ORDER R. R. K. Trivedi, J.
1. Aggrieved by the order dated 6-12-1996, passed by learned single Judge, in Company Petition No. 16 of 1996, the respondent therein has filed this appeal. By the impugned order objection of the appellant questioning the maintainability of the Company petition in this Court at Allahabad has been overruled.
2. The facts, in short, giving rise to this appeal are that respondent Punjab National Bank tiled a petition on 2-7-1996 for winding up of appellant Company under Sections 433, 434 and 439 of the Companies Act, 1956. The winding up of the Company has been sought on the ground that it is unable to pay its debts and, therefore, it should be wound up by order of this Court. On 3-7-1996 this Court issued notice to the appellant Company to show cause why the petition may not be admitted and advertised. In response to this notice, the appellant Company appeared and filed objection questioning the maintainability of the Company Petition and prayed for dismissal of the same. After exchange of affidavit, the objection raised by the appellant was rejected on 6-12-1996. Against the aforesaid order the present appeal was filed by the appellant on 28-3-1997.
3. We have heard Shri Janardan Sahai for appellant and Shri K. L. Grover for respondent. Learned counsel for appellant has submitted that the Notification dated 15-7-1949 excluding jurisdiction of Lucknow bench in respect of Company cases was issued by the Chief Justice in exercise of his power under the Second Proviso to para. 14 of the United Provinces High Courts (Amalgamation) Order, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as the Amalgamation Order). The Notification is not under the First Proviso which deals with the territorial jurisdiction of the Lucknow bench in respect of districts falling in Oudh Area. It has been submitted that the Second Proviso confers power oh the Chief Justice to order that any case or class of cases arising in the said areas, shall be heard at Allahabad. The word "heard" has been interpreted by the Apex Court in case of Nasiruddin v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal reported in AIR 1976 SC 331 and it has been held that the expression "heard" would not include institution of cases. Thus, under the Second Proviso, the Chief Justice could issue an order for the case or class of cases arising out of Oudh Area to be heard at Allahabad which were already instituted at Lucknow. It has been further submitted that the effect of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Nasiruddin's case is that the power under the Second Provisocan be exercised only with reference to cases already instituted at Lucknow and pending there and not in respect of cases to be instituted in future. If the order of the Chief Justice published in Notification dated 15-7-1949 is interpreted to mean that institution of case or class of cases at Lucknow bench is excluded and the institution should also be at Allahabad, the notification would be beyond the powers conferred on the Chief Justice under the Second Proviso to para. 14 of the Amalgamation Order and consequently it shall be invalid. It has also been submitted that as Notification dated 15-7-1949 modifies partially the Notification dated 26-7-1948 by which the jurisdiction of Lucknow Bench has been defined in respect of the cases arising out of the Oudh Areas, the Notification is illegal and bad for want of authority in view of the Full Bench judgment of this Court in case of Ram Lakhan Saran v. Sunni Central Board of Waqfs. U. P., Lucknow. reported in AIR 1975 All 532 : (1976 All LJ 720). It has also been submitted that the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court dated 24-9-1982 in case of Jukul Kishorev. Official Liquidator in Special Appeals Nos. 7 and 8 of the 1979 is distinguishable as in that case winding up order had already been passed at Allahabad. The Bench in that case observed that the proceedings under Sections 446. 448. 542 and 543 of the Companies Act were in course of winding up and for these proceedings cause of action arose at Allahabad where the winding up order was passed. It is submitted that the aforesaid judgment of the Division Bench is not applicable to the facts of the present case. It is also submitted that the view taken by the Division Bench cannot be termed to be a good law as the Bench could not consider the observations of the Supreme Court in Nasiruddin's in para 37 in which the expression "heard" has been considered and interpreted and distinguished from the expression "institution". U has been further submitted that under Section 10 of the Companies Act also the Company petition for winding up of the appellant company could be filed at Lucknow and not at Allahabad. The jurisdiction at Allahabad could not be created for filing of company petition on the ground that the official liquidator has his office at Allahabad. The official liquidator is appointed for the High Courl and not in respect of any Bench of High Court. It has also been submitted that the question of jurisdiction can be raised at any stage. In the present case objection was raised at the earliest opportunity even before filing of the counter-affidavit. In the counter-affidavit filed on Company Petition also the question of jurisdiction was raised in para 22. Even after exchange of counter and rejoinder affidavit, the winding up proceedings are at initial stage. It has also been submitted that the cases reported in: Pathumma v. Kuntalan Kutti, AIR 1981 SC 1683 and Manager, Hardware and Tools Ltd. v. Saru Smalling (P.) Ltd., AIR 1983 All 329 are based on Section 21, C.P.C. and cannot be helpful in the present case where appeal has been filed against the order deciding the question of jurisdiction. Learned counsel has also placed reliance in case of U. P. Rashtriya Chini Mill Adhikari Parishad v. State of U. P., reported in AIR 1995 SC 2148 : 1995 AIR SCW 3318.
