1. Heard Sri Mahboob Ahmad Siddiqui, learned learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Madhav Jain, learned counsel for the respondent.
2. The present petition seeks to challenge the order dated 30.10.2017 passed by the Judge Small Cause Court Prescribed Authority, Agra whereby the application filed by the respondent-landlord under Section 21(1)(a) of U.P. Act No.13 of 1972 registered as P.A. Case No. 74 of 2013 was allowed. The petitioner also seeks to challenge the order dated 18.02.2019 passed by the Additional District Judge, Agra, whereby the appeal filed by him as P.A. Appeal No. 239 of 2017 has been dismissed.
3. Concurrent findings of fact have been returned by the courts below on the issue of bonafide need and comparative hardship. The Prescribed Authority has considered the facts of the case and the need set up by the respondent-landlord on the basis of which the release application was filed and upon due consideration of the same has held the need to be bonafide. On the issue of comparative hardship a finding has been returned that the petitioner-tenant has a number of properties of which he is the owner whereas the landlord did not have any other shop from which he could carry on his business, and upon considering the documentary evidence in this regard the issue of comparative hardship has been decided in favour of the respondent-landlord.
4. The principal ground which was raised in the appeal was that the Prescribed Authority proceeded to decide the application without framing any issue with regard to the landlord and tenant relationship. In this regard, the Appellate Authority has taken note of the fact that in the release application the respondent-landlord had asserted himself to be the landlord and in his written submission the defendant had admitted his status as that of the tenant; accordingly the landlord-tenant relationship having been admitted between the parties, no issue in this regard was required to be framed. The other contention which was raised in appeal was that the release application had been filed only by one of the co-landlords. This ground was also turned down by the Appellate Authority after recording that it was not necessary for all the landlords to file the release application jointly. As regards the claim of the tenant in respect of goodwill notice was taken of the fact that the Prescribed Authority, under the second proviso to Section 21(1) of U.P. Act No.13 of 1972, has awarded compensation for the said purpose.
5. Counsel for the petitioner has tried to re-urge the grounds with regard to the Prescribed Authority deciding the release application without framing any issue in respect of landlord-tenant relationship, and the release application having been filed by only one of the co-landlords. The aforementioned grounds were duly considered by the Appellate Authority and have been repelled by giving reasons which are based on settled principles of law, and are not required to be interfered with.
6. No other point was argued by the counsel for the petitioner.
7. Counsel for the petitioner has not been able to point out any material error or illegality in the orders passed by the Prescribed Authority as well as the Appellate Authority.
8. The courts below having recorded concurrent findings of facts based upon appreciation of evidence, the scope of judicial review in exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 in such a matter is extremely limited and such findings of fact recorded by statutory authorities unless they are demonstrated to be vitiated by manifest error of law or are shown to be patently perverse, are not to be interfered with.
9. In this regard reference may be had to the judgment in the case of Ashok Kumar and others Vs. Sita Ram1 (2001) 4 SCC 478 wherein in proceedings arising out of Section 21 (1) (a) of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972, the following observations were made with regard to the exercise of powers in writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
"17. The question that remains to be considered is whether the High Court in exercise of writ jurisdiction was justified in setting aside the order of the Appellate Authority. The order passed by the Appellate Authority did not suffer from any serious illegality, nor can it be said to have taken a view of the matter which no reasonable person was likely to take. In that view of the matter there was no justification for the High Court to interfere with the order in exercise of its writ jurisdiction . In a matter like the present case where orders passed by the Statutory Authority vested with power to act quasi-judicially is challenged before the High Court, the role of the Court is supervisory and corrective. In exercise of such jurisdiction the High Court is not expected to interfere with the final order passed by the Statutory Authority unless the order suffers from manifest error and if it is allowed to stand it would amount to perpetuation of grave injustice. The Court should bear in mind that it is not acting as yet another Appellate Court in the matter. We are constrained to observe that in the present case the High Court has failed to keep the salutary principles in mind while deciding the case."
10. Having regard to the facts of the case and the proposition of law as discussed above, there is no ground which may warrant interference with the orders which have been impugned in the present writ petition.
11. Petition lacks merit and is accordingly dismissed.
12. At this stage, the counsel for the petitioner prayed that some time may be granted to the petitioner to vacate the demised premises.
13. Counsel for the respondent has no objection to the prayer so made.
14. As jointly agreed, the petitioner is granted one year's time to vacate the demised premises provided that he furnishes an undertaking before the Prescribed Authority, within two weeks from today, that he would vacate the demised premises within one year from today and handover vacant and peaceful possession thereof to the respondent-landlord. The petitioner shall also deposit rent/damages at the rate of Rs. 1000/- per month for a period of one year within three weeks from today, as agreed by the counsel for the parties. In case of default of any of the above conditions, the protection granted shall stand withdrawn and it would be open to the respondent-landlord to enforce the eviction order.
Order Date :- 30.4.2019 Pratima [Dr. Y. K. Srivastava, J.]