may be dismissed at this very stage.
2. The finding recorded by order dated 21-4-1966 is "no valid notification u/S. 5(1} of the Muslim Waqf Act No. XIII of 1936 was ever made so far relating to specific disputed property of the present suits at hand." At the time of hearing Sri V. K. S. Chowdhary, learned counsel for some of the defendants prayed that Issues 3, 5(b), 5(e), 5(f), 6, 18, 19(d), 19(e), 20(b) and 21 be also heard and decided as preliminary issues. The ground for making the prayer is that decision on those issues one way may bring the litigation to a close which will save the parties from the ordeal of summoning witness and incurring expense therein. It is submitted that these issues are of law and can be decided without oral evidence. It is also submitted that even if any oral evidence is required for deciding these issues the same may be recorded so that the parties may be saved of a protracted trial. Certain statements in the pleadings of the plaintiffs have been relied upon as containing admission in favour of the defendant.
3. The prayer has been opposed by Sri Abdul Mannan and Sri Z. Jitani, counsel for the plaintiffs. The main thrust of the argument of these counsel is that the matters raised by the defendants have already been dealt with by this Court in order dated 23-10-1989 whereby defendants' Civil Misc. Application No. I4(o) of 1989 dated 11-8-1989 under O. VII, R. 11(d) for rejection of plaint has been rejected. It is passed that the reasons contained in that order are relevant for rejection of the present prayer also. It is submitted that substantial evidence wilt be required to decide the issues in question and the same evidence may have to be repeated at the trial of suit on all issues. Learned counsel, therefore, contend that the bearing of the issues as preliminary issues will be an exercise in futility and will impose unnecessary financial burden on the parties, apart from causing inconvenience and hardship to them.
4. Before proceeding to examine the rival contentions it will be useful to reproduce the issues which are sought to be treated as preliminary issues. They are as follows:--
Issue No. 3. It the suit within time?
Issue No.5 (b) Has the said Act (U.P. Act No. XIII of 1936) no application to the right of Hindus in general and defendants in particular to the right of their worship?
Issue No. 5(e) : Whether in view of the findings recorded by the learned Civil Judge on 21-4-1966 on issue No. 17 to the effect that "no valid notification u/ S. 5(1) of the Muslim Waqf Act (No. XIII of 1936) was ever made in respect of the property in dispute", the plaintiff Sunni Central Board of Waqf has no right to maintain the present suit?
Issue No. 5(f) : Whether in view of the aforesaid finding the suit is barred on account of lack of jurisdiction and limitation as it was filed after the commencement of the U.P. Muslim Waqf Act, 1960?
Issue No. 6 : Whether the present suit is a representative suit, plaintiffs representing the interest of the Muslims and defendants representing the interest of the Hindus?
Issue No. 18 : What is the effect of the judgment of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Ghulam Abbas v. State of U.P., AIR 1981 SC 2198 : (1981 Cri LJ 1835) on the finding of the learned Civil Judge recorded on 21-4-1966 on Issue No. 17.
Issue No. 19(d) : Whether the building in question cannot be a mosque under the Islamic law in view of the admitted position that it does not have minarets?
Issue No. 19(e) : Whether the building in question cannot legally be a mosque as on plaintiffs' own showing is surrounded by a grave-yard on three sides?
Issue No. 20(b) : Whether there was a Mutwalli of the alleged Waqf and whether the alleged Mutwalli not having joined in the suit, the suit is not maintainable so far as it relates to relief for possession?
Issue No. 21 : Whether the suit is bad for non-joinder of alleged deities?
5. For submitting that the aforesaid issues require preliminary hearing the learned counsel for the defendants has invited our attention to the order dated 12-1-1990 passed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court on defendants Special Leave Petition No. 14891 of 1989 directed against this Court's order dated 23-10-1989 passed on Civil Misc. Application No. 14(o) of 1989.
6. Civil Misc. Application No. 14(o) of 1989 had been made by UK present applicant under O. VII R. 11 C.P.C. for rejection of the plaint on the grounds That:--
(i) relief for declaration claimed in para 24(a) was barred by the six year-rule of limitation prescribed in Art. 120 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908.