4. Shri K. L. Grover, on the other hand, submitted that learned Company Judge passed the order and issued notice and registered the case on 7-8-1996. The appellant Company filed objection to the jurisdiction which was rejected by the impugned order on 6-12-1996 and after the impugned order was passed, counter and rejoinder affidavits were exchanged. The special appeal was filed in this Court after about four months during which period the hearing of the Company petition continued. Learned counsel has further submitted that the Division Bench of this Court in Special Appeals Nos. 7 and 8 of 1979 in the matter of Ram Chandra Sugar Mills has already held that Nasiruddin's case supra has no application in the matters relating toCompany cases. Learned counsel has submitted that as the Chief Justice by order dated 15-7-1949 excluded the jurisdiction of Lucknow Bench to hear the Company cases, the Company petition was rightly filed at Allahabad. It has been submitted that the Supreme Court in the Nasiruddin's case has upheld the power of the Chief Justice to pass orders in his discretion for transfer of a case or class of cases arising in erstwhile Oudh Area to be heard at Allahabad. The Notification is legal and valid, and docs not suffer from want of authority. Learned counsel has further submitted that under para. 18 of the Amalgamation Order, application of ihc laws enacted subsequent to it has been saved. The Company Act was enacted by Parliament in 1956. The jurisdiction of the new High Court of Judicature at Allahabad created by the Amalgamation Order could not be prejudiced or affecicd with regard to the jurisdiction conferred under the Companies Act. Learned counsel has placed reliance on S. 10 of the Companies Act and has submitted that the High Court at Allahabad has jurisdiction to hear the company petitions filed under the Company Act. The High Court is the new High Court created under para 3 of the Amalgamation Order. From a combined reading of para 3 and 10 of the Amalgamation Orderand S. 10 of the Companies Act, the only conclusion which can be drawn is that the Company Judge who sits at Allahabad alone has jurisdiction to entertain company petitions. For this purpose reliance has also been placed on Chapter V. Rule I of the Rules of the Court. 1952 which provides that Judges shall sit alone or in such Division Bench as may be constituted from time to lime and do such work as may be allotted to them by order of Chief Justice or in accordance with his discretion. As the Company Judge has been appointed at Allahabad alone allowing him all the crises pertaining to the Company matters, there is no illegality involved in entertainment of winding up petitions at Allahabad in relation to acompany which has its registered office within the territories of the State of Uttar Pradesh. It has also been submitted that judgments of the Apex Courl in Nasiruddin's case and case of U. P. Rashtirya Chini Mill Adhikari Parishad v. State of U. P. and another supra have no application in the present case. Learned counsel for respondent has submitted that the winding up proceedings are now at ripe stage, the appellant's objection is not sublantial but only technical and no failure of justice or prejudice has been shown in the memo of appeal or in any other document and it is not a fit case for interference at appellate stage. Learned counsel has placed reliance in case of AIR 1981 SC 1683 and AIR 1983 All 329 supra.