(ii) relief for delivery of possession by removal of idols and other articles was in effect a relief for mandatory injunction and the same was also barred by the six-year rule of limitation prescribed in the aforementioned Art. 120,
(iii) the suit is beyond time under Art. 14 also,
(iv) the idols or deities who are juristic persons under Hindu Law have not been impleaded in the suit; and
(v) the suit for possession cannot be decreed in the absence of Mutwalli.
This application was rejected by order dated 23-10-89. The Special Leave Petition was directed against this order. While disposing of the Special Leave Petition their Lordships observed:--
"If the defendants pressed the contentions regarding maintainability grounded upon limitation to be raised as a preliminary issue, the Full Bench of the High Court which is trying the suit would do well to entertain the request. The evidence which is contemplated to be received under the impugned order, in the event, should be confined to the issues The SIP is disposed of accordingly."
7. The learned counsel relies upon the emphasized portion in the order for submitting that even their Lordships of the Supreme Court were of the opinion that issues relating to limitation were required to be disposed of as preliminary issues. Later portion of the order is relied upon for submitting that the fact that evidence may have to be recorded for deciding any issue should not be a deterrent in hearing that issue as a preliminary issue.
8. The above order was passed without notice to the plaintiffs. Plaintiff No. 1 on coming to know of the order moved application for recall thereof on which following order was passed by their Lordships on 13-3-1990:--
"Heard learned counsel. When we made our order on 12-1-1990 we did not intend to give any direction to the Full Bench of the High Court specially constituted to hear the case and, therefore, did not issue notice to the defendant respondents. We only indicated that it was for the High Court to consider, in case the defendants wanted the direction whether prayer should be entertained. Since we have given no directions the High Court is free to deal with the matter on its own.
9. The consequence of the above order is that this Court's order dated 23-10-1989 remains intact; it has not been set aside or superseded. The question whether any issue is to be heard and decided as a preliminary issue is to be decided by this Court. There is no direction either way from their Lordships.
10. 0.14, R.2 of the Code of Civil Procedure as it stood prior to the amendment made in the year 1976 read as follows:--
"R. 2. Where issues both of law and of fact arise in the same suit, and the Court is of opinion that the case or any part thereof may be disposed of on the issues, of law only, it shall try those issues first, and for that purpose may, if it thinks fit, postpone the settlement of the issues of fact until after the issues of law have been determined."
Under the above provision once the court came to the conclusion that the case or any part thereof could be disposed of on thejssues of law only it was obliged to try those issues first and the other issues could be taken up only thereafter, if necessity survived. The court had no discretion in the matter. This flows from the use of the word "it shall try those issues first". Material change has been brought about in legal position by amended 0.14, R. 2 which reads as follows:--
"R. 2(1) Notwithstanding that a case may be disposed of on a preliminary issue, the Court shall subject to the provisions of sub-rule (2), pronounce judgment on all issues.
(2) Where issues both of law and of fact arise in the same suit, and the court is of opinion that the case or any part thereof may be disposed of on an issue of law only, it may try that issue first if that issue relates to -
(a) the jurisdiction of the Court, or
(b) a bar to the suit created by any law for the time being in force, and for that purpose may, if it thinks fit, postpone the settlement of the other issues until after that issue."
This amendment has been made by Act 104 of 1976 which came into effect on 1-2-1977.
11. The word "shall" used in old 0.14, R. 2 has been replaced in the present Rule by the word "may". Thus now it is discretionary for the Court to decide the issue of law as a preliminary issue or to decide it along with the other issues. It is no longer obligatory for the Court to decide an issue of law as a preliminary issue.
12. Another Change brought about by the amended provision is that not all issues of law can be decided as preliminary issues. Only those issues of law can be decided as preliminary issues which fell within the ambit of els. (a) and (b) of sub-r. (2) of R.2 of O. 14.
Cl. (a) mentions "jurisdiction of the Court" and clause (b) deals with "bar to the suit created by any law for the time being in force." In the present case cl. (a) is not attracted. The case is sought to be brought within the ambit of cl. (b). For bringing it under cl. (b) Limitation Act and the Muslim Waqf Act have been invoked.
13. We may now proceed to consider which of the issues may be said to fall under cl. (b). In our opinion issues 5(b), 5(e), 6, 18, 19(d), 19(c), 20(b) and 21 do not fall within the ambit of cl. (b). We proceed to examine each of these issues separately.
Issue 5(b)
14. U.P. Act No. XIII of 1936 provides the procedure for identification of Wakfs and Wakf properties and their notification in the gazette. The plaintiffs state that the property in dispute has been identified and notified under the provisions of the said Act. The plea of the defendants is that the notification, if any issued, is bad in law and is in any case not binding upon the Hindus. If the defendants' plea is upheld the Civil Court will have jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the title to the property in suit. It is, therefore, not a case of "bar to the suit" referred to in cl. (b). It will rather be a case of defendants accepting the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to try the suit.
Issue 5(e)
15. The present suit has been filed not only by Sunni Central Board of Waqfs but also by eight others. This issue refers to the right of only one of the plaintiffs to file the suit. It does not refer to the right of the other plaintiffs to institute the suit. At the most it may be said to be case of mis-joinder of party. Mis-joinder of party is also not covered by the expression "bar to the suit", referred to in cl. (b).
16. This issue relates to the character of the suit. Even if it is held that the suit is not of representative character it will not lead to its dismissal. Therefore, this issue is also not covered by cl. (b).
17. This issue is related to issue No. 5(c). Issue No. 5(e) has been held to be beyond the scope of cl. (b). Accordingly this issue is also not covered by cl. (b).
Issues Nos. 19(2) and 19(e)
18. These issues do not relate to bar of suit but to bar of the claim made by the plaintiffs in respect of the property in dispute. Plaintiffs' claim is that the property in dispute is. mosque and grave-yard. This claim is denied by the defendants. The claim of one party may be upheld and of the other may be negatived. For determining which party is correct and which party is wrong there will have to be adjudication. Court is the appropriate forum for adjudication of rival claims. These issues cannot, therefore, be said to raise a question of "bar to the suit."
Issue No. 20(b).
19. This issue relates to entitlement of the plaintiffs to only one of the reliefs, namely, the relief for possession. It does not challenge the right of the plaintiffs to obtain the other reliefs. The question raised by this issue is the extent to which the plaintiffs' suit can be decreed, if it is to be decreed at all. This issue also does not raise the question of "bar to the suit" referred to in cl. (b).
Issue No. 21.
20. The learned counsel for the defendants referred to the pleadings of the plaintiffs and submitted that the plaintiffs have admitted existence of gleities and, therefore, deities are necessary parties to the suit as any finding recorded against the deities will not be binding upon them. The plea of non-joinder in our opinion stands on the same footing as a plea of mis-joinder. In respect of mis-joinder we have held herein above that it is not relatable to "bar to suit" referred to in cl. (b). The said observation applies to this issue also.
Issues Nos. 3 and 5(f)
21. The issues which now survive for consideration are 3 and 5(f). The question of limitation is involved in both these issues. Issue No. 5(f) refers to the question of juris-
diction also. The question of jurisdiction is relatable to the finding recorded by the learned Civil Judge on issue No. 17 which is subject matter of issues we have already held that they are not covered by cl. (b). Accordingly the question of jurisdiction referred to in issue No. 5(f) cannot be taken up as a preliminary issue.
22. We are now left only with the question of limitation referred to in issues 3 and 5(f). S. 3 of the Limitation Act 1908 provides that subject to the provision contained in Ss. 4 to 25 every suit instituted after the prescribed period shall be dismissed although limitation has not been set up as a defence. This provision therefore, creates a statutory bar to suit which is filed beyond the period of limitation prescribed by statute. Therefore, the question of limitation contained in issues 3 and 5(f) is covered by cl. (b). However, that alone is not sufficient for taking up these two issues as preliminary issues. We will have to consider whether any question of fact is involved in determination of these issues for which evidence may have to be adduced. If the finding on these issues will depend upon oral evidence it may not be desirable to take up these issues as preliminary issues.