5. We have carefully considered the submissions of learned counsel for the parties. Before we consider rival submissions made on behalf of the parties, it would be appropriate if the relevant provisions of the Amalgamation Order of 1948 and the Notification issued thereunder are looked into. The Amalgamation Order has been subject mater of consideration before the Apex Court as well as before various Full Benches and Division Benches of this Court. The historical background of the Amalgamation Order, 1948 has been mentioned in detail in the aforesaid Judgments and we need not repeat the same in this judgment. However, as the issue involved in the present appeal is about the interpretation of para 14 of Amalgamation Order and the Notification dated 26-7-1948 and 15-7-1949, it shall be relevant to reproduce them here for convenience and better appreciation.
"14. The new High Court, and the Judges and division courts thereof, shall sit at Allahabad or at such other places in the United Provinces as the Chief Justice may, with the approval of the Governor of the United Provinces, appoint:
Provided that unless the Governor of the United Provinces with the concurrence of the Chief^ Justice, otherwise directs, such judges of the new High Court, not less than two in number, as the Chief Justice, may, from time to time nominaie. shall sit at Lucknow in order to exercise in respect of cases arising in such areas in Oudh, as the Chief Justice may direct, the jurisdiction and power for the time being vested in the new High Court.
Provided furtherthat the Chief Justice may, in his discretion, order that any case or class of cases arising in the said areas shall be heard at Allahabad."
6. Under para 14, the Chief Justice passed order No. 6103, dated 26-7-1948 in the following terms :--
"In exercise of the powers conferred by Art. 14 of the United Provinces High Courts (Amalgamation) Order, 1948, the Chief Justice of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad is pleased to direct that as from the 26-7-1948 until further order, the Bench of the High Court at Lucknow shall exercise the jurisdiction and power vested under the said Order in the High Court in respect of cases arising in the whole of Oudh."
7. On 15-7-1949 Chief Jusiice passed order No. 8427 to the following effect :
"In exercise of the power conferred by Art'. 14 of the United Provinces High Courts (Amalgamation) Order, 1948, and in partial modification of the Court's Notification No. 6103, dated July 26, 1948, as amended up-to-date, the Chief Justice of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad is pleased to direci that with effect from July 25, 1949, the Lucknow Bench of the High Courl of Judicature al Allahabad shall not exercise jurisdiction and power in respect of cases under the following Acts arising within its existing territorial jurisdiction :--
1. The Indian Divorce Act, 1869 (Act IV of 1869).
2. The Special Marriage Act, 1872 (Act III of 1872).
3. The Indian Companies Act, 1913(ActVII of 1913).
4. The Indian Income Tax Act, 1922 (Act XI of 1922).
5. The Indian Succession Act, 1925 (Act XXXIX of 1925).
6. The Indian Matrimonial Causes (War Marriages) Act, 1948 (Act No. XL of 1948).
Provided that nothing herein contained shall affect the jurisdiction and power of the Lucknow Bench in respect of proceedings already pending before that Bench prior to the coming into force of this Notification."
8. By subsequent Notification of April, 1972 cases under some more Acts were also excluded from the jurisdiction of Lucknow Bench. They were Agricultural Income Tax Act. Sales Tax Act and Displaced Persons Rehabilitation Act.
9. Timeandagain, various orders were passed by the Chief Justice under para 14 with regard to exercise of jurisdiction. Such orders were of 14-12-1948, 11-2-1950, 18-4-1973 and 3.5.1975. However, these orders are not relevant for the present controversy.