23. Let us now consider the pleas raised in the plaint. In para 11 of the plaint it is stated that the Muslims were in peaceful possession of the mosque in question till 23-12-1949 when a large crowd of Hindus entered it and placed idols therein. In para 13 it is averred that in proceedings u/S. 145 Code of Criminal Procedure, for short Cr. P.C., the City Magistrate, Faizabad attached the mosque and handed over its possession to the Receiver appointed by him. In paras 15 and 16 it is mentioned that Gopal Singh Visharad, defendant No. 1 of the present suit, filed Suit No. 2 of 1950 in which an interim injunction was issued restraining the defendants of that suit from removing the idols from the mosque in dispute and from interfering with Pooja etc., of the Hindus.
The consequence of this interim injunction is stated in para 18 in these terms. "The result of the injunction order of the learned Civil Judge is that while Hindus are permitted to perform Puja of the idols placed by them in the mosque, the Muslims are not allowed even to enter the mosque, are deprived of their just and legal rights and are not allowed even to enter the mosque...... which has been used by generations of Muslims since then as a mosque for Recitjng Prayers Therein. The order of injunction is fraught with injustice, hence the necessity of the institution of suit....."
In para 20 the plaintiffs aver......".......the building in suit claimed by the plaintiffs as Muslim Waqf is in the possession of Receiver holding for the real owner and would be released in case the plaintiffs' suit succeeds but if for any reason in the opinion of the Court, a suit for possession is the proper relief to be claimed, the plaintiffs, in the alternative pray for recovery of possession." Para 23 describes the accrual of cause of action in following terms -
"The cause of action for the suit against the Hindu public arose on 23-12-1989 at Ajodhya, district Faizabad ..........When the Hindus unlawfully and illegally entered the mosque and desercrated the mosque thus causing obstruction and interference with the rights of the Muslims in general of saying prayers and performing religious ceremonies in the mosque. The Hindus are also causing obstructions to the Muslims going in the grave-yard (Can Shahidan) and reciting "Fatiha" to the dead persons buried therein. The injuries so caused are continuing injuries and the cause of action arising thereform is renewed de-die-indiem and as against defendants 5 to 9 the cause of action arose to the plaintiffs on 29-12-1949 the date on which the defendant No. 7, the City Magistrate, Faizabad-cum-Ajodhya attached the mosque in suit and handed over possession of the same to Sri Priya Dutt Ram, defendant No. 9, as the Receiver, who assumed charge of the same on January 5, 1950."
With these averments following prayers have been made in para 24 -
"(A) A declaration to the effect that the property indicated by letters 'ABCD' in the sketch map attached to the plaint is public mosque commonly known as "Babri Masjid"
and that the land adjoining the mosque shown in the sketch map by letters FFGH is a public Muslim graveyards specified in para 2 of the plaint, may be decreed.
(B) That in case in the opinion of the Court delivery of possession is deemed to be the proper remedy a decree for delivery of possession of the mosque and graveyared in suit by removal of the idols and other articles which the Hindus may have placed in the mosque as objects of their worship be passed in plaintiffs' favour against the defendants.
(Q to (D) .....
24. The defendant's learned counsel submits that the primary relief claimed by the plaintiffs is declaration and the relief for possession has been claimed only in the alternative and as such if the relief for declaration cannot be granted because of the bar of limitation, the relief for possession also will not be permissible to be granted. The further submission of the learned counsel is that the relief of possession has been claimed by removal of idols and other articles which the Hindus consider objects of worship. This, according to the learned counsel, in substance, constitutes claim of mandatory injunction. For both the reliefs, declaration as well as mandatory injunction, the learned counsel submits. Art. 120 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 would be applicable, as the suit was filed before the enforcement of the Limitation Act, 1963. This is the residuary Article inasmuch as it covers suits for which no period of limitation is provided else where in the Schedule and prescribes the limitation of six years. This period runs from the date "when right to sue accrues". According to the learned counsel, for both the reliefs mentioned herein, the right to sue, on plaintiffs own showing, accrued on 23-12-1949 when the idols were allegedly placed. The period of six years expired on 23-12-1955. The suit filed on 6-12-1961, it is pressed, is hopelessly beyond time. These facts, the learned counsel submits, are apparent from the plaint itself and the mandate of S. 3 of the Limitation Act can be complied with without recording any evidence. In the Limitation Act, 1963 the equivalent Art. 113 which provides the period of limitation as three years. In this Act suits to obtain declaratory decrees are mentioned in Part III of the Schedule containing Arts. 56, 57 and 58. The declaration sought by the plaintiffs of the present suit is not covered by Arts. 56 and 57. Art. 58 is residuary Article covering suits to obtain other types of declarations. Under all the three Articles the period of limitation is three years. If the new Limitation Act is applied, the suit, if the defendants' case is accepted would be beyond time by further years.
25. The cause of action against defendants 5 to 9, namely, the State of Uttar Pradesh, the Collector Faizabad, the City Magistrate, Faizabad, the Superintendent of Police, Faizabad arid Sri Priya Dutt Ram (Receiver) has been shown in para 23 of the plaint to have accrued on 29-12-1989 and 6-1-1990. On the first mentioned date the City Magistrate attached the mosque and on the second mentioned date the Receiver assumed charge of his office. On these facts, the learned counsel for the defendants submits, Arts. 14 of the Limitation Act, 1908 would be applicable which prescribes the period of limitation as one year only.
26. The learned counsel for the defendants does not accept the applicability of Arts. 142 and 144 of the old Limitation Act which provide the period of limitation as 12 years. He also does not accept the applicability of S. 23 of the said Act which deals with continuing breaches and wrongs. He submits that on the allegations made in the plaint itself, it is a case of completed wrong and not continuing wrong.
27. The learned counsel for the plaintiffs submits that in order to show the applicability of S. 23, the plaintiffs will have to establish the facturn of worship by the Muslims within the disputed structure and of performance of other religious ceremonies as claimed by them in the plaint. Similarly in respect of the graveyard they will have to establish that the land was used for burying the dead and that "Fatiha" was said on the graves. In respect of both, the learned counsel submits, oral evidence will have to be adduced.
28. We find substance in the submission of the learned counsel. The case made out by the plaintiffs in the plaint is that they had been saying preyers in the mosque and Fatiha in the graveyard and now there is obstruction by the defendants in performance of both these religious functions. It has been held by fheir Lordships of the Privy Counsel. In Hukuin Chand v. Maharaj Bahadur Singh, AIR 1933 PC 193 : (1933 ALJ 1325) that alleged obstruction in worship attracts S. 23 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908. For attracting this provision the petitioners will have to establish that they had in fact been using the alleged mosque for saying prayers and the alleged graveyard for burying the dead and saying "Fatiha" on the graves. In others words, user of the two places in the manner alleged by the plaintiffs will have to be established by them. Obviously this can be done only through oral evidence. Prima facie, we are not satisfied that S. 23 is not attracted to the present case.
29. AIR 1959 SC 798 Balakrishna Saval-ram Pujari Waghmare v. Shree Dhyaneshwar Maharaj Sansthan relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners has no application to the facts of the present case. In this case the plaintiffs had sought declaration of their rights as hareditary "Watandar Pujaris" and injunction to restrain the defendant-trustees from interfering with the rights. More than six years prior to the institution of the suit the defendant-trustees had, in execution of Court decree, ousted the predecessors of the plaintiffs from the office of Pujari. Plaintiffs relied upon S. 23 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 and claimed that the wrong done to them was a continuing one. The plea was negatived and it was held that the suit was governed by the residuary Art. 120 which prescribed six years as the period of limitation. The limitation was held to have started running from the date predecessors of the plaintiffs were ousted from possession of the office of Pujari.
30. This was not a suit in which primary grievance was invasion of right of worship. The primary grievance was invasion of the right to hold the office of Pujari. Ouster from the office of Pujari did not prevent the plaintiffs from offering prayers in the temple. It is on this basis that plaintiffs' reliance on S. 23 was not accepted.