10. From a perusal of para 14 of the Amalgamation Order, it is clear that Chief Justice of New High Court could nominate judges from time to lime to sit at Lucknow in order to exercise, in respect of cases arising in such areas in Ould as the Chief Justice may direct, the jurisdiction and power for the time being vested in the new High Court. In exercise of this power the Chief Justice passed first order in shape of Notification No. 6103, dated July 26, 1948. Obviously, by this Notification the jurisdiction and power of the Judges silling at Lucknow was defined in respect of cases arising only in territory of Oudh area irrespective of their nature. The Second Proviso to para 14, however, provides an exception under which exercise of jurisdiction and power under the First Proviso could be excluded by order of Hon'ble the Chief Justice in respect of case orclassof cases. Under the second proviso, the Chief Justice in his discretion thus could order that in case or class of cases arising in the Oudh Areas hearing shall be done at Allahabad. This power'of the Chief Justice conferred by Second Proviso can be exercised for various reasons including with reference to nature of cases determined according to the provisions of law under which they are to be decided. Such cases could be heard at Allahabad without causing any kind of increase or decrease of the territorial jurisdiction of the Judges sitting at Lucknow. The order dated 15-7-1949 thus does not affect the territorial jurisdiction defined by order dated 26-7-1948 for exercise of jurisdiction and power by the Judges sitting at Lucknow. By subsequent order only exercise of Jurisdiction and power in respect of certain cases of particular nature under specified Acts was excluded. Thus, the contention of the learned counsel for appellant that order dated 15-7-1949 is invalid and bad for want of authority cannot be accepted. The ratio of Nasiruddin's case (supra) and Ram Lakhan's case (supra) js in respect of the subsequent order of the Chief Justice effecting the territorial jurisdiction and in that context it was held that once the power defining the territorial jurisdiction was exercised by the Chief Justice, it stood exhausted and could not be exercised again. In Ram Lakhan's case the Notification dated 14-12-1948 by which, in respect of cases arising within the loccal limits of the Jurisdiction of the District Paizabad. Bench of High Court at Lucknow was directed not to exercise jurisdiction, was in consideration. Thus the dispute was with regard to territorial jurisdiction. The Full Bench following Nasiruddin's cake held that after passing the order dated 26-7-1948 demarcating whole of the Oudh Area for exercise of jurisdiction and power by Judges sitting at Lucknow, the power stood exhausted and the area could not be curtailed or reduced by order dated 14-12-1948. It may also be noticed that para 14 of the Amalgamation Order and dispute about jurisdiction has been subject matter of consideration before the Apex Court as well as before several Full Benches and Division Benches of this Court but the validity of the order dated 15-7-1949 has never been questioned,. Since 1949 the cases under the Companies Act are being instituted and heard at Allahabad.
11. Learned counsel for the appellant during his submissions attempted to say that the Notification dt. 15-7-1949 is a Notification under Proviso II of para 14 and not under Proviso 1. However, from a close look on to the provisions contained in para 14 and the order dated 15-7-1949 there remains no doubt that the order could be and has been passed under the First Proviso. The Second Proviso provides only an exception to the First Proviso which is the main provision conferring power on the Chief Justice to define the area and the cases arising therein for exercise of jurisdiction and power by the learned Judges sitting at Lucknow. The Second Proviso is in the nature of an enabling provision. It was for this reason that the order dated 15-7-1949 has been passed by the Chief Justice in partial modification of the earlier order dated 26-7-1948. Such a modification was necessary to avoid conflict and doubt wilh regard to exercise of jurisdiction and power in respect of cases of the specified nature under the order dated 15-7-1949.
12. The next submission of the learned counsel for the appellant was that under the Second Proviso to para 14, the Chief Justice could pass order only in respect of those cases which have been already instituted at Lucknow as the expression "heard" does not include institution. For this submission reliance has been placed in para 37 of the judgment in Nasiruddin's case which is being reproduced below :--
"To, sum up, our conclusions are follows. First, there is no permanent seat of the High Court at Allahabad. The seats at Allahabad and Lucknow may be changed i n accordance with the provisionsof the Order. Second, the Chief Justice of the High Court has no power to increase or decrease the areas in Oudh from time to time. The areas in Oudh have been determined once by the Chief Justice and, therefore, there is no scope for changing the areas. Third, the Chief Justice has power under the Second Proviso to paragraph 14 of the Order to direct in his discretion that any case or class of cases arising in Oudh areas shall be heard at Allahabad. Any case or class of cases are those which are instituted at Lucknow. The interpretation given by the High Court that the word "heard" confers power on the Chief Justice to order that any case or class of cases arising in Oudh areas shall be instituted or filed at Allahabad instead of Lucknow is wrong. The word "heard" means that cases which have already been instituted or filed at Lucknow may in the discretion of the Chief Justice under the Second Proviso to paragraph 14 of the Order be directed to be heard at Allahabad. Fourth, the expression "cause of action" wilh regard to acivil matter means that it should be left to the litigant to institute cases at Lucknow Bench or at Allahabad Bench according to the cause of action arising wholly or in part within either of the areas. If the cause of action arises wholly within Oudh areas then the Lucknow Bench will have jurisdiction. Similary, if the causeof action arises wholly outsidethe specified areas in Oudh, then Allahabad will have jurisdiction. If the cause of action in part arises in the specified Oudh areas and pan of the cause of action arises outside the specified areas, it will be open to the litigant to frame thecase appropriately. to attract the jurisdiction either at Lucknow oral Allahabad. Fifth, a criminal casesarises where the, offence has been committed or otherwise as provided in the Criminal Procedure Code. That will attract the jurisdiction of the Court at Allahabad or Lucknow. In some cases depending on the facts and the provisions regarding jurisdiction, it may arise in either place."