31. User of the place in question is the crux of the dispute between the parties. One party asserts that the place in question has been used as a temple and Hindus have been offering prayers therein. The other party states that the place in question has been used as a mosque and grave-yard, at former prayers have been offered and at latter Fatiha has been said. For establishing their claim of applicability of S. 23 of the Limitation Act, 1908 the plaintiffs of the present suit will have to prove user of the place for the purposes mentioned herein. Evidence on the applicability of S. 23 will, therefore, be as good as evidence in the suit itself. Where evidence on the alleged preliminary issue will be the same or almost the same as in the suit itself, we are of the opinion that such issue should not be heard and tried as a preliminary issue. In M/s Basti Ram Roop Chand v. M/s Radhey Shyam Gulab Chand, AIR 1973 All 499 it has been held by this court that where the question is not purely of law or it is a mixed question of law and fact the Court has no jurisdiction to try the issue as preliminary issue.
32. We have observed hereinabove that after the amendment brought about in the year 1976 it is discretionary with the Court to take up an issue as a preliminary issue. The Court is not bound to take up any issue as a preliminary issue. All judicial discretions have to be exercised reasonably. Reasonable exercise of discretion in the present oase dictates us against taking up issues 3 and 5(f) as preliminary issues. The suit in question is connected with four other suits; namely suits numbered 1, 2, 3 and 5 of 1989. The corresponding number of these suits in the court of the Civil Judge were 2 of 1950, 25 of 1950, 26 of 1959 and 236 of 1989. The earliest suit was filed on 16-1-1950; this is Suit No. 2 of 1950 of the court of civil Judge which has been registered here as Original suit No. 1 of 1989. From this it would appear that dispute between the parties is pending for the last 40 years. The dispute raised in these suits is of vital importance to the country. It is not a suit between two individuals, it is a dispute between two major communities of the country. Off and on leaders of these communities adopt hostile postures. The entire nation is waiting for resolution of the dispute by this Court. Delay in resolution of the dispute threatens to disturb peace in one or the other part of the country. It is, therefore, desirable that all the suits should be decided as early as possible. Our decision on the so called preliminary issues will not be final. Appeal may be preferred against our decision and further hearing in the suits may be stayed. This will cause delay in the final resolution of the dispute. Accordingly we are of the opinion that issues 3 and 5(f) should not be decided as preliminary issues even if they fall within the ambit of els. (a) and (b) of R. 2 of 0.14 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
33. In Major S. S. Khanna v. Brig. F. J. Dhillon AIR 1964 SC 497 their Lordships have : (1963 All LJ 1068) observed that normally all issues in a suit should be tried by the Court as not to do so especially when the decision on issues even of law depends upon the decision of issue of fact, would result in a lop-sided trial of the suit. This observation of their Lordships now finds statutory recognition in sub-r.(l) of 0. 14, R. 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure reproduced hereinabove. According to this sub-rule normal rule is to decide all the issues together. Sub-r. (2) carves out exception to this normal rule. For the reasons already stated hereinbefore the present case does not fall in the exception carved out by sub-r. (2) of 0.14, R. 2.
34. We may now turn to the plea raised in the application Civil Misc. Application No. 18(o) of 1989. The plea is that in view of the finding recorded by the Learned Civil Judge on Issue No. 17 the suit at the instance of Sunni Central Board of Waqfs is not maintainable. On this basis it is urged that on the finding recorded by the learned Civil Judge the suit should be dismissed outright.
35. The finding recorded by the learned Civil Judge merely says that no valid notification has been made in respect of the property in suit u/S.6(1) of the Muslim Waqfs Act.
The Waqf Boards have been created under the Act for the purpose of prolecting Waqf properties. A Waqf will not cease to be a Waqf and Waqf property will not cease to be so merely because the Waqf or the property has not been validly notified u/S. 6(1) of the Act. The effect of notification u/S. (1) is that the character of the institution and of the property becomes unassailable by the Muslims. Such unassailability does not attach to members of other communities. S. 66 of the Act provides that in every suit or proceeding relating to the title to Waqf property or a right of Mutwalli, the court shall issue notice to the Board at the cost of the party inslituting such suit or proceeding. The obvious purpose of issuing this notice is to give opportunity to the Waqf Board to place its version in respect of the title claimed to the propoerty. If the Waqf Board has to be impleaded when a suit is filed by a stranger, we see no reason why the Waqf Board cannot maintain suit when it acquires knowledge that Waqf properly is under litigation before a Court of Law. In fact u/S. 19(2)(q) of the Waqfs Act the Board has been specifically authorised to insiitute suits and proceedings in a court of law relating to Waqfs. This provision does not say that the proceedings can be taken only in respect of Waqfs which have been notified u/S.6(1). S. 2(1) deals with the application of the Act and says that "Save as herein otherwise specifically stated, this Act shall apply to all wakfs, whether created before or after the commencement of this Act...... and to all the wakfs which at the time of the coming into force of this Act were under the superintendence of the Sunni Central Board or the Shia Central Board constituted under the U.P. Muslim Wakfs Act, 1936 (U.P. Act X11I of 1936)". This provision also does not restrict the applicability of the Act to Waqfs notified u/S. 6(1). Prior to the filing of the suit by the Waqf Board others had already filed suit in respect of the property in suit claiming the same to be a Hindu temple. Once the Waqf Board acquired knowledge of these suits it could in exercise of power available under S. 19(2)(q) file the instant suit. We are accordingly of the opinion that on the basis of the finding recorded under issue No. 17 the present suit cannot be dismissed. Further, as already pointed out hereinabove, Waqf Board is not the only plaintiff in the suit. The Waqf Board is one of the plaintiffs. There are other Muslims who have claimed their right of prayers in the structure in question which they describe as Mosque. Their right to maintain the suit is not affected by the finding recorded under issue No. 17. The application is accordingly liable to be rejected.
36. In view of our above findings it is not necessary to consider the plaintiffs' plea that the dispute now raised is'already covered in this Court's order dated 23rd October 1989 passed on Defendants' application (C.M.A. No. 18(0) of 1989) for rejection of the plaint. We may, however, make brief observation on the plea.
37. The aforesaid application was made under O. VII, R. II of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. From the order dated 23rd October 1989 it appears that rejection of the plaint was pressed on the following grounds:--
i) that the relief of declaration claimed in cl. (a) of para 24 of the plaint was barred by the limitation of six years prescribed by Art. 120 of the Limitation Act, 1908;
ii) that the relief of delivery of possession of the mosque and grave-yard in suit by removal of idols and other articles, which had been placed in the mosque by Hindus for their worship was barred by limitation of six years under Art. 120 of the Limitation Act, 1908;
iii)that no court can direct a Hindu idol, who has a personality of his own, to shift His situs, and not at all in His absence, and, therefore, the relief of "removal of the idols" cannot be granted by the court in this suit, particularly, when idols have a juridical personality;
iv) that a bare relief of possession over a place, where a Hindu idol is installed, cannot be granted, for the place is in the possession of the idol,
v)that possession over a mosque can be sued only by a Mutwalli and not by the U.P. Muslim Waqfs Board;
vi)that the plea raised in para 23 of the plaint that "The injuries...... are continuing injuries and the cause of action arising therefrom is renewed de-die-indieni," is contrary to law, and would seem to have been raised only to cover up, falsely though, the obvious bar of limitation which states on the face of the plaint;
vii) that the suit is barred by the limitation of one year prescribed by Art. 14 of the Limitation Act.
Indeed the arguments urged in support of the above grounds were repeated before us in support of the plea for setting down the issues in question for preliminary hearing. On the question of limitation it is observed in the order dated 23rd October 1989 that the same cannot be decided without recording evidence (see page 11 of the order). Our finding is also to the same effect.
38. The effect of non-impleadment of idols or deities has been dealt with in the order of Hon. U. C. Srivastava, (J) as he then was, at pages 16 and 17 and he has observed that the same can be decided "when the case is finally heard and disposed of." In fact the sanctity or divinity, if any acquired by the idols placed in the temple, is itself in dispute. Perhaps not all idols will have juristic personality. Whether the idols placed inside the so called mosque have acquired juristic personality is a question on which oral evidence may also be necessary. The question raised by the parties is a serious one and we agree with Hon. U. C. Srivastava, J. that the same should be dealt with at the stage of final hearing.
39. In view of the above Civil Misc. Application No. 18(1) of 1989 is rejected. The prayer of Sri V. K. S, Chowdhary for hearing and deciding aforesaid issues as preliminary issues is also rejected.
40. Petition dismissed.