13. With great respect it is stated that the Conclusion Third in paragraph 37 of Nasiruddin's case dealt with an assumed order under Second Proviso to paragraph 14 of the Amalgamation Order. However, we have already found earlier that order dated 15-7-1949has been passed under the First Proviso in partial modification of the order dated 26-7-1948. The order dated 15-7-1949 was not in question before Hon'ble Supreme Court. It may be noted here that the dispute in Nasiruddin's case was with regard to territorial jurisdiction. We do not see any useful purpose or end of Justice to be served in directing that cases of nature excluded by order dated 15-7-1949 should be first institued at Lucknow and then heard at Allahabad. If such an interpretation as advanced by the learned counsel for appellant is accepted, it shall create only complications and unnecessary harassment to parties. The Notification dated 15-7-1949 uses the same phraseology which has been used in the First Proviso to paragraph 14 and it provides that with effect from July 25, 1949, the Lucknow Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad shall not exercise jurisdiction and power in respect of cases under the following Acts arising within its existing territorial jurisdiction. The phraseology used in the order dated 15-7-1949 is wide enough and excludes even the institution of the cases under the Companies Act at Lucknow. The expression used in the Order is "exercise of jurisdiction and power" which is much wider than the expression "heard", to include the institution of cases also. Thus in terms of the order dated 15-7-1949 all company cases could be filed and heard at Allahabad. We are in respectful agreement with the view taken by Division Bench in case of Jugal Kishore. Even assuming for sake of arguments that the contention of learned counsel for the appellant is correct, as the learned counsel does not dispute that thecase can be lawfully heard at Allahabad, it shall be only a technical breach if petition is instituted at Allahabad instead of Lucknow as it has to be ultimately heard at Allahabad and for this technical defect or reason, in our opinion, it shall not be appropriate to hold that the proceedings are not maintainable at Allahabad. If the petition is instituted and heard at Allahabad, it shall not be a case of total lack of jurisdiction. It may at the most can be said to be defective exercise of jurisdiction at one stage but which is rendered ineffective at the stage of hearing has come. Ultimately both the Benches at Allahabad and Lucknow from one High Court. The jurisdiction of this Court at Allahabad in a company case is not disputed, hence there is no chance of any failure of justice. The learned counsel for the respondent has rightly submitted that no prejudice or failure of justice has been established or even pleaded to show that if the company petition is heard at Allahabad, it shall cause any prejudice or failure of justice to the appellant. It is not disputed before us that the parties have already exchanged counter and rejoinder affidavits and thus the company petition is ripe for hearing. If at this stage the case is transmitted to Lucknow to remove the technical defect pointed out by the appellant, it shall not in any way subserve the ends of justice and in our opinion it may only cause waste of time and money. This Company petition is pending in this Court for the last more thana year.
14. For the reasons stated above, we do not find any illegality or error of law in the impugned order justifying interference in the same. The appeal is devoid of any merit and is dismissed. The interim order dated 31-3-1997 is vacated. There will be no order as to costs.
15. Appeal dismissed